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  • Lockheed Makes $4.4B Bid to Buy Aerojet Rocketdyne

    22 décembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    Lockheed Makes $4.4B Bid to Buy Aerojet Rocketdyne

    By: Sam LaGrone Lockheed Martin has made a $4.4 billion offer to acquire rocket engine maker Aerojet Rocketdyne, the companies announced on Sunday. Speaking with investors on Monday, Lockheed CEO Jim Taiclet said the move to acquire the engine maker was rooted in the future growth of hypersonic weapons and missile defense systems the Pentagon is developing, as well as the growing space business. In the call, Taiclet and Lockheed CFO Ken Possenriede said the merger had the potential to improve the development of new missile and space systems by allowing engineers across both companies to work closer together. In naval programs, Aerojet supplies engines for the Navy's Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, Raytheon's Standard Missile-2, SM-3 and SM-6, and the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile. Aerojet is also developing a new propulsion system for the MK 54 lightweight torpedo. The company also supplies engines for Lockheed and Boeing's joint venture United Launch Alliance. Lockheed's space division is its third-largest business, accounting for 18 percent of the company's 2019 earnings, reported the Los Angeles Times. The merger, expected to close in the middle of next year, will have to clear regulators in the incoming Biden administration and is viewed by analysts as an early test of how the next White House will handle defense industry consolidation. https://news.usni.org/2020/12/21/lockheed-makes-4-4b-bid-to-buy-aerojet-rocketdyne

  • The US Air Force has built and flown a mysterious full-scale prototype of its future fighter jet

    15 septembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    The US Air Force has built and flown a mysterious full-scale prototype of its future fighter jet

