Contract Awards by US Department of Defense – October 09, 2020

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  9 mars 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - March 06, 2019

  DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY Tactical & Survival Specialties Inc.,* Harrisonburg, Virginia (SPE8EJ-20-D-0010); W.S. Darley & Co.,* Itasca, Illinois (SPE8EJ-20-D-0011); Atlantic Diving Supply Inc., doing business as ADS,* Virginia Beach, Virginia (SPE8EJ-20-D-0012); Federal Resources Supply Co.,* Stevensville, Maryland (SPE8EJ-20-D-0013); Unifire Inc.,* Spokane, Washington (SPE8EJ-20-D-0014); and Quantico Tactical Inc.,* Aberdeen, North Carolina (SPE8EJ-19-D-0015), are sharing a maximum $4,000,000,000 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract under solicitation SPM8EJ-13-R-0001 for special operational equipment. This was a sole-source acquisition using justification 10 U.S. Code 2304 (c)(1), as stated in Federal Acquisition Regulation 6.302-1. These are 365-day bridge contracts. Locations of performance are Virginia, Illinois, Maryland, Washington, and North Carolina, with a March 6, 2021, performance completion date. Using military services are Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2020 through 2021 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (SPE8EJ-20-D-0010). General Dynamics Mission Systems Inc., Taunton, Massachusetts, has been awarded a maximum $49,000,000 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for production of spare parts in support of the Warfighter Information Network Tactical Increment 1. This was a sole-source acquisition using justification 10 U.S. Code 2304 (c)(1), as stated in Federal Acquisition Regulations 6.302-1. This is a five-year contract with no option periods. Location of performance is Massachusetts, with a March 5, 2025, performance completion date. Using military service is Army. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2020 through 2025 Army working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Land and Maritime, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (SPRBL1-20-D-0003). Cummins Inc., Memphis, Tennessee, has been awarded a maximum $9,752,276 fixed-price contract for diesel engine repair kits. This was a competitive acquisition with one offer received. This is a five-year contract with no option periods. Location of performance is Tennessee, with a March 5, 2025, performance completion date. Using military services are Army and Marine Corps. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2020 through 2025 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Land and Maritime, Columbus, Ohio (SPE7LX-20-D-0095). NAVY The Boeing Co., Seattle, Washington, is awarded $800,000,000 for an advanced acquisition modification (P00167) to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-14-C-0067). This modification procures long lead material and activities in support of lot 11 P-8A aircraft production and delivery. Work will be performed in Seattle, Washington (97.04%); Huntington Beach, California (2.4%); Mesa, Arizona (.55%) and El Segundo, California (.01%). The purpose of this contract modification is to procure long-lead material and activities in support of 18 P-8A Lot 11 aircraft (8 Navy, 4 New Zealand, and 6 Republic of Korea). The mission of the P-8A MMA is to provide long-range anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capable of broad-area, maritime and littoral operations. Work is expected to be completed by June 2020. Fiscal 2020 aircraft procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $800,000,000 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. AIR FORCE George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, has been awarded a $320,689,444 cost-type contract for Mobile Unmanned/Manned Distributed Lethality Airborne Network (MUDLAN) accelerated development and demonstrations software and hardware. This contract provides for the enhancement of technologies to be developed under the MUDLAN Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration program, including digital beam forming multi-beam Common Data Link apertures; directional K/Ku/eKU and W-band systems; MUDLAN multi-functional network controller (MFNC) for connecting multiple platforms while maneuvering; and using the MFNC to recognize jamming and autonomously move to other bands. Work will be performed in Fairfax, Virginia, and is expected to be complete by March 6, 2025. This award is the result of a competitive acquisition, and two offers were received. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $650,000 are being obligated at time of award. Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome, New York, is the contracting activity (FA8750-20-C-0555). Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory LLC, Laurel, Maryland, has been awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee $16,769,744 modification (P00009) to task order FA8819-19-F-1003 for deep space advanced radar concept technology demonstration. The contract modification completes the delivery of the technology demonstration project. Work will be performed in Laurel, Maryland; and White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and is expected to be completed by June 30, 2021. Fiscal 2020 research and development funds in the amount of $2,000,000 are being obligated at the time of award. The total cumulative face value of the task order is $45,564,088. The Space and Missile System Center Directorate, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, is the contracting activity. ARMY Lockheed Martin Corp., Orlando, Florida, was awarded a $154,979,758 contract for Modernized Target Acquisition Designation Sight/Pilot Night Vision Sensor System (M-TADS/PNVS) systems for the Apache attack helicopter in support of the Moroccan government. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of Aug. 31, 2023. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, is the contracting activity (W52P1J-20-F-0225). Raytheon Co., Andover, Massachusetts, was awarded a $108,321,679 modification (P00002) to contract W31P4Q-19-C-0055 for the procurement of hardware, facilities, equipment, and all technical, planning, management, manufacturing, and testing efforts to include all incidental services to produce the PATRIOT Digital Sidelobe Canceler and Peripheral Enhancement Assembly box production kits. Work will be performed in Andover, Massachusetts; Chatsworth, California; and Simsbury, Connecticut, with an estimated completion date of July 31, 2022. Fiscal 2020 missile procurement, Army; and 2010 Foreign Military Sales (Netherlands) funds in the amount of $108,321,679 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity. Oshkosh Defense LLC, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, was awarded a $25,522,182 modification (P00314) to contract W56HZV-15-C-0095 to exercise available options on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle contract. Work will be performed in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, with an estimated completion date of Aug. 31, 2021. Fiscal 2020 other procurement, Army; Marine Corp procurement; and Navy procurement funds in the amount of $25,522,182 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan, is the contracting activity. Sierra Nevada Corp., Sparks, Nevada, was awarded an $8,500,000 firm-fixed-price contract for Tactical Automated Landing System components support for the RQ-7B tactical unmanned aircraft system. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of Feb. 27, 2023. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is the contracting activity (W911QY-20-D-0011). General Dynamics Mission Systems, Taunton, Massachusetts, was awarded an $8,016,219 modification (P00001) to contract (W15P7T-19-F-0022) to procure warranty coverage for the configuration items for the Tactical Network Transport On the Move System. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work will be performed in Taunton, Massachusetts, with an estimated completion date of Dec. 31, 2025. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance, Army funds in the amount of $8,016,219 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is the contracting activity. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Bluehawk LLC, West Palm Beach, Florida, was awarded a $32,094,786 labor-hour contract (HHM402-20-C-0019) to provide technology transfer analysis and assessment services. Work will be conducted in Charlottesville, Virginia, with an expected completion date of Aug. 31, 2025. Fiscal 2020 operations and management funds in the amount of $2,935,456 are being obligated at time of award. This contract was awarded through a HUBZone set-aside and six offers were received. The Virginia Contracting Activity, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity. *Small business https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2104849/source/GovDelivery/

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  3 juillet 2018 | International, Aérospatial

  The German Air Force Wants To Know If Its Eurofighters Can Carry U.S. Nuclear Bombs

  BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK German officials have reportedly asked their American counterparts about whether it would be possible to turn the Eurofighter Typhoon into a nuclear strike aircraft. The answer to this question could have serious ramifications on Germany's effort to replace its aging Panavia Tornado combat jets, which are certified to carry U.S. B61 nuclear bombs during a crisis as part of an inter-NATO agreement, and reinforces previous reports that the European fighter jet is the German Air Force's preferred option. In April 2018, the German Federal Ministry of Defense sent a formal letter to U.S. officials asking about whether it would be feasible to configure Typhoons for the nuclear mission, how expensive it would be, and how long the process might take, according to Reuters. The German Air Force's ability to fly nuclear strikes has become an increasingly important issue even though the country is not a nuclear power itself. During the Cold War, Germany, as well as other NATO allies, agreed to host American nuclear bombs with the understanding that their aircraft could be called upon to employ them if a major conflict with the Soviet Union broke out. After the Cold War, this arrangement has persisted and the Germans continue to keep an unspecified number of B61 bombs at