25 octobre 2018 | International, Aérospatial

AIR2030: A la rencontre de Boeing et du F/A 18 Super Hornet (4/5)

Alexis Pfefferlé

Mardi 23 octobre 2018, 0800, Lausanne, entrée en lice des avionneurs américains.

Pour rappel, deux avions américains sont en compétition dans le cadre du programme AIR2030, le F/A 18 Super Hornet de Boeing et le F35 de Lockheed Martin.

Au menu de cette matinée, le F/A 18 Super Hornet de Boeing.

L'avion proposé n'est pas inconnu puisqu'il avait été naturellement envisagé lors de la précédente campagne de renouvellement de la flotte avant que Boeing ne renonce à faire une offre à la Suisse.

Boeing avait expliqué à l'époque que « le nouveau Super Hornet est peut-être un avion trop poussé par rapport aux besoins de la Suisse. ».

Huit ans plus tard, les besoins exprimés par la Suisse pour son nouvel avion de combat ont évolué et le Super Hornet fait à nouveau office de candidat sérieux.

En effet, les F/A 18 Hornet dans leur version C et D sont en service dans les forces aériennes suisses depuis maintenant vingt ans et l'avion est bien connu de nos pilotes et militaires.

Quelles différences par rapport au modèle actuel ?

Le F/A 18 Super Hornet n'est pas un nouvel avion mais bien une évolution du Hornet que nous connaissons. Il s'agit cependant d'une évolution en profondeur avec une refonte du design, de la signature radar, une mise à jour des systèmes d'armes et de l'électronique embarquée ou encore une augmentation importante de l'autonomie.

Aujourd'hui, le F/A 18 Super Hornet E/F est un biréacteur de 4ème génération + disponible en monoplace et biplace comme les variantes C et D de son prédécesseur.

Boeing va droit au but

La présentation du jour de Boeing est, comme disent les américains, « straight to the point ».

Communication à l'américaine oblige, on débute avec un clip vidéo figurant un compte à rebours égrené par une voix féminine à l'issue duquel divers types d'engins fabriqués par Boeing s'élancent dans le ciel dans un panache de fumée incandescent.

Sans autre intermède, le représentant de Boeing, Monsieur CRUTCHFIELD, développe directement sur la facilité de transition entre le modèle actuel de l'armée suisse et le Super Hornet, un mois d'entraînement au maximum étant selon lui nécessaire aux pilotes aguerris sur F/A 18 Hornet pour se familiariser avec cette nouvelle version.

Quant au matériel d'entretien et à l'armement, il est en partie compatible entre les deux versions.

Compte tenu de l'avenir bien incertain des F/A 18 suisses actuels dans le contexte politique tendu des exportations d'armes, le recyclage partiel est un point pour le moins pertinent.

Pour Boeing, le Super Hornet est la transition la plus simple et la moins onéreuse pour la Suisse.

C'est au tour de Madame Nell BRECKENRIDGE, première femme à s'exprimer pour un constructeur, de prendre le relais.

Elle partage premièrement quelques chiffres : Boeing est un géant de l'industrie, qui a l'habitude de l'offset et de travailler avec des partenaires dans le monde entier.

Historiquement, l'offset Boeing c'est près de 50 milliards USD dans environ 40 pays depuis 35 ans. Actuellement, c'est 65 collaborations pour un montant de 20 milliards USD dans 20 pays.

Efficacité et engagement

Viennent ensuite les arguments phares de Boeing pour la Suisse.

Premièrement, le géant américain, en tant que constructeur du F/A 18 Hornet, le dernier avion acquis par l'armée suisse, peut s'appuyer sur sa propre expérience dans le cadre du programme offset d'USD 1,3 milliards réalisé en Suisse dans le cadre de l'achat de cet avion en 1997.

Détail piquant au pays de la ponctualité, le programme d'offset de l'époque a été complété 3 ans avant le délai prévu.

Dans la même veine, un nouveau programme d'offset a été signé par Boeing avec la Suisse en 2009 pour la mise à jour des F/A 18 Hornet, lequel a également été complété, selon Boeing, en avance du calendrier prévu.

Au total, toujours selon Boeing, ce sont plus de 600 sociétés suisses qui font ou ont fait affaire avec l'avionneur au cours des vingt dernières années.

Sur leur dernier slide de présentation, Boeing déclare : Promises made, promises kept. (Promesses faites, promesses tenues)

Tout un programme.

https://blogs.letemps.ch/alexis-pfefferle/2018/10/25/air2030-a-la-rencontre-de-boeing-et-du-f-a-18-super-hornet-4-5/

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