    By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force has secretly designed, built and flown at least one prototype of its enigmatic next-generation fighter jet, the service's top acquisition official confirmed to Defense News on Sept. 14. The development is certain to shock the defense community, which last saw the first flight of an experimental fighter during the battle for the Joint Strike Fighter contract 20 years ago. With the Air Force's future fighter program still in its infancy, the rollout and successful first flight of a demonstrator was not expected for years. “We've already built and flown a full-scale flight demonstrator in the real world, and we broke records in doing it,” Will Roper told Defense News in an exclusive interview ahead of the Air Force Association's Air, Space and Cyber Conference. “We are ready to go and build the next-generation aircraft in a way that has never happened before.” Almost every detail about the aircraft itself will remain a mystery due to the classification of the Next Generation Air Dominance program, the Air Force's effort for fielding a family of connected air warfare systems that could include fighters, drones and other networked platforms in space or the cyber realm. Roper declined to comment on how many prototype aircraft have been flown or which defense contractors manufactured them. He wouldn't say when or where the first flight occurred. And he refused to divulge any aspect of the aircraft's design — its mission, whether it was uncrewed or optionally crewed, whether it could fly at hypersonic speeds or if it has stealth characteristics. Those attributes, he said, are beside the point. The importance, Roper said, is that just a year after the service completed an analysis of alternatives, the Air Force has proven it can use cutting-edge advanced manufacturing techniques to build and test a virtual version of its next fighter — and then move to constructing a full-scale prototype and flying it with mission systems onboard. “This is not just something that you can apply to things that are simple systems” like Boeing's T-7 Red Hawk trainer jet, the first Air Force aircraft to be built using the “holy trinity” of digital engineering, agile software development and open architecture, Roper said. “We're going after the most complicated systems that have ever been built, and checked all the boxes with this digital technology. In fact, [we've] not just checked the boxes, [we've] demonstrated something that's truly magical.” Now, the Next Generation Air Dominance program, or NGAD, sits at a decision point. Roper declined to say how quickly the Air Force could move its next-gen fighter into production, except to say “pretty fast.” But before the service decides to begin producing a new generation of fighters, it must determine how many aircraft it will commit to buy and when it wants to start purchasing them — all choices that could influence the fiscal 2022 budget. The program itself has the potential to radically shake up the defense industry. Should the Air Force move to buy NGAD in the near term, it will be adding a challenger to the F-35 and F-15EX programs, potentially putting those programs at risk. And because the advanced manufacturing techniques that are critical for building NGAD were pioneered by the commercial sector, the program could open the door for new prime contractors for the aircraft to emerge — and perhaps give SpaceX founder Elon Musk a shot at designing an F-35 competitor. “I have to imagine there will be a lot of engineers — maybe famous ones with well-known household names with billions of dollars to invest — that will decide starting the world's greatest aircraft company to build the world's greatest aircraft with the Air Force is exactly the kind of inspiring thing they want to do as a hobby or even a main gig,” Roper said. The disclosure of a flying full-scale fighter prototype could be just what the Air Force needs to garner more financial support from Congress during a critical time where the service is facing budget constraints and needs to gain momentum, said Mackenzie Eaglen, a defense budget analyst with the American Enterprise Institute. “If you can quickly get to something and show progress through product, it just changes the whole dynamic for the Hill,” she said. “[Roper has] got so many headwinds, it seems this would be a likely avenue to show conceptual success for his ideas.” A radical new acquisition Flying a prototype of its future fighter was the easy part. Now the Air Force must choose whether to commit to a radical method of buying it. Over the last 50 years, the U.S. industrial base has dwindled from 10 manufacturers capable of building an advanced fighter to only three defense companies: Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The time it takes the Air Force to move a new fighter from research and development to full-rate production has stretched from a matter of years to multiple decades. The result is that every fighter program becomes existential for companies, who fight to prove that they can meet technical requirements during the development and production phase at a lower cost than their competitors. The companies are finally able to turn a profit during the later years of a program, when they become locked in as sustainment providers with the technical knowledge necessary for upgrading, repairing and extending the life of their product — often with little congressional interest or scrutiny. “The sustainment account is a black hole that nobody understands. The [operation and maintenance] account is a black hole that no one can figure out,” Eaglen said. “The person who can change sustainment can change the acquisition game, writ large.” For the Air Force, the turning point is when an aircraft hits 15 years old. At that age, maintenance costs compound rapidly, growing another 3-7 percent every year, Roper wrote in a Sept. 15 document titled “Take the Red Pill: The New Digital Acquisition Reality.” But what if instead of spending significant funds on sustaining old jets, the Air Force used that money to buy new ones? Instead of buying a large quantity of a single fighter over decades and retaining each plane for 30 years or more — as is currently the norm — the “Digital Century Series” model, proposed by Roper, posits that advanced