Boeing defense biz reports $139M loss across three major programs

Sur le même sujet

• 

  13 mars 2023 | International, C4ISR

  Pentagon seeks 21% boost in cyberspace spending

  The fiscal 2024 budget blueprint arrives days after the Biden administration shared its latest national cybersecurity strategy.

• 

  3 février 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  The drive to advance missile defense is there, but there must be funding

  By: Richard Matlock Over the past five years, missile threats have evolved far more rapidly than conventional wisdom had predicted. Best known is North Korea's accelerated development and testing of sophisticated, road-mobile ballistic missiles. But the U.S. National Defense Strategy requires renewed focus on greater powers. China has adopted an anti-access strategy consisting of new offensive missiles, operational tactics and fortifications in the South China Sea. Russia, too, has developed highly maneuverable hypersonic missiles specifically designed to defeat today's defenses. Grappling with these sobering realities demands change. The 2019 Missile Defense Review called for a comprehensive approach to countering regional missiles of all kinds and from whatever source, as well as the increasingly complex intercontinental ballistic missiles from rogue states. But programs and budgets have not yet aligned with the policy. The upcoming defense budget submission presents an important opportunity to address these new and complex challenges. The Missile Defense Agency's current top three goals are sustaining the existing force, increasing capacity and capability, and addressing more advanced threats. The first two are necessary but insufficient. The third goal must be elevated to adapt U.S. missile defense efforts to the geopolitical and technological realities of our time. For the last decade, less than 2 percent of MDA's annual funding has been dedicated to developing advanced technology, during which time our adversaries have begun outpacing us. As President Donald Trump said last January, we “cannot simply build more of the same, or make incremental improvements.” Adapting our missile defense architecture will require rebalance, discipline and difficult choices. Realigning resources to develop advanced technologies and operational concepts means investing less in single-purpose systems incapable against the broader threat. It also requires we accept and manage new kinds of risk. Indeed, meeting the advanced threat may, in the short term, require accepting some strategic risk with North Korea. The beginning of this rebalance requires more distributed, elevated and survivable sensors capable of tracking advanced threats. The most important component here is a proliferated, globally persistent space layer in low-Earth orbit consisting of both passive and active sensors. MDA may be the missile defense-centric organization best suited to developing and integrating this capability into the architecture, but there is considerable opportunity for partnering with others to move out smartly, as recently urged by Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Hyten. Partnerships with the Space Development Agency and the Air Force can be supplemented by collaborative efforts with commercial space companies. We need not do this all at once. Space assets could be fielded in phases, with numbers, capability (sensors, interceptors, lasers), missions, and orbits evolving over time. MDA demonstrated a similar paradigm with the Delta experiments, Miniature Sensor Technology Integration series and the Near Field Infrared Experiment in the past. Meanwhile, other sensors could alleviate the cost of building new, billion-dollar radar on islands in the Pacific Ocean — efforts which continue to suffer delay. Adding infrared tracking sensors to high-altitude drones, for instance, has already been demonstrated experimentally in the Indo-Pacific theater with modified Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles. These need not be dedicated assets. Sensor pod kits could be stored in theater to be deployed aboard Reapers or other platforms during heightened tensions. We must revisit boost-phase defenses and directed energy. In 2010, the Airborne Laser program demonstrated that lasers could destroy missiles in the boost phase, but deploying toxic chemical lasers aboard large commercial aircraft was fiscally and operationally untenable. Fortunately, considerable operational promise exists with recently developed solid-state lasers (the cost of which is around $2 of electricity per shot). We must move these systems out of the laboratory and build and test operational prototypes. Near-term actions to better manage risk against the rogue-state ballistic missile threat must not overtake the pursuit of these larger goals. Although the Pentagon is currently considering a 10-year, $12 billion program for a next-generation interceptor, nearer-term, cheaper options are available. Replacing each existing kill vehicle on the Ground-Based Interceptors with several smaller kill vehicles would multiply each interceptor's effectiveness dramatically. The U.S. has been developing this technology since 2006, including a “hover” flight test in 2009. Affordable solutions like this must be found. Missile defense cannot do it all. Denying, degrading and destroying enemy missile systems prior to launch must be part of the mix. But left-of-launch activities can be expensive and difficult, and reliance on a cyber magic wand carries risk, too. We need to broaden our approach to attack all parts of our adversary's kill chain. The National Defense Strategy urges that we contend with the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be — or as it previously was. To meet the threats of today and tomorrow, we must radically transform our U.S. missile defenses. It falls to the 2021 budget to do so. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/01/31/the-drive-to-advance-missile-defense-is-there-but-there-must-be-funding/

• 

  7 octobre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Here’s how many foreign military sales the US State Department OK’d in FY19

