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DAVID PUGLIESE, OTTAWA CITIZEN The U.S. should follow Canada's lead in putting far-right extremist groups on its list of outlawed terrorist organizations, a new report on the danger of the white supremacist movement recommends. There is also a growing trend for white supremacist groups to seek military training and experience in foreign conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, warns the New York-based Soufan Center in its report “White Supremacy Extremism: The Transnational Rise of The Violent White Supremacist Movement. U.S. government efforts to fight white supremacy extremism (WSE) are lacking despite the increasing danger it poses, the report pointed out. “White supremacy extremism is a transnational challenge — its tentacles reach from Canada to Australia, and the United States to Ukraine – but it has evolved at a different pace in different parts of the world,” noted the report. “To make serious progress, the United States should consider building upon Canada and the United Kingdom's leadership by sanctioning transnational WSE groups as foreign terrorist organizations.” The report specifically pointed to Canadian efforts against the international neo-Nazi network called Blood & Honor. In June, Canada for the first time added right-wing extremist groups to its list of terrorist organizations. Blood & Honor as well as its armed branch, Combat 18, which has carried out murders and bombings around the world, were both put on the list. Blood & Honor was founded in the United Kingdom in the late 1980s but has supporters in Canada. By designating white supremacist groups as international terrorists, the U.S. government could hinder the travel of their members and prosecute individuals for providing material support to designated groups. In 2018 white supremacist extremists were connected to 50 murders in the U.S. The Soufan Center, created by former FBI agent Ali Soufan who was involved in a number of counter-terrorism cases, also warned white nationalists have been traveling to Ukraine to learn combat skills. Such recruits are on both sides of the conflict between Ukraine and pro-Russian separatists and an estimated 17,000 foreigners from 50 countries have gone to fight in that war, it added. “In Ukraine, the Azov Battalion has recruited foreign fighters motivated by white supremacy and neo-Nazi beliefs, including many from the West, to join its ranks and receive training, indoctrination, and instruction in irregular warfare,” the report outlined. The Azov Battalion has been formerly incorporated into the Ukrainian military, at least in theory, the report added. But the battalion has cultivated a relationship with members of the Atomwaffen Division, a U.S.-based neo-Nazi terrorist network. In late September police arrested a U.S. Army soldier in Kansas for allegedly sharing bomb-making instructions online and discussing attacks on the news media, left-leaning activists and former U.S. Congressman Beto O'Rourke. The soldier, Jarrett William Smith, was interested in joining the Azov Battalion in Ukraine, according to the FBI. He was corresponding with another man in Texas who had fought in Ukraine for a right-wing extremist organization. In June 2018 Canadian government and military officials in Ukraine met with members of the Azov Battalion, which earlier that year had been banned by the U.S. Congress from receiving American arms because of its links to neo-Nazis The Canadians were photographed with battalion members, images which were shared on the unit's social media site In a statement to this newspaper Department of National Defence spokesman Dan Le Bouthillier said the meeting was planned by Ukrainian authorities and Canadian representatives had no prior knowledge of those who would be invited. “Canada has not, does not, and will not be providing support to Azov and affiliated entities,” Le Bouthillier said. “Canada is strongly opposed to the glorification of Nazism and all forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, intolerance and extremism.” The Soufan Center report also noted that Russian neo-Nazis have links with white supremacists in western nations. On the other side of the conflict in Ukraine, Russian groups like the Russian Imperial Movement and its paramilitary unit have also attracted and trained foreign fighters motivated by white supremacy and neo-Nazi beliefs, the report added. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/us-should-follow-canadas-lead-in-placing-far-right-groups-on-terror-list-says-report