manufacturing and software development techniques make it possible for the Air Force to rapidly develop and buy aircraft more frequently, much as the service did during the 1950s when it bought six fighters from six companies just years apart from each other during the original Century Series. In August, Air Force's advanced aircraft program office completed a business case analysis of the Digital Century Series model meant to validate whether the idea was technically feasible and, more importantly, whether it could save money. Leaders found that by applying digital manufacturing and development practices — as used by the T-7 program, as well as in the development of the NGAD prototype — it could drop the total life cycle cost of a next-gen fighter by 10 percent over 30 years compared to legacy fighters like the F-35 and F-15, Roper wrote. But for the same price as a single variant of a digitally manufactured fighter produced with a 30-year life cycle, the Air Force could buy a new fighter every eight years and replace them after 16 years — before the plane reaches the 3,500 flight-hour mark here it starts needing heavy overhauls and expensive modifications to extend its service life. “I don't think it's smart thinking to build one and only one aircraft that has to be dominant for all missions in all cases all the time,” he said. “Digital engineering allows us to build different kinds of airplanes, and if we're really smart ... we ensure smart commonality across the fleet — common support equipment, common cockpit configurations, common interfaces, common architecture, even common components like a landing gear — that simplify the sustainment and maintenance in the field.” The main difference is that the Air Force would flip from spending the majority of fighter program costs upfront instead of at the end of the aircraft's life. To continuously design new fighter jets, the service would keep multiple vendors constantly under contract for the development of new planes, choosing a new design about every eight years. To make a business case that is profitable for industry, it would then buy batches of about 50-80 aircraft every year. The result is a 25 percent increase in development costs and an 18 percent increase in production costs. However, the price of modernizing aircraft would drop by 79 percent while sustainment costs are basically cut in half, Roper wrote in the paper. “I can't make both ends of the life cycle go away; industry has to make a profit somewhere,” Roper said. “And I'm arguing in the paper that if you get to choose what color of money you use for future air superiority, make it research, development and production because it's the sharp point of the spear, not the geriatric side that consumes so much of our resources today.” There is also a strategic benefit to continuous fighter production and development, Roper said. It puts China on the defense, having to respond to U.S. technical advances as new capabilities — whether they're hypersonic missiles or drone wingmen — are matured and spiraled into the fighter's production. “This speeds up the pace at which we can do things so that we can be the disrupter instead of the disrupted, but it does so in a way that can't be undermined by throwing cheap labor at the problem,” he said. The next step is for Air Force leadership to decide how much it can afford for the program in FY22 and whether it will adopt the Digital Century Series model for developing the aircraft. “What we need to do going forward is simply understand the [Department of the Air Force's] level of financial commitment and the date they want us to charge towards for initial operations, and we can fit the acquisition strategy for [NGAD] to it, and explain how quickly we can afford to spiral and when we need to retire the aircraft to generate enough savings to afford those spirals,” he said. “Perhaps getting to the fastest [initial fielding date] may not be the most important thing. It may be important for us to push the [technical] boundaries more. Those are decisions that I've given for leadership to think about. But every decision I've given them is a better decision over the legacy ones.” If the Air Force is going to get financial support for a business plan that requires taxpayers to pay a higher upfront cost for fighter aircraft, it must clearly identify desired combat capabilities, said Rebecca Grant, an aerospace analyst with IRIS Independent Research. “Now we have the F-35, F-15EX and the Digital Century Series' small batch costs,” she said. “If it's that great, maybe it's worth the upfront cost. I could argue that, for sure. Is this the new F-117, which was similar batch size at similar cost and worth every penny? We just don't know.” On the technical side, the Air Force needs to solidify a rigorous, standardized method of conducting test activities in a virtual environment using modeling and simulation tools that can cut down the amount of time needed for live flight tests. It also needs industry to buy in to coding via a government-owned computing environment, Roper said. “We can't have every industry partner creating their own mechanism,” Roper said. “We have to have just as rigorous a process for digital design and assembly as we do for physical design assembly. So we will own that in the government, we will certify that in the government.” And — perhaps most critically — the Air Force will have to sell the concept to Congress. Roper has briefed staff members on the defense committees, and he held classified sessions with many of the lawmakers who sit on those panels to present findings of the business case study as well as the detailed progress of NGAD development and test activities. “I had some tough audiences on this. I've had people that I've been told want to cut the program or they don't understand why we need it,” he acknowledged. “But I have not left a single one of those briefings with anything other than [lawmakers saying]: ‘This is the future, we ought to do it now. And why aren't we going faster?' And the answer [to] why we aren't going faster is simply money. We can push the accelerator down more today because the digital technology allows it.” https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2020/09/15/the-us-air-force-has-built-and-flown-a-mysterious-full-scale-prototype-of-its-future-fighter-jet

