17 janvier 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - January 16, 2020

AIR FORCE

Raytheon Co., Marlborough, Massachusetts, is awarded a $442,265,464 cost-plus-incentive-fee undefinitized contract action for the force element terminal (FET) development effort. This contract provides for the design, development, testing, integration, and logistical support of a FET system that will transition the B-52 and RC-135 hardened communication terminals from the Military Strategic Tactical Relay satellite communications satellite constellation to the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite constellation. The majority of the work will be performed at Raytheon's facilities in Marlborough, Massachusetts; and Largo, Florida, and is expected to be completed by August 2023. This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition. Fiscal 2019 and 2020 research, development, test and evaluation 3600 funds, in the amount of $5,812,581, are being obligated at the time of contract award. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Bedford, Massachusetts, is the contracting activity (FA8735-20-C-0003).

Raytheon Co., Marlborough, Massachusetts, has been awarded a $36,848,806 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification (P00152) for the software encryption platform (SEP) engineering change effort, under the Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) production contract. The contract action will develop and deliver an updated National Security Agency approved SEP. Work will be performed at Marlborough, Massachusetts, and is expected to be completed by March 2023. This award is the result of a sole source acquisition. Fiscal 2019 research, development, test and evaluation funding in the amount of $1,000,000 is being obligated at the time of award. The FAB-T Contracting Office, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts, is the contracting activity (FA8705-13-C-0005).

ARMY

LOC Performance Products,* Plymouth, Michigan, was awarded a $41,439,129 firm-fixed-price contract for the procurement of manufactured T-161 double pin track which is comprised of molded track pads, rubberized pins and forged track shoe bodies with bonded rubber backings to be used on the Army's Bradley family of vehicles, armored multi-purpose vehicle and Paladin family of vehicles. Bids were solicited via the internet with two received. Work will be performed in Plymouth, Michigan, with an estimated completion date of Jan. 12, 2022. Fiscal 2020 other procurement, Army funds in the amount of $41,439,129 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Warren, Michigan, is the contracting activity (W56HZV-20-C-0052).

Lockheed Martin Corp., Orlando, Florida, was awarded a $9,829,327 modification (P00013) to contract W31P4Q-19-C-0071 for engineering services in support of the Hellfire Missile and Joint Air-to-Ground Missile. Work will be performed in Orlando, Florida, with an estimated completion date of Jan. 15, 2021. Fiscal 2020 missile procurement, Army funds in the amount of $9,829,327 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity.

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Carter Enterprises,** Brooklyn, New York, has been awarded a maximum $21,105,765 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-quantity contract for coats and trousers. This was a competitive acquisition with six responses received. This is a one-year base contract with three one-year option periods. Location of performance is New York, with a Jan. 15, 2021, performance completion date. Using military services are Army and Air Force. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2020 through 2021 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (SPE1C1-20-D-1206).

NAVY

Crowley Government Services, Jacksonville, Florida (N62387-15-C-2505), is awarded a $20,771,542 firm-fixed-price contract with reimbursable elements extension by invoking Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.217-8 “option to extend services” to continue the operation and maintenance of five Tactical Auxiliary General Ocean Surveillance (T-AGOS) vessels; and two missile range instrumentation ships (T-AGM). This option includes a 365-day base period of performance, four one-year option periods, and a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.217-8 “option to extend services” option period for up to six months, which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $375,202,948. Work will be performed at sea worldwide and is expected to be completed by July 21, 2020. Fiscal 2020 Navy operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $20,771,542 will be awarded at time of award and will expire at the end of fiscal year. This contract extension was not competitively procured. The contract was prepared under the provisions of 10 U.S. Code § 2304(c)(1), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(iii) (only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements). The Military Sealift Command, Norfolk, Virginia, is the contracting activity (N62387-15-C-2505).

MAC LLC, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, is awarded a $9,998,493 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for the purchase of up to a maximum of 2,400,000 MK323 Mod 0 polymer cased .50 caliber linked cartridges, and .50 caliber armor piercing/armor piercing incendiary polymer cased linked cartridges. Work will be performed in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, and is expected to be completed by January 2024. Fiscal 2019 procurement ammunition (Marine Corps) funds in the amount of $3,051,359 will be obligated on the first delivery order immediately following contract award and funds will expire the end of fiscal 2021. The contract was awarded on a sole source basis in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation 6.302-1.The Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia, is the contracting activity (M67854-20-D-5200).

