Bell Boeing awarded $144 million for V-22 support

Sur le même sujet

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  29 août 2019 | International, Terrestre

  Swiss seek package deal of ground-based weapons, combat aircraft

  By: Sebastian Sprenger COLOGNE, Germany — The Swiss government plans to make the integration of combat aircraft and ground-based air defense assets a key benchmark in its planned $8 billion Air 2030 program, according to officials. Program leaders disclosed the desire for a high degree of interplay between the two competing missile-defense offers and four possible aircraft types during a news conference in the capital Bern earlier this month. The comments reveal a new front in the selection criteria for one of Europe's most prized defense acquisitions, where the air and ground portions had always existed as separate tracks. Fear of fratricide in Switzerland's small and crowded airspace is one of two key factors driving the need for close integration between ground and aerial assets, said Swiss Air Force Col. Marco Forrer. Given the country's alpine terrain and the requirement to hit targets more than 50 kilometers away and over 12 kilometers high, official are concerned about erroneously downing civilian planes, he said. “That's why BodLuv has to be integrated into the Air Force operational picture and command-and-control network,” Forrer said, referring to the German-language acronym for the ground-based program Bodengestützte Luftverteidigung. Forrer added that a high level of integration also is crucial to keeping costs down, enabling air defenders to engage targets with greater precision and — hopefully — fewer misses. Of the total Air 2030 program, $6 billion is slated for a new fleet of aircraft, while $2 billion is budgeted for ground-based defenses. In the aerial segment, the planes in play are the Airbus Eurofighter Typhoon, the Lockheed Martin F-35, Dassault's Rafale and Boeing's F-18 Super Hornet. In the ground segment, Swiss officials are left with choosing between Raytheon's Patriot and the SAMP-T system, which is made by an MBDA-Thales consortium called Eurosam. Israel's Rafael, which was also invited to bid with its David's Sling system, never responded to the invitation, presumably following pressure by the Israeli or American governments to stay out of the race. Swiss officials have complained that they never got a straight answer explaining Rafael's abstention, and the company's non-response has left them worried about the losing an element of competition in the race that could make for lower costs. “It can have a negative impact on the competitive situation,” said Christian Catrina, who oversees Air 2030 at Switzerland's defense ministry. “We will never know if so and how strongly. We would have appreciated having three contenders.” Following a similar wave of aircraft tests in Switzerland over the spring and early summer, evaluations of the two ground-based systems, namely regarding their radar sensors, began this month. First up is the Patriot system with a two-week test, which will end Aug. 30; SAMP-T is next, beginning Sept. 16. The tests will take place at an army range near Menzingen, central Switzerland, where the Swiss operated the Bloodhound weapon system until its retirement in the late 1990s. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/08/28/swiss-seek-package-deal-of-ground-based-weapons-combat-aircraft/

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  6 janvier 2024 | International, Terrestre

  Finland to purchase more Patria 6x6 armoured vehicles

  The agreement also included a purchase option up to 70 vehicles of which the Finnish Defence Forces now redeems 40 vehicles.

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  3 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Securing the final frontier: Digital twins, satellites and cybersecurity

  Kevin Coggins The United States and our allies are increasingly dependent on unfettered access to space. However, it has become abundantly clear that our space systems have significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities that our adversaries are eager to exploit. Earlier this year, William Akoto wrote about the growing constellations of satellites operated by private industry, led by SpaceX, Blue Origin and others: “If hackers were to take control of these satellites, the consequences could be dire. On the mundane end of scale, hackers could simply shut satellites down, denying access to their services. Hackers could also jam or spoof the signals from satellites, creating havoc for critical infrastructure. This includes electric grids, water networks and transportation systems.” Space Policy Directive 5, recently issued by the White House, notes that “cybersecurity principles and practices that apply to terrestrial systems also apply to space systems” and that we must integrate these principles and practices into every phase of the space system life cycle. SPD-5 is charting the right course toward assuring our cybersecurity in the space domain. This article highlights the unique vulnerabilities of space systems and how innovative solutions like “digital twins” can help us protect systems in orbit today and design more secure ones for the future. Cyberattacks on space systems — comprised of satellites, ground control stations, and user terminals (e.g., GPS receivers) — are appealing to nation-states, criminal groups, hackers and other bad actors. It's a tremendous opportunity to breach data and disrupt operations in a low-risk way with a low cost of execution. The different components that make up space systems each come with their own set of cyber vulnerabilities, the ground segment in particular. Some space systems were built with speed to market rather than cybersecurity in mind. In contrast, for traditional defense-focused space systems, a slower design and development process has introduced vulnerabilities as well. Space systems operating today may have taken a full 20 years to go from paper to launch and lack the capabilities to recognize or respond to today's cyberthreats. Space systems are increasingly interconnected — a malicious attack can easily spread from a single point of vulnerability in a ground station to the satellites. Cybersecurity in space systems has struggled to keep pace with the rapid evolution of threat actors and exploits. Given these challenges, how can organizations with space systems stay ahead of cyberthreats and protect their missions and users? The older approach of paper-based assessments has significant limitations, like the inability to duplicate reactions to all possible scenarios. At the other end of the spectrum, full-scale replicas are expensive and time-consuming to build. In the middle is the “digital twin” concept — a virtual mirror model that synchronizes a physical object with a cyber representation. With this approach, organizations can test a satellite in different scenarios to identify vulnerabilities and develop protection strategies, even before the satellite is built. One specific project that demonstrated digital twins' strengths and capabilities: testing Air Force GPS space systems for vulnerabilities after the passage of Section 1647 of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. Starting with a model-based system engineering review of thousands of pages of design documents, we built a digital replica of critical GPS Block IIR satellite components launched between 1987 and 2004 that ran on a single laptop with lightweight applications. Our digital twin created the foundation for a flexible cyber test bed — a suite of scalable software applications to demonstrate and validate cyber vulnerabilities and protection strategies as the system is designed or modified. The test bed can connect with assets beyond the network to generate data, provide war-gaming support and explore attack scenarios. We need this flexibility and functionality for future space system protection. The next generation of satellites will encounter more extreme service conditions and increased, simultaneous cyberattack vectors over longer periods of time. To respond to these challenges, these space systems will need increasingly complex designs, and with such complexity comes potentially greater vulnerability to cyberattacks and threats. Digital twins and model-based system engineering approaches can strengthen security throughout the acquisition and sustainment phases. Use them to: Develop system requirements and analyze design trades. Create test scenarios for requirements clarification and reference systems. Simulate threats, anomalies and impacts without risk to critical infrastructure. Assess the impact of new threats or operational scenarios on an on-orbit system design. What can space system acquisition professionals, developers and operators learn here? Digital twins offer an innovative approach that can streamline and strengthen the testing and design process of our space assets. They can also provide insights on as-built systems and enable the buydown of risks across the space system life cycle, enabling affordability across the entire system life cycle. Now is the time to leverage their capabilities, to ensure that the space infrastructure so vital to our security and American way of life has the protection it requires. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/11/02/securing-the-final-frontier-digital-twins-satellites-and-cybersecurity/