29 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Terrestre

Advanced Air and Missile Defense, in the Hands of Soldiers

May 27, 2020 - It’s a cold December morning at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, and two surrogate cruise missile targets have just been launched, one after the other. They are flying separate courses among the jagged San Andres and Sacramento mountains toward soldiers in a U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense unit at a test site called TAC-2 – Tactical Command Post 2.

These sophisticated targets precisely mimic real cruise missile threats and can take advantage of this terrain to hide from the radars and sensors commanders have positioned in the area. This can create gaps in tracking that make the job of interceptor missiles or other defensive weapons more difficult – you can’t hit what you can’t see.

Today, though, their maneuvers won’t enable them to evade detection. This is Flight Test 5 (FT-5), the most sophisticated and difficult development test yet for the Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS), developed by Northrop Grumman.

High above the range, sensors aboard U.S. Air Force F-35 fighter aircraft see and acquire the two surrogate missiles. IBCS integrates the aircraft sensor data with that of available ground sensors, including Sentinel, Patriot weapon system and U.S. Marine Corps TPS-59 radars. All share information via the IBCS Integrated Fire Control Network (IFCN). As one sensor loses sight of the threats – and each will at some point – the targets are acquired by other sensors on the IFCN, enabling IBCS to create a precise, uninterrupted composite track of each missile’s movements.

With data from every sensor, IBCS produces a single integrated air picture on the screens of the air defense soldiers at TAC-2. They see every change in altitude and direction as the two surrogate missiles paint tracks across their screens. Because IBCS enables joint weapons as well as joint sensors, the defenders at the controls can select the best effector to use against these targets. Today, the soldiers are about to launch two Patriot Advanced Capability 2 (PAC-2) interceptor missiles.

“Without IBCS, all those different sensors operate independently, creating opportunities for threats to avoid detection as they fly to a target,” explained Northrop Grumman IBCS Program Director Mark Rist. “Without being integrated onto a network, these sensors produce a more ambiguous, less-clear air picture, making engagements of threat systems more challenging.”

He is monitoring FT-5 from miles away, in the test’s mission control room. The soldiers at TAC-2 can be heard on the radio, calm but urgent voices reporting “target acquired” by airborne sensor, and talking of the “IP” or intercept point, and “kill box.” It’s only been moments since the threats were launched, but now comes “Free to engage … Missile away … Missile away …”

One, then another PAC-2 interceptor missile is launched by the soldiers. IBCS is not only able to launch the missiles, but also plays a critical role in the engagement by actively closing the fire control loop and providing in-flight updates as the PAC-2s converge on their targets. The surrogate cruise missile targets are closing in and can now be seen on video in the control room – and then suddenly they can’t: One, then the other disappears in a ball of fire as the PAC-2s destroy them.

Cheers erupted in the control room, and those of Rist and his team may have been loudest among the many generals, colonels and visiting officials that day at White Sands. After years of effort, working closely and constantly with soldiers, FT-5 fully demonstrated IBCS’s unprecedented capability to integrate sensors and effectors to detect, track and simultaneously engage multiple targets in flight.

“Information is ammunition, and IBCS is providing soldiers with more,” Rist said. “We brought a lot of things together in this development test. It was the first including joint operations with the Air Force F-35 and Marine Corps radar systems, the first with Air Defense Artillery soldiers at the controls, and the first involving software developed using our Agile methodology.”

FT-5 was the latest in a series of test successes, and further evidence of the program’s maturity as soldiers train on IBCS equipment in preparation for an important Limited User Test (LUT) this spring.

“I’m very proud of these soldiers and of the system’s performance,” said Colonel Phil Rottenborn, Army IAMD project manager. “This was the first time soldiers conducted a live engagement using IBCS in a developmental test, and they showed we are ready to go into the operational test phase.”

“Success!” said Col. Tony Behrens, Army Capability Manager for the Air and Missile Defense (AMD) Command, and a nearly 26-year career Air Defense Artillery (ADA) officer. “It showed me that an Army operator – not an engineer or software developer – can sit at that console and do his or her job. I am very comfortable and confident about the path we’re on.”

IBCS enables soldiers to be even more effective by integrating all the systems’ data and providing a common command-and-control (C2). Soldiers will only need to learn to use the IBCS C2, instead of spending time becoming specialists on only one or two of a dozen different sensor and weapon systems. That enhances IBCS’s already impressive battlefield survivability, because soldiers will be capable of using any of the available sensors with any available weapon systems at any command post connected to the self-connecting, self-healing IFCN.

Also, less time will be spent in recurrent training, making more time available for teaching operators defense strategy and how to fight. The IBCS “every sensor; best effector” concept gives commanders greater flexibility in defense design, allowing them to position resources for greatest coverage in far less time essentially helping to change the way soldiers see and fight air battle.

Northrop Grumman’s open-architecture system-of-systems approach to IBCS eases the integration of any new or legacy sensor and effector systems, which is important for U.S. joint operations and to foreign governments. Poland has an agreement with the U.S. Army to purchase IBCS for modernization of the nation’s WISLA medium-range air defense system, and other countries have expressed interest as well.

With the success of FT-5, Northrop Grumman will now focus on the Army’s Limited User Test planned for later this year, followed by the low-rate initial production and full-rate production phases of the system, to field IBCS to Army air defenders in fiscal year 2021.

Behrens said the Army must have the IBCS capabilities to be effective and successful in future combat operations. “To me, it’s beyond critical,” he said. “We’re not just giving soldiers a new piece of equipment, a new piece of gear. We’re going to give them an entirely new way of operating on the battlefield that is so much more efficient. But it has to start with the system that enables you to do that.”

IBCS may also be the Army’s first big step toward multi-domain convergence – the next level above integration.

“Enabling multi-domain – or more accurately, all-domain – operations is vital to ensuring battlefield advantage and superiority,” said Brig. Gen. Brian Gibson, director of the Army’s AMD Cross-Functional Team, at an Association of the U.S. Army event in early March. “When successfully fielded, IBCS will be one of the Army’s pathfinder capabilities into what is becoming a top priority for our military leaders: joint, all-domain command and control.”

Media Contact
Kenneth Kesner
256-327-6889
Kenneth.Kesner@ngc.com 

View source version on Northrop Grumman: https://news.northropgrumman.com/news/features/advanced-air-and-missile-defense-in-the-hands-of-soldiers

Sur le même sujet

  • Army Rebuilds Artillery Arm For Large-Scale War

    28 avril 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR

    Army Rebuilds Artillery Arm For Large-Scale War

    The service’s new AimPoint plan builds very different forces for Europe and the Pacific – but new high-level artillery HQs are central to both. By   SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR WASHINGTON: Call it the once and future king of battle. The Army’s artillery branch, neglected over 20 years of hunting guerrillas, is being revived as the long-range striking arm for multi-domain warfare against Russia and China. That will affect everything from what missiles the service buys, to which officers get promoted, to how the service organizes itself for battle – a force structure outlined in a new Army Futures Command study called AimPoint. The biggest change? Having already created two experimental Multi-Domain Task Forces built around artillery brigades, the Army now plans to build new high-level headquarters called Theater Fires Commands to coordinate long-range missile warfare on a continent-wide scale. “That is a direct output of AimPoint,” said Lt. Gen. Eric Wesley, whose Futures & Concepts Center developed the force structure plan. While the Theater Fires Commands do not exist yet, he said, the service has already begun setting aside manpower in its Total Army Analysis process to staff them. In AimPoint’s vision of the future, “the brigades largely look very similar to what you might see right now… except for your [increased] ability to connect to national assets” in space and cyberspace, Lt. Gen. Wesley told reporters last week in a wide-ranging discussion. (Read more here). The big changes, he said, will come at higher levels – division, corps, and theater command – that have largely played a supporting role in highly localized counterinsurgency operations, but which must take the lead in coordinating large-scale campaigns against well-armed nation-states. “If you look at echelons above brigade, what we’re having to do is build out our capacity to fight large-scale, campaign-quality combat,” he said. “Those echelons we have mortgaged a bit in the last 20 or 30 years because our BCTs [Brigade Combat Teams] were so powerful relative to our opponent. [Today], because we are being contested in all domains and our two peer competitors are investing in their militaries, we have to build back some of that campaign quality at echelon, with the distinction being you’ve got to have information warfare, you’ve got to have cyber, you’ve got to have space access.” Once the shooting starts, however – and even before, when you’re trying to deter the other side from shooting at all – you still need old-fashioned firepower, with a 21st century twist. Artillery has been a US Army strength since World War II, when its ability to quickly coordinate far-flung howitzer batteries to pour overwhelming fire on a chosen target was one of the few things the German Wehrmacht feared. But back then, and even throughout the Cold War, the limits of radio networks, artillery range and precision targeting meant artillery could only be decisive on the tactical level, supporting the face-to-face battle of infantry and tanks. Today, however, the precision-guided missiles that the US, Russia, and China are developing have such long ranges – hundreds or thousands of miles – that you need satellites to spot suitable targets and send back targeting data, plus superior cyber warriors to protect that communications network from hostile hackers. Bringing all those technologies together in the right organization with well-trained personnel, and artillery can make a decisive impact on theater-wide operations or even the strategic level. Dead Branch Resurrecting? But there’s a problem. Over the three decades between the end of the Cold War and the reawakening to Russian and Chinese threats, the Army neglected its artillery branch. In 2002, the Army actually disbanded the artillery brigades in its divisions and dispersed their component battalions across its armor and infantry brigades. Then, in Afghanistan and Iraq, US firepower was so overwhelmingly superior, and air support was so readily available for even small patrols, that artillery troops rarely got to fire their guns, even in training, and were routinely retasked for other duties. By 2008, three artillery colonels co-wrote a paper that called their arm of service a “dead branch walking.” Meanwhile, Russian and Chinese howitzers, rocket launchers and surface-to-surface missiles came to not only outnumber but also outperform their aging US counterparts. That led Lt. Gen. Wesley’s predecessor as the Army’s chief futurist, Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, to tell Congress in 2016 that “we are outranged and outgunned.” The next year, in October 2017, the Army officially made Long-Range Precision Fires its No. 1 modernization priority. Now the Army is urgently developed new artillery systems, from rocket-boosted, precision-guided howitzer shells with a range of 40 miles, to 300-plus-mile tactical missiles, to hypersonic weapons that can fly thousands of miles at more than Mach 10. But technology alone is not enough. After two decades of its soldiers rarely getting to use artillery, the Army now needs experienced gunners to run its new high-level Fires Commands and make the most of its new long-range missiles. Sure, infantry and tank brigade commanders can call in strikes on the targets they see in front of them in a tactical fight. But it takes senior artillery officers and experienced, specialist staff to choose the most critical targets for an entire theater of war and to coordinate long-range strikes over hundreds of miles. While the Army recreated division-level artillery headquarters in 2014, it is now studying long-range fires commands at the corps and theater levels. What’s more, the different theaters will require a different mix, not only of artillery systems, but of all the supporting players being developed as part of the Army’s “Big Six”: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Networks, , Air & Missile Defense (also an artillery branch mission), and Soldier Lethality gear. For Indo-Pacific Command, focused on the Chinese threat, the vast expanse of ocean means the Army must support the Navy. That means long-range artillery batteries – very long range, given the distances involved – based on friendly islands to control the surrounding sea lanes, forming unsinkable anvils for the Navy’s highly mobile hammer. But, Wesley said, that also requires advanced air and missile defense systems to blunt the enemy’s own long-range salvos, long-range high-speed aircraft to move ground forces from island to island and a sophisticated, secure network to coordinate it all. In Europe, by contrast, the distances are shorter – requiring a different mix of missiles – and ground combat is the central front, with small and largely landlocked seas on either flank. That makes armored ground vehicles and soldier gear, from new rifles to targeting goggles, much more important than in the Pacific. Those profound differences mean the Army cannot create a single universal unit with one set of equipment that can adapt to every situation, as the cancelled Future Combat Systems program once attempted. Even if a one-size-fits-all Army somehow made sense tactically, Wesley said, it wouldn’t work out technologically. With rapid advances in computing affecting everything from targeting to logistics, there’s no way to develop a new piece of equipment, mass-produce it and issue it to every brigade across the Army before something new and better comes along. Instead of “pure fleets” where every brigade has the same software, trucks, missiles, etc., organized in the same way, the Army must tailor its forces to the theater. For more from Lt. Gen. Wesley in his own words (edited for brevity and clarity), read on: Q: Historically, the Army has always wanted to standardize equipment, training, and organization as much as possible – after all, “G.I.” stands for “General Issue.” But Europe and the Pacific are very different. Do you need more of a mix of forces across the Army? A: The world and technology are moving too fast to believe I’m going to get Technology One in every single brigade [before Technology Two makes it obsolete]. We have to be more agile than that. Pure fleeting and even pure structuring is probably not an acceptable approach. Second, the reality is there are two pacing threats that we’re looking at, and they’re distinctly different, the geography is different, and so we have to consider different ways to approach those problems. You can expect that the force package we build for INDOPACOM will be distinct from the force package we build in Europe. Where there’s commonality is in Multi-Domain Operations. MDO is a way of fighting, and I think you’re going to see that way of fighting be consistent in both theaters, but the application of it will be different. What are those distinctions? In INDOPACOM, fires to help the Navy control sea lanes are indispensable. In Europe, the essence of the problem is the ability to conduct a very advanced ground maneuver effort. Those [Big Six] priorities that we identified are pretty consistent with what most of the data and analytics and the rigor of the experimentation we look at – those priorities are priorities for a reason. But if you look at the theaters, those priorities might look a little different. So in INDOPACOM, fires, air and missile defense, and the network are some of the really critical pieces, and Future Vertical Lift, I would argue. If you look to Europe, it’s going to be long range fires, the network, next generation combat vehicles, and soldier lethality. Q: How are you designing that future force? A: Gen. Milley [the 39th Army Chief of Staff, from 2015 to 2019], asked us, in a perfect world, what that force looks like. [He] asked us to build a resource-unconstrained design that reflects the precepts and principles of multi-domain operations. That was affectionately called the White Board Force. CSA 40 [the new Chief of Staff, Gen. James McConville] and Gen. Murray, the AFC commander, asked us to do a resource-informed design. That’s what is called the AimPoint. It tightens the shot group and it allows us to define our experimentation, analysis, and programming better. When you’re resource-unconstrained, you can go out and buy a Maserati. When you’re resource-informed, you might buy a Corvette. We just had to throttle back on some of the ambitious desires we were looking for. We’re on a [trajectory] to 492,000 [active duty soldiers]: How would you organize that in order to achieve MDO? AimPoint is not a locked down design that everybody has to invest in and build towards now. It’s really an architect’s design, and now we have to get into the detailed engineering and blueprint of it. We need an enhanced posture forward in both INDOPACOM and in Europe – nothing like the 1980s, but larger than what we have now. That’s obviously going to be informed by resource decisions, but already the Army [is reactivating] an additional corps headquarters with an operational command post forward [in Europe]. Q: How will the AimPoint Army be organized differently to fight? A: The brigades largely look very similar to what you might see right now, because you still have to shoot, move, and communicate. BCT [Brigade Combat Team] and below, what you see won’t change a lot — except for your ability to connect to national assets. Why is that? Well, we’re fighting multi-domain, which means access to cyber, access to space assets, in certain instances at the tactical level. You have to have the plugs to get connect to national assets. If you look at echelons above brigade, what we’re having to do is build out our capacity to fight large-scale, campaign-quality combat. Those echelons we have mortgaged a bit in the last 20 or 30 years because our BCTs were so powerful relative to our opponent. [Today], because we are being contested in all domains and our two peer competitors are investing in their militaries, we have to build back some of that campaign quality at echelon, with the distinction being you’ve got to have information warfare, you’ve got to have cyber, you’ve got to have space access. So in each echelon you would have that capacity to fight all domains and integrate them. Each echelon has distinct problems that has to be solved in order to enable the force to get to a position of advantage. Sometimes that requires each echelon to have distinct capabilities. Competition [short of war] is the first joint problem that has to be solved. Frankly, a brigade commander cannot provide the resources, the solutions, and the decisions made, to compete with a peer competitor. That’s got to be retained at the three- and four- star level. In the event of conflict, it requires long range fire to strike the Russian combined arms army or Chinese equivalent. Again, that BCT commander would not necessarily have either the assets or the authority to strike the targets we’re talking about with long range fire. So you have to do that at a different echelon. There are problems that the BCT commander does not solve for the theater, and some of that needs to be done at echelon.   Q: What kinds of higher-echelon capabilities from the Cold War era are being recreated, like corps level artillery formations? A: Building out the ability to integrate fires at echelon is really important to being able to fight at scale. When we went to modularity, with the BCT being the coin of the realm, we moved the artillery fires battalion [out of the division-level artillery brigade] into the BCT. Now what you’re going to see is the need to return to some aspects of centralization of fires, with the ability to decentralize [as needed], which makes the problem even harder. So, how have we done that? Well, for example, you saw a couple of years ago that we went back into the [division-level] fires brigade. That might be further reinforced as we go forward. Then the theater fires command, as an example, that is a direct output of AimPoint. In the last TAA [Total Army Analysis] cycle, we started to [set aside] a wedge of structure that we can design against. So that does not exist [yet]. Q: What are you able to do in the near term? You already have one experimental Multi-Domain Task Force in the Pacific and another being stood up in Europe. A: We’ve got AimPoint, we’ve got this orientation to the future, but General McConville said, ‘hey, I want to get stuff out there now, because the customer needs it, and that is the capacity to penetrate with long range fires, with the ability to integrate all domains.’ That is what a MDTF is, and we’re building them right now, and we want to get them into each theater. As we deploy those, we’re going to learn lessons on how they best connect with the joint force. You may see, for example, an MDTF subordinate to a theater fires command or subordinate to a corps fires element. Right now, they’re individual [units] that are being built; we will experiment with them and learn how they plug in, but ultimately you’re going to see that capability migrate to the [higher] echelons. Topics: army, Army AimPoint, army future, Army Futures Command, Army strategic fires, artillery, Big Six, China, europe, Gen. Eric Wesley, INDOPACOM, Long-Range Precision Fires, LRPF, Missiles, Pacific, Russia, strategy, Theater Fires Command https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/army-rebuilds-artillery-arm-for-large-scale-war/

  • Trustworthy AI: A Conversation with NIST's Chuck Romine

    21 janvier 2020 | International, C4ISR

    Trustworthy AI: A Conversation with NIST's Chuck Romine

    By: Charles Romine Artificial Intelligence (AI) promises to grow the economy and improve our lives, but with these benefits, it also brings new risks that society is grappling with. How can we be sure this new technology is not just innovative and helpful, but also trustworthy, unbiased, and resilient in the face of attack? We sat down with NIST Information Technology Lab Director Chuck Romine to learn how measurement science can help provide answers. How would you define artificial intelligence? How is it different from regular computing? One of the challenges with defining artificial intelligence is that if you put 10 people in a room, you get 11 different definitions. It's a moving target. We haven’t converged yet on exactly what the definition is, but I think NIST can play an important role here. What we can't do, and what we never do, is go off in a room and think deep thoughts and say we have the definition. We engage the community. That said, we’re using a narrow working definition specifically for the satisfaction of the Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, which makes us responsible for providing guidance to the federal government on how it should engage in the standards arena for AI. We acknowledge that there are multiple definitions out there, but from our perspective, an AI system is one that exhibits reasoning and performs some sort of automated decision-making without the interference of a human. There’s a lot of talk at NIST about “trustworthy” AI. What is trustworthy AI? Why do we need AI systems to be trustworthy? AI systems will need to exhibit characteristics like resilience, security and privacy if they're going to be useful and people can adopt them without fear. That’s what we mean by trustworthy. Our aim is to help ensure these desirable characteristics. We want systems that are capable of either combating cybersecurity attacks, or, perhaps more importantly, at least recognizing when they are being attacked. We need to protect people’s privacy. If systems are going to operate in life-or-death type of environments, whether it's in medicine or transportation, people need to be able to trust AI will make the right decisions and not jeopardize their health or well-being. Resilience is important. An artificial intelligence system needs to be able to fail gracefully. For example, let’s say you train an artificial intelligence system to operate in a certain environment. Well, what if the system is taken out of its comfort zone, so to speak? One very real possibility is catastrophic failure. That's clearly not desirable, especially if you have the AI deployed in systems that operate critical infrastructure or our transportation systems. So, if the AI is outside of the boundaries of its nominal operating environment, can it fail in such a way that it doesn't cause a disaster, and can it recover from that in a way that allows it to continue to operate? These are the characteristics that we're looking for in a trustworthy artificial intelligence system. NIST is supposed to be helping industry before they even know they needed us to. What are we thinking about in this area that is beyond the present state of development of AI? Industry has a remarkable ability to innovate and to provide new capabilities that people don't even realize that they need or want. And they're doing that now in the AI consumer space. What they don't often do is to combine that push to market with deep thought about how to measure characteristics that are going to be important in the future. And we're talking about, again, privacy, security and resilience … trustworthiness. Those things are critically important, but many companies that are developing and marketing new AI capabilities and products may not have taken those characteristics into consideration. Ultimately, I think there's a risk of a consumer backlash where people may start saying these things are too easy to compromise and they’re betraying too much of my personal information, so get them out of my house. What we can do to help, and the reason that we've prioritized trustworthy AI, is we can provide that foundational work that people in the consumer space need to manage those risks overall. And I think that the drumbeat for that will get increasingly louder as AI systems begin to be marketed for more than entertainment. Especially at the point when they start to operate critical infrastructure, we're going to need a little more assurance. That's where NIST can come together with industry to think about those things, and we've already had some conversations with industry about what trustworthy AI means and how we can get there. I'm often asked, how is it even possible to influence a trillion-dollar, multitrillion-dollar industry on a budget of $150 million? And the answer is, if we were sitting in our offices doing our own work independent of industry, we would never be able to. But that's not what we do. We can work in partnership with industry, and we do that routinely. And they trust us, they're thrilled when we show up, and they're eager to work with us. AI is a scary idea for some people. They've seen “I, Robot,” or “The Matrix,” or “The Terminator.” What would you say to help them allay these fears? I think some of this has been overhyped. At the same time, I think it's important to acknowledge that risks are there, and that they can be pretty high if they're not managed ahead of time. For the foreseeable future, however, these systems are going to be too fragile and too dependent on us to worry about them taking over. I think the biggest revolution is not AI taking over, but AI augmenting human intelligence. We're seeing examples of that now, for instance, in the area of face recognition. The algorithms for face recognition have improved at an astonishing rate over the last seven years. We’re now at the point where, under controlled circumstances, the best artificial intelligence algorithms perform on par with the best human face recognizers. A fascinating thing we learned recently, and published in a report, is that if you take two trained human face recognizers and put them together, the dual system doesn't perform appreciably better than either one of them alone. If you take two top-performing algorithms, the combination of the two doesn't really perform much better than either one of them alone. But if you put the best algorithm together with a trained recognizer, that system performs substantially better than either one of them alone. So, I think, human augmentation by AI is going to be the revolution. What's next? I think one of the things that is going to be necessary for us is pulling out the desirable characteristics like usability, interoperability, resilience, security, privacy and all the things that will require a certain amount of care to build into the systems, and get innovators to start incorporating them. Guidance and standards can help to do that. Last year, we published our plan for how the federal government should engage in the AI standards development process. I think there's general agreement that guidance will be needed for interoperability, security, reliability, robustness, these characteristics that we want AI systems to exhibit if they're going to be trusted. https://www.nist.gov/blogs/taking-measure/trustworthy-ai-conversation-nists-chuck-romine

  • Défense: la France veut son «planeur hypersonique»

    28 janvier 2019 | International, Aérospatial

    Défense: la France veut son «planeur hypersonique»

    Jean-Dominique Merchet La ministre des Armées a annoncé le lancement d’un « démonstrateur », qui s’inscrit dans la relance de la course aux armements. Florence Parly a annoncé le 21 janvier avoir notifié un contrat à ArianeGroup pour le lancement d’un démonstrateur de «  planeur hypersonique » qui devrait effectuer son premier vol d’ici à la fin 2021. Ces systèmes, dont s’équipent les grandes puissances nucléaires, permettent d’échapper aux défenses antimissiles et de réaliser des frappes très précises. Beaucoup d’experts estiment qu’ils ont un rôle «  déstabilisateur » des équilibres stratégiques. Une simple phrase glissée au milieu d’un long discours de vœux. C’est ainsi que la ministre des Armées Florence Parly a annoncé le lancement d’un « planeur hypersonique », un projet d’importance stratégique. Ce « démonstrateur », qui devrait voler d’ici « à la fin 2021 », s’inscrit dans la relance actuelle de la course aux armements stratégiques entre les grandes puissances. Cette annonce a provoqué la surprise dans les milieux spécialisés et le ministère des Armées est réticent à fournir publiquement beaucoup plus de détails. Toutefois, plusieurs experts et proches du dossier, tenus à l’anonymat, se sont confiés à l’Opinion et permettent de mesurer l’importance de ce projet. Article complet: https://www.lopinion.fr/edition/international/defense-france-veut-planeur-hypersonique-175912

Toutes les nouvelles