*Small Business
**Small Business in Historically Underutilized Business Zone

https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2059429/source/GovDelivery/

Sur le même sujet

  • How the Space Cybersecurity Working Group fosters communication

    11 novembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR, Sécurité

    How the Space Cybersecurity Working Group fosters communication

    By: Nathan Strout  In September 2018, the Trump administration added space cybersecurity to the National Cyber Strategy. Of course, adding space cybersecurity to a strategy document doesn’t automatically make those systems secure from cyberthreats. In the year since that document was adopted, the Space Cybersecurity Working Group has been trying to make the administration’s desire that United States space assets are cybersecure a reality. “The National Security Council, in very close coordination with the National Space Council, as well as the Office of the vice president, decided to form an inner agency group called the Space Cybersecurity Working Group,” explained Jaisha Wray, cybersecurity director of the National Security Council. “The goals of our working group are to identify and coordinate and prioritize U.S. government efforts to manage cybersecurity risks to space systems.” As the cybersecurity director of the National Security Council, Wray is in charge of developing international cybersecurity partnerships. Previously she served as the acting deputy director of emerging security challenges at the Department of State, where she helped build space and cyber policies. At the CyberSat19 conference Nov. 7, Wray explained how her Space Cybersecurity Working Group was fostering communications between various organizations to enhance cybersecurity in space. Key to developing effective cybersecurity across the nation’s space systems is communication, be it between space and cyber communities, the U.S. and international partners, or the government and industry, said Wray. “What we saw was that across departments and agencies in the U.S. government, the space and the cyber people are often located in different offices in different bureaus, and so one of the early successes of our working group is simply just bringing these folks together to try to reduce stovepipes, compare notes and provide updates,” she explained. Those meetings are ongoing and have been embraced by both communities, said Wray. The National Cyber Strategy also directed the National Security Council to enhance partnerships between the U.S. government and commercial and other space-faring nations. “This is particularly important since our efforts in space are becoming increasingly intertwined, both commercially and internationally, and we must ensure that all space systems — not just U.S. government satellites — are protected from cyberthreats,” said Wray. “However, a key challenge is convincing others to spend the extra money and resources necessary to make their satellites more secure when the extent of the threat is not always well known or available in the public domain. So this is why both internationally and with industry we plan to enhance our efforts to raise awareness and share information on cyberthreats and to develop and share best practices and principles to counter these threats.” On the industry front, the working group is backing the efforts of the newly established Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). ISACs are member-driven groups that work with the government to spread information through industry. The formation of a separate Space ISAC was announced in April, and the group held its first board meeting Nov. 7. “We were very pleased to see and now support the efforts of the new Space ISAC, which will help gather, analyze and disseminate critical cyberthreat information related to space among the federal commercial and international community,” said Wray. While the technical side of enhancing space cybersecurity presents its own challenge, it’s clear that a major gap in implementing cybersecurity in space is connecting the various stakeholders, be they commercial companies, various agencies or other countries. “I’m confident that through the Space Cybersecurity Working Group, we can continue to make progress and working cooperatively to address these threats,” said Wray. https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/2019/11/08/how-the-space-cybersecurity-working-group-fosters-communication/

  • Cinq Etats européens vont collaborer pour développer un hélicoptère moyen de nouvelle génération

    24 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    Cinq Etats européens vont collaborer pour développer un hélicoptère moyen de nouvelle génération

    L'OTAN annonce que la France, l'Allemagne, la Grèce, l'Italie et le Royaume-Uni ont signé le 19 novembre dernier un accord visant à lancer les travaux de développement d'un hélicoptère moyen de nouvelle génération, dans un cadre multinational. Le programme, nommé NGRC, pour Next Generation Rotorcraft Capabilities, sera mené dans le cadre des projets à haute visibilité (HVP) de l'Alliance Atlantique. «Un nombre important d'hélicoptères polyvalents moyens actuellement exploités par les Alliés arriveront à la fin de leur cycle de vie à l'horizon 2035-2040 et au-delà, et devront donc être remplacés», précise l'OTAN. Le programme NGRC doit permettre de remplacer ces flottes tout en intégrant les menaces futures, «en tirant parti d'un large éventail de progrès récents en matière de technologie, de méthodes de production et de concepts opérationnels». Air & Cosmos du 24 novembre

