17 novembre 2021 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

AIA president says industry is still seeing ''the impact of COVID even 18 months later''™

Though the aerospace sector is working to recover — with the first airshow here in two years — not all companies are moving at the same pace, according to the head of the Aerospace Industries Association.

https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2021/11/16/aia-president-says-industry-is-still-seeing-the-impact-of-covid-even-18-months-later/

Sur le même sujet

  • Boeing and Mitsubishi sign agreement to support Japan F-15 upgrades

    30 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    Boeing and Mitsubishi sign agreement to support Japan F-15 upgrades

    By: Mike Yeo    1 day ago MELBOURNE, Australia — American firm Boeing has signed an agreement with Japanese company Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to support upgrades to Japan’s fleet of F-15 fighter jets. The agreement, made through the U.S. Direct Commercial Sales process, is part of a larger $4.5 billion modernization program for 98 of Japan’s F-15J/DJ Eagle interceptors ordered through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales process and approved by the U.S. State Department in 2019. Boeing will provide MHI with retrofit drawings, ground support equipment and technical publications for the upgrade of the first two F-15J aircraft to the Japan Super Interceptor configuration, also known as F-15JSI. The full suite of upgrades will introduce a new radar, electronic warfare capabilities and weapons. Also included is a new advanced cockpit system running on an advanced mission computer for meant to improve pilot situational awareness. The new active electronically scanned array radar will be the Raytheon AN/APG-82(v)1 multimode set, which is also being fit on the U.S. Air Force’s F-15E Strike Eagles. Japan had requested 103 radars, including six spare sets, along with 116 Honeywell Advanced Display Core Processor II mission computers and 101 BAE Systems AN/ALQ-239 digital electronic warfare systems. The upgrade package will also include anti-spoofing GPS gear for more precise navigation, as well as new radios. Japan’s also requested “aircraft and munition integration and test support.” The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency notification about Japan’s request did not provide more details, but Boeing’s announcement of the contract included artwork of an F-15 in Japanese markings with a Lockheed Martin AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile on its centerline weapon station. Japan had confirmed in its Mid-Term Defense Plan in late 2018 that it intended to procure the JASSM for long-range land-attack missions and integrate it onto F-15s. However, it’s not clear whether Japan will take up Boeing’s proposal to increase the number of AIM-120 medium-range air-to-air missiles that can be carried by the F-15 to 18, which the company had previously displayed on model at an aerospace exhibition in Japan. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force operates a fleet of about 200 single-seat F-15J and two-seat F-15DJ Eagle aircraft. These are all configured for an air defense role with virtually no air-to-ground capability, and they serve with seven different operational squadrons throughout Japan, a training squadron and another unit in the dedicated aggressor role, acting as the adversary during training exercises. The fleet, particularly the two squadrons based on Japan’s southern island of Okinawa, have been heavily engaged in monitoring foreign military aircraft entering Japan’s air defense identification zone in the international airspace around Japan. The Defense Ministry says these foreign aircraft are predominantly Chinese, with Russian aircraft coming in at a distant second. The Japan Times newspaper recently reported on China’s increased use of an air base in its Fujian province to fly fighter jets near the disputed Senkaku islands. In response, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force scrambles interceptors from Okinawa once the Chinese jets take off from the Fujian base. The newspaper also reported that the Japan Air Self-Defense Force is scrambling four instead of two aircraft on each occasion, noting that the Chinese base is closer to the disputed islands than the Japanese air bases in Okinawa. https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2020/07/29/boeing-and-mitsubishi-ink-deal-to-support-japan-f-15-upgrades/

  • Losing Market Share And Damaging National Security Due To Anachronistic Drone Policy

    10 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    Losing Market Share And Damaging National Security Due To Anachronistic Drone Policy

