11 janvier 2022 | International, Aérospatial

Atos accompagne Dassault Aviation dans le développement du Falcon Albatros

Atos accompagne Dassault Aviation dans le développement et la production de la nouvelle version du système vidéo embarqué à bord du Falcon Albatros, futur avion de surveillance et d'intervention maritime de l'aéronautique navale française. Prévu pour une mise en service en 2025 dans le cadre du programme AVSIMAR conduit par la Direction générale de l'armement (DGA), la Marine nationale va acquérir l'Albatros, ce qui contribuera au renouvellement de ses capacités pour la protection et la défense maritime du territoire. Le programme AVSIMAR vise à répond aux enjeux de l'action de l'Etat en mer (lutte contre la pollution et les trafics, surveillance des frontières et des zones exclusives, etc) ; pour cela, l'Albatros est doté d'un système de mission de dernière génération et de systèmes de communication dédiés. Atos prend en charge la conception et la production du système vidéo embarqué qui intègre les enjeux de sécurité informatique. « Nous sommes fiers d'accompagner Dassault Aviation dans la préparation des Falcon Albatros qui soutiendront l'Etat dans ses missions de surveillance et d'intervention maritime » a déclaré Cyril Dujardin, SVP, Directeur des activités Digital Security chez Atos. « Ce projet stratégique nous permet de consolider notre relation de long terme avec Dassault Aviation autour des systèmes embarqués et de mettre en œuvre notre expertise en matière de systèmes de missions sécuritaires et de vidéo haute définition sur fibre optique ».

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    20 avril 2018 | International, Naval

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    18 mars 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

    The Pentagon is handling cyber vulnerabilities inconsistently

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    Saab eyes Colombia, Peru as potential Gripen clients amid Latam push

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