Büchel Air Base near the borders with Belgium and Luxembourg. The problem is that the only German aircraft that can carry these weapons are the Tornados, which are in desperate need of replacement. Availability rates for the Cold War-era swing wing jets have dramatically dropped in recent years. In 2015, state broadcaster Deutsche Welle reported that only 30 of the approximately 85 remaining aircraft were airworthy at any one time. The aircraft also lack cockpits that will work with night vision goggles, which limits the jet's ability to perform missions at night. In March 2018, German magazine Der Spiegel also obtained a report calling into question the security of the Tornado's data links. “This could in the worst case mean that the demand for an encrypted communication system for the Tornado weapons system can't be achieved,” the document stated according to the report. “That means the Tornado weapons system may not take part in NATO missions.” The German Air Force disputed the story, saying that all of the Tornados set aside to support the alliance's requirements had the equipment necessary to perform their missions. Regardless, the service has made no effort to hide the importance of replacing the jets. The Germans will need to certify whatever aircraft replaces the Tornado as a nuclear-capable platform in order to continue performing the mission. In addition to Eurofighter, the Germans are considering an unspecified variant of Boeing's F-15 Eagle or that company's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and Lockheed Martin's stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The process to make sure any of those planes could carry the B61 would likely include ensuring they could safely drop the bombs at all, as well as developing appropriate mission systems and software to enable this capability under various different attack parameters. In addition, engineers would have to find ways to install the necessary systems and linkages so that the pilot can arm the weapon in flight. Each one of the bombs has a so-called “Permissive Action Link,” or PAL, that prevents the warhead from functioning until an individual puts in a specific code. You can read more about these safety features and other components of the bombs in this past feature. The U.S. military has not certified any variants of the Joint Strike Fighter to carry the B61, but Air Force is in the process of doing so with regards to the F-35A. The aircraft types that Boeing is offering are the only ones in the running that have already gone through this process. But the German Air Force's top preference is reportedly the Eurofighter. Germany already has nearly 130 of the jets in service and recently began adding a robust air-to-ground capability to some of them. “A possible purchase of the Eurofighter would ensure the retention of military aircraft expertise in Germany and Europe, and value creation in our own country,” Germany's Deputy Defense Minister Ralf Brauksiepe told the Green Party's Tobias Lindner in a letter earlier in 2018, according to Reuters. “The weapons system has already been introduced to the Bundeswehr [the German Armed Forces] and is being successfully used.” Replacing the Tornados with Eurofighters does make good sense, something we at The War Zone have noted in the past. As I wrote in December 2017: “Eurofighter, a consortium that includes portions of Airbus Defense in Germany and Spain, BAE Systems in the United Kingdom, and Leonardo in Italy, manage the development and production of the fighter jets. A major sale to the Luftwaffe could be worth billions to the group and help keep the production line running and its employees at work, an important domestic consideration for the Germans. On Dec. 11, 2017, Qatar signed a deal for 24 of its own Eurofighters, making it the ninth country to buy the type. This alone could mean significantly lower training and maintenance costs, not to mention saving on large infrastructure needs, compared to acquiring an entirely new type of aircraft, and especially one with high secondary cost demands like the F-35. It also could make it easier for the Luftwaffe to quickly absorb the new aircraft into its inventory. Existing Typhoon variants are already compatible with the targeting and reconnaissance pods the Luftwaffe uses on the Tornado, as well as many of its weapons. Saab has already tested the Taurus KEPD 350 cruise missile on one of the fourth generation fighter jets, as well, giving it a relatively long-range standoff attack capability." There is a growing concern, however, that the Eurofighter won't be survivable enough to perform the nuclear mission in the future. One source told Reuters that the United States would consider this factor in its response about whether it would certify the jets to carry the B61s. The implication is that the fifth generation F-35 could be the only realistic option. But German authorities reportedly forced the German Air Force's previous head, Lieutenant General Karl Müllner, into retirement over his support for the F-35 option, though it's not clear whether that was over his preference for the jet itself or his public comments on the matter. It is important to note that the United States has been working to make