22 octobre 2019 | International, Aérospatial
By: Valerie Insinna
WASHINGTON — Boeing's risk reduction contract for the Air Force's Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program is functionally cancelled, the company announced Oct. 21.
“Boeing is disappointed in the Air Force's decision to not allot additional funding for the GBSD Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) contract,” said Boeing spokesman Todd Blecher. “The Boeing team has delivered substantial value under the contract, achieved all contract milestones on time and received strong performance feedback from the Air Force.”
“Continuing Boeing's TMRR contract would advance the Air Force's objectives of maturing the missile system's design and reducing the risk for this critical national priority capability,” he added.
GBSD is the Air Force's program to replace its existing Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles, a major priority for the service as well as for U.S. Strategic Command, which oversees the operations of America's nuclear arsenal.
Earlier on Monday evening, Politico reported that the Air Force had sent a letter to Boeing last week declaring its intent to stop funding the TMRR contract.
Without additional money from the Air Force to continue work, Boeing expected its funding stream for the GBSD contract to be exhausted on Oct. 18, the company stated in an Oct. 16 letter to the GBSD program office at Hill Air Force Base, Utah.
“The Air Force's decision not to allocate any further funding to the TMRR contract requires immediate and irrevocable actions by Boeing to wind down contract performance within the allotted funds. These measures include the reassignment of approximately 300 Boeing employees and the flow-down of a Stop Work notice to all suppliers working on the TMRR contract,” states the letter, which was obtained by Defense News.
Air Force spokeswoman Capt. Cara Bousie told Defense News that the service had not cancelled Boeing's TMRR contract. However, she declined to comment on whether the Air Force had sent Boeing a letter stating its intention to curtail funding for the contract.
Regardless of the semantics, a decision to cut short the TMRR contract would effectively hand the GBSD award to Northrop Grumman, the sole company competing against Boeing to produce the weapon system.
Both Boeing and Northrop were awarded risk reduction contracts worth up to $359 million in 2017, beating out Lockheed Martin for the chance to bring their designs into the production stage.
But Boeing withdrew from the GBSD competition in July, claiming that Northrop Grumman's purchase of one of the only two U.S. solid rocket motor manufacturers — Orbital ATK, now known as Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems — gave the company an unfair advantage in terms of being able to offer the lowest-cost system.
In a July 23 letter, Leanne Caret, who leads Boeing's defense business, wrote that the current acquisition approach gives Northrop “inherently unfair cost, resource and integration advantages.”
“We lack confidence in the fairness of any procurement that does not correct this basic imbalance between competitors,” she stated. Caret added that a joint bid between the two companies was unrealistic, as Northrop would have no incentive to partner with Boeing when it can put forward a solo bid.
However, Boeing switched tactics about a month later, with Frank McCall, its director of strategic deterrence systems, telling reporters in September that the company hoped to persuade the Air Force to force Northrop to partner with it.
“We think clearly it's time for the Air Force or other governmental entities to engage and direct the right solution. Northrop has elected not to do that,” McCall said during the Air Force Association's annual conference. “So, we're looking for government intervention to drive us to the best solution.”
The Air Force did not take Boeing up on that suggestion. Nor did Northrop, which pointedly released its list of suppliers days before the AFA conference. The list — which featured Aerojet Rocketdyne, Collins Aerospace, Lockheed Martin and other major defense contractors — did not include Boeing.
Boeing, in its letter to the program office, stated that the dissolution of the risk reduction contract could disadvantage the Air Force as it moves forward with the GBSD program, even if it ultimately opts to sole-source from Northrop.
“The Government's decision also prevents Boeing from completing the work left to be performed under the TMRR contract, including the major milestones of a successful Software System Review and Preliminary Design Review,” it said. "We believe this work would provide substantial value to the Government, irrespective of the fact that Boeing will not participate as a prime offeror under the current EMD [engineering, manufacturing and development] solicitation structure for the next phase of the GBSD program.
In September, McCall pointed to Boeing's ongoing risk reduction work on GBSD as a positive sign that the service may not be ready to sole-source the program to Northrop.
“The service is maintaining our work," he said. “They continue to accept our deliverables, continue to fund our contract. So, I think we're in good shape with the service.”
But with the TMRR contract revoked, Boeing's last hope may be an appeal to Congress. Sen. Doug Jones of Alabama as someone who has already raised shown support for Boeing's position, McCall said in September.
McCall declined to name others, but should this turn into a legislative fight, it could come down to Boeing's supporters – with strongholds in Alabama, Washington and Missouri – versus those of Northrop Grumman.
9 juillet 2022 | International, Aérospatial
The election closes a period of remarkable open conflict between Aerojet's top leaders that spilled into the open as its proposed acquisition by Lockheed Martin foundered.