  • Hypersonic threats need an offense-defense mix

    5 août 2019 | International, Aérospatial

    Hypersonic threats need an offense-defense mix

    By: Melanie Marlowe   Next week, people from across the missile defense community will gather at an annual symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, to consider how to adapt U.S. missile defense efforts to the challenge of renewed competition with Russia and China. A centerpiece of their discussions will be the emergence of advanced hypersonic missile threats and what to do about them. Over the past few years, the Pentagon has prioritized the development of offensive hypersonic strike weapons, with billions of dollars in contracts already awarded for each of the major military services to acquire hypersonic strike missiles of their own. The counter-hypersonic mission, however, received surprisingly short shrift in recent defense budgets, with progress on hypersonic defense thus far piecemeal and halting. Some leading military officials charged with procuring hypersonic strike missiles have said that defending against hypersonic missiles is too hard, so we shouldn’t even try. That short-sighted approach is at odds with the vision of newly confirmed Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, who stated to Congress that he will advocate hypersonic missile defense, to include the development of new sensors, interceptors, and advanced command-and-control systems. Public commentary on hypersonic threats has been somewhat hyperbolic. Yes, hypersonics are fast — five or more times the speed of sound — but that’s slower than many ballistic missiles. Aerodynamic maneuver makes for a less predictable flight path, but this also means that atmospheric friction would remove the kind of decoys that might accompany a ballistic reentry vehicle. Whether a boosted glide vehicle, a scramjet cruise missile or a maneuverable quasi-ballistic missile, hypersonics pose a complex air defense challenge, but they are not invulnerable. The strategic significance of hypersonics is nevertheless quite real. Today’s Patriot, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Aegis defenses protect American carrier groups and ground forces against aerial and ballistic missile attack. Designed to go around or under those defenses, hypersonics are a more sophisticated means to hold forces at risk, and thereby undermine our broader defense goals and alliance system. Even if the United States catches up with the Chinese and Russians on hypersonic strike, our adversaries’ ability to hold U.S. carriers and forward bases at risk will push back U.S. forces. They could certainly also be used to target the American homeland, but the more urgent threat is regional. Passive defense only goes so far — ships can only go so fast, and air bases cannot be moved. Active defenses must be part of a balanced strategy. The first priority here is a space sensor layer. Unlike ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles fly at lower and changing altitudes, are harder to see, and travel an uncertain flight path. Current early warning satellites can detect the launch of boost-glide vehicles but are unsuited to tracking them during the glide phase. Today’s surface-based ballistic missile radars would only be able to spot a weapon once it crosses the horizon. Only space sensors can provide birth-to-death, fire-control quality tracks for hypersonic missiles. Unfortunately, recent budget requests have been rather tepid in their commitment to space sensors. The administration’s 2020 request virtually divested the program, and for the second year in a row the Missile Defense Agency listed the space sensor layer as its No. 1 unfunded priority. Thankfully, Congress seems to be in the process of restoring $108 million to return the program to the MDA to move out on development this year. The second element of hypersonic defense is interceptors. Although existing interceptors may well be improved, Secretary Esper has affirmed that new interceptors will have to be developed that are better suited to the mission’s stressing thermal and high-maneuver environment. The MDA’s third-highest unfunded priority for 2020 — $720 million for hypersonic defense — seems unlikely to be restored this year, but should be restored in the 2021 budget. Directed-energy weapons could potentially target hypersonic threats in their cruise phase or jam them in their terminal phase, but the mission’s complexity will almost certainly require both kinetic and nonkinetic effectors. The most challenging element will be developing a command-and-control architecture that ties everything together. A long-range hypersonic glide vehicle of significant range could cross continents and multiple combatant commands. Even with better interceptors and an adequate sensor layer, information and fire-control solutions must be developed and rapidly passed to commanders. The Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications network that supports the Ballistic Missile Defense System may be the foundation of such an architecture, but more dramatic upgrades will be required. The advent of the hypersonic era is central to the efforts by Russia and China to counter U.S. power projection in the world. The Pentagon’s recent focus on hypersonic strike is necessary but insufficient. It falls now to congressional leadership and those assembling the 2021 budget to rebalance it with a more appropriate mix of hypersonic strike and defense. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/08/02/hypersonic-threats-need-an-offense-defense-mix/

Toutes les nouvelles