  By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — The U.S. State Department cleared $67.9 billion in weapons in fiscal 2019, in an indication that America's position in the global arms trade remains strong. The number, spread across 64 individual procurement requests from 28 different countries and a NATO consortium, represents the second year in a row that the overall value of foreign military sales requests have slightly declined. But the total still represents almost double the total cleared by the State Department in fiscal year 2016. These numbers represent potential arms sales that the State Department cleared internally, then passed on to Congress through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The notifications do not represent final sales; if Congress does not reject the potential sale, it then goes into negotiations, during which dollar figures and quantities of equipment can change. In some cases, as highlighted by the large FMS request notification for Turkey to buy Patriot batteries, those sales will never happen. However, while not solid dollars, notifications are a notable way of tracking interest in procuring American arms from foreign partners, and can be a leading indicator of final sales to come. Geographically, the Pacific region led the way with 21 requests, totaling $24.8 billion in potential sales – notable given the emphasis put forth by the Trump administration that the Pacific represents a priority theater for the future. Following that was the Middle East, with 18 requests totaling $15.2 billion. Europe had 18 requests for $19.8 billion; the only nation from Africa, Morocco, put in six requests totaling $7.26 billion; and Canada put in three requests, for $731 million. The biggest potential customer, at a time of a whole-of-government effort against China is underway, is Taiwan. Over four different requests, Taiwan requested $10.7 billion in sales, driven primarily by $8 billion for long-sought F-16 aircraft, as well as $2 billion for Abrams tanks. In second place was Japan, with $7.54 billion in requested sales, spread over six requests. That was driven by three different tranches of SM-3 missiles and an Aegis Ashore missile defense system. Morocco, which was cleared for six separate requests totaling $7.26 billion on U.S. arms, came in third. Their procurement was driven mainly by its purchase of new F-16 fighter jets and the associated equipment, as well as a request for Abrams tanks. As always with FMS notifications, a few large sales can drive the overall total. Sixteen of the 63 sales requests topped $1 billion, led by Taiwan's F-16 request ($8 billion), Poland's F-35 request ($6.5 billion), Morocco's F-16s ($3.79 billion), the U.K's procurement of Chinook helicopters ($3.5 billion), Turkey's Patriot request ($3.5 billion) and Japan's largest SM-3 request ($3.3 billion). The F-16 was a significant driver of FMS requests this year, showing the Lockheed Martin legacy plane remains popular around the world. Eight requests, with a potential total of $15.8 billion in sales, involved the F-16, raging from the request for tranches of fighters from Taiwan, Morocco and Bulgaria to $125 million for Pakistan security support related to their F-16 fighters. While the numbers are strong, Roman Schweizer, an analyst with Cowen, notes that political realities could upend an unusual number of these potential deals in the coming year. “Notably, for FY19, there are a number of large sales that may be unlikely for political or other reasons: these include a $3.5B sale to Turkey of Raytheon's Patriot missile system, a $2B sale to Taiwan of General Dynamics' M1 Abrams tanks, and an $8B sale to Taiwan of Lockheed Martin F-16s,” he wrote in a note to investors. “We don't think a Turkish Patriot purchase is possible as they continue to own/operate Russian-made S-400s. And while Taiwan needs U.S. weapons (fighters, tanks and more), there is a legitimate concern that those sales could be halted if there is a broader strategic agreement with China on trade and economic issues. “If that's the case, about 20% of this year's potential deals aren't viable, meaning this would be a step-down year but not quite as low as FY16's $37B in announcements.” From a corporate level, Schweizer estimates Lockheed Martin is the big winner for the year with $32 billion, followed by Raytheon at $15 billion, Boeing at $9 billion, General Dynamics at $3 billion, Northrop Grumman at $1.2 billion and Textron $600 million. A specific wrinkle for FY19's accounting was the inclusion of $3.9 billion as part of a controversial emergency package pushed through by the Trump administration for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For the better part of a year, those weapons were tied up in Congress over concerns of how they will be used as part of the Saudi-led actions against Iranian-backed fighters in Yemen, an operation that has contributed to a humanitarian crisis in that country. The issue escalated following the death of columnist Jamal Khashoggi, which has been tied to the Saudi royal family. In May, the State Department announced that an emergency exemption would be used to push those arm sales through; while the administration cited a broad threat from Iran in the region as the reason, the move received bipartisan rebuke from both the Senate and the House, with some members expressing concern this was a precedent-setting move to take away arms sale veto powers from Congress. That $3.9 billion was divided among seven FMS notifications, four for the UAE and three for Saudi Arabia. https://www.defensenews.com/global/2019/10/04/heres-how-many-foreign-military-sales-the-state-department-okd-in-fy19/