15 juillet 2020 | International, Naval
By: Sam LaGrone July 14, 2020 8:48 PM • Updated: July 15, 2020 6:38 AM The Navy has awarded a contract for the first unmanned surface vessel it will design and build on its own, a key milestone for the eventual family of unmanned systems that will be a key component of the future surface fleet, according to a Monday contract announcement from the Pentagon. L3 Technologies won a $35-million contract to develop a prototype medium unmanned surface vehicle (MUSV) on Monday, which could grow to $281 million if options for eight follow-on craft are exercised, Naval Sea Systems Command announced. The contract calls for delivering the first prototype by the end of the Fiscal Year 2023, according to a release from NAVSEA. “The president's 2021 budget request for the Navy includes additional funding for a second MUSV prototype in FY23. The acquisition strategy for the FY23 vessel is to be determined, however, for flexibility, the development contract contains options for additional USVs,” read the statement. The award to L3 for MUSV is the Navy's first bite at the apple for developing a USV. DARPA contracted for two Sea Hunter vessels in what was originally the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) program but has since shifted its focus to be the predecessor to MUSV. A Pentagon office also contracted for two Large USVs as part of the Overlord program, and the Navy will also take those vessels and use them to shape an eventual LUSV program of its own. The Navy envisions a family of unmanned systems that will be the backbone of a future fleet of netted “attritable” platforms that will provide lower-cost options compared to manned surface combatants like the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer or the new FFG(X) frigate program. “The initial focus is on the design, fabrication, testing and support of funded MUSV prototype vehicles. Rapid prototyping efforts will inform procurement of additional MUSV units,” Navy spokesman Capt. Danny Hernandez told USNI News on Tuesday. “The Navy will continue to assess the MUSV acquisition plan and has the option to conduct new or additional competitions, if warranted.” According to a notional list of requirements reviewed by USNI News in 2019, the MUSV would “function as a sensor and communications relay as part of a family of unmanned surface systems being developed by the service. The craft will be able to carry a payload equivalent to a 40-foot shipping container, will operate on its own for at least 60 days before needing to return to port, and be capable of refueling at sea,” reported USNI News. “The craft will have to also be able to autonomously operate under the rules of the maritime road at a cruising speed of about 16 knots with a minimum range of about 4,500 nautical miles and operate via a government-provided communication relay system.” L3 served as a subcontractor for Leidos, the lead contractor for the Sea Hunter program that DARPA contracted for before passing it off to the Navy. However, the next version of the MUSV will be different from the Sea Hunter, Navy officials told USNI News this week. “The MUSV and the existing Sea Hunter vessel have differing missions and requirements. The existing Sea Hunter vessel was designed and built with the mission of anti-submarine warfare and would be capable of tracking and following submarines using a hull-mounted sonar array over long distances. The MUSV will provide and improve distributed situational awareness in maritime areas of responsibility through [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] and [electronic warfare] implemented by modular payloads,” Hernandez told USNI News. While the program is under development, the current Sea Hunter has been assigned to Surface Development Squadron 1 and is set to operate with a carrier strike group in the near future. L3 Technologies Inc., Camden, New Jersey, is awarded a $34,999,948 fixed-price-incentive-firm-target contract for the detail design and fabrication of a prototype Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MUSV). This contract includes options for up to eight additional MUSVs, logistics packages, engineering support, technical data, and other direct costs, which, if exercised, will bring the cumulative value of this contract to $281,435,446. Work will be performed in Morgan City, Louisiana (72.7%); Arlington, Virginia (9.8%); Jeanerette, Louisiana (8.1%); New Orleans, Louisiana (6.6%); Worthington, Ohio (1.7%); Lafayette, Louisiana (0.9 %); and Gautier, Mississippi (0.2%), and is expected to be completed by December 2022. If all options are exercised, work will continue through June 2027. Fiscal 2019 and 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funding in the amount of $34,999,948 will be obligated at the time of award, and $29,779,038 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. https://news.usni.org/2020/07/14/navy-awards-contract-for-first-vessel-in-its-family-of-unmanned-surface-vehicles
11 juin 2019 | International, Sécurité, Autre défense
by Michael O'Hanlon All is busy on NATO's eastern front. That was our main conclusion during a recent study delegation to Lithuania sponsored by the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense and organized by the Atlantic Council. A lot is happening on the defense preparation front, and the overall security situation is improving considerably compared with a few years ago. But problems remain and work still has to be done, if deterrence and stability are to be ensured, and a potentially devastating war with Russia prevented. As many people will recall, the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with a combined population of some six million and combined military strength of some thirty thousand active-duty troops, joined NATO in 2004. All three border Russia, though in the case of Lithuania, that border is in the western part of the country (near Russia's Kaliningrad pocket). Lithuania's eastern frontier is shared with Belarus, a close ally of Moscow, at Vladimir Putin's insistence. Its southern border touches Poland, along the famed “Suwalki gap,” the narrow land corridor through which NATO would likely send most of its tens of thousands of reinforcements during any major crisis or conflict with Russia over the Baltics. All three Baltic states, plus Poland, are now among the seven of NATO's twenty-nine members that meet their obligations to spend at least 2 percent of gross domestic