18 mars 2022 | International, Aérospatial
Boeing completes critical design review for protected satellite communications payload
The design milestone positions the company to begin integration and test next year.
23 juillet 2018 | International, Aérospatial
Tout comme son partenaire Airbus, le groupe attend des contrats d'études et de développement de démonstrateurs.
«Une bonne nouvelle.» La décision du Royaume-Uni de lancer, lundi 16 juillet, un nouvel avion de combat pour succéder à l'Eurofighter et au F-35 américain, qui équipent ses forces armées, est bien accueillie par Éric Trappier, PDG de Dassault Aviation*. «Cette décision prouve que l'aviation de combat est un sujet stratégique pour les pays européens, qu'elle suscite de l'enthousiasme et de la compétition face à la volonté hégémonique des États-Unis», a-t-il développé en marge de la publication des résultats semestriels du groupe ce jeudi.
Le programme britannique, baptisé Tempest, répond au projet d'avion de combat franco-allemand qui doit succéder au Rafale français, construit par Dassault Aviation, et à l'Eurofighter, fabriqué par Airbus Defence, BAE Systems et Leonardo.
L'Eurofighter équipe plusieurs armées européennes dont l'Allemagne. Plusieurs jalons ont été franchis depuis l'impulsion politique donnée par Emmanuel Macron et la chancelière Angela Merkel, en juillet 2017. Dernier en date, la signature, lors du sommet franco-allemand de juin dernier, de deux lettres d'intention commune: la première pour la réalisation du Système de combat aérien du futur (Scaf), qui sera mis en service à horizon 2040 ; la seconde pour la conception d'un char de combat opérationnel à partir de 2035.
Après cette étape importante, les deux grands partenaires du projet, Dassault Aviation, maître d'œuvre du futur avion de combat, et Airbus Defence attendent l'entrée en vigueur de contrats d'études et de développement de démonstrateurs. Il faut établir une feuille de route en balisant les développements et en passant par une réduction des risques gr'ce à la simulation et aux démonstrateurs.
Dassault Aviation attend «un engagement dans le temps long» et un budget sanctuarisé. Et «le plus tôt serait le mieux», souligne Éric Trappier. Il relève que le Royaume-Uni a annoncé un investissement de 2 milliards de livres (2,3 milliards d'euros) d'ici à 2025 dans le projet Tempest. Comme si les Britanniques tentaient de prendre de vitesse l'alliance franco-allemande. À terme, ces deux projets pourraient-ils converger? Trop tôt pour le dire. Si le Scaf franco-allemand a vocation à embarquer d'autres pays européens, au préalable, il «faut une locomotive. Et elle est formée de deux pays, la France et l'Allemagne», résume Éric Trappier.
À ce stade, Saab, qui construit le Gripen, le 3e avion de combat européen, n'a pas rendu publiques ses intentions. Le suédois modernise son appareil, tout comme Dassault Aviation, qui, parallèlement au Scaf qui prépare le long terme, améliore le Rafale avec le standard F3R et, demain, le standard F4.
Au cours du semestre écoulé, le groupe français a continué à livrer des Rafale dont deux à la France. Dassault Aviation a également signé un nouveau lot de 12 Rafale pour le Qatar. Doha a levé une option prise, en mai 2015, dans le cadre d'un premier contrat portant sur l'achat de 24 avions de combat français. Le Qatar a également pris une nouvelle option pour 36 appareils de plus.
L'activité militaire de Dassault est tirée par les livraisons du Rafale aux clients exports et à l'éventuelle concrétisation de nouveaux contrats à l'international. Le Rafale est notamment en lice en Belgique. Après trois années blanches (2019-2021), les livraisons aux armées françaises doivent reprendre en 2022. Quant aux jets d'affaires Falcon, ils évoluent sur un marché «qui va mieux et repart», souligne Éric Trappier. Les stocks de jets d'occasion ont décru et les ventes d'avions neufs se redressent (18 prises de commandes au 1er semestre). «L'embellie vient du marché américain et du redémarrage de l'Asie. Nous espérons que l'Europe va suivre», développe le PDG du groupe.
Autre source de satisfaction, le lancement, en mars 2018, du 6X, le nouveau Falcon à long rayon d'action et large cabine, qui doit entrer en service en 2022. Son bon démarrage commercial a permis de tirer un trait sur le Falcon 5X, dont le carnet de commandes en a été totalement expurgé. Pour 2018, Dassault prévoit de livrer 12 Rafale et 40 Falcon et de réaliser un chiffre d'affaires proche de celui de 2017 (4,8 milliards d'euros).
18 mars 2022 | International, Aérospatial
The design milestone positions the company to begin integration and test next year.