DAVID PUGLIESE, OTTAWA CITIZEN Canada's future fighter jet competition has already lost two European competitors. Will it lose a third, the Gripen built by Saab of Sweden? At the end of August, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence and Airbus Defence and Space informed the Canadian government of their decision to withdraw from Canada's future fighter competition. Airbus had been offering Canada the Eurofighter Typhoon. Last year the European firm Dassault informed the Canadian government it would not be competing in the competition. It had been planning to offer Canada the Rafale fighter jet. Airbus and the UK Defence Ministry noted that their decision to withdraw was the result of a detailed review of Canada's request for proposals which was released to industry on July 23. Airbus pointed to the changes Canada made to the industrial benefits package to appease Lockheed Martin as well as the excessive costs that U.S.-Canadian security requirements placed on a company based outside North America. “A detailed review has led the parties to conclude that NORAD security requirements continue to place too significant of a cost on platforms whose manufacture and repair chains sit outside the United States-Canada 2-EYES community,” the statement from Airbus and the UK Defence Ministry noted. “Second, both parties concluded that the significant recent revision of industrial technological benefits obligations does not sufficiently value the binding commitments the Typhoon Canada package was willing to make, and which were one of its major points of focus.” The $19 billion competition has been dogged by allegations it is designed to favour Lockheed Martin's F-35 stealth fighter. Take for instance, the response that Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan provided when the Liberal government in November 2016 announced the purchase of 18 interim Boeing Super Hornets. That deal was eventually scuttled after Boeing decided to go after Bombardier in a trade dispute over civilian aircraft. But at the time when the purchase was announced, Sajjan was asked why Canada was buying the Super Hornet and not one of the other fighter jets on the market. “When you look at the various aircraft, we have our NORAD commitment's (which are) extremely important,” the defence minister responded. “There's certainly interoperability issues as well.” Procurement Minister Judy Foote was more blunt. “From our perspective, we're working with the American government, so we have to look at an American plane.” So how is that different from the aircraft to be selected for the future fighter jet competition? Sajjan and Foote were stating in November 2016 that Canada needed to buy American because of its NORAD commitments and other interoperability concerns with the U.S. Nothing appears to have changed in the last three years, at least as far as the federal government and Canadian Forces are concerned. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/european-built-fighter-aircraft-did-they-ever-stand-a-chance-in-canadas-competition

Byron Callan During upcoming earnings conference calls, expect some defense contractors to again state that they are well-positioned in high-priority programs and markets that fully align with customer priorities. In addition, planners and analysts are going to be asking a lot more questions about contractor positioning and the outcome of the 2020 U.S. election. Who will be best positioned if President Donald Trump is reelected or if there is a Democrat in the White House in 2021? On the first assertion of “well-positioned,” to a degree it is axiomatic. Defense requirements are validated, so by that very process, they take priority over emerging and yet-to-be-funded requirements. However, if one accepts the premises that Defense Department budgets may be flat for a multi-year period and that demand signals for security are going to rise, the sector will be entering a far more dynamic period in the 2020s than the past 4-5 years. Instead of being “well-positioned,” a broader set of filters may need to be applied. Posture may be a better way to assess contractor outlooks. There are five attributes on which this may be assessed. 1. The priority and relative safety of programs matters both in U.S. and international markets. But that needs to be assessed and reassessed against changed defense needs. Today's major programs of record are likely to change. If there is doubt on that issue, a reading of the U.S. Marine Corps Commandant's Planning Guidance released last July may dispel notions that the next 10 years are going to be stable and predictable. 2. One contractor can disrupt others through new product and service offerings or even a new business model. Examples of the former include Boeing's T-X/T-7 aircraft, which, if evolved into a fighter/attack aircraft, may be good enough for some missions. Kratos' Valkyrie is another example, which could affect demand for manned combat aircraft. On the latter, the Pentagon now intends to purchase launch services instead of expendable launch vehicles. Where else might these sorts of “as a service” models be applied? 3. The pipeline of bid opportunities: There are some large programs that are in competition and for which decisions are pending. The Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, Long-Range Standoff, Army aviation and ground-vehicle modernization and Navy FFG(X) programs are some of the larger ones that could be decided, but there also are classified ones and swaths of opportunity in unmanned systems, hypersonics, software for data and artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity. International opportunity also clearly matters in assessing how a contractor is postured. 4. The ability to execute within cost and schedule is essential. Human capital, technology application and risk, contracting and supply chain management are critical attributes. This also will tie into the bid pipeline and the degree to which a contractor is postured to pursue new opportunities or if the contractor will have challenges managing its current portfolio of products and services. From the outside looking in at contractors, this attribute may be difficult to measure. Open job position data can be sketchy, but it is one metric to consider. Performance on current programs is another. 5. Contractor culture will be critical in the 2020s. One aspect of culture is how well a contractor anticipates potential changes in defense and security needs. Another is how receptive company leaders are to positioning or repositioning to capitalize on those changes. There will not be solid metrics here, although there are plenty of good questions to ask. In order to anticipate change, contractors are going to have to be wired to understand when and where change is occurring. This has to allow perspectives that may differ from the consensus view to reach leaders so they can assess whether ideas are worth pursuing or if there is a threat to be addressed. Part of this posture entails a willingness to create top cover and breathing space for conflicting views. There will be a natural tendency of company leaders to continue to exploit current business models and protect major products and services. There will likely be very strong pressure from shareholders to sustain or increase operational margins and cash flow and stay within current business lanes. Posture, however, may also include a willingness to take some short-term or even intermediate-term pain and risk in order to better position for the future. Innovation is an overused term these days, and it may be like former Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's assertion on obscenity: “I know it when I see it.” Be that as it may, contractors must dedicate time to innovation every week in order to achieve it. https://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-how-assess-defense-prospects-future

RTCA, Inc. announced that under a new training agreement with Mannarino Systems & Software, Inc. four new technical seminars will be available in 2020 expanding the suite of training programs and seminars that RTCA provides for the aviation industry. The seminars will offer aviation industry participants proficient domain knowledge on topics relevant to current challenges in aircraft systems, software and electronic hardware development. “I am pleased to be partnering with MANNARINO in broadening our training catalog”, said Terry McVenes, president and CEO of RTCA. “These new courses will continue our goal to facilitate the use of key documents by our stakeholders and further the understanding of developing and using global standards and guidance.” “We are extremely proud to have the opportunity to work with RTCA and bring our practical experience, methods and efficient approaches to satisfying regulatory requirements on increasingly complex development projects” indicated John Mannarino, president of Mannarino Systems & Software. Details and dates for the new seminars will be announced shortly. https://www.skiesmag.com/press-releases/rtca-announces-new-training-agreement-with-mannarino-systems-software

The first Airbus CC-295, purchased by the Government of Canada for the Royal Canadian Air Force's (RCAF) Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft Replacement (FWSAR) program, rolled out of the paint shop showing off its final livery at the Airbus facility in Seville, Spain. The aircraft will now go through the final preparation phase before its delivery to the customer, planned to take place in Spain before the end of the year. The aircraft adopts the yellow paint scheme following the tradition defined in the 1970s for search and rescue aircraft, giving high visibility for those in the air and on the ground. The contract, awarded in December 2016, includes 16 CC-295 aircraft and all in-service support elements including training and engineering services, the construction of a new training centre in Comox, B.C., and maintenance and support services. The aircraft will be based where search and rescue squadrons are currently located: Comox, B.C.; Winnipeg, Man.; Trenton, Ont.; and Greenwood, N.S. Considerable progress has been made since the FWSAR programme was announced two and a half years ago: the first aircraft is due to be delivered in Spain in the coming months; another six aircraft are either completing flight tests or in various stages of final assembly; and seven simulators and training devices are starting up preliminary acceptance tests. The first RCAF crews started training in late summer 2019 at Airbus' International Training Centre in Seville, Spain. https://www.skiesmag.com/press-releases/first-royal-canadian-air-force-c295-shows-off-its-final-livery

By DAVID PUGLIESE, OTTAWA CITIZEN It's not much of a surprise that defence and security issues aren't a factor in this federal election. Despite the concerns of various commentators and analysts, the political parties can safely ignore those topics. Even though billions of dollars are to be spent on the future purchase of military equipment, and Canada is engaged in training missions in Ukraine, Latvia and Iraq, the average Canadian doesn't appear to care all that much about such topics. That doesn't mean that such a viewpoint is right. But it's typical of recent elections. The parties have touched briefly on defence and security in their platforms. Conservative Leader Andrew Scheer has noted he would improve relations with the U.S. and join the U.S. missile defence program. His government would buy new submarines and improve Arctic sovereignty. The Conservatives haven't discussed what it would cost to join the American missile defence system and there is no price tag for new submarines designed to operate in the Arctic. The subs, in particular, could be costly. In 2016 Australia announced its program to acquire 12 new subs with a price tag of $50 billion. Earlier this year Scheer vowed that a Conservative government would take the politics out of defence procurement, equipping the Canadian Forces with only what it needs. But even as he re-emphasized that point on the campaign trail, Scheer promised to order a second naval supply ship to be built at Davie shipyards in Quebec. While that would create jobs in the province and potentially generate support for the Conservatives, the leadership of the Royal Canadian Navy is adamant the second vessel is not needed. Liberal party defence promises have fewer details. Once again the Liberals have promised to increase support for the United Nations. But that's a repeat from the 2015 election campaign and many defence analysts point out that the Liberals didn't really deliver on that in their first mandate. There was the Canadian Forces mission to Mali, finished after only a year, and the assignment of a transport aircraft for UN use. But little else. The Liberals have a new promise to use the Canadian military's expertise for climate-related disasters, but again there are few details. They've also resurrected another of their 2015 election promises, which was to reform the defence procurement system. Little was done over the past several years to improve the system to purchase billions of dollars of military equipment. This time around the Liberals are promising to create a Defence Procurement Agency but it is unclear how that would be set up. The Green party has promised stable funding for military equipment and training, deployment of military personnel to deal with climate change disasters and pollution in the Arctic, to sign a treaty to abolish nuclear weapons and to cancel a deal with Saudi Arabia for light armoured vehicles. The NDP stated they would hold a fair competition for new fighter jets, keep shipbuilding procurement on time, stop the privatization of services at military bases and put more focus on peacekeeping. While defence and security issues are important, and can be costly to taxpayers, they don't seem to appear at the forefront of voter concerns. Most of the time they don't even register. Despite the thousands of words written and spoken by politicians and defence analysts about aging fighter jets, Canadians aren't marching in the streets to demand replacements for the RCAF's CF-18s. Scheer's promise to spend $1.5 billion to buy new medical imaging equipment for hospitals across Canada is more directly relevant to the average Canadian – who likely knows someone who has had to wait months for a MRI – than his promise to have Canada join the U.S. missile defence shield. The lack of interest by Canadians on defence matters has not been lost on politicians in power, particularly when they need to cut spending. By realizing that defence issues concerned only a small portion of the electorate, Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper – who counted himself as a politician firmly behind the Canadian Forces – was able to chop the military's budget. At the heart of that issue is the lack of connection to and knowledge of the Canadian military by most Canadians. That was illustrated by a July 2018 report commissioned by the Department of National Defence which concluded that, “Awareness of and familiarity with the [Canadian Forces] was generally very low; virtually non-existent among those in the younger age group.” Only 26 per cent of those surveyed had some awareness of what the Canadian Forces had been doing over a year-and-a-half period. They couldn't even name what types of missions the military did at home, despite the high profile responses by the Canadian Forces to natural disasters such as floods and forest fires. Participants in the study were even surprised the learn the Canadian Forces operated in the Arctic. It's a situation that doesn't bode well for the future of the Canadian military. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/with-canadians-tuned-out-on-defence-political-parties-can-safely-ignore-the-topic-at-election-time

The Ottawa Macdonald-Cartier International Airport Authority has partnered with NAV Canada and QinetiQ Canada to trial drone detection technology at Ottawa International Airport (YOW). Named Obsidian Counter UAS System, the technology is equipped to accurately recognise drone features and avoid classifying non-drone activity such as wildlife movement. NAV Canada and QinetiQ will work with the airport authority to install and deploy the Obsidian micro-Doppler radar unit, determining the compatibility of the system in a civilian airport environment. Ottawa Macdonald-Cartier International Airport Authority president and CEO Mark Laroche said: “The trial with QinetiQ's Obsidian Counter UAS System will provide all parties the opportunity to test a viable detection and mitigation system at an active airport. “The trial dovetails perfectly with both the Airport Authority's Drone Incident Protocol and the recommendations in the BRTF's Interim and Final reports.” The trial will evaluate the accurate and timely detection of drones or remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS). It will assess the effectiveness of the system in initiating the right response to drone / RPAS detection between the airport authority and NAV Canada. The trial will also assess the system compatibility in an international airport environment, which is prone to interference by other partner systems. QinetiQ Canada MD Robert Aubé said: “Obsidian Counter UAS is specifically designed to meet the current and forecast threat of drone incursion upon critical national infrastructure, including daily operations in complex environments such as the Ottawa Macdonald-Cartier International Airport.” NAV Canada is a non-profit corporation that owns and operates the country's civil air navigation system. Last month, two flights were diverted to nearby airports due to suspected drone activity in the surroundings of Dubai International Airport. London's Gatwick Airport closed for approximately 36 hours in December 2018 due to threats posed by illegal drones flying near its runway. It caused widespread disruption and led to the cancellation of approximately 1,000 flights. https://www.airport-technology.com/news/ottawa-airport-authority-drone-detection/

Every election, would-be prime ministers promise to cancel bad military purchases or processes, hurry along good ones, fix the mess once and for all OTTAWA — The seemingly endless effort to replace Canada's CF-18s fighter jets passed a tiny milestone Friday: fighter-jet makers participating in the $19-billion competition were required to explain how they planned to make their aircraft compliant with U.S. intelligence systems. For nearly a decade, Canadians have been inundated with talk of fighter jets without Canada ever buying them, an ever-worsening symbol of the failures of Canada's military procurement system. Every election, would-be prime ministers promise to cancel bad purchases or processes, hurry along good ones, fix the mess once and for all. Conservative Leader Andrew Scheer this week promised to “de-politicize” military procurement with new oversight bodies in cabinet and the Privy Council Office while working toward multi-partisan consensus on procurement projects in Parliament. The Liberals promise to establish a new agency called Defence Procurement Canada, which suggests taking the entire function away from the four departments that now share responsibility for buying military kit. The New Democrats and Greens promise, without detail, that they will ensure Canada's military gets the equipment it needs. The origins of what we face today can be traced back to the end of the Cold War when Canada and its allies began to cut defence spending after a decades-long arms race with the Soviet Union. There were concerns about whether or not you're getting the right kind of economic benefits “We deferred purchasing new fighter planes and did the same thing with our frigate fleet,” says David Perry, vice-president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and one of Canada's foremost experts on defence spending and procurement. “We just kicked the can down the road on fixed-wing search-and-rescue aircraft. There was a bunch of other projects that fit the same vein.” The military had to use equipment for years longer than it was supposed to and the Department of National Defence lost most of its procurement experts. But in the mid-2000s, the Forces' equipment problems were revealed in Kandahar: the military lacked transport aircraft to resupply its Afghanistan mission, artillery and tanks to support troops on the ground and helicopters to move them around. Ottawa rushed into gear, purchasing transport planes, howitzers, helicopters and tanks in short order — in most cases without competitions. New equipment flooded in but there were some big failures, starting with accusations defence officials rigged the requirements for a new search-and-rescue plane to select a specific U.S. plane. There was also a failed effort to buy new supply ships for the navy and, most explosively, a plan to buy new fighter jets, Lockheed Martin's F-35s, without a competition. In 2012, auditor general Michael Ferguson blasted the Defence Department for failing to communicate the stealth fighter's risks, including escalating costs and schedule delays, to Parliament and decision-makers. Dan Ross, who was the department's head of military procurement at the time, would later say defence officials had all the information and were willing to share it — the Harper government just wouldn't let them. Either way, the public's confidence in the system and the government's ability to manage it were shaken. The F-35 purchase was scrapped. The Tories imposed new constraints to keep costs under control and ensure Canadian industry and communities benefit from defence contracts. “There were concerns about whether or not you're getting the right kind of economic benefits, some significant concerns about whether or not process was being adhered to until you had this system recalibration where you had an injection of additional rules and governance,” Perry says. That recalibration imposed a fundamental tension on the system: the need to get the best equipment possible, with the most benefit to the economy or local industry, at the lowest cost. Every big procurement is partly about the military's needs and partly about national industrial policy — and, that means, partly about politics. Most procurements are still completed with minimal fuss. The problems largely lie with big, once-in-a-lifetime contracts like fighters and warships that are worth billions of dollars and are not only essential for the military to operate, but have the potential to benefit Canadian businesses and communities for years. The ones that involve billions of public dollars. “You're trying to get the best bang for the buck for as little buck as possible,” says Queen's University professor Kim Nossal, who wrote a book entitled “Charlie Foxtrot: Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada” in 2016. “The one comforting thing is that very few countries have got the balance right. All industrial countries, all of our allies, faces these kinds of pressures. They worry about jobs and costs and capability.” Efforts to combine the three competing priorities can lead to bickering among federal departments, lawsuits from companies and politicians sticking their fingers in things. Seconds after saying he would de-politicize the military procurement system this week, Scheer promised to negotiate the purchase of an interim naval supply ship from Quebec's Chantier Davie shipyard, which lobbied the Liberal government for years to ink such a contract without success. Davie is one of Canada's big players in shipbuilding — and it's in much-contested political territory just outside Quebec City. Alan Williams, who was the Defence Department's head of procurement from 1999 to 2005 and now advises companies on procurement matters, compares Scheer's promise on Davie to Justin Trudeau's promise in 2015 not to buy the F-35. That's because while a government can decide to purchase a piece of military equipment, procurement laws — and Canada's international trade obligations — forbid it from choosing or excluding a specific product or supplier except under extreme circumstances. Upon taking office, the Liberals twisted themselves in pretzels to get around the legal implications of their promise. That twisting led to a plan to buy Super Hornets from a competing vendor. When that fell through, four years passed before an actual competition was launched — with the F-35 now one of three planes still in contention. In the meantime, the CF-18s will fly until 2032, reinforced with second-hand Australian F-18s to buy time. https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/election-2019/with-billions-of-dollars-at-stake-all-parties-promise-to-fix-defence-purchases

by Alan Stephenson The path towards procuring a replacement fighter for the CF-188 Hornet has been one with many twists and turns due to political gamesmanship and strategic business marketing, causing much public misunderstanding. This short article aims to put a few things into perspective as the competitors complete their analysis and response to the government's request for proposal (RFP) issued July 23, 2019, for the Future Fighter Capability Project (FFCP). Eligible suppliers Of the original five qualifying suppliers, only the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet Block III, Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II, and Saab Gripen E fighters remain in the competition. The Dassault Rafale and Airbus Eurofighter Typhoon were both pulled from consideration, with company officials citing “that NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] security requirements continue to place too significant of a cost on platforms whose manufacture and repair chains sit outside the United States-Canada 2-EYES community.” Given that the Canadian government identified the first two principal roles of the Canadian Armed Forces as ensuring Canadian sovereignty and the defence of North America, the requirement to be fully functional and integral within NORAD is mandatory. The reality today is that fighters are not simply weapons platforms, but flying computers that also function as airborne sensors that are designed to be integrated into command and control computer networks. Thus, the challenge for non-American manufacturers is to overcome both sensitive commercial and U.S. national security concerns when they are required to integrate and support U.S. information-sharing equipment in their platforms. A second reason given for Airbus's departure was the eleventh-hour modification to the RFP that relaxed the expected industrial technological benefits (ITB) obligations. To attract more than three suppliers and ensure a competition, the government originally stuck to its standing ITB policy of “requiring the winning supplier to make investments in Canada equal to the value of the contract.” However, this effectively eliminated the F-35 due to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program agreement – signed by Canada – that forbade such a demand. To provide latitude to all bidders, the final RFP was modified into a two-phased proposal to allow non-American companies to address 2/5-EYES challenges up front, while also applying rated criteria for economic offset potential of stated ITB requirements, to keep the F-35 within the bidding process. Additionally, five per cent was shifted from cost to economic criteria to compensate for changes in the original draft ITB policy. The proposals will now be assessed on 60 per cent technical merit, 20 per cent cost and 20 per cent economic benefits. Current bidders In recent years, the Saab Group expanded globally by offering industrial partnerships that combined local production and capital-heavy ventures with national customer partners. Saab's approach with the Gripen E bid in Canada follows this successful formula of maximizing national economic benefits with an economical product; however, Saab also faces the challenges that Airbus determined to be too difficult to overcome. Additionally, the Gripen E is still in development; its first production flight occurred on Aug. 26, 2019, meaning issues of proven performance and systems maturation need to be factored in during bid evaluation. According to the firm, this first fighter will be used as a test aircraft in a joint Swedish/Brazilian test program, the only two customers for the Gripen E to date. Given that the Eurofighter bid was sponsored by the U.K. government, a member of the 5-EYES community that decided it could not meet the information-sharing requirements, Saab will need to be innovative and cost-conscious in its proposal if it is to surmount this mission-critical criteria. As for the Super Hornet, Boeing promised to invest $18 billion in ITBs under the failed 2017 purchase agreement for 18 fighters, and it is anticipated that the company will follow its established approach to investing in Canada as per previous ITB commitments. Concern over the so-called Boeing Clause, “to allow only companies that it deems ‘trusted partners' to bid on major capital programs,” has faded away and Boeing is confident that it can mount a competitive bid, particularly now that the U.S. Navy's (USN) commitment to future purchases will keep the production line open until 2033. By incorporating leading-edge technology into the Block III to meet adversarial advances, Boeing has ensured the Super Hornet will meet Canadian requirements. Although still in development as well, a major question for government decision-makers has to do with sustainability. At present, only the USN and Kuwait will operate the Super Hornet Block III, while Australia has plans to upgrade their Block II version. As Australia expects to retire its fleet in the early 2040s and the USN in 2045, the challenge for Boeing will be in meeting the stated lifecycle expectancy of Canada's future fighter in a cost-effective manner. Since 2015, the much-maligned F-35 has proven itself in combat and counts Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the three U.S. services as customers. As the only fifth generation fighter, it contains technological advances that are designed into the aircraft and cannot be replicated in fourth generation platforms. The overall architectural concept regards the F-35 as more than just a weapons platform, but also as a forward sensor that is fully integrated into the developing multi-domain command and control system. Initial airframe costs have been significantly reduced and early sustainment issues are being resolved; however, the F-35 remains the most costly platform to own and operate at the moment. With a projected lifetime production run of over 4,000 fighters, lifecycle support is guaranteed, and Canadian industry stands to gain substantially from Canada's early investment in the co-operative JSF Program. However, according to reports, manufacturers will lose points in the ITB element formula scoring system if they do not make a 100 per cent commitment to the contract value, which Lockheed-Martin is prohibited from doing by JSF contractual agreement. Arctic Interestingly, all remaining competitors can lay claim to being Arctic platforms. Canada has already proven the F/A-18's credentials in the high North, the U.S. will base two combat F-35 squadrons in Alaska, and Sweden has developed the Gripen with Arctic operations in mind. The issue of one versus two engines has never been a significant issue for Arctic operations except in Canada. Originally, two engines was one of the many discriminators used in choosing the F/A-18 over the F-16 in 1979. Recently, the Standing Committee on National Defence's shaping of the narrative in 2016 to promote the sole-source purchase of the Super Hornet reintroduced the idea that operations in the Arctic demanded two engines. As with commercial aviation where transatlantic flight once required four-engine passenger planes, the advancements in engine technology have led to standard two-engine models today. Engine reliability is not a concern with any of the competing fighters. However, operations in Canada's Arctic are unique and risky in an inhospitable region that is 11 times the size of Sweden. Other discriminators, such as continuous communications and tracking, become equally or more important to survival. Stealth One of the unfortunate aspects of American F-35 global marketing efforts with respect to the FFCP is the issue of stealth technology. Although the idea of penetrating, first strike operations sells well in the U.S., stealth is a much maligned and misappropriated concept in Canada. Stealth technology is all about maximizing self-protection and increasing survivability by disrupting the ‘kill-chain' through low observability. This concept is no different from the tactical advantages that I used while flying the CF-104 in Germany during the Cold War. The Starfighter had a one-square-metre cross-section nose-on, making the adversary's initial radar detection difficult and target acquisition and identification questionable, delaying force commitment to the target. This complicated the decision and order to attack the target, and finally upon weapons release, the low radar cross-section shrunk the available radar weapons envelope needed for destruction of the fighter. The CF-104's speed significantly exacerbated the adversary's kill-chain difficulties. The CF-188 Hornet I flew later required a Defensive Electronic Countermeasures suite that masked the larger aircraft radar cross-section, and electronically intervened and complicated a more advanced kill-chain. The advent of artificial intelligence (AI) will significantly decrease ambiguity and decision-making time in the near future. Whether built into the design or strapped on later, some form of self-protection is required to protect the pilot and the fighter asset that will either be defending Canadian territory or operate in foreign contested airspace when the government commits its fighter force. The question is one of application and the cost effectiveness of self-protection measures used by each platform and how they are expressed in the bid proposal. Costs Costing is a nebulous exercise outside evaluation of the final bids due to the many variables. Although airframe costs are most often thrown around, the government must consider the airframe, operating, infrastructure, sustainment and other related costs as a package, balanced against the capability being purchased. A good example of the intricacies involves the way the fighter fleet is bought. The Super Hornet must be purchased through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, where the U.S. government acts as the broker. Generally, a 30 per cent mark-up is charged for research and development (R&D) and administrative fees. In the case of the F-35, as a JSF partner, these costs are reduced for Canada through common funding. The costs for R&D have already been shared by the membership pool, and partners pay the same price for the weapons system as the U.S. services. Future upgrades become additional FMS expenses for the Super Hornet, whereas upgrade developments are shared by JSF members. Each of the competitors is being asked to provide 88 fighter aircraft within the $19 billion funding envelope and the old adage of “you get what you pay for” is very applicable. Each of these platforms brings a different level of current and future combat capability that needs to be judiciously weighed. If the fighter is to reach the government's goal of flying until 2060, each needs to be flexible and adaptative to evolving technology. More significantly, 70 per cent of lifecycle costs are in sustainment and therefore the fighter chosen must be cost-effectively supported for the next 40 years. The next leg In the lead-up to the RFP, it has been evident that national security factors have been competing with economic benefit interests. With the election this fall, the next government (whatever form this takes) will no doubt want to review the project and put its own stamp of approval on the process that it has inherited. Hopefully this will not further delay the decision on the replacement of the CF-188 fleet and the Royal Canadian Air Force will finally be able to move ahead with the best fighter aircraft Canadians can provide to the women and men who are putting their lives in harm's way. https://www.skiesmag.com/features/erratic-flight-path-canadas-fighter-procurement-plan