11 février 2022 | International, Aérospatial

Air Force eyes contract for AWACS replacement in 2023

The Air Force wants to know how a potential contractor would provide at least two prototype replacements for the AWACS by 2028.

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/02/09/air-force-eyes-contract-for-awacs-replacement-in-2023/

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  • These five items should top Biden’s defense priorities

    2 février 2021 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    These five items should top Biden’s defense priorities

    By: Sean Kennedy The Biden administration has the opportunity to institute reforms in several crucial areas at the Department of Defense. First and foremost, it should eliminate the overseas contingency operations account. The continued justification for the OCO has reached the stage of parody. Originally intended for emergency spending in response to the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the account has transitioned into a slush fund designed to inflate spending at the DoD far above the baseline budget and for purposes unrelated to foreign wars. In fiscal 2015, approximately 50 percent of OCO funding was for nonemergency items. An August 2019 Congressional Budget Office report noted that approximately 85 percent of funding for the OCO in FY20 and FY21 “is designated for base-budget and ‘enduring' activities,” funding maintenance in support of foreign operations that will continue regardless of force size. OCO spending has long outpaced the military's presence in combat zones. In FY08, the U.S. deployed an average of 187,000 troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. OCO spending topped $187 billion that year, equating to $1 million per service member. The DoD currently has approximately 5,000 troops stationed in these countries, meaning the $70.7 billion in OCO spending in FY20 equates to $14.1 million in funding per service member — more than 14 times the amount in FY08. With President Joe Biden unlikely to substantially increase the military's footprint in Afghanistan and Iraq, outsized OCO spending will continue in FY21 and beyond, barring reform. The DoD has received approximately $2 trillion from the OCO since 2001. Were it considered to be a federal agency, the FY20 OCO funding would make it the fourth largest, dwarfing spending at all other agencies except the departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs. The incoming administration must also expand efforts to make DoD finances more transparent and accountable. The bookkeeping is so abysmal that areas within the DoD have been on the Government Accountability Office's list of programs at high risk for waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement since 1995. The financial black hole is nowhere more evident than in the DoD's inability to pass a clean audit, unlike every other federal agency. On Nov. 16, 2020, the Pentagon announced that for the third straight year it failed its financial review. Progress has been incremental, with seven of 24 DoD agencies thus far producing clean audits. However, the DoD estimates that it will not be able to pass an audit before 2027, or 37 years after it was required to do so by law. The DoD must also determine the replacement mechanism for the chief management officer position, which was the No. 3 civilian slot until it was eliminated in the FY21 National Defense Authorization Act. Despite identifying $22.3 billion in savings between FY18 and FY21, legislators bowed to Pentagon pressure, distributing the duties and responsibilities of the role to various existing positions with far less authority. The acquisition side is also a mess, including several infamous procurement disasters that epitomize the Pentagon's systemic problems. The foremost example is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The program has been under continuous development since the contract was awarded in 2001, and has encountered innumerable delays and cost overruns. Total acquisition costs now exceed $428 billion, nearly double the initial estimate of $233 billion. The total costs for the F-35 are estimated to reach $1.727 trillion over the lifetime of the program. On Jan. 14, 2021, then-acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller labeled the Joint Strike Fighter a “piece of sh*t.” Enough said. Many of the problems with the F-35 program can be traced to the decision to develop and procure the Joint Strike Fighter simultaneously. Whenever problems have been identified, contractors needed to go back and make changes to aircraft that were already assembled, adding to overall costs. Of course none of this has stopped the Pentagon from asking for Joint Strike Fighter funding, and members of Congress from supplying it, oftentimes exceeding the request from the DoD. This trend continued in FY20, when legislators added $2.1 billion in earmarks to fund the acquisition of 22 Joint Strike Fighters beyond the amount requested by the Pentagon, bringing the total amount of earmarks for the program to $8.9 billion since FY01. Lastly, the Biden administration would do well to introduce some stability into Pentagon leadership. Every defense secretary brings to the job different priorities for the government's largest bureaucracy. President Donald Trump burned through two confirmed and four acting secretaries, the most for any administration. President Biden should endeavor to reverse this churn. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/02/01/these-five-items-should-top-bidens-defense-priorities/