    Dave Deptula Contributor Adherence to an obsolescent approach to the international nuclear non-proliferation export guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is hurting the United States (U.S.) both commercially and from a national security perspective. In a nutshell, the MTCR treats large drones as if they were nuclear missiles—which they are not. As a result, this self-imposed restriction not only limits the sale of large U.S. drones to our friends and allies but pushes them into the arms of foreign suppliers some of whom are potential adversaries. The result is a series of negative consequences for the U.S. When the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute released its annual report on global arms transfers earlier this year, it was a good news story for the U.S. From 2015-2019, the U.S. accounted for 36 percent of major global arms sales, a 23 percent increase in volume over the previous five-year period and 76 percent more than its next closest competitor—Russia. The dominant position the U.S. finds itself in is a testament to both the quality of U.S. defense equipment, which is typically accompanied by robust training, sustainment, and support packages, as well as the mutual desire of the U.S. and its partners and allies to develop and maintain strong defense relationships. However, one important segment of the defense market where this pattern does not hold are large military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). This is not due to a lack of capability—the U.S. remains the world’s leader in UAV technology and expertise—nor a lack of demand as by 2029 the international market will account for over 50 percent of the over $10 billion projected to be spent annually on UAVs. Instead, the U.S. has hamstrung itself due to restrictive export policies that equate large UAVs to nuclear missiles. This mismatch between the definitions and controls imposed on UAVs and the reality of how they are actually employed has significantly harmed coalition operations, U.S. relationships with its partners and allies, and the U.S. defense industrial base. It is imperative that the U.S. modernize its UAV export policy. Currently, the MTCR governs the export of U.S. UAVs. Initially formed in 1987, the MTCR is a voluntary agreement intended to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons—and later weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The MTCR defines UAVs capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload more than 300 kilometers one way as Category I systems, the transfer of which “are subject to an unconditional strong presumption of denial.” Although at the time the MTCR was negotiated no UAV exceeded the Category I thresholds, their envisioned use as delivery vehicles for WMD equivalent to cruise missiles precipitated their inclusion in the MTCR. However, since then the development of UAVs evolved as remotely piloted aircraft, not cruise missiles. Unfortunately, export policy has failed to keep pace, resulting in a situation where the export of UAVs is regulated under the same stringent regime as intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. policy failure to adequately remedy this situation creates significant problems for the following reasons. First, current U.S. export policy prevents the U.S. from realizing the full potential of UAVs in coalition operations. Because current policy frequently results in the denial of export requests for U.S. UAVs by close partners and allies, these nations must either resort to indigenous production or to another foreign manufacturer to meet their military requirements. Under the best of circumstances, the result is a lower level of interoperability with U.S. forces than possible had they been able to acquire U.S. UAVs. This hampers the integration of partners that would enable the coalition to be much more effective. The current policy impedes the use of common UAVs critical for success in allied operations. Of greater concern is that much of the unmet demand by friends for U.S. military UAVs is now being fulfilled by China because of the MTCR restrictions. Integrating partners into coalition operations using Chinese UAVs creates significant security risks. This is because China maintains control of the systems necessary to operate their UAVs. This enables them to collect intelligence on coalition operations if allowed access to coalition networks. From the perspective of a U.S. commander, the risk these likely infiltrations pose to security is sufficient to exclude partners operating Chinese UAVs from participating in both U.S. led coalition operations and intelligence sharing agreements.  Second, the U.S. denying UAV export requests from nations that are security partners fosters frustration, raises doubts about U.S. commitments, and drive partners to pursue security relationships with China. Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates provide recent examples of solid U.S. partners that have procured Chinese UAVs. Furthermore, these countries are then forced to rely on China for training, sustainment, intelligence processing, and other related services. China’s willingness to integrate indigenous industry in joint ventures—another practice restricted by the MTCR—serves to further solidify the ties between China and the partnering nation. Absent a change in U.S. policy, China will continue to expand its UAV market share and associated influence into regions important to the U.S. Third, the associated U.S. loss of global market share of UAV sales weakens U.S. business and the U.S. defense industrial base. Domestic funding for certain UAVs already faced downward pressure in the most recent budget request amidst other modernization priorities. Looking ahead the enormous federal expenditures to address the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated economic downturn are likely to result in significant cuts to future U.S. defense budgets. Greater access to foreign markets would serve to diversify the customer base of U.S. manufacturers of large UAVs, helping to offset reduced revenue from domestic buyers and keeping commercial production lines. Unfortunately, current UAV export policy precludes this from happening. Declining production rates for large military UAVs threaten to not only to shrink the U.S. aerospace industrial base, but also to undermine its competitive edge. Lacking predictable cash flow and sufficient profit margins, companies that manage to remain in the market will become more reticent to invest significant funds into research and development. Furthermore, the MTCR prohibits co-development and co-production of UAVs, precluding U.S. drone companies from pooling resources and expertise with international partners. The danger is that the U.S. may squander its drone advantage just as international interest in procuring advanced, survivable, multi-mission UAVs ramps up. It would be a tremendous shame if the U.S. finds itself no longer in a leading position and must instead rely on others to develop cutting-edge UAV technologies. Although there is growing awareness of these problems, recent efforts to craft a more reasonable UAV export policy have largely fallen short. Rather than a fundamental shift in policy, the few positive steps taken have been stopgap measures involving workarounds—approving more Category I sales via direct commercial sales rather than foreign military sales—or maneuvering within the confines of the MTCR through attempts to modify UAV definitions such as adding a speed criteria. Instead, as is comprehensively laid out in the Mitchell Institute’s most recent policy paper, what is needed is for the Congress to insert language into the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act that explicitly defines UAVs as combat aircraft and subject them to the same export considerations. This would effectively remove U.S. UAV export decisions from the MTCR guidelines. The U.S. has a proven process of adjudicating sales of the most advanced fighter aircraft in the world, including how to configure them to make sales mutually beneficial to the U.S. and its partners. The example of the F-35 is particularly pertinent because technologies approved for export on the F-35 would be restricted by the MCTR if applied to a UAV—the only difference being the pilot of the F-35 is in the aircraft whereas large UAVs are remotely piloted. Given both the high degree of commonality of combat aircraft and UAVs, as well as the proven success combat aircraft sales have in providing partners a formidable deterrent and warfighting capability, improving interoperability among coalition partners, and supporting both U.S. and partner industrial capacity, treating UAVs as combat aircraft for export policy offers the most sensible and effective solution. Change cannot come soon enough. The U.S. has a limited window to re-engage with partners with a stated interest in U.S. UAVs or who are experiencing buyer’s remorse with regard to their Chinese UAV partnerships. It is therefore critical that the U.S. normalize its UAV export policy before China can consolidate its gains. The future of warfare increasingly depends on UAV technology. Exporting large U.S. UAVs is vital to effective coalition operations. For too long the MTCR has distorted the balance of national security and economic interests against the fear of nuclear and WMD proliferation. Acknowledging UAVs as what they are—aircraft, not missiles—will enhance U.S. security, improve commercial trade in a growing business sector while preserving the MTCR as an effective means to prevent the proliferation of missiles and their associated technologies. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davedeptula/2020/06/09/losing-market-share-and-damaging-national-security-due-to-anachronistic-drone-policy/#50ce76d51332

