Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - September 4, 2019

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  7 février 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Here’s how much money the Pentagon found through internal savings — and where it’s going

  By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — The Department of Defense has identified $5.7 billion in funding that will be reallocated from current offices towards new priorities such as hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence, department officials revealed Wednesday. The money, colloquially referred to as “savings” found through efficiencies, is part of an internal review process of the department's so-called fourth-estate offices, which include all the defense agencies not associated with either a service or a combatant command. As part of that reallocation, expect a “significant” change in the Missile Defense Agency's R&D investments and changes to an agency monitoring nuclear programs around the world, officials told reporters. The review process was launched by Secretary of Defense Mark Esper after he took office last summer as part of several attempts to focus the department's energy and dollars on the National Defense Strategy. This effort is largely independent of the review looking at force posture in the combatant commands. Fourth estate agencies account for roughly $99 billion in funds in the fiscal year 2021 budget, meaning the $5.7 billion in savings represent about 5.8 percent of the overall budget for those offices. Another $2.1 billion was transferred out of the fourth estate and into the services. However, no personnel will be involuntarily terminated from their jobs; any personnel reductions are planned to come from expected retirements. The funds will be redirected to the following areas: Nuclear modernization Space priorities, including the establishment of the U.S. Space Force Missile defense, with funds going towards a “multi-layered approach to homeland missile defense” and the development of the Next Generation Interceptor Hypersonic weapons, with the review providing for a “major increase in this investment” in both FY21 and the following years Artificial intelligence, with review funds “significantly” accelerating investment in AI for “maneuver, intelligent business automation and logistics, war fighter health analysis and intelligence data processing" 5G communications technologies, with money going towards providing test facilities for 5G prototyping Response force readiness, part of Esper's plan to have forces that can rapidly respond to issues around the globe with a flexible posture A trio of senior defense officials, speaking on background ahead of Monday's budget release, briefed reporters on the findings. The officials avoided sharing specific details of where the money was coming from, or how much of the savings are being rolled into specific areas of interest, due to sensitivities with the budget rollout next week. They also declined to say how these savings might reflect over the Future Years Defense Program, a five-year projection included in the department's budget request. Missile defense changes The officials said that there were over 130 decisions made that combined for the total; some saved a hundred thousand dollars, and others saved millions. And the officials gave four large-scale examples of the kind of work that has led to the $5.7 billion. The first is right-sizing 50 medical treatment facilities by studying the workloads and shrinking or growing the capacity at those locations based on what work is actually needed. Another comes from transferring all remaining storage, supply and distribution missions to the Defense Logistics Agency, something that was a left-over requirement from the 2005 BRAC effort which should lead to savings via economies of scale. A chart showing the five categories of fourth-estate offices, how much their budget is expected to be, and how much in savings have been found as part of the defense wide review. (DoD) A third example comes from reducing the number of operations run through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which was stood up to track and monitor weapons of mass destruction. While CTR will continue to monitor potential threats like China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, it was also running a number of programs tracking the work on chemical or nuclear programs from allied nations, one official said — requiring dollars and assets that could be better put to use studying and countering potential threats. “What we found when we dug into it [is] it had expanded,” the official said. “This has really turned into partnership building, capacity building far beyond the CTR mission. So then we had to ask the question in those areas, is that more impotent than hypersonics? In a lot of those cases we said no, hypersonics is more important than that.” A fourth example, perhaps the most eye-catching, comes from the Missile Defense Agency, with the official saying a line-by-line review of MDA led to a decision to “divest significant legacy capabilities.” The review gave MDA an “opportunity to go through and look at some of the investments they are making that are really targeted at things that had either lessened in importance or were declining, and really realign funding to the new threats,” the official said, hinting that a major focus is in changing where MDA dollars are going to R&D as opposed to buying equipment needed now, including on technologies focused on discrimination of threats. “We could really start to say, what about bringing together some of the things we've been doing at the regional level into a new underlay,” the official added. “And we said, the ability to shoot down actual missiles and putting more capability on the ground to shoot down missiles was a higher priority than some of the advanced R&D work which was really taking us from an already good capability to a really exquisite capability.” Next steps Esper has already tasked officials to continue the review in FY22, with a plan of finding more savings. Part of the plan for finding more savings comes from Esper empowering Lisa Hershman, the department's chief management officer, to take a more active role in shaping the budgets of the fourth estate agencies into something that looks more similar to how the services operate. When a service puts together its budget, it goes through an internal process, where decisions about tradeoffs between offices and programs are fought over before a service secretary makes a final decision and moves the budget up to the secretary of defense level. However, the fourth estate agencies do not currently go through such a process — they drop their budgets at the same time as the services do, without that broad overview of a service secretary. Going forward, Esper has ordered Hershman to act as, essentially, a service secretary for the fourth estate offices, overseeing their budget development process before presenting a unified budget alongside the services. Doing so should provide better oversight on the process and ensure savings going forward, the officials said. “We can make the defense wide account balanced, so we're not getting a bill from MDA and passing it to the services or taking a bill from MDA and saying [others] have to pony up,” the first official said. However, to find more savings down the road, actual reductions may have to happen. Asked if personnel reductions could come during the FY22 review, all three officials used some version of this phrase: “All options are on the table.” Similarly, a second official said that while no agencies were limited to this round, that could not be ruled out in FY22. And asked whether there is another $5.7 billion to be found in the remaining parts of the fourth estate, the first official carefully said “I think the secretary thinks it's repeatable.” https://www.defensenews.com/congress/budget/2020/02/06/heres-how-much-money-the-pentagon-found-through-internal-savings-and-where-its-going/