product on their militaries, however imperfect a metric of burden-sharing that formal NATO requirement may be. In Lithuania's case, this represents a tripling of military spending since 2013. Give President Donald Trump and President Barack Obama some of the credit for recent increases if you wish. But give the Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Poles the majority of the credit—with a nod, of course, to Vladimir Putin, who has done more to unify and motivate eastern Europeans' security efforts than anyone else this century. Since 2014, when Russia seized Crimea in Ukraine and stoked a conflict in Ukraine's east that continues to this day, NATO has been gradually fortifying its eastern flank, in the Baltic states and Poland. It now has a multinational battalion-size battlegroup (of about one thousand soldiers) in each of the three Baltic states, plus a larger U.S. brigade-sized presence in Poland (with occasional, but intermittent, American deployments into the Baltic states for exercising and signaling resolve). The battalion in Lithuania is backstopped by Germany, with additional major contributions from the Czech Republic and the Netherlands. These battalions are collectively described as the “enhanced forward presence” or eFP program, following NATO's Operation Atlantic Resolve; the U.S. element is often described as the European deterrence initiative. Adding in those rotational deployments, there are some thirty-five thousand total NATO troops in the Baltics, with only a smattering of Americans on most days. Russia has well over one hundred thousand of its own recently-improved forces just across the border and could probably muster closer to two hundred thousand with little effort under the guise of an exercise, if it wished. The Lithuanians' recent defense efforts need to be put in perspective. The nation is resolute, with 80 percent supporting NATO forces deployed to its territory and all of the recent major presidential candidates—and eventual winner—favoring the ongoing defense buildup. But it does not seem paranoid, or on serious edge, even as the officials we saw were clear about the challenge and legitimately focused on progress. While a military budget at 2 percent of GDP, headed towards 2.5 percent, is an impressive defense effort, it does not reflect the dire sense of urgency of a society expecting imminent war. After all, the United States and Russia each spend more than 3 percent of GDP on their armed forces; in fact, NATO aimed for a 3 percent minimum during the Cold War, when the United States typically spent upwards of 5 percent of GDP on its military. And for all the enhancements to its two main combat brigades, Lithuania has restrained from fortifying the eastern and western flanks of the country with smart minefields or other barriers to invasion. For its part, NATO more generally has stationed the eFP forces but has not tied them into a truly integrated combat force; nor has it deployed many helicopters or air defense systems into the Baltic states. It certainly has not prestationed the seven brigades of capability that a 2016 RAND Corporation simulation estimated as necessary to constitute a viable forward defense position. The current level of effort, vigilant but tempered, strikes us as roughly appropriate to the circumstances at hand. While there are still conflict scenarios that can be imagined, it is hard to think that President Putin believes he could really get away with naked aggression against any NATO member, including those in the Baltic region. Even if NATO does not have an adequate forward defense in place against hypothetical Russian aggression, it does have a rather robust forward tripwire, combined with increasingly credible ways of rapidly reinforcing that tripwire in a crisis. Still, there are three additional lines of effort that Washington and other NATO capitals should pursue in the interest of greater deterrence, stability, and predictability in eastern Europe. First, as a recent Atlantic Council report, “Permanent Deterrence,” underscored, NATO should strengthen key pieces of its modest military presence in Poland and the Baltic states. Much of this can happen in the Polish/American sector, but elements of it should extend to the Baltics as well. It makes good sense to combine greater combat engineering capability for military mobility, so as to better move reinforcements into the east in the face of possible Russian opposition, together with plugging gaps in areas such as combat aviation and air defense, and pre-stocking certain equipment. Moscow may complain, but it cannot credibly view such additions as major NATO additions or provocations, especially because they are modest, and because Russian actions have necessitated them. Second, nonmilitary elements of NATO resoluteness need to be strengthened, too. As discussed in The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War over Small Stakes, there are various types of very small Russian probing attacks that could leave NATO flummoxed and paralyzed over how to respond. These attacks might not reach the threshold where all alliance members would wish to invoke NATO's Article V mutual-defense clause and send military forces in response, yet they could be too serious to ignore. NATO should conceptualize such scenarios and exercise crisis decisionmaking in advance while honing various economic and diplomatic approaches to complement any military responses. NATO also needs to develop more contingency plans for economic warfare with Russia that would provide alternative energy sources in a crisis. Lithuania's recent development of a liquefied natural gas terminal is exemplary in this regard. Third, while projecting resolve vis-à-vis Moscow, including retention of the EU and U.S. sanctions that have been imposed on Russia in recent years, NATO needs to rethink its broader strategy towards Russia. This strategy should include options for bettering relations in a post–Putin Russia. Various types of security architectures and arrangements should be explored and debated. For now, with a new president in Kiev, a concerted effort to help Ukraine reform its economy and further weed out corruption makes eminent sense. Things are moving in the right direction in eastern Europe, but there is considerable work left to be done. Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of the new book, The Senkaku Paradox; Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/report-natos-front-lines-62067