  • Top départ pour le futur avion de combat franco-allemand

    7 décembre 2018 | International, Aérospatial

    Top départ pour le futur avion de combat franco-allemand

    Le futur chasseur franco-allemand devra remplacer, à l’horizon 2035-2040, le Rafale français et l’Eurofighter déployé dans les armées allemandes. Découvrez les noms des industriels qui s'envoleront avec lui. Le coup d’envoi industriel du futur avion de combat franco-allemand est donné. La ministre des Armées Florence Parly et son homologue allemande Ursula von der Leyen se sont accordées pour attribuer l’an prochain aux industriels européens les premiers contrats d’études pour affiner le concept de système aérien de combat du futur (Scaf). Le futur chasseur franco-allemand devra remplacer, à l’horizon 2035-2040, le Rafale français et l’Eurofighter déployé dans les armées allemandes. Dassault Aviation a été confirmé comme le chef de file industriel du programme. Il travaillera avec Airbus pour l’étude de l’architecture du Scaf et sur un démonstrateur d’appareil. Safrandirigera celle sur le démonstrateur du moteur en partenariat avec le motoriste allemand MTU. Thales, qui fournit l’électronique et les systèmes de combat du Rafale, n’a pas été pas mentionné en premier rang dans l’attribution des contrats d’études et fait figure de grand perdant de ce premier round industriel. La France et l’Allemagne ont déjà rappelé qu’ils comptaient ouvrir leur collaboration à d’autres pays européens, notamment à l’Espagne. https://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/top-depart-pour-le-futur-avion-de-combat-franco-allemand.N774254

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