  • Slippery slope: MDA boss fights transfer of missile defense system to Army

    16 août 2019 | International, Terrestre

    Slippery slope: MDA boss fights transfer of missile defense system to Army

    By: Jen Judson HUNTSVILLE, Ala. — The new U.S. Missile Defense Agency director is opposed to the transfer of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System, or THAAD, to the Army — something Senate authorizers want to do this year in the fiscal 2020 authorization bill. Talk of transferring THAAD to the Army has been ongoing for roughly a decade. The Army officially operates the system, but the MDA conducts its development and continued modernization. Both MDA and Army leadership have said if Congress were to authorize a transfer, they would not oppose the move as long as the necessary funding is made available and not taken from other portfolios within the service. But there's still a fear that programs transferred to the services is where they go to die, either in their entirety or at least the chance of continued system modernization. For instance, there could be a plan down the road to extend the range of the THAAD interceptor. Historically, at times, when programs are transferred, funding meant to further improve systems has been cannibalized for more pressing, immediate needs within the armed services. “Why would we hand that off to the Army or Air Force, that sort of transfer to a service where it won't be prioritized? They have many other priorities,” MDA Director Vice Adm. Jon Hill told Defense News in an exclusive interview at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama. “I don't like organizational experiments on programs that are delivering more fighting capability,” he added. The challenge Before Congress, the military or the MDA consider transferring such a capability, a better definition for “transfer of services” must be ironed out, Hill said. He considers defining this one of his top challenges. “It gets suspicious when we don't have a fully defined term because all it really results in is fracturing of a program during a time where it's most critical to have those programs stable and taking care of the war fighter,” Hill said. “There's been a lot of discussion about the THAAD and the SM-3 [missile] transfer to the services. What does that mean?” The definition of transfer “ranges everything from a full-up transfer of the system over to the service, which assumes that the system is static and how it's designed today is how it's going to be designed forever,” Hill said. If it means transferring operations and sustainment responsibility, and then “put that in the done pile. The Army invests heavily in the operations and sustainment of that. I don't know what more we would want out of them,” he said. The argument MDA is examining whether it is doing enough to support the Army's successful operation and sustainment of the system, he noted, such as whether the service has the right logistics line in place and the right training. A THAAD transfer could also be disruptive to production at a time when THAAD interceptors are in high demand and orders continue to grow. Even if the transfer of THAAD meant the service would responsible for interceptor procurement, the MDA would have to break contracts for the Army to take over, which could result in delayed production, according to Hill. “We know right now, in today's operational environment, we need more,” Hill said. “So that makes no sense to me.” And for Hill, a THAAD transfer is a slippery slope. If the Army took complete control of the batteries, “then there's this discussion, ‘Well, let's include the TPY/2 radar and let's walk it a little bit further and let's take the homeland defense radars that are deployed globally that have a totally different mission.” The resistance to transfer THAAD in its entirety is not a sign of a resistance to transfer where it makes sense, Hill noted. “I often hear that we don't know how to transfer. Well look at the Aegis ships today. Navy procures those ships with ballistic missile defense capability. The Navy has come in and said: ‘Hey, we're going to build a multimission radar to include BMD capability in a SPY-6 [radar],' ” Hill said. “Man, what's wrong with that? That's fantastic.” MDA has also fully transferred the Patriot air and missile defense system to the Army. “Where Patriot is different, is it's a multimission system,” Hill said. “They have air defense as part of the maneuver force. It's sort of like cruise missile defense on a ship. We don't need to take over the Navy's cruise missile defense. ... Patriot is sort of the same thing.” THAAD is part of a wider integrated missile defense system, he added. “THAAD has to stay in MDA ... for the interoperability and integration into the other domains from across the services," Riki Ellison, chairman and founder of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, told Defense News. "THAAD is not an Army-centric weapon system. It should never be deployed as a standoff, alone weapon system.” The Joint Urgent Operational Need out of the Korean theater that calls for the integration of THAAD and Patriot is a prime example, Ellison noted. “MDA is the only one that has cross-domain [Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications] development and operational development as proven with the [Ground-Based Midcourse Defense] System," he said. Rebeccah Heinrichs, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, said: “I'm afraid the Army won't fund THAAD if it's their responsibility. We need to free up more money in MDA so it can focus on research and development, so we have a dilemma. Something has to give.” Short of the defense secretary directing the services to fund and support systems like THAAD, Heinrichs said, “they're probably just going to have to stay in MDA. That means we need a much bigger top line in MDA ... to fund the new technologies needed for advanced threats, especially.” The agency is currently advising the Pentagon and Congress on the right plan for where THAAD should live. “That's something that we have to work internally," Hill noted, "and so we need to get our act together on both sides.” https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/smd/2019/08/14/mda-director-opposes-transfer-of-terminal-missile-defense-system-to-army/

  • Tanks are here to stay: What the Army’s future armored fleet will look like

    16 juillet 2021 | International, Terrestre

    Tanks are here to stay: What the Army’s future armored fleet will look like

    Armored vehicles and formations may be unrecognizable in the next decade. But the mission remains the same — take and hold terrain.

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