sure the forthcoming improved B61-12 bombs will be compatible with existing NATO platforms, including Tornado, since 2015. Eurofighter, as well as Boeing, also both insist that their aircraft would be able to carry out nuclear strikes in any high-threat environment in cooperation with electronic warfare aircraft and other supporting assets. NATO members regularly train to do just this as part of what is known as Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics, or SNOWCAT. At the same time, Germany and the rest of the alliance are increasingly worried about Russia's steadily more aggressive foreign policy. This has included veiled and outright threats against member states and non-NATO partners in Europe. Earlier in June 2018, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova implied that increased U.S. military presence in Norway was an implicit threat toward her country. The Kremlin has also deployed advanced air defenses and other weapons systems, including the S-400 surface-to-air missile system and Iskander nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles, along NATO's eastern flanks and within its Kaliningrad enclave on the Baltic Sea. The latter position means that Russian weapons already have the range to engage aircraft flying over Germany proper. Lieutenant General Müllner and other supporters of buying the F-35 had argued that this reality made a stealthy fifth-generation aircraft a necessity. Germany has joined with France to develop a new low-observable combat jetfor both countries. The Joint Strike Fighter program and other stealth fighter development efforts elsewhere make it clear that this process will be long and potentially exorbitantly expensive. There's no guarantee that it will produce a working design any time soon, if at all. For all of its very real issues, the F-35 is in production now. If the German Air Force does decide to replace the Tornados with more Typhoons, it could take up to a decade to certify the latter type for the nuclear mission, according to Reuters. It's not clear when that process might begin, but Germany wants to have all of the older Tornado jets out of service by 2030. This means there is a distinct potential for a gap in capability to occur between when the replacement aircraft arrive and when they're deemed nuclear capable. Domestic and international politics are almost certain to have an impact on the final decision, too. Germany itself is in the midst of a political crisis that traces back the last federal elections in September 2017. A poor showing for Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) part, as well as its allies in the Christian Social Union (CSU), led to six months of deliberations on the future of their bloc. This was the longest the country had been without a government since the end of World War II. Any further upheaval could impact attempts to increase the country's defense spending overall and to address systematic readiness issuesplaguing the German Armed Forces as a whole. Perhaps more importantly, German relations with the United States have plummeted amid a largely personal feud between Merkel and President Donald Trump. Richard Grenell, the new U.S. Ambassador to Germany and a Trump appointee, has suggested he could engage with opposition parties looking to unseat the CDU-CSU alliance. In May 2018, Merkel reiterated comments she had made in 2017 that it was increasingly clear Germany could not rely on the United States for protection. “It's no longer the case that the United States will simply just protect us,” Merkel said in the 2018 speech, which also lauded French President Emmanuel Macron who was on hand to receive an award. “Rather, Europe needs to take its fate into its own hands. That's the task for the future.” This could make the idea of buying any type of American aircraft increasingly politically untenable. It could also potentially raise new questions about whether Germany should be hosting American nuclear weapons in the first place, which is a controversial issue that left-leaning political parties in the country typically oppose on principle. In the meantime, the Tornados are only getting older and are steadily less capable of performing any missions, nuclear or otherwise. As such, Germany and the United States will have to come to some agreement on certifying any future planes soon if the German Air Force intends to continue having a nuclear role at all. http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/21679/the-german-air-force-wants-to-know-if-its-eurofighters-can-carry-u-s-nuclear-bombs

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  1 juin 2020 | International, C4ISR

  DARPA Seeks Secure Microchip Supply Chain

