23 septembre 2024 | International, Terrestre
2 juin 2020 | International, Naval
By: Valerie Insinna
WASHINGTON — In the coming years, the U.S. Navy will be faced with a decision that will radically shape the carrier air wing: Is the service willing to sacrifice dozens of new Super Hornet jets for the promise of a sixth-generation fighter in the 2030s?
The Navy is opting to buy a final 24 F/A-18E/Fs in fiscal 2021, slashing a planned purchase of at least 36 Super Hornets that would have spanned FY22 through FY24. The move will save $4.5 billion, which the service plans to redirect to its sixth-generation fighter program, known as Next Generation Air Dominance, or F/A-XX.
However, the decision may not be as clear cut — or final — as budget documents make it seem.
The Navy is at the very start of the NGAD development process, having completed an analysis of alternatives in June 2019, as well as broad requirements and guidance for a concept of operations. The effort is now in the concept development phase, during which defense companies explore ideas “that balance advanced air dominance capabilities and long-term affordability/sustainment,” said Navy spokesman Capt. Danny Hernandez.
But with an economic downturn potentially leading to even more pressure on the defense budget, the Navy may not have the funds to proceed with NGAD as a clean-sheet fighter jet.
“Although the Navy would like to start developing the next generation of aircraft ... I just don't think — and increasingly people in the department are thinking — there's not going to be the money to devote to this next generation of fighter,” said Bryan Clark, an analyst with the Hudson Institute and a retired naval officer.
“I think they are going to fall back to looking at F/A-XX as a modification or an evolution of the F-35,” he said. “Instead of the other half of the air wing being some new aircraft, you'll have a combination of F-35Cs and then some modified version of the F-35 or a modified Super Hornet."
Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and an analyst with the Telemus Group, said the service's enthusiasm for F/A-XX is a sign of a continued preference for manned aviation as well as a desire to shut out any hope of fielding a long-range, penetrating strike drone.
“I've always been in favor of extending the Hornet production line because it is solid and stable,” Hendrix said. “But the extension was based on the proviso that we're extending in order to get to an unmanned combat aerial vehicle. If it was an extension to get to the next manned fighter ... we're missing the idea of what the future competitive environment, or really the present competitive environment, is all about.”
A tightrope of risk
The Navy has grappled in prior years with the question of whether to cease production of the Super Hornet in favor of a future fighter, and it is an argument that lawmakers are wary of.
The Navy first planned to stop buying the F/A-18 in its FY15 budget — a decision made to fund the transition to the F-35. But technical issues and delays pushed out the fielding of the Navy's F-35C takeoff-and-landing model for aircraft carriers to 2018, leaving the service dependent on a fleet of aging, battle-worn F/A-18s in need of a service-life extension. The Navy ended up listing the F/A-18 on its unfunded priorities list, and Congress followed by funding enough Super Hornets to keep Boeing's line running.
“If we go back a few years and we look at what happened when we thought we were going to plant the F-35, we let the F-18 slide down,” Rep. Donald Norcross, D-N.J., said in a March 10 hearing. Norcross is the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces.
The process of standing up the F-35C was much slower than expected, and the Navy ended up buying additional F/A-18s to bridge the capability gap, he said. “Yet, here we are getting ready to curtail 36 Super Hornets because we are expecting, you know, the F/A-XX to come online,” he added.
Asked how he could be confident that F/A-XX would stay on schedule, Rear Adm. Gregory Harris, the Navy's director of air warfare, said he could provide lawmakers a more detailed defense of the Navy's Next Generation Air Dominance family of systems in a classified setting.
“We're working closely with the Air Force to ensure the systems that we put on that have the [technology readiness level] that gives us confidence that we can achieve that aircraft on time in the early 2030s to replace the F/A-18E/F as it reaches the end of its service life,” Harris said.
Missouri Rep. Vicky Hartzler, the subcommittee's top Republican, pointed out that the Navy already has a fighter shortfall of about 49 aircraft, with additional F/A-18s being pulled from the operational fleet into a service-life extension period that will take at least a year.
“I feel like this is too much operational risk,” she said. “If you add all those up, this is a severe shortage that we are experiencing, and if you don't account for the attrition rate, actually in combat we would have a very large gap there potentially.”
James Geurts, the Navy's assistant secretary for research, development and acquisition, said there is always risk when transitioning from legacy to new aircraft, but that improved mission-capable rates and a steady flow of jets moving through upgrades will help balance the shortfall.
“We're taking risk until the late 2020s. I think 2029 is when we will get to the full fighter inventory, and so we had to take some risk as we balance that,” he said.
The most likely scenario is that, as the Navy presses forward with its plan to curtail funding for F/A-18s, Congress will simply continue buying more of them, Hendrix said.
But one unanswered question is whether lawmakers will also intervene to force the Navy to consider a wider range of aviation options that could give the carrier air wing longer legs.
“I'm hopeful that there will be a broader conversation, led by Congress and the administration, perhaps together, to say: ‘We are looking at the future security environment. We are looking at the Chinese threat. We are looking at what's happening in Taiwan, what's happening [in] Hong Kong and within the first island chain, and we really need to have this new capability of long-range, penetrating strike,' ” Hendrix said.
“What I do realize is that because the Navy is very conservative right now in how it's approaching its procurement programs, the Navy will not be the one to say we need this mission.”
