15 décembre 2022 | Local, Aérospatial

Canada not sending fighter jets to Europe next year as Air Force rearms, regroups

The decision is raising eyebrows given the West’s current tensions with Russia and the ongoing war in Ukraine

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-canada-not-sending-fighter-jets-to-europe-next-year-as-air-force/

Sur le même sujet

  • Unlock access to an enhanced Eurosatory 2022 experience

    20 janvier 2022 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Unlock access to an enhanced Eurosatory 2022 experience

    The Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries (CADSI) is the national industry voice of more than 900 Canadian defence and security companies.

  • Russia’s Arctic Agenda and the Role of Canada

    16 avril 2020 | Local, Naval

    Russia’s Arctic Agenda and the Role of Canada

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 51 By: Sergey Sukhankin April 15, 2020 05:24 PM Age: 14 mins New research (which includes two articles written by Russian experts) published by the prominent think tank the Canadian Global Affairs Institute has spurred interest and hopes in Russia's expert community about the possibility of normalizing ties between Russia and Canada through cooperation in the Arctic region (Russiancouncil.ru, April 3; Cgai.ca, accessed April 12). This cooperation could potentially be premised on two main pillars. First would be the mutual rejection of “internationalization” of the Arctic. Both Canada and Russia—for whom the Arctic region is an issue of foreign policy (Russiancouncil.ru, July 1, 2019) —feel ill at ease with the increasing involvement of non-Arctic states in the region, particularly, China. Russian information outlets noted the level of distress when the Chinese icebreaker Snow Dragon completed its first-ever voyage through the Arctic Ocean off the coast of Canada, accumulating “a wealth of experience for Chinese ships going through the Northwest Passage in the future” (Regnum, September 17, 2017; see EDM, October 3, 2017). Second, Moscow seeks to exploit regional frictions and disagreements between Canada and the United States (Pentagonus.ru, accessed April 10) to boost its own position/influence in the region. Russian sources recall the year 2010, when then–Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly challenged Canada's stance on the status of the Northwest Passage, which Ottawa considers part of Canadian territory (Foreignpolicy.ru, February 20, 2015). In the past, both the Russian tone and general assessment of Canada's role in the Arctic were denigrating, claiming Ottawa lacked agency. Perhaps the clearest expression of this sentiment came from the director of the Institute of Strategic Planning and Forecasting, Professor Alexander Gusev, who, in 2015, declared that “they [Canada] are only performing the role assigned by the US” (Odnako.org, March 30, 2015). After 2016, however, Russia dramatically changed its coverage of the US-Canadian dispute in the Arctic region, with Moscow increasingly employing reconciliatory rhetoric toward Ottawa and employing ever more assertive public diplomacy tools. One notable example of this new approach is Moscow's reliance on pro-Russian experts based in Canada. In 2016, speaking in Sochi, on the margins of that year's Valdai Club session, Professor Piotr Dutkiewicz (a former director of the Institute of European and Russian Studies at Carleton University, in Ottawa) stated, “[T]his area [the Arctic region] will be the first one where we will feel real changes in our relations... Arctic cooperation will become the focal point thanks to which our two sides [Canada and Russia] will be extending their areas of collaboration” (Izvestia, October 28, 2016). Moreover, as repeatedly stated by Federation Council member Igor Chernyshenko (a senator from Murmansk Oblast), the Arctic region could become a “bridge,” helping Canada and Russia overcome the existing difficulties in their bilateral ties. Last May, he announced, “[W]e invited them [the Canadian side] to return to a dialogue. We proposed holding a conference between Russian and Canadian universities in northwest Russia, maybe in