August 2, 2022 | International, Aerospace
AFSOC hopes its Armed Overwatch plane will be able to pressure violent extremist groups in austere places like Africa, where the airspace is largely permissive.
September 7, 2021 | International, Aerospace
An Italy-based defense firm that has supplied small drones to the country's special forces was quietly and illegally purchased by Chinese state companies, Italian investigators claim.
May 25, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
By: Thomas Ayres As Americans respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, we have become acutely aware of the outsized impact of our dependence on China in the supply chain. Pharmaceutical companies learned key chemicals and minerals are exclusively made or mined in China. For instance, reports show China produces 97 percent of the antibiotics, 95 percent of ibuprofen and 91 percent of hydrocortisone consumed in the U.S. market. Hospitals also learned that while China produces 50 percent of the world's face masks, they are of dubious reliability. There is cause for concern with the quantity or quality of ventilators. In sum, we learned as citizens what we in the Department of Defense have known for some time: Our national security supply chain must be free from dependence on China. The DoD's concern for its supply chain is not new. Congress spurred activity over a decade ago by questioning the DoD's supply chain risk management, or SCRM, policies. The National Defense Strategy‘s recognition of a new era of strategic, great power competition further sharpened the DoD's focus, propelling recent efforts to enhance regulations and procedures in addressing supply chain threats. We are transitioning from analog to digital, with the goal of planes, ships, tanks and satellites all seamlessly sharing data — a lethal version of the ride-sharing app on your smartphone. Yet, even as the DoD builds this future, the threat of supply chain disruption and concerns about component quality within the electronic backbone are real. Counterfeit or planted microelectronic parts can be vectors for cybersecurity intrusions. Recently, for instance, the DoD voiced concerns that Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei's 5G solution provided back doors, purposefully or negligently, for data corruption, data extraction, system failure or worse. Similarly, SCRM policies have increasingly addressed the concern of intellectual property theft enabled by subcomponents designed to allow information to flow back to larger architectures. The COVID-19 pandemic is giving new meaning to that threat, and the risk of disruption to both raw and manufactured materials from abroad has become apparent. Our SCRM focus must broaden in response to COVID-19 to better address national production capacity and sustainability. Being able to assure access to the minerals, chemicals, subcomponents and components required to build weapon systems is essential. China supplies 80 percent of the rare earth minerals imported to the U.S., many of which are essential to electronic parts. Since 1933, the Buy American Act has required federal agencies, including the DoD, to purchase items manufactured in the U.S. Additionally, these items must be made from supplies mined or made in the U.S. The act is implemented by regulations requiring analysis of the components — where they are mined or made, and where they are assembled. Companies that falsify “Made in America” designations can be debarred from the federal marketplace. In July 2019, months before the pandemic emerged, President Donald Trump issued an executive order seeking to increase the minimum domestic manufacture thresholds above the current 50 percent floors. The pandemic now shows even more needs to be done. We must increase to President Trump's mandated percentages, and we must also analyze where each of the subcomponents are manufactured. This doesn't mean we need to back away from allied contributions or alliance-based weapon systems like the F-35 fighter jet, which benefits from the industrial cooperation of nine partner nations. But in light of COVID-19, it does mean that when we make risk-based and measured decisions to produce an alliance system, we program in several months' worth of component backlogs to allow continued production during future quarantines. The majority of our weapon systems are made in the U.S. by American companies with greater than 50 percent of component production and assembly done domestically. Yet, what is less clear are the composition of the subcomponents in the components themselves. Not recognizing the risks of the subcomponents equally jeopardizes the new reality of disruptions to our supply chain and risks of data extraction, degradation and spying, about which we have increasingly been concerned. Recently, I sought to buy a grapefruit spoon on the internet and found it exceedingly difficult to learn where the offered spoons were made. The harder it was to find, the more I suspected it was made in China. Perhaps Congress should pass a law making it easier to learn the source of manufacturing. Ensuring my access to an American-made grapefruit spoon is not nearly as vital as assuring our access to critical weapon systems, rare earth materials, and pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. A vital step is knowing the source countries of components and subcomponents. We must have deeper knowledge of the full supply chains of subcomponents, and how and where they are produced. Trust can only come once we know all that is required to understand our supply chains and we seek even greater focus in our new normal. Our security depends on it. Thomas Ayres is general counsel for the U.S. Air Force. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/22/the-us-needs-to-rethink-its-overseas-supply-chain/
June 25, 2020 | International, Naval
By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy is poised to ink almost $10.4 billion in contracts with General Dynamics Electric Boat to procure the first two Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, which carry more than a dozen nuclear missiles on constant deterrent patrols. The announcement, released by the Defense Department Monday afternoon, detailed an award of $869 million to Electric Boat to complete design work on the subs as part of a contract modification. The announcement also establishes the Navy's intent to award an additional $9.5 billion for the first two hulls, which will happen once Congress officially approves the two-ship buy and appropriates the money. “The intent would be to award that option as soon as possible after the FY21 appropriation to ensure we keep this No. 1 priority on track,” said James Geurts, the Navy's assistant secretary for research, development and acquisition. “That will allow us to begin full-rate construction of the first ship, begin advanced construction on the second ship, with the intent of beginning construction of the second ship in 2024.” The first ship is slated for a 2028 deliver and to go on its first patrol in 2031. The total buy is planned for 12 submarines. In a statement Rep. Joe Courntey, D-Conn., who represents the Electric Boat's district, praised the announcement, saying it was years in the making. “This award is the culmination of nearly a decade's worth of preparation for this milestone moment for our region and our nation,” Courntey said. “The replacement of our sea-based strategic deterrent comes only once every other generation, and this work is already fueling unprecedented growth in the workforce in Groton and transformation of the shipyard.” The Columbia-class subs are the Navy's top acquisition priority, and a monstrously expensive one at that. All in, the program will cost roughly $109 billion, according to a recent Congressional Research Service report, and the service faces an enormous challenge in balancing the rest of the fleet's priorities with the Columbia bill. https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/06/22/us-navy-announces-intent-to-ink-10-billion-in-contracts-for-first-2-columbia-subs/