No matter what the Navy decides, it could impact its procurement of the MQ-25 unmanned tanker drone currently under development by Boeing. Hendrix sees the MQ-25 program as a likely bill payer, particularly if the service continues to buy Hornets.
“What was the reason for the MQ-25? It was to take the strain off from the Hornets,” which were being used to refuel other F/A-18s and burning through their service lives faster than anticipated, Hendrix said. “When you reopen the Hornet production line and you add 120-something new Hornets, you actually took that strain off the Hornet fleet. So there really isn't a requirement now for a recovery tanker.”
Clark agrees that the Navy should develop a long-range unmanned combat aircraft but is unlikely to do so.
But should the Navy choose not to proceed with an F/A-XX program, Clark believes the service could funnel some of that money into modifying the MQ-25 to supplement strike, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacities, and could even end buy more MQ-25s than planned.
“The MQ-25 program, once it gets fielded and proven out, I could see the Navy expanding it,” he said. “I think the operational and programmatic pressures have driven the Navy to embrace the MQ-25, and because it's a complement to the manned aircraft, it's generated less resentment among the manned aviation community.”
23 septembre 2024 | International, Terrestre
17 août 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
By: Fenella McGerty The two Russian defense companies in this year's Top 100 list — air defense missile systems manufacturer Almaz-Antey and weapons developer Tactical Missiles Corporation JSC — have again fallen in rank. Almaz-Antey has fallen to 17th place from 8th and 15th in 2018 and 2019 respectively. Similarly, Tactical Missiles Corporation JSC has fallen to 35th place from 25th and 32nd in 2018 and 2019 respectively. The falling revenues of the companies this year reflect the difficult market conditions these enterprises are operating in as a result of the impact of COVID-19 on government budgets. Even before the pandemic and the consequent contraction in economic output emerged, the outlook for Russian defense spending was already subdued in light of persistently low oil prices in 2019. Domestic spending was further constrained this year as the oil price fell below $20 per barrel in April, with the projected average price for the year reaching just $40 per barrel. The International Monetary Fund forecasts a 6.6 percent contraction in Russia's real gross domestic product this year as lockdown measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 subdued domestic and international economic activity, the latter further weakening global energy demand. The 4.1 percent growth projected for 2021 means the Russian economy will only return to pre-pandemic output in 2022. Last month, as part of wider measures to offset the bleaker fiscal setting, the Russian Ministry of Finance proposed a 5 percent reduction in financing for the state armament program over the next three years. Under the new plans, the 20 trillion rouble (U.S. $271 billion), 10-year military appropriations program (known as GPV 2027) that runs to 2027 covering defense procurement, repairs, research and development, and infrastructure investment will be reduced by a total of 225 billion roubles between 2021 and 2023. Wider defense funding could be reduced by as much 323 billion roubles. The previous state armament program (GPV 2020) saw significant increases enacted to defense investment between 2011 and 2016 as the country pursued ambitious modernization targets. As a proportion of GDP, the official Russian defense budget peaked in 2015 at 3.8 percent. If one includes wider defense spending items such as military pensions, social support and housing, total Russia expenditure accounted for as much at 4.8 percent of GDP that year. This period of significant defense investment helped to recover some lost ground from the previous two decades. Progress was remarkable but by no means comprehensive, with strategic nuclear forces and defense aerospace surpassing modernization targets, while maritime and land forces fared less well. Pockets of advanced capability — e.g., air defense, weapons, combat aircraft — evolved alongside less efficient entities that failed to deliver against the ambitions of GPV 2020. Nonetheless, as Russia approached the overarching target of 70 percent “modern” equipment within the armed forces inventory, defense spending increases slowed and the country moved from a period of dramatic capability buildup toward a sustainment phase — a move further presaged by wider economic constraints at the time As such, GPV 2027 is less ambitious than GPV 2020, and annual defense budget allocations have reflected this. Russian defense spending has been stagnant in real terms since 2017, as sanctions impacted government finances, energy revenues remained subdued and modernization ambitions were deemed close to fulfillment. Official projections of the budget for national defense saw slightly stronger growth in 2021 and 2022, although this was proposed in the months before the full economic ramifications of the pandemic were realized. Russian companies therefore face a tighter domestic market — as indeed will most countries in the wake of the pandemic — while the burden of debt has stifled investment in new technologies and R&D. This lack of funds to invest in research has created a further challenge for companies facing increasing political pressure domestically to diversify production efforts toward the civil market. The reported moves to restructure defense industry debt will ease some of the stress on companies and provide some temporary bandwidth with which to focus on investment. However, such moves will further constrain domestic defense spending, as funds to absolve debt will inevitably squeeze investment elsewhere in the budget. Perhaps on the positive side, the further weakening of the rouble against the dollar in 2020 has the potential to provide Russian defense equipment with an added price advantage in global defense markets and to facilitate exports. The comparatively cheaper kit will appeal to countries that find they have less investment funds at their disposal than a year ago. As competition in export markets intensifies and funding tightens, buyers may find they can demand greater industrial participation, partnership and technology transfer in moves to bolster self-sufficiency and resilience. Markets which have previously shown preference for Western equipment may find such capabilities are no longer affordable with Russia's relative willingness to offer favorable exchange rate agreements and flexible financing terms, offering a further advantage in constrained export markets. Fenella McGerty is a senior fellow for defense economics at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/08/17/budget-and-pandemic-present-challenges-to-russias-defense-industrial-base
30 juin 2024 | International, Terrestre