Murmansk Oblast. They supported this idea” (TASS, May 25, 2019). Notably, the last such event was held in November 2014, in Canada, hosted by the aforementioned Carleton University. In addition to trying to foster bilateral academic ties, Russia's outreach to Canada on Arctic issues involves sustained information campaigns via RT and similar multi-language information outlets with international reach. In particular, Russian propaganda narratives routinely overemphasize the extent of current US-Canadian disagreements in the Arctic. At the same time, foreign-audience-facing Kremlin-linked media outlets underscore the allegedly negative role of President Donald Trump (and his policies toward Canada) in aggravating the existing disputes. RT widely claimed that “after Trump's inauguration, he began pressing Ottawa on economic issues and extended claims on Canadian possessions in the Arctic region.” It also highlighted US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo's remarks suggesting that “Russia is not the only country with illegitimate claims [in the Arctic] ...the US has a lasting dispute with Canada over its claims on sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. Finally, RT's propaganda reporting also relied on a statement by Pavel Feldman, the deputy director of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Forecasts at the Moscow-based Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (RUDN). Feldman is quoted as saying, “[T]he US and Canada carry on a heated competition over the Arctic region; yet, publicly, these countries are trying to position themselves as partners” (RT, October 16, 2019). In recent months, this increasing Russian attention to Canada as an Arctic power and a key element of regional stability and order has started to be expressed at the highest levels in Moscow. Poignantly, President Vladimir Putin declared in a public address at the start of this year that Russia “is open to cooperation with Canada on the basis of mutual respect and consideration of each other's interest.” Putin added, “[O]ur countries are neighbors in the Arctic region and bear joint responsibility for the development of this vast region, for preservation of the traditional lifestyle of its native populations and the careful treatment of its brittle ecosystem” (Vzglyad, February 5, 2020). Such reconciliatory rhetoric should, however, be taken with a heavy dose of caution in Ottawa: from the earliest days of the Soviet Union, Moscow's stance on the Arctic region has been deliberately flexible and tightly premised on being able to demonstrate its military potential in the High North and to intimidate other regional players. The Russian Federation has increasingly undertaken the same policy course since 2014 (see EDM, April 9). Incidentally, on January 31, 2020, two Russian Tu-160 heavy strategic bombers approached Canadian airspace—maneuvers that the Russian Ministry of Defense explained away as “planned exercises” (Vpk.name, February 3). It is worth pointing out that the US North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is unable to identify and track Russian bombers of this type until they are close enough to launch missiles at targets on the continent. Furthermore, it is worth keeping in mind that, in fact, Russia (not the US) is Canada's direct competitor when it comes to territorial claims in the Arctic (the Lomonosov Ridge)—a point explicitly corroborated by Russia's Arktika 2007 expedition, which explored this disputed undersea area and famously planted a Russian flag at the North Pole, on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean (Izvestia, August 3, 2007). Lastly, it may be worth keeping an eye on one of the proposed amendments (soon to be officially adopted) to the Russian Constitution on the “prohibition of actions related to the alienation of Russian territory, or the propaganda thereof” (TASS, February 25). This amendment—reportedly drafted with predominantly Kaliningrad and Vladivostok in mind—is likely to also be applied to some Arctic territories that are of equally strategic interest to Canada. https://jamestown.org/program/russias-arctic-agenda-and-the-role-of-canada/