3 avril 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval
By: Aaron Mehta How will US Marines adjust for the future fight? | Reagan Defense Forum 2019 WASHINGTON — The top officer in the U.S. Marine Corps is sticking to the planned procurement of the F-35 joint strike fighter — but indicated a willingness to cut planes in the future if analysis says it makes sense. Marine Commandant Gen. David Berger told reporters Wednesday that he is a firm believer in the capabilities the F-35 is bringing, in particular the jump-jet B model favored by the service. However, Berger made it clear he's not wedded to long-term procurement plans, at a time the corps is shedding legacy missions as it pivots to focus to a primarily naval-focused service. “Right now, the program of record plows ahead as it is,” he said. “But I'm signaling to the industry, we have to be prepared to adjust as the operating environment adjusts. Right now, the program of record stays the same, but we will — we must — adapt to the adversary and we must adapt to the operating environment that we're challenged with being in.” Berger noted that an upcoming independent review of his force posture plans, expected to be completed in the next few months, could be a forcing function for more changes. Already, his planning guidance to the corps changed how many planes are featured in each F-35 squad, from 16 to 10. Longstanding plans call for the Marines to procure 353 of the F-35B and 67 of the F-35C carrier variants. “There's nothing like it,” Berger said of the jet. “The F-35B, the ability to operate from austere airfields and ships both, [is] incredible. In wargames, it's one of the handful of capabilities that really caused an adversary problems, because it is so flexible, it's deployable ashore or from ship. Gamechanger is sort of an overused phrase, but I'm a huge advocate of the F-35 and its capabilities.” Broadly speaking, Berger said, what will drive how many F-35s are in a squadron going forward, or how many the Corps eventually buys, comes down to maintenance — a longstanding issue for the stealthy jet. “If the maintenance readiness of the F-35 proves to be very, very strong, then of course, like any other system you need less of them because more of them are up all the time. On the other hand, if it turns out not to be so, then you're going to need more of them, to account for the ones that are in repair, that are down right now,” he said. Complicating that issue is what he called the “unique” supply chain for the jet, which in theory lets parts flow in from all over the world, as opposed to the traditional U.S. based supply. “In all aspects, we absolutely know we will learn along the way, and if its appropriate we will make adjustments” to either the squad level or the overall buy, Berger said. “But it's not a lack of confidence in the airframe at all.” https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/04/01/top-marine-signaling-to-industry-that-f-35-cuts-are-on-the-table/
4 décembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
By: Jeffrey A. Stacey After the successful 2011 Libya operation, it appeared the U.S. and European allies were on the cusp of a new era of working together on international crises, only to stall out thanks to economic austerity and populist elections. Now that the refugee crisis in Europe is subsiding and allied troops and equipment have deployed to Poland and the Baltics, the window of opportunity has once again opened for deepening relations between the European Union and NATO. By setting up an EU-NATO informal track, regularizing operational transitions and embarking on expanded coordination in out-of-area operations — all of which are more crucial, given a potential Brexit and the 2020 U.S. election — these two crucial, overlapping alliances can step into a new era. There are two logical diplomatic tracks to be pursued: a formal track centered on implementation of EU and NATO ministerials/summits, as well as an informal track centered on working through difficult issues and preparing them for decision-makers. Senior officials from both organizations have commented recently that the informal track would be particularly useful for the kind of deep-dive, “peer around the corner” strategizing that busy officials are rarely afforded an opportunity to engage in. The EU is a global leader in what it calls “crisis management,” and what NATO refers to as “stabilization and reconstruction.” Joint planning ahead of such operations, aligning civil/military planning in advance, will allow for improved outcomes in theater. In general, NATO would gain a new capability to act in the immediate aftermath of its military operations when a crisis occurs, and the EU would gain the opportunity to spearhead joint Western crisis management as a matter of course. Taking a cue from the so-called changing of berets in the 2004 NATO mission in Bosnia — when European soldiers involved in the terminating NATO mission simply changed their uniforms out for EU uniforms and remained in place to take part in the EU follow-on mission — there is a strong likelihood that a similar arrangement can be made for deployed civilians. The EU and NATO have ample reasons to agree to regularize operational leadership transitions in moving from the military phase of a conflict to the post-conflict stabilization phase. Here's how it could work: The EU would be designated to spearhead the stabilization phase, having jointly planned this phase of the operation with NATO civilian planners at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. NATO would commit to always selecting a European as the head of the NATO temporary civilian operation, and would call up a modest number of civilian experts from the nations, who would deploy to theater and engage in a delimited number of core stabilization tasks with the plan for a larger EU-led civilian deployment to absorb the NATO operation. NATO civilian operators would focus on a discrete set of core stabilization tasks awaiting the follow-on EU mission to become more comprehensive. Once a decision to deploy a civilian mission occurs in Brussels, the NATO stabilization mission would devolve to the EU. Most of the civilian experts will already be from EU countries, with the mission head also European. The rest of the NATO civilians can be seconded to the civilian operation mission via framework agreements such as the extant one between the U.S. and the EU that already has seconded Americans to EU missions in Africa. This operational compromise would prevent either alliance from playing second fiddle, ushering in a new era of co-planning and cooperating for both. Why can't both sides “just do it,” i.e., simply enact a leadership transition in theater whenever the need arises? Pragmatism can work in the moment, but it doesn't set precedents, as proven by the fact this is not already happening; past “impromptu” experiences of working together on the ground have not led to any pattern or even expectation of repeat or improved cooperating since. This proposal is firmly in the EU's interests, as it will put it fully in the driver's seat of crisis management and bring the EU the recognition it deserves for its existing capabilities and substantial operational experience. This proposal is also firmly in NATO's interests, for the alliance that almost split over its ongoing Afghanistan operation has no interest in further prolonged field deployments. There is also an additional strategic opportunity for both, as closer EU-NATO cooperation would be an important means for keeping the U.K. connected with its EU partners in the security and defense field following Brexit. But with crises around the world proliferating, in more pressing terms these two critical overlapping alliances among Western allies need to jointly become more operationally ready. Despite the political challenges in numerous Western countries, an agreement to overcome the EU-NATO operational impasse is on the cards. Prior to the negative impact of U.S. President Donald Trump's arrival, NATO-EU relations had been at their pinnacle. With an EU-NATO informal track and a means for overcoming the operational hurdle in hand, substantial progress can still be made prior to the next U.S. administration. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/12/03/how-to-take-eu-nato-relations-from-words-to-action/