  "Once a chip is designed, adding security after the fact or making changes to address newly discovered threats is nearly impossible," explains a DARPA spokesperson. By THERESA HITCHENSon May 29, 2020 at 2:46 PM WASHINGTON: DARPA has launched a four-year project to find ways to design security features into microchips as they are being made to help ensure the future supply chain. While the name of the project is daunting — Automatic Implementation of Secure Silicon (AISS) — and the technical requirements are a serious challenge, the concept is pretty simple. “AISS aims to automate the process of incorporating security into chip designs, making it easier and potentially more cost effective for any organization with even a small design team (start-ups, mid-size companies, etc.) to build security measures into their designs,” a DARPA spokesperson told Breaking D today. “Overall, with AISS DARPA aims to bring greater automation to the chip design process to profoundly decrease the burden of including security measures,” the spokesperson said. The two winning teams, according to a May 27 DARPA press release, are: The two AISS research teams are: Synopsys, Arm, Boeing, Florida Institute for Cybersecurity Research at the University of Florida, Texas A&M University, UltraSoC, and the University of California, San Diego Northrop Grumman, IBM, University of Arkansas, and University of Florida “Research and development on the $75 million program was commenced two weeks ago and incremental capabilities are expected to roll out to the chip design community over the next four years,” the spokesperson said in an email. “Our hope is that many of the capabilities will start appearing as features in commercial design automation software before the program completion.” Digital integrated circuits are the engines that drive modern computers, and everyday digital devices such as smart phones. They are critical to the evolution of the Internet of Things (IoT). As such, they increasingly have become a key target of hacking by US adversaries and cyber criminals alike, DARPA explains. “Threats to IC chips are well known, and despite various measures designed to mitigate them, hardware developers have largely been slow to implement security solutions due to limited expertise, high cost and complexity,” the DARPA release says. “Further, when unsecure circuits are used in critical systems, the lack of embedded countermeasures exposes them to exploitation.” Indeed, the Department of Commerce on May 15 took another swipe at Chinese telecoms behemoth Huawei and tightened its earlier efforts to block it from exporting its semiconductors and products to the US and allies. The Trump administration alleges that Huawei's hardware and software, in particular that related to 5G wireless technology, are full of deliberate security holes in order to enable Chinese government spying. The ruling by Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security, which will take effect in September, seeks to prevent companies around the world from using American-made software and machinery develop chips for Huawei or its subsidiary firms. The problem for device-makers, particularly in the IoT world where the market is largely for commercial products (think smart refrigerators), is that fixing potential security holes often isn't seen as worth the time, effort and most importantly, money. “The inclusion of security also often requires certain trade-offs with the typical design objectives, such as size, performance, and power dissipation,” the DARPA spokesperson said. “For example, something like a sprinkler isn't likely to require the highest level of security protections. Investing in security mechanisms that take up a lot of space on the underlying chip, or significantly impact chip performance likely doesn't make sense based on the sprinkler's expected use and application.” And yet, that future IoT sprinkler also will be other IoT devices and computer networks in operation by an individual, a company or a facility, such as a weapons depot. Even more unfortunately, the spokesperson explained, “modern chip design methods are unforgiving – once a chip is designed, adding security after the fact or making changes to address newly discovered threats is nearly impossible.” Thus, the AISS program is aimed at spurring research into two areas that can address four types of microchip vulnerability, the release says: “side channel attacks, hardware Trojans, reverse engineering, and supply chain attacks, such as counterfeiting, recycling, re-marking, cloning, and over-production.” The first area of research will be focusing on “development of a ‘security engine' that combines the latest academic research and commercial technology into an upgradable platform that can be used to defend chips against attacks, and provide an infrastructure to manage these hardened chips as they progress through their lifecycle,” DARPA said. The second area, led by software specialists Synopsys, “involves integrating the security engine technology developed in the first research area into system-on-chip (SOC) platforms in a highly automated way,” the DARPA release said. The Synopsys team also will be working on how to integrate new security designs and manufacturing tools with currently available off-the-shelf products. Nicholas Paraskevopoulous, sector VP for emerging capabilities development at Northrop Grumman, said in a May 27 press release that the firm's “design tools will enable the development of secure and trusted integrated circuits with reduced costs.” Northrop Grumman is involved in the first AISS research area. Synopsis could not be reached for comment by press time. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/darpa-seeks-secure-microchip-supply-chain/