  • RPAS: Pursuing unmanned success

    25 juin 2020 | Local, Aérospatial

    RPAS: Pursuing unmanned success

    The two leading candidates to provide the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) with a new remotely piloted aerial system (RPAS) are offering American and Israeli aircraft, but the federal government will be leveraging the project to grow Canadian capabilities and capacity in the unmanned aerial system (UAS) sector. “The scope and scale of this procurement gives us a unique opportunity to strategically position Canada's UAS sector for future success,” John MacInnis, director of the project at Innovation, Science and Economic Development, told a webinar hosted by Unmanned Systems Canada on June 22. Canada's modest UAS sector amounts to about five to eight per cent of the global market, generating between $400 million and $700 million in revenue in 2018, he noted. But it is projected to grow substantially as opportunities open up in adjacent sectors, including law enforcement and public safety. At present there are over 100 companies employing between 2,000 and 2,500 people in skilled jobs, but 90 per cent are small firms of under 250 employees. “We see this procurement as an opportunity to build upon and develop new and lasting local supply chain relationships in the sector,” said MacInnis. Previously known as the Joint Unmanned Surveillance Target Acquisition System (JUSTAS) project, RPAS has been a work in progress since 2005. That's when the RCAF formally stood up a project office in the Directorate of Air Requirements and assigned the task of assessing unmanned capability to a lieutenant-colonel and CC-130 Hercules pilot, who mused that he was probably being a heretic for developing the requirements for an aircraft without a pilot in the cockpit. Over the ensuing years, the Air Force has gathered the lessons of allies and acquired some of its own – from 2008 to 2011, the RCAF leased an Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Heron, the CU-170, to support operations in Afghanistan, flying around 550 hours every month – to craft a statement of requirements. Given the range of missions the government wants answered by a single aircraft, and the complexity of operating in the Arctic, the slow pace of the procurement might have spared the Air Force a poor investment. Successive RCAF commanders have noted that any platform acquired in the years after the project office was initially established would now be obsolete due to the rapid pace of UAS technology changes. As a former project director observed in 2013: “Canada is trying to do a lot of things with this UAV ... Where the United States would have a couple of different families of UAVs, we're probably going to have one or two. So, we're looking for a general-purpose system that can accomplish everything in one project.” The RPAS project will acquire a medium altitude, long endurance (MALE) intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision strike system with ground control stations, munitions, long-term sustainment and infrastructure to deliver up to three concurrent lines of operation at home or abroad, explained Mike Barret, project manager for the Department of National Defence. The high-level mandatory requirements so far include the ability to operate in all weather, day or night; identify, track and prosecute targets over land or sea; reach the edge of Canada's domestic area of operations from a main base or established forward operating locations; and have the endurance to monitor or prosecute targets of interest such as a ship at that extreme edge for a minimum of six hours before handing off to a manned or unmanned aircraft. The platform, which is expected to serve for 25 years, must also have the ability to operate in low to medium threat environments and in appropriate class civil airspace under adverse weather conditions; integrate new payloads as technology evolves; accept and share data with and from Canadian platforms such as the CP-140 Aurora, CF-188 Hornet or Halifax-class frigate and its CH-148 Cyclone helicopter and with allies; and conduct air strikes with precision-guided munitions. Since 2012, the government has conducted multiple information gathering exercises with industry and in May 2019 issued a formal invitation to qualify as a supplier. That process confirmed two teams able to offer a NATO Class III RPAS capable of beyond-line-of-sight flight above 18,000 feet, at least 28 hours endurance in zero wind conditions, and able to employ a minimum of two precision-guided munitions. Team Artemis is led by Quebec's L3 Harris MAS while Team SkyGuardian is led by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, supported by the U.S. government. The procurement process is now in a “review and refinement phase” as the government obtains feedback from suppliers on the preliminary requirements, explained Sandra Labbe, senior director for the RPAS project at Public Services and Procurement Canada. The department expects to issue a draft request for proposals (RFP) in October 2020, followed by the formal RFP in March 2021. The project, which has an estimated cost of between $1 billion and $5 billion, would include the aircraft and associated equipment, munitions, training, materials support and a period of in-service support. Infrastructure such as hangars at a main operating base or forward locations would be acquired under a separate process. As with all procurements valued at over $100 million, RPAS will be subject to the government's Industrial and Technological Benefits (ITB) policy. Both bid teams will have to submit a value proposition demonstrating their economic investment in Canadian industry, which will be weighted and rated along with cost and technical merit. MacInnis said one of the aims of the project will be to strengthen and expand the global profile of the Canadian sector “beyond the completion of the program.” He highlighted core areas where companies could contribute, such as payloads, data management and onboard processing, command, control and communications, and sustainment services, and encouraged collaborative R&D between the prime and suppliers to spur innovation in areas such as artificial intelligence (AI), cyber resilience and systems integration. Value proposition commitments should also help build advanced skills and capacity in the sector through training programs, scholarships, technology transfer and other initiatives, and increase the “participation of women and other underrepresented groups in the Canadian workforce,” he said. Team SkyGuardian, which includes CAE, MDA, and L3Harris, is proposing the MQ-9B SkyGuardian, a variant of the MQ-9 Reaper, a fleet that has accumulated over three million flight hours with U.S. and allied partners. Significantly for future suppliers, it is a fleet with global growth, both for military operations and for border security, humanitarian operations, disaster assistance and others, said Benjamin Brookshire of General Atomics. He welcomed the application of the ITB policy and said previous experience with national offsets policies has taught the company that a strong local supply base can be crucial to meeting unique customer needs. “We have our own vested interest in making sure that Canadian industry is involved in this program,” he said. Areas of opportunity for Canadian companies are sensor technology, integrated training, communications, avionics, composite manufacturing, AI and propulsion systems. Recalling General Atomics' start as a small company of seven guys in a garage, he encouraged proposals from companies of all sizes if they can fit the business case. “If you are like General Atomics and you've got a hairbrained idea like flying an airplane with nobody in it, we're definitely excited to hear about it.” For Team Artemis, L3 MAS has partnered with Israel Aerospace Industries to offer the IAI Heron TP, a mature platform “with tens of thousands of flight hours” over the past decade, noted Neil Tabbenor, director of business development for special missions and ISR. IAI will supply green, certified aircraft and ground control stations while L3 MAS will provide the systems integration and fleet management expertise. The Heron already has some confirmed Canadian content – the engine will be a Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6 turboprop – but he opened the door to “any R&D effort” and “any capability” that will fit the program, though composites, tooling, wire harnesses and other manufacturing components were at the top of his list. https://www.skiesmag.com/news/rpas-pursuing-unmanned-success/

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