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  25 octobre 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  US Air Force Selects L3Harris Technologies to Develop Space Hub End Cryptographic Unit for Protected Tactical SATCOM Program

  amden, N.J., October 24, 2019 - The U.S. Air Force has selected L3Harris Technologies (NYSE:LHX) to deliver the space hub end cryptographic unit (ECU) for the Protected Tactical SATCOM (PTS) SHIELD program. The Air Force PTS program will implement Protected Tactical Waveform (PTW) over a fully-processed satellite payload, enabling adaptive, anti-jam communications channels, which will provide the greatest level of protection available for tactical U.S. and coalition/international partner warfighting efforts. As the SHIELD contractor, L3Harris will develop an NSA-certified, space-flight qualified, production-ready ECU for future PTS payloads. The L3Harris ECUs will support 13 space-based communications payload hubs that will serve up to 1,800 simultaneous tactical user terminals. L3Harris' Modular Open System Architecture (MOSA) approach employs standards-based interfaces that minimize the information security boundary and simplify integration for the multiple payload providers. The ECU incorporates L3Harris' HMV™ Space Cryptographic processor that supports full on-orbit reprogrammability in a low-power, highly extensible design. The MOSA form factor and innovative technical approach also results in a low SWaP solution for substantial cost savings due to reduced payload weight and hardware costs. “The PTS SHIELD program continues our legacy of delivering cryptography solutions for the nation's most important missions,” said Don Hairston, President, C5 Systems, L3Harris. “It reinforces our position as the leader in providing space-grade MILSATCOM cryptographic solutions and in the implementation of the Protected Tactical Waveform.” L3Harris was selected by the U.S. Air Force based on its low-risk innovative solution and extensive experience developing Type 1 hardware for space applications as proven on the AEHF, MUOS and SBIRS programs. The SHIELD solution also benefits from extensive reuse of PTW technology from the PTS Field Demonstration Terminal Program to minimize development risk and support the Air Force's critical deployment schedule. About L3Harris Technologies L3Harris Technologies is an agile global aerospace and defense technology innovator, delivering end-to-end solutions that meet customers' mission-critical needs. The company provides advanced defense and commercial technologies across air, land, sea, space and cyber domains. L3Harris has approximately $17 billion in annual revenue and 50,000 employees, with customers in 130 countries. L3Harris.com. Forward-Looking Statements This press release contains forward-looking statements that reflect management's current expectations, assumptions and estimates of future performance and economic conditions. Such statements are made in reliance upon the safe harbor provisions of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The company cautions investors that any forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that may cause actual results and future trends to differ materially from those matters expressed in or implied by such forward-looking statements. Statements about product, system or technology capabilities are forward-looking and involve risks and uncertainties. L3Harris disclaims any intention or obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise. View source version on L3Harris Technologies: https://www.l3harris.com/press-releases/2019/10/88671/us-air-force-selects-l3harris-technologies-to-develop-space-hub-end-cryptographic-unit-for-protected-tactical-satcom-program

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  21 janvier 2021 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

  After huge hack, Biden security picks want more cyber coordination with industry

  Andrew Eversden WASHINGTON — Two top national security nominees advocated Tuesday for stronger federal cybersecurity and increased collaboration with contractors in the aftermath of a supply chain breach that infiltrated numerous federal agencies. If confirmed, retired Army Gen. Lloyd Austin and Avril Haines, President-elect Joe Biden's nominees for defense secretary and director of national intelligence, respectively, would start their jobs in the middle of the national security community's assessment of damage from a cybersecurity breach pinned on Russian hackers. They gained access through software from SolarWinds, a major government contractor. “We must elevate cybersecurity as an imperative across the government in order to defend the American people and U.S. critical infrastructure,” Austin told the Senate Armed Services Committee in his answers to the lawmaker's advance policy questions. “Additionally, the government must continue to strengthen its partnership with the private sector to foster greater information sharing and collaboration.” So far, federal investigators have discovered breaches at “fewer than 10” federal agencies, though the Pentagon and intelligence community haven't confirmed whether their offices were among the victims. Haines, who served as deputy CIA director and deputy national security adviser to President Barack Obama, found it concerning that the breach first came to light through cybersecurity company FireEye, instead of through U.S. government cybersecurity operators. “[I] absolutely share ... concern that we're actually able to detect these because that's obviously absolutely critical to us protecting against them,” Haines said before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “I think ... it was pretty alarming that we found out about it through a private company as opposed to our being able to detect it ourselves to begin with.” In response to the breach, Austin committed to reviewing the DoD's cyber posture and emphasized that Russia must be punished for infiltrating federal networks. In the advance questions, Austin stopped short of calling the breach an act of war, arguing that designation “requires a case-by-case and fact-specific determination.” “For example, malicious cyber activities could result in injury, death or significant property destruction,” Austin wrote. “These activities would need to be considered in their totality.” An early January announcement from several federal investigators, including the NSA and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, stated that the breach was believed to be an espionage campaign and “likely Russian in origin.” “If that's the case, I think Russia should be held accountable,” Austin said at the hearing. “That's my personal belief.” Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., who sits on both SASC and SSCI, called the breach “the greatest cyber intrusion in the history, I think, perhaps, of the world” and said that the stovepiped nature of the U.S. national security apparatus needed to be addressed. Reed said one challenge for Haines will be developing a “more coherent, cohesive, integrated approach” to dealing with cybersecurity threats, particularly from advanced nation-state actors. Under questioning from senators, Haines said the SolarWinds supply chain hack was a “grave threat,” and the government needs new to improve its defenses against such attacks, though she noted that she hasn't received a classified briefing on the intrusion. In 2019, a report from ODNI warned of growing software supply chain hacks that provide an “efficient way to bypass traditional defenses and compromise a large number of computers.” “To prevent a recurrence of this kind of attack, we need to close the gap between where our capabilities are now and where they need to be in order to deter, detect, disrupt and respond to such intrusions far more effectively in the future,” Haines wrote in her questionnaire. “If confirmed as DNI, I will review the expert conclusions from the SolarWinds incident and the current intelligence about supply chain vulnerabilities and what steps may be taken to address any vulnerabilities.” Haines told senators that she would assess how the intelligence community can improve its cybersecurity partnerships with industry and the whole federal government. “I believe that the IC plays an integral role in detecting and warning against nation-state targeting of U.S. networks and infrastructure,” she wrote. “If confirmed, I will examine how better collaboration between the IC and the rest of the U.S. government, coupled with closer partnerships with the private sector and our international allies, can enhance our ability to deter, detect, and mitigate cyberattacks.” Haines will review whether the intelligence community is allocating resources properly to face advanced cyber threats and will examine the adequacy of the IC's existing authorities to protect the digital infrastructure of the United States, she said. Austin pointed to a cyber-threat sharing partnership the department has with the defense industrial base and stated that the department should “continue to look for ways to better integrate with interagency partners and the private sector.” In light of the SolarWinds breach, the senators on SSCI wrote that they are worried about a “lack of mandatory threat information sharing between the private sector and government,” adding that any information sharing from the private sector after the breach is voluntary. Haines would review the relationship. “Information sharing between the IC and the private sector is increasingly important to ensure that our data systems and networks are secure,” she wrote. “If confirmed as DNI, I look forward to reviewing the Intelligence Community's data sharing and information exchange relationship with the private sector, to engaging with IC experts and private sector leaders on what information is currently being shared, and to examining the efficacy of the current framework for sharing threat information.” The incoming Biden administration has signaled that it will prioritize cybersecurity in the aftermath of the SolarWinds breach. The Biden team named Anne Neuberger, the NSA's cybersecurity director who worked to improve information sharing with the private sector, to National Security Council as deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology. Haines wrote that she will “ensure” that the intelligence community has a “robust data sharing and information exchange relationship” with private companies and said that she will be “studying current information sharing to determine how it can be improved and what types of information can be shared to enhance cybersecurity protections.” “The private sector has unique insight and expertise on malicious activity occurring within its networks,” Haines said. “Real-time integration of private sector and government data could lead to more effective prevention and mitigation outcomes.” Cyber norms and deterrence For the last few years, the U.S. government wrestled with the concept of deterrence in the cyber domain, a complex challenge that including resilient defenses, risk management and strong international partnerships. As the SolarWinds breach demonstrated, deterring adversaries from hacking, which is seen as below the threshold of an armed response, is difficult. In response to a question from Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, about how to approach cyber deterrence, Haines pointed to many of the same tenets of current U.S. cyber deterrence, including imposition of costs for malicious actors' behavior, bringing foreign allies together to impose those costs, building resilient systems that are hard to hack, developing norms and creating strong relationship with the private sector. Haines wrote that setting norms should include outlining sanctionable behavior with the agreement from allies. A cornerstone to sanctioning is attributing cyberattacks to actors, a challenging undertaking in the cyber realm. Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., said he wanted Haines to be more forthcoming with attribution of cyberattacks, stating that he found it “extraordinarily concerning” that the “[Trump] White House underplay[ed] attribution on Russia.” Attribution, Haines said, would be a major piece of the ODNI's role in deterrence. “Something we [ODNI] can do is promote the ability to detect when adversaries are engaging in such activity so as then to provide information about attribution, for example. And then hold adversaries to account through that.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2021/01/20/after-huge-hack-biden-security-picks-want-more-cyber-coordination-with-industry