  • Can the Army perfect an AI strategy for a fast and deadly future?

    15 octobre 2019 | International, C4ISR

    Can the Army perfect an AI strategy for a fast and deadly future?

    By: Kelsey D. Atherton Military planners spent the first two days of the Association of the United States Army's annual meeting outlining the future of artificial intelligence for the service and tracing back from this imagined future to the needs of the present. This is a world where AI is so seamless and ubiquitous that it factors into everything from rifle sights to logistical management. It is a future where every soldier is a node covered in sensors, and every access point to that network is under constant threat by enemies moving invisibly through the very parts of the electromagnetic spectrum that make networks possible. It is a future where weapons can, on their own, interpret the world, position themselves within it, plot a course of action, and then, in the most extreme situations, follow through. It is a world of rich battlefield data, hyperfast machines and vulnerable humans. And it is discussed as an inevitability. “We need AI for the speed at which we believe we will fight future wars,” said Brig. Gen. Matthew Easley, director of the Army AI Task Force. Easley is one of a handful of people with an outsized role shaping how militaries adopt AI. The past of data future Before the Army can build the AI it needs, the service needs to collect the data that will fuel and train its machines. In the shortest terms, that means the task force's first areas of focus will include preventative maintenance and talent management, where the Army is gathering a wealth of data. Processing what is already collected has the potential for an outsized impact on the logistics and business side of administering the Army. For AI to matter in combat, the Army will need to build a database of what sensor-readable events happen in battle, and then refine that data to ultimately provide useful information to soldiers. And to get there means turning every member of the infantry into a sensor. “Soldier lethality is fielding the Integrated Visual Augmentation Systems, or our IVAS soldier goggles that each of our infantry soldiers will be wearing,” Easley said. “In the short term, we are looking at fielding nearly 200,000 of these systems.” The IVAS is built on top of Microsoft's HoloLens augmented reality tool. That the equipment has been explicitly tied to not just military use, but military use in combat, led to protests from workers at Microsoft who objected to the product of their labor being used with “intent to harm.” And with IVAS in place, Easley imagines a scenario where IVAS sensors plot fields of fire for every soldier in a squad, up through a platoon and beyond. “By the time it gets to [a] battalion commander,” Easley said, “they're able to say where their dead zones are in front of [the] defensive line. They'll know what their soldiers can touch right now, and they'll know what they can't touch right now.” Easley compared the overall effect to the data collection done by commercial companies through the sensors on smartphones — devices that build detailed pictures of the individuals carrying them. Fitting sensors to infantry, vehicles or drones can help build the data the Army needs to power AI. Another path involves creating synthetic data. While the Army has largely fought the same type of enemy for the past 18 years, preparing for the future means designing systems that can handle the full range of vehicles and weapons of a professional military. With insurgents unlikely to field tanks or attack helicopters at scale anytime soon, the Army may need to generate synthetic data to train an AI to fight a near-peer adversary. Faster, stronger, better, more autonomous “I want to proof the threat,” said Bruce Jette, the Army's assistant secretary for acquisition, logistics and technology, while speaking at a C4ISRNET event on artificial intelligence at AUSA. Jette then set out the kind of capability he wants AI to provide, starting from the perspective of a tank turret. “Flip the switch on, it hunts for targets, it finds targets, it classifies targets. That's a Volkswagen, that's a BTR [Russian-origin armored personnel carrier], that's a BMP [Russian-origin infantry fighting vehicle]. It determines whether a target is a threat or not. The Volkswagen's not a threat, the BTR is probably a threat, the BMP is a threat, and it prioritizes them. BMP is probably more dangerous than the BTR. And then it classifies which one's [an] imminent threat, one's pointing towards you, one's driving away, those type of things, and then it does a firing solution to the target, which one's going to fire first, then it has all the firing solutions and shoots it.” Enter Jette's ideal end state for AI: an armed machine that senses the world around it, interprets that data, plots a course of action and then fires a weapon. It is the observe–orient–decide–act cycle without a human in the loop, and Jette was explicit on that point. “Did you hear me anywhere in there say ‘man in the loop?,' ” Jette said. “Of course, I have people throwing their hands up about ‘Terminator,' I did this for a reason. If you break it into little pieces and then try to assemble it, there'll be 1,000 interface problems. I tell you to do it once through, and then I put the interface in for any safety concerns we want. It's much more fluid.” In Jette's end state, the AI of the vehicle is designed to be fully lethal and autonomous, and then the safety features are added in later — a precautionary stop, a deliberate calming intrusion into an already complete system. Jette was light on the details of how to get from the present to the thinking tanks of tomorrow's wars. But it is a process that will, by necessity, involve buy-in and collaboration with industry to deliver the tools, whether it comes as a gestalt whole or in a thousand little pieces. Learning machines, fighting machines Autonomous kill decisions, with or without humans in the loop, are a matter of still-debated international legal and ethical concern. That likely means that Jette's thought experiment tank is part of a more distant future than a host of other weapons. The existence of small and cheap battlefield robots, however, means that we are likely to see AI used against drones in the more immediate future. Before robots fight people, robots will fight robots. Before that, AI will mostly manage spreadsheets and maintenance requests. “There are systems now that can take down a UAS pretty quickly with little collateral damage,” Easley said. “I can imagine those systems becoming much more autonomous in the short term than many of our other systems.” Autonomous systems designed to counter other fast, autonomous systems without people on board are already in place. The aptly named Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar, or C-RAM, systems use autonomous sensing and reaction to specifically destroy projectiles pointed at humans. Likewise, autonomy exists on the battlefield in systems like loitering munitions designed to search for and then destroy anti-air radar defense systems. Iterating AI will mean finding a new space of what is acceptable risk for machines sent into combat. “From a testing and evaluation perspective, we want a risk knob. I want the commander to be able to go maximum risk, minimum risk,” said Brian Sadler, a senior research scientist at the Army Research Laboratory. “When he's willing to take that risk, that's OK. He knows his current rules of engagement, he knows where he's operating, he knows if he uses some platforms; he's willing to make that sacrifice. In his work at the Vehicle Technology Directorate of the Army Combat Capabilities Development Command, Sadler is tasked with catching up the science of AI to the engineered reality of it. It is not enough to get AI to work; it has to be understood. “If people don't trust AI, people won't use it,” Tim Barton, chief technology officer at Leidos, said at the C4ISRNET event. Building that trust is an effort that industry and the Army have to tackle from multiple angles. Part of it involves iterating the design of AI tools with the people in the field who will use them so that the information analyzed and the product produced has immediate value. “AI should be introduced to soldiers as an augmentation system,” said Lt. Col. Chris Lowrance, a project manager in the Army's AI Task Force. “The system needs to enhance capability and reduce cognitive load.” Away from but adjacent to the battlefield, Sadler pointed to tools that can provide immediate value even as they're iterated upon. “If it's not a safety of life mission, I can interact with that analyst continuously over time in some kind of spiral development cycle for that product, which I can slowly whittle down to something better and better, and even in the get-go we're helping the analyst quite a bit,” Sadler said. “I think Project Maven is the poster child for this,” he added, referring to the Google-started tool that identifies objects from drone footage. Project Maven is the rare intelligence tool that found its way into the public consciousness. It was built on top of open-source tools, and workers at Google circulated a petition objecting to the role of their labor in creating something that could “lead to potentially lethal outcomes.” The worker protest led the Silicon Valley giant to outline new principles for its own use of AI. Ultimately, the experience of engineering AI is vastly different than the end user, where AI fades seamlessly into the background, becoming just an ambient part of modern life. If the future plays out as described, AI will move from a hyped feature, to a normal component of software, to an invisible processor that runs all the time. “Once we succeed in AI,” said Danielle Tarraf, a senior information scientist at the think tank Rand, “it will become invisible like control systems, noticed only in failure.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/artificial-intelligence/2019/10/15/can-the-army-perfect-an-ai-strategy-for-a-fast-and-deadly-future

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