US Navy acquisition chief outlines FY22 priorities

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  March 31, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  USAF Announces New Major Deficiency On KC-46

  Lee Hudson The U.S. Air Force has upgraded an existing deficiency for the KC-46A Pegasus fuel system to Category 1. The service's program office first identified “excessive fuel leaks” in July after an air refueling test. The Air Force and Boeing are working together to determine the root cause and implement corrective actions. A Category 1 deficiency means the government has identified a risk that jeopardizes lives or critical assets. “The KC-46 Program Office continues to monitor the entire KC-46 fleet and is enhancing acceptance testing of the fuel system to identify potential leaks at the factory where they can be repaired prior to delivery,” according to an Air Force statement. Boeing is contractually obligated to rectify this deficiency at no additional cost to the Air Force. “We are disappointed to learn of this development and are already implementing assembly and installation improvements to correct the issue,” Boeing spokesman Larry Chambers said in a statement to Aerospace DAILY. “We have repaired several of the airplanes and will continue to implement repairs as needed. Boeing is working with urgency to address this issue.” The Air Force discovered several required fuel-system repairs, Chambers said. The fuel system is equipped with redundant protection for fuel containment. “In some cases with this issue, aircraft maintenance crews are finding fuel between the primary and secondary fuel barriers within the system,” Chambers said. The KC-46A program still faces other unresolved Category 1 deficiencies that involve the Remote Vision System (RVS) and the boom telescope actuator. The problem with the RVS is what the Air Force calls a “rubber sheet” effect that distorts the image on the visual display used by the boom operator during refueling operations. The actuator on the boom needs to be more sensitive to smaller receiver aircraft, such as A-10s and F-16s. Boeing has agreed to pay for the RVS design fix, while the Air Force will finance the design change to the actuator. “There's profound problems with the system,” Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein said March 3 during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. The service is certifying the aircraft to conduct airlift and medical evacuation missions. The plan is for the Air Force to employ the KC-46 in those roles while a long-term fix is being developed, Goldfein said. Goldfein told new Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun to focus on the KC-46 program, even as it is fixing the 737 MAX. Calhoun said the KC-46 is his top military priority. “I have seen a change in the behavior of that company since he took over, and so that's why we're more confident sitting here today that we have a serious fix on the table,” Goldfein said. “We're in final negotiations, so we can't go into any more detail than that. But I will say that it's looking better today than it was even six months ago.” https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/aircraft-propulsion/usaf-announces-new-major-deficiency-kc-46

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  August 23, 2018 | International, Aerospace

  Lockheed offers Japan majority of work in plan for new fighter jet

  YUKIO TAJIMA, Nikkei staff writer TOKYO -- Lockheed Martin has proposed that Japanese companies be responsible for more than half of the development and production of a next-generation fighter jet that Japan wants to introduce in 2030, Nikkei learned Wednesday. Lockheed is offering Japan an upgraded version of the existing F-22. The U.S. currently bans exports of the plane known as "the Raptor," which is considered the world's most powerful fighter, has stealth capabilities and is armed with eight air-to-air missiles. The U.S. aircraft manufacturer's decision to open the production to Japan comes out of the belief that there is little risk of technology leaks. The company also says providing the jet to Japan would contribute to the security of Asia. If the share of work pans out as proposed, it would strengthen Japan's defense industry and the Japan-U.S. alliance. Lockheed's proposal comes in response to concerns in Japan that American companies might monopolize the development and production of the upgraded warplane, leaving little room for Japanese partners' involvement. The company calls the plan a Japan-led framework. The next-generation fighter will replace Japan's F-2 jets, scheduled to retire around 2030. Tokyo initially looked for ways for Japan Inc. to completely develop a successor on its own, hoping to boost the domestic defense industry's orders, but the idea proved unfeasible due to technological and cost hurdles. The Japanese government sees Lockheed's proposal, which could deliver high performance at reduced development costs, as the most promising alternative. The next-generation fighter program is estimated to cost about 6 trillion yen ($54.2 billion), including development, acquisition and maintenance. Some voices are citing a need to update the F-22, which has been deployed since around 2000, and Lockheed's plan has the benefit of lowering upgrade costs shouldered by the U.S. Although Japan produced 60% of the jointly developed F-2, the U.S. handled engine development since Japan did not have the basic technology at the time. But Lockheed has expressed a willingness this time to shift development and production of new engines to major Japanese heavy machinery maker IHI in the future. If IHI's XF9-1 jet engine is adopted, Japanese companies could be responsible for more than 60% of the total work. In addition, the exports of high--margin military equipment for the project could ease the U.S. trade deficit with Japan. Mitsubishi Electric's fighter jet electronics system could be adopted, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries will handle the development and production of wings, according to the plan. The aircraft's body, engines and the fighter system are to be made in the U.S., but Lockheed intends to use more Japanese-made components, incorporating them gradually until Japanese companies play a central role in development. To hasten development, Lockheed will send Japan F-22s that have not been deployed by the U.S. Air Force so that it can grasp its performance in advance. The updates will improve the plane's main wings and allow more fuel to be loaded, increasing the jet's range to about 2,200 km so it can be used to defend isolated islands and other missions. Although the F-22 has the most advanced stealth abilities in the world, it requires a special coating that is laborious to maintain. Maintenance will be simplified by using the same material as the F-35 stealth fighter, making it easier to perform drills and deploy for battle. One challenge is the cost. Lockheed estimates the price of the next-generation fighter will be far higher than the F-35's 15 billion yen-per-jet price tag. Lockheed estimates the price of a next-generation F-22 at about 24 billion yen if it is part of an order of 70 aircraft. Producing 140 of the jets could reduce the unit price to about 21 billion yen. There is also concern that including Japanese companies, which have not independently developed a fighter jet in recent years, could complicate production and ramp up costs. Lockheed initially estimated that the F-35A would cost about 10 billion yen per jet. Costs temporarily rose to 17 billion yen, however, when assembly was given to Japanese companies, a cause for concern this time. Some doubt that the U.S. will fully disclose core technology for the world's most powerful fighter jet. Although Lockheed plans to outfit the jet with several Japan-made weapons in an effort to include as much domestic technology as possible, the U.S. will initially be responsible for most of the work, with Japanese companies gradually joining the process later. It is unclear, however, when development will proceed to that second stage. "It is likely that the U.S. will not want to give up such core technologies as fighter systems and software," said Heigo Sato, a professor at Takushoku University. "The technological spillover to Japanese companies would be limited if they mostly receive subcontracting work." Although Mitsubishi Heavy assembles the F-35, which has begun deployment, it has been pointed out that having that job has hardly improved the company's technology knowledge. The U.S. Congress also turned down Japan's request for the F-22 to succeed the F-4 a decade ago because of hesitance about transferring military technology. Should technology transfers from the U.S. slow, it may hinder Japan's continued development of fighter jet technology. Japan must choose whether to develop its own jet, jointly develop with another country or update existing aircraft. Tokyo will make its decisions at the end of the year in its revised medium-term defense program. Boeing and Britain's BAE Systems have also made submitted proposals to upgrade existing planes. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Lockheed-offers-Japan-majority-of-work-in-plan-for-new-fighter-jet

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  October 9, 2019 | International, C4ISR

  How airmen can work together for persistent ISR

  By: Brig. Gen. Gregory Gagnon and Lt. Col. Nishawn Smagh There is always a next war. Great power competition is here. Now is the time, while the United States maintains a position of strength, to ensure we are not outmatched, out-thought, or out-witted. Rapidly and realistically positioning the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance enterprise for first-mover advantage in today's data-driven environment is beginning with purposeful urgency. The past paradigm: crew-to-aircraft model During our careers, the Air Force ISR enterprise grew in both capability and capacity. In the late 1990s, the Air Force operated an ISR enterprise dominated by manned aircraft, each with their own specialized team operating unique systems that turned data into initial intelligence. Only a few organizations could turn raw airborne sensor data into intelligence in near-real time. We were only beginning to move data to the analyst, versus deploying the analyst to the data. As battlefield demand of ISR grew, we scaled up. We were fortunate to help build and execute airborne intelligence operations on a global scale, connected via a global network — we called them “reachback” operations. Reachback operations were the first step in transmitting ISR sensor collection across the globe in seconds. Even today, few nations can conduct this type of ISR operational design. The enterprise has continued to advance, achieving fully distributed operations around the world. We also made it possible to remove humans from aircraft, allowing missions to fly nearly three times longer and expand the data available to exploit. Correspondingly, the Air Force increased the number of organizations that could accept data and create intelligence. Following 9/11, our nation's needs changed; the fight necessitated the Air Force grow its capacity to deliver intelligence for expanded operations in the Middle East. We bought more unmanned vehicles, trained more ISR Airmen, and created more organizations to exploit data. Collection operations were happening 24/7 and most sorties required multiple crews to fly, control sensors and turn collection tasks into intelligence. As reachback operations grew, they became the Distributed Common Ground System and developed the ability to exploit aircraft sensor data. This growth was significant, but at the tactical level we employed the same crew model and simply grew at scale. This resulted in manpower growth, but also in disparate, distributed crews working similar tactical requirements with little unity of effort or larger purpose. This limited the ability of ISR airpower to have broader operational effects. While suitable for counter-terrorism, history tells us this approach is ill advised for great power conflict. Observe and orient: the data explosion and sense-making The traditional crew-to-aircraft model for exploitation must fast forward to today's information environment. The Pentagon has shifted its guidance to this new reality. The Defense Department recently declared information a seventh core function, and the Air Force's formal ISR flight plan maps a course for digital-age capabilities to turn information into intelligence. This “sense-making” must be able to handle both the complexity of a diverse information environment and scale to contend with an exploding volume of data. Access to expanded data sets, from diverse collection sources and phenomenology, is near and urgently needed. The Department's focus on artificial intelligence and machine learning in this realm remains stable and necessary. The next step is to retool how we task, organize, and equip both intelligence collection and analytic crews. As the Pentagon focuses on open architectures, artificial intelligence and machine learning, and data standards, the field is rapidly moving out. Air Combat Command , