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POLICY PERSPECTIVE by Ian Mack CGAI Fellow May 2020 DOWNLOAD PDF Introduction In the autumn of 2019, the federal government announced on www.buyandsell.gc.ca the creation of a discussion group to address in-service support for the Canadian Surface Combatants (CSCs). The objective of Canada's procurement is 15 warships and the project is in the early stages of modifying the design of the U.K.'s global combat ship (GCS), with the first Canadian ship delivery anticipated after 2025. It must be assumed that this discussion group formation is the first stage of industry consultation. The City-class Type 26 frigate design has been in development for over a decade and the first of eight U.K. Type 26 warships is now in production. BAE Systems won the contract for the design and construction work in the U.K. This design has been available for export under the moniker global combat ship, and both Canada and Australia have selected it – the latter intending to build nine Hunter-class frigates. While neither the Australian nor Canadian designs have been completed, the combat systems will apparently be quite different across the three nations. However, it is unlikely that the major platform design will change dramatically. If this assumption is correct, it could mean that the major equipment of the platforms of some 32 hulls would likely be substantially the same. And from an in-service support point of view, this clearly creates an opportunity for international co-operation wherever it makes sense. TOP OF PAGE Conventional Wisdom – International Programs There are indications that three-nation government-to-government meetings have taken place to exchange views on creating a user group during the acquisition activity. It would make sense to also explore a related arrangement for in-service support. Clearly, with the potential to support 32 equipment sets across the marine platforms, there are many opportunities for economies of scale which could reduce the costs for all three nations – for common design modifications, for spares through bulk buys, for depot-level maintenance with many more units, for common training of potentially two to four times individual nations' throughput/requirements and the like. Such synergies could be worth hundreds of millions of dollars in savings over the extended lives of these warships. But international programs are not always easy to establish and implement, for many reasons. Nations are very different. They place different priorities on defence matters so the simple co-ordination required to achieve timely agreements can be difficult. Governments also change and a falling-out between two nations can lead to reversals. Nations lose some of their autonomy in decision-making when they join such programs, which can be a major deterrent. And governments have approaches to contracting which are very different, so negotiations on behalf of multiple governments can become bogged down in disagreements as to what approaches nations will support. In a perfect world, Canadian and Australian officials might have included an option during the design selection competitions so that such international in-service support programs could have been enabled by adopting a number of mandatory attributes. Unfortunately, the variability in schedules driving Canada's and Australia's frigate programs, as well as the built-in challenges of running competitions, conspired against any detailed discussion of “what ifs”. Work share (or industrial benefits) is important – to the domestic industries and thus to governments that always care about high-value jobs of the sort one finds in defence-related work. Without doubt, companies in all three countries are already seeing dollar signs and/or may already have won certain rights during the competitions for selection. Hence, Australia and Canada would be unlikely to sign up if all the work is being done, say, in Europe because the bar to agree to collaborate for other reasons could be so high as to be a non-starter. And there could be a number of other challenging commercial issues related to such things as intellectual property that could affect the shape of work-share agreements. There are also many tactical issues. The three time zones are not conducive to ongoing dialogue; one should never underestimate the challenges of working across large distances. As simple as international meeting arrangements should be, one of the partners will not be able to make it at the 11th hour more often than one expects – much less the travel budget involved and/or the cost of personnel liaison/exchange programs between the countries. Canada's Treasury Board is frequently much more involved in expensive and long-term international contracts, routinely requiring the tedious achievement of annual approvals. Nations and organizations have different laws/regulations and standards respectively which must be synchronized upfront and as changes occur. And so it goes. One can conclude that, aside from international information exchange forums, complex business arrangements involving both governments and industries in international programs detrimentally impact a nation's autonomy in decision-making and often offer fewer economic benefits. They are not for the faint of heart. TOP OF PAGE Conventional Wisdom – The Opportunity If one were to consider an international three-party in-service support (ISS) program for common platform major equipment/systems which would leverage BAE Systems as the common ISS agent, wouldn't there be potentially significant benefits to Canada? On the face of it, one must assume that the answer is “maybe” and this is worth exploring. In reviewing this option from a Canadian perspective, it would be appropriate to assess the ISS outcomes against the four sustainment pillars as now mandated for inclusion in the business cases driving Department of National Defence (DND) ISS procurement decisions: performance (operational readiness), value for money (price at or below the market rate), flexibility (adaptable and scalable to accommodate change in operational tempo and available budgets) and economic benefits (jobs and economic growth for Canadian companies). As mentioned earlier, international programs often render economic benefits much more elusive. However, in terms of performance, flexibility and value for money, there is no doubt that the potential exists to see maximum return on investment. In the case under review, BAE Systems is reported to be the second largest Western defence contractor and therefore should be able to wield the clout that comes with it when dealing with major equipment system manufacturers (OEMs). And of course, the supplemental impact must also be understood and catered to – BAE Systems can choose to be difficult in any business arrangement without significantly affecting its bottom line. With respect to contractual response to major equipment and systems performance (which contributes to technical readiness), a client with a large work share is more likely to get attention for initiatives to maintain and improve performance than will smaller clients. This would be important in this case because the three navies operate in significantly different environments around the world with the concomitant variations in some performance requirements. As well an OEMs' failure to address the concerns of three allied navies could result in being blacklisted by BAE Systems when procuring equipment/systems for new ship designs, while timely and effective contractual response could lead to future opportunities. Low performance achievement could also deliver a much more significant blow to an OEM's reputation if more than one navy is impacted detrimentally – witness the Boeing scenario with the 737 Max. This can be important, as select foreign OEMs have essentially ignored Canada before when Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) equipment has suffered performance shortfalls. From a performance perspective, an international ISS program with BAE Systems at the centre could be a plus. In terms of providing adaptability and scalability, the presence of a number of clients can allow reductions in the demand for various services by one client (e.g., facing a budget downturn) to be picked up by another on an interim basis. Alternatively, the need for a surge in support by one navy (e.g., facing major unforeseen operations) may be easier to address by diverting some degree of effort from other clients. Only in the case where all clients are experiencing a similar variation in demand will such flexibility be jeopardized; but such a challenge can equally accrue whether in an international support program or not. Therefore, on balance, there can be greater flexibility in traditional circumstances for an international program, but there are limits. Value for money should be a strong argument for an international collaboration, if only because of economies of scale when considering, in this case, a fleet of 32 ship sets instead of eight, nine or 15 – and that is as-fitted, with spares increasing the overall numbers of common units of equipment. As an ISS client agent with much more maintenance, repair work and spares demand for an OEM, there would be greater interest in keeping multiple navies happy with the prices paid and the requirement over time to see support costs reduced. International programs frequently benefit by pooling spare units and ownership by OEMs, such that the number required (and hence the costs) are lower and risks to availability can be somewhat mitigated. Instead of each nation addressing emerging technical issues separately, sharing the costs should make it cheaper for all. So too are there potential benefits for OEM infrastructure, as top-notch physical plant and software assurance against cyber-attack are much more affordable to all concerned. Hence, the conventional wisdom is that such an international in-service support program should offer a better return on investment in terms of greater performance at lower costs, as well as the possibility for greater scalability to adapt to variations in demand for services. But as mentioned earlier, this comes typically with the potential for fewer economic benefits for Canada – clearly an important consideration. TOP OF PAGE Unique Considerations of the Case at Hand In exploring a possible international program for the U.K., Australia and Canada to leverage their selection of the same basic platform design and designer (BAE Systems), it is useful to accept the conventional wisdom but explore additional factors that should be weighed in a sustainment business case. What follows is a potpourri of additional considerations worthy of study. It is useful to address what could be included in the term “in-service support”. Based on common equipments and systems, it could include design agent services, maintenance, spares, training and documentation within an integrated data environment, to name the most important few. Nations could also select from among these options for hybrid arrangements. Near the top of the list for CSC is the fact that it is under the umbrella of the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS). The strategy specifically prevents the NSS shipyards from providing a single day of in-service support once they are delivered to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) unless such shipyards win those rights through a competitive procurement process. This is unique – a departure from past approaches in Canadian government shipbuilding – and quite frankly considered to be imprudent. In the very early days of a new class of complex ships, the prime contractor (often the build shipyard and/or designer) usually provides as a minimum a number of years of ISS. The shipbuilder typically has the best expert knowledge that exists for the initial years of services, along with the relationships and a degree of leverage with the major equipment/systems' OEMs. Normally, an in-service support bridging contract is awarded concurrent with the ship construction contract. Often, the prime contractor is then awarded a long-term ISS contract. There is a story as to why ship maintenance support for vessels delivered under NSS departed from the norm (there is always a story), and confirmation should be obtained as soon as possible that the earlier decision is reversible, to allow the business case to include all options. Related to the former paragraph, Canada has relatively recently awarded a contract to Thales for support services for the Arctic offshore patrol ships and the joint support ships. Although these ships have yet to be turned over to the RCN, one would expect that even at this early stage many lessons have been learned which should be taken into account when conducting the business case, such as whether the knowledge was/is available to support first-day-under-power with the RCN. BAE Systems is at the heart of the potential international program. From the internet alone, one observes that, among other classes of Royal Navy (RN) ships, BAE Systems manages design, equipment maintenance and ship modifications for the RN's Type 45 destroyers. It therefore would be important to ask the RN how well their approach is working and to explore the details of the existing contract, infrastructure arrangements, innovations introduced and performance to date. This would be a bellwether to the likelihood that the RN would be at least interested in an international support program for their Type 26 frigates in terms of capability and customer-focused cultural flexibility at BAE Systems. And if they have misgivings and/or if Australia is not interested, the international program option may be eliminated from the business case. One would expect that all three nations would support the generation of their own business cases and compare conclusions before making decisions. Earlier, I offered the assumption that the platform systems are likely to employ the same major equipment systems, but that the combat systems are unlikely to be common. But to overstate the obvious, warships are not like layer cakes – they do not have separate top and bottom halves. The three naval variants being procured are exceptionally integrated and complex super-systems. Therefore, in-service support must address both sets of major equipment/systems – platform and combat systems. BAE Systems is the overall combat systems integrator for the Type 26 frigates destined for the RN and an obvious choice to deliver in-service support. Lockheed Martin Canada is the equivalent for the CSC. And BAE Systems Australia is partnered with Lockheed Martin Australia and Saab Australia to deliver the combat system integration for the Hunter-class frigates. Therefore, an international – almost-whole-of-ship – ISS solution might even offer significant economic benefits to all three nations. This could create challenges based on the proverbial “too many eggs in one basket”, and certain safeguards would be required. It is worthwhile to note an anomaly in Canada's case regarding the construction of these warships. BAE Systems is responsible for building all of the ships in question in the U.K. and Australia, but Irving Shipbuilding is responsible under NSS to construct the CSCs. One should never underestimate the shipbuilder's knowledge when dealing with a complex seagoing vessel, and a sole platform-related focus on BAE Systems alone would, in the Canadian case, be a deficit in any international program. Irving Shipbuilding's contribution should therefore be considered in the business case for Canada. Should the business case be strong, there is an argument that a directed contract to an Irving-BAE partnership for in-country platform in-service support would make sense and be in the public's interest. As mentioned earlier, although this was prohibited under the original terms of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, it could be waived in this instance for those warships that will be the backbone of Canada's maritime defence for 30 years. It would provide significant economic benefits as well. There is clearly the significant potential of operational value to such an arrangement, in addition to strong performance supporting day-to-day readiness. The three nations are on three different continents, and all three navies pursue global deployments. The availability of full ISS in or within the reach of Canada, the U.K. and Australia provides significant benefits to all three navies over their 30-year lives when breakdowns occur far from home port. The business case should take into account the fact that the U.K. may export the global combat ship design more broadly in the world. If an international consortium delivering in-service support were in place, it could become an important selling feature for potential buyers of the GCS. This undoubtedly could enhance value for money, flexibility and performance for the three plank owner nations. And from a Canadian perspective, as the nation with the largest stake in the game at 15 warships, we should be able to significantly influence the contractual arrangements with current and future parties to the international program. A typical and expensive part of the life cycle of warships is midlife conversions. Combat systems in particular require modernization to employ new technologies designed to address new threats. These are extremely complex endeavours. Once again, the degree of value for money through life could be even greater, depending on the degree of commonality of the equipment upgrade options selected. And the very fact that Canada would see opportunities worth considering as fully developed options would in itself offer potential cost benefits that would otherwise be unlikely to occur. As part of the business case analysis, it would be useful to study the commercial marine industry examples of international in-service support. Large ship operators and OEMs are very experienced in working across national and client boundaries to deliver economical services. Any business case should capture the pros and cons more broadly in the commercial business sector as well. There could be a benefit as part of an international program in terms of the people required. As the proverb goes, many hands make light work. Since the launch of what was then termed the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, Canada's marine HR challenges within government have become more pronounced. An international program could lighten the load while expanding the experience base for involved government and naval personnel in tackling the demands of supporting as complex a platform as the CSC. It would be important to understand the challenges surrounding the governance in the broadest sense. Though not at all unique, governance would likely need to be structured to address three separate functions – the integrated supplier-client engagement, the clients' government-to-government activity and industry-to-industry supplier co-ordination. While not uncommon when contracting for goods and services for complex systems, the international aspects, length of the arrangement and the ever-increasing volatility in the marketplace are noteworthy. With such complexity and the constantly changing stakeholders involved over 30 years, the mechanisms for a strong and appropriate relationship alignment would be critical to long-term success. When dealing with a high degree of complexity in an international program such as this, the business case needs to assess the likelihood that the collaboration can be created and maintained in terms of the critical enabling relationships. In the factors highlighted here and as with any business case, the importance of comparing the international program solution with what seems to be the more recent and typical Canadian in-service solution resulting from a competitive procurement cannot be underestimated. Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships and Joint Support Ships In-Service Support (AJISS) is the latest Canadian example and must be carefully analyzed even at this early stage to determine the prognosis for achieving the desired outcomes. Again, engagement with allies to assess their experience with single-nation support scenarios would be important in establishing the right comparators to enable coherent business case recommendations. It would be prudent to consider the long view as part of the business case – including such things as the likelihood that nations would retire their warships at different times or even opt out of the international ISS program long before end-of life. While much can change, an early appreciation and understanding of various scenarios and the related risks would be important. As a final point, such complicated business case assessments are never easy. After assembling the assumption set and the criteria analysis, and after negotiating “les grandes lignes” of a contractual agreement, it would be important to avoid the common pitfall of allowing one or two pros or cons to dominate the decision-making. Too often, the complexity that defies the “kiss principle” leads to rejection of otherwise optimum solutions. But at the end of the day, one must accept that it will be a judgment call. TOP OF PAGE Concluding Material Under the five-year-old Defence Procurement Strategy, Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) is responsible for leading the industry engagement that launches defence procurement processes. More recently, the ISS procurement strategies have been based on the results of the sustainment initiative business case led by DND. At virtually every opportunity over the past decade, I have emphasized the importance of managing expectations. In every discussion with industry, it behooves those leading the CSC in-service support exploration activity to include the possibility of an international program solution. To eliminate that option without study would be both shortsighted and inexcusable. Also, failing to repeatedly ensure that all stakeholders are aware of the potential for such an outcome would lack transparency and be disingenuous. When the RCN's readiness to deliver operational capability is at stake, along with billions of Canadian taxpayers' dollars for CSC in-service support over 30 years, it matters. And an international in-service support program for the new frigates of Canada, the U.K. and Australia is an important option worth considering. TOP OF PAGE About the Author After a 38 year career with the Royal Canadian Navy, Ian Mack (Rear-Admiral Retired) served for a decade (2007-2017) as the Director-General in the Department of National Defence responsible for the conception, shaping and support of the launch and subsequent implementation of the National Shipbuilding Strategy, and for guiding the DND project managers for the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, the Joint Support Ships and the Canadian Surface Combatants. He also had responsibility for four vehicle projects for the Canadian Army until 2015. Since leaving the government, he has offered his shipbuilding and project management perspectives internationally. Ian is a longstanding Fellow of the International Centre for Complex Project Management. He also is allied with Strategic Relationships Solutions Inc. He is married to Alex, and has three grown children. With few accommodations for impaired mobility, he remains active. Upon retirement, he founded a small business, Xi Complexity Consulting Inc. in Ottawa Canada. TOP OF PAGE Canadian Global Affairs Institute The Canadian Global Affairs Institute focuses on the entire range of Canada's international relations in all its forms including (in partnership with the University of Calgary's School of Public Policy), trade investment and international capacity building. Successor to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI, which was established in 2001), the Institute works to inform Canadians about the importance of having a respected and influential voice in those parts of the globe where Canada has significant interests due to trade and investment, origins of Canada's population, geographic security (and especially security of North America in conjunction with the United States), social development, or the peace and freedom of allied nations. The Institute aims to demonstrate to Canadians the importance of comprehensive foreign, defence and trade policies which both express our values and represent our interests. The Institute was created to bridge the gap between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically Canadians have tended to look abroad out of a search for markets because Canada depends heavily on foreign trade. In the modern post-Cold War world, however, global security and stability have become the bedrocks of global commerce and the free movement of people, goods and ideas across international boundaries. Canada has striven to open the world since the 1930s and was a driving factor behind the adoption of the main structures which underpin globalization such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and emerging free trade networks connecting dozens of international economies. The Canadian Global Affairs Institute recognizes Canada's contribution to a globalized world and aims to inform Canadians about Canada's role in that process and the connection between globalization and security. In all its activities the Institute is a charitable, non-partisan, non-advocacy organization that provides a platform for a variety of viewpoints. It is supported financially by the contributions of individuals, foundations, and corporations. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Institute publications and programs are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Institute staff, fellows, directors, advisors or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to, or collaborate with, the Institute. https://www.cgai.ca/an_in_service_support_opportunity

MARKHAM, Ontario--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Leading defence and military magazine, CANADIAN DEFENCE REVIEW, has just released its annual survey and ranking of Canada's Top Defence Companies. For 2020, CDR has named Lockheed Martin Canada, its Top Defence Company and it's their third time at the #1 spot over the 16 years the survey has been published. Parent company, Lockheed Martin, is the world's largest defence contractor but the Canadian operation constitutes a tiny sliver of the corporation, however, of particular interest to CDR, is the fact that its cutting edge naval technology is all home-grown! In commenting on the selection, Lorraine Ben, Lockheed Martin Canada Chief Executive, said, “... our success is founded upon long-standing partnerships with Canada, the Canadian Forces, and the country's defence supply sector.” She added, “This recognition by CDR is a true testament to our team and the extraordinary talent and dedication our employees have. And not only for our Lockheed Martin Canada team, but for our vast network of Canadian suppliers and partners – we have a rich history supporting collective success across Canadian industry and we are looking forward to growing this positive impact.” CDR Editor-in-Chief, Peter Kitchen, commented, “Lockheed Martin Canada has proven time and time again that it is a great corporate citizen and we were particularly impressed how the company not only develops its key naval technology in-country, but it also draws on the vast resources of the mother company in a very effective way.” There have been ten new companies added to the CDR survey this year, showing Canada's defence industry is vibrant and growing. An evaluation panel consisting of CDR editorial staff and independent advisors ranked the companies based on factors such as economic impact, innovation, contribution to the nation's security, corporate integrity and support for Canada's military. With the publication of its annual Top 75 Defence Companies Survey & Ranking, CDR's goal is to showcase Canada's defence industry and all that it has to offer. And that's why, in the current challenging environment, CDR is proud to be part of an industry that is fighting valiantly against the Covid-19 pandemic threatening the nation. Contacts Peter A. Kitchen, Editor-in-Chief Telephone: (905) 554-4586 Email: Comments@CanadianDefenceReview.com www.CanadianDefenceReview.com https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200504005040/en/CDR-Names-Lockheed-Martin-Canada-Top-Defence

SaltWire Network Published: May 01 at 2:43 p.m. Updated: May 01 at 3:18 p.m Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced Friday the addition of "assault-style" weapons to the list of prohibited Firearms in Canada. Here are the updated sections of federal firearms regulations. 83 The firearms of the designs commonly known as the SG-550 rifle and SG-551 carbine, and any variants or modified versions of them, including the SAN Swiss Arms (a) Aestas; (b) Autumnus; (c) Black Special; (d) Black Special Carbine; (e) Black Special CQB; (f) Black Special Target; (g) Blue Star; (h) Classic Green; (i) Classic Green Carbine; (j) Classic Green CQB; (k) Classic Green Sniper; (l) Heavy Metal; (m) Hiemis; (n) Red Devil; (o) Swiss Arms Edition; and (p) Ver. The entire list : https://www.thechronicleherald.ca/news/canada/the-list-here-are-the-weapons-identified-as-prohibited-in-canada-444750/

The Liberal government is walking back an election promise to buy back “all" military-style assault rifles in Canada, opting instead to allow current owners to sell their weapons to the government or to keep them under a grandfathering process, federal officials say. The measure is set to anger both sides of the gun-control debate, who are already polarized over the looming ban of a number of semi-automatic weapons. The partial buyback program is the latest example of the Liberal Party of Canada promising strict gun-control measures during an election and then backing off in government. Under grandfathering, new weapons sales will be stopped, but current owners will be allowed to keep their banned weapons at home under certain conditions. The broad details of the buyback program were provided by federal officials, whom The Globe and Mail is not identifying because they were not authorized to speak publicly on the matter. Alison de Groot, of the Canadian Sporting Arms and Ammunition Association, said a partial buyback program is “bad public policy” and doesn't make sense. “It is totally ineffective and a waste of taxpayer dollars,” she said. “Canadians will not be safer.” Nathalie Provost, who was hit by four bullets during the 1989 École Polytechnique massacre in which 14 women died, said a partial buyback is another disappointment in her 30-year battle for gun control. She said she understands the logistical difficulties of a full buyback, but blamed the situation on a series of failures by successive governments to enact strong gun-control measures. She was particularly critical of the elimination in 2012 of much of the federal long-gun registry under the previous Harper government. “I'm so angry, you can't imagine,” said Ms. Provost, who is part of a gun-control group called Poly Remembers. As previously reported by The Globe, the federal government is implementing its election promise to ban military-style assault rifles in Canada. Federal officials said the government has adopted a list of nine weapons to be prohibited in Canada, including firearms such as the AR-15, the Ruger Mini-14 and the Beretta CX4 Storm that have been used in mass shootings, in Canada or abroad Provisional list of recommended prohibited firearms Estimated numbers in Canada M16, M4, AR-10, AR-15 Sandy Hook, New Zealand, Las Vegas, Orlando Mini-14 Polytechnique 83,570 16,860 M14 Moncton Swiss Arms Classic Green 5,230 1,340 Vz58 Quebec Mosque CZ Scorpion EVO 3 11,590 1,810 Beretta CX4 Storm Dawson College SIG MCX and SIG MPX 1,510 1,000 Robinson XCR Guns above 20 mm calibre 1,830 30 Guns with muzzle energy above 10,000 joules 600 MURAT YÜKSELIR / THE GLOBE AND MAIL, SOURCE: GOVERNMENT OF CANADA The ban, which has been made through a cabinet decision, is set to be announced and take effect shortly. The government expects that banning the nine platforms and their variants will scoop up close to 1,500 different models in the country, totalling tens of thousands of individual firearms. In addition to the nine platforms, prohibitions are expected to be placed on guns with a muzzle energy exceeding 10,000 joules, which would snare .50-calibre sniper rifles, and those with calibres in excess of 20 millimetres, a rare grade of firearm that includes some grenade launchers. “Those are the only two prohibitions that make sense,” said A.J. Somerset, author of Arms: The Culture and Credo of the Gun and a former gunnery instructor with the Canadian Forces. “They seek to ban things around specifications. Going after individual models perpetuates the same failed approach." Mr. Somerset said that prohibiting specific models resembles a push in the 1990s to crack down on semi-automatic assault-style rifles under then-prime minister Jean Chrétien. Rather than passing comprehensive legislation, the government of the day sought to stamp out “military-style assault weapons” by identifying gun models through order-in-council. According to RCMP briefing notes, the orders-in-council were intended to be updated continually as new guns arrived on the Canadian market. For the most part, that never happened and gun manufacturers easily switched production to firearm models that circumvented the regulations. “As soon as they prohibit one model, other models will become popular – it's whack-a-mole,” said Alan Voth, a gun forensics consultant and retired RCMP firearms analyst. Mr. Voth said the 1990s prohibitions made Canada's classification system so convoluted that regional RCMP forensics labs would often disagree with one another over how certain firearm models should be classified. The government eventually centralized classification duties in Ottawa, in part to overcome regional discrepancies. Unlike the coming ban on specific assault-style weapons, the buyback program, and further gun-control measures being prepared by Ottawa, will need to be enacted through new legislation and are only scheduled to take effect next year. It remains unclear how much the buyback program will cost, but Ms. de Groot said the Liberals “grossly underestimated” the cost when they provided a $250-million price tag during the election. In a statement, Conservative MP Pierre Paul-Hus accused the government of using the “immediate emotion” of a recent mass shooting in Nova Scotia to “make major policy changes” such as the ban on assault weapons. The NDP and the Bloc Québécois both said they support a ban of assault weapons. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau defended the timing of the ban on Thursday, explaining his government was nearly ready to introduce the gun-control measures when Parliament suspended its regular activities in March because of the COVID-19 pandemic. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-liberals-set-to-break-promise-to-buy-back-all-assault-weapons-in/

In the coming months, OEMs who have been pre-qualified will be looking for a Canadian supplier in order to optimize their value proposition in order to obtain an important contract with the Canadian Government for the Logistics Vehicle Modernization (LVM) project and the Enhanced Recovery Capability (ERC) project. So there will be business opportunities for Quebec compagnies, especially for those having land vehicle, service support and armor capabilities. If you would like to know more about these opportunities, please contact Mathieu Poirier of Canada Economic Development for Quebec Regions at the following email address: mathieu.poirier@canada.ca For further information : Logistics Vehicle Modernization (LVM https://buyandsell.gc.ca/procurement-data/tender-notice/PW-BW-005-27293 Enhanced Recovery Capability (ERC) project https://buyandsell.gc.ca/procurement-data/tender-notice/PW-BL-316-27602

A recognizable face in the Kanata North business community has left the tech park to join a “startup” of a very different kind. Deborah Lovegrove, who spent more than five years as the head of marketing at the Kanata North Business Association, recently moved on to a new position as the marketing and media manager at Peraton Canada. Most of the aerospace and defence firm's Canadian operations are in Calgary, but last fall the company opened a new business development branch in downtown Ottawa. While Lovegrove's name is well-known in local business circles, the company she's joining might be a bit less familiar to casual observers of the aerospace and defence industry. But Peraton comes with an impressive pedigree. Its parent company, Harris Corp., was a dominant player in the sector for more than a century before it merged with fellow aerospace firm L3 Technologies last year to form L3Harris Technologies. When Harris sold its Harris Corporation Government Services business to Veritas Capital in 2017, Veritas changed its new acquisition's name to Peraton. The company now refers to itself as a “125-plus-year-old startup.” With more than 3,500 employees and annual revenues exceeding US$1 billion, the Virginia-based firm is quickly making its own mark in the aerospace realm. Peraton has partnered with government agencies such as NASA and Canada's Department of National Defence to provide supply chain management, engineering solutions and maintenance and repair services on a range of projects in the space, defence, cybersecurity and communications fields. The company is involved in a number of high-profile projects in this country, including an effort to commercialize advanced drone systems as well as bids from Boeing and Saab to replace the Royal Canadian Air Force's aging fleet of F-18 fighter jets – a contract with a total value of nearly $20 billion. Lovegrove, whose 25-year marketing career also includes stints in government and other non-profit trade organizations, said the new job gets her back to an industry that fascinated her when she managed marketing and promotional activities for the Canadian Aeronautics and Space Institute in 2013 and 2014. “It was tough to leave (the KNBA) because I'd been there almost six years,” Lovegrove says. “But I was definitely looking for some sort of change. It was time to try a new challenge.” With the range of opportunities in Peraton's project pipeline, Lovegrove said the chance to get back into the aerospace industry was too good to pass up. “I'm a skydiver. Anything to do with planes and speed is something that I find particularly fascinating,” she says with a laugh. “They're working on some really cool projects right now.” https://www.obj.ca/article/techopia-former-knba-marketing-boss-helping-raise-aerospace-firm-peratons-profile-capital

Murray Brewster Canada's ban on new arms exports to Turkey has been extended indefinitely, Global Affairs confirmed today. The Liberal government imposed a suspension on the approval of export permits last fall after Turkish forces launched an incursion into northern Syria. Charles-Marie Matte, deputy director of the export controls division at Global Affairs, said in an email that approvals have been suspended "until further notice." The government of Turkish President Recep Erdoğan has insisted the incursion was necessary to create a buffer zone against Kurdish militia forces. Turkey is on a Canadian government list of "trusted" countries where Canadian defence contractors can safely do business and sell sophisticated, restricted weapons. While some permit applications are reviewed on a case-by-case basis, the revised notification makes it clear that certain military items "will be presumptively denied" to Turkey. In other words, companies with those goods shouldn't even bother applying for permission to sell them to Turkey. 'Exceptional circumstances' The items in question include ammunition, light weapons, armour, protective equipment and electronics. "Exceptional circumstances" related to Canada's international alliance commitments might see the government consider issuing a permit, the notice said. An example might be the export of components for "a NATO missile defence system," Matte said in an email. Turkey has said it's willing to buy U.S.-made MIM-104 Patriot air defence missiles system if it gets a good price from Washington. The country's foreign minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, was quoted in international publications last week saying his country was interested in the purchase as part of a solution to the stalemate with the Trump administration over the Erdogan government's purchase of a Russian-made S-400 air defence system. Cavusoglu also repeated Turkey's offer to lead "a technical working group" with NATO to iron out concerns about his country operating the Russian system while still being part of the alliance. U.S. defence contractor Raytheon, which has a branch in Canada, manufactures the Patriot missile system. Rising tensions with Syria Since the incursion last fall, tensions between Turkey and Syria have only increased and came close to boiling over last winter. There were direct clashes between the Turkish army and Syrian government forces in late February and early March. An air strike on rebel-held territory in the northwestern Syrian province of Idlib on Feb 27 killed 34 Turkish soldiers. In response, Turkey shot down three Syrian warplanes and has used armed drones to carry out several attacks on forces loyal to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Several other countries — including France, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Norway, the Netherlands, Finland, Spain and Germany — have imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/turkey-canada-arms-sales-nato-1.5541714

Canadian Armed Forces members are mobilizing to help provinces and territories Emergencies are first handled by local authorities and municipal services such as firefighters, the police and medical professionals, but when first responders are overwhelmed, provinces and territories can request support from the federal government. After the request is approved, the federal government's response is managed by Public Safety Canada, who may ask the Canadian Armed Forces for help by stepping in under Operation LENTUS, the Canadian Armed Forces response to natural disasters in Canada. The same request process applies to the COVID-19 pandemic, only the CAF is responding under Operation LASER — the activation of Contingency Plan LASER “for the response to a pandemic of influenza-like disease.” Operation LASER consists of four phases. Phase one is pandemic preparedness, involving mitigation planning and monitoring of potential worldwide pandemic threats. Phase two, which began on March 2, is pandemic alert. This includes active monitoring of an evolving pandemic threat and implementing some restrictions. Phase three is the CAF's response to the pandemic. This means the CAF is able to deploy when help is requested and approved from a province or territory. Phase four is post-pandemic restoration, which is the resumption of CAF services and operations to normal levels. Phase one is also resumed. Since March 13 the CAF has been at phase three after the Chief of the Defence Staff, Jonathan Vance, approved the CAF response to the pandemic. Last month the federal government prepared 24,000 members of the Canadian Armed Forces, a total of one quarter of their regular and reserve members, to deploy in the event that a province requested their support. Since then, Quebec has requested the CAF's assistance. The province specified that it needed medical personnel to help nursing homes struggling with outbreaks of COVID-19 and staff shortages. Quebec's request was approved by the federal government and CAF medical personnel have arrived at five nursing homes. On April 22, Ontario also requested help from the federal government and the CAF for their long-term care nursing homes, which was approved the following day. CAF medical officers must have completed a medical degree from an accredited university before applying to the Medical Officer Training Program (MOTP). Once completed and accepted into the MOTP, officers are trained within the military to ensure their performance follows under military policies and in environments abroad. This includes the completion of the Basic Military Officer Qualification in Quebec before they can complete the Common Health Services course, which is provided by the Defence Learning Network. They also attend the Canadian Forces Health Services Training Center in Borden, Ontario, where they “are introduced to the organizational structure and history of the Canadian Forces Medical Service and the unique circumstances of practicing military medicine.” Medical officers then can choose to either specialize their medical practice or acquire advanced training in several fields of medicine. CAF members are also helping process materials for Personal Protective Equipment at Public Health Agency warehouses across Canada. In Northern Canada, they are prepared to assist remote communities to combat outbreaks. The CAF has activated three Northern Saskatchewan Ranger Patrols, gathering firewood for residents during their winter season as the pandemic continues. https://runnermag.ca/2020/04/explainer-what-the-canadian-military-is-doing-for-canadians-during-the-pandemic/

At Skies, we've heard from a number of North American aviation product, support and services businesses that are doing their best to keep our industry moving during this global pandemic. To ensure that operators can still access the support they need, here is a non-exhaustive list of companies who are still open for business in some capacity. This list will be updated regularly. If you would like your company to be added to the list, please email news@skiesmag.com. Aero Aviation Ltd. Airborne Engines Ltd. Airbus Helicopters Canada Air Comm Corporation Air Georgian AirSuite Inc. AJW Technique Alpine Aerotech ALSIM Flight Training Solutions Altitude Aerospace Inc. Anodyne Electronics Manufacturing Corp. Apex Industries Inc. ARTEX Atlantic Avionics Aurora Jet Partners Avialta Helicopter Maintenance Ltd. Avianor Inc. Aviation Business Support Inc. Aviation Ground Fueling Technologies Avicor Aviation International Avmax Avstar Media AvroTecknik Aviation B.C. Aviation Council Bella Coola Air Ltd. Boeing Distribution Inc. Bridger Aerospace Group, LLC Brotech Precision CNC Inc. Cadorath Calm Air International Canadian Airports Council Canadian Air Parts, Ltd. Canadian Air Transport Security Authority Canadian Business Aviation Association Canadian Council for Aviation & Aerospace CanRep Inc. CanWest Aerospace Inc. CarteNav Solutions (Mission systems) Cascade Aerospace Custom Helicopters Cyclone Manufacturing DART Aerospace De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd. Diamond Aircraft Industries Inc. (London, Ont.) Eagle Copters EFC Developments Elisen & Associés Inc. Essential Turbines, Inc. EuroTec Canada Exchange Petroleum Execaire Executive Flight Centre Fast Air – Air Charter Services Fast Air Jet Centre (FBO) FDC Aero Composites Field Aviation (Calgary and Toronto) Firkus Aircraft Inc. Fleet Canada Inc. Flight Data Systems Flightdeck Solutions Flightdocs FlightPath International FlightSafety Canada FlightSafety International Flying Colours Corp. FlyRite Accessory Overhauls Inc. Freedom Aero Service Inc. FreeFlight Systems Global Airparts Inc. Helicopter Accessory Service South, LLC. Helicopter Accessory Service, Inc. Heli-Lynx Helicopters Heli-One Heliproducts Industries Helitowcart Helitrades Heliwelders Canada Ltd. HM Aero Aviation Consulting Hope Aero Propeller & Components Inc. Hopkinson Aircraft Sales ICARUS Aero, Inc. Image Air IMP Aerospace Innotech Aviation JITbase KADEX Aero Supply Ltd. Keewatin Air (Aircraft maintenance and hangarage) KF Aerospace Latitude Technologies Lee Aerospace Levaero Aviation Longview Aviation Capital Marshall Aerospace Canada Inc. Maxcraft Avionics Ltd. Meridian Helicopters LLC Mid-Canada Mod Center Moncton Flight College Morningstar Air Express National Airlines Council of Canada National Helicopters Inc. Nav Canada Northwest Helicopters NovaJet Aviation Group Pacific Coastal Airlines (Emergency charter services and reduced WestJet Link flights) PAL Aerospace PAL Airlines PAL Aviation Services (Full-service FBO) Passport Helico (Commercial 702/703 and AMO) Perimeter Aviation Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. Precision Aero Components Premier Aviation Québec Inc. Priority 1 Air Rescue Professional Aircraft Accessories Professional Aircraft Associates Propair Inc. PropWorks Propeller Systems QualaTech Aero Consulting Ltd. Rocky Mountain Aircraft Rotorcorp, LLC Rotor Services Ltd. Sander Geophysics Limited (Air cargo) Sealand Aviation Ltd. Sealand Aerospace Ltd. Sealand Flight SEI Industries Select Helicopter Services Ltd. Signature Flight Support – Edmonton Skandia, Inc. Skyservice Business Aviation SKYTRAC Systems Springer Aerospace StandardAero Summit Aviation Sunwest Aviation Szabo Aviation International TEAAM Aeromedical Technisonic Industries Ltd. Tempest Aviation Thunder Airlines Tradewind International, LLC TrainingPort.net Transwest Helicopters Ltd. TSL Aerospace Technologies Ltd. Turbolyft Aerospace United Aero Group Upper Valley Aviation Ltd. Vanguard Air Care VIH Aerospace Viking Air Ltd. Vmo Solutions Voyageur Aviation Corp. Wasaya Airways Westcan Aircraft Sales & Salvage Ltd. Western Aircraft Western Propeller Westholme Graphics, Inc. Wilderness Helicopters WinAir We're all in this together! https://www.skiesmag.com/news/canadian-aviation-product-support-services-businesses-that-are-remaining-open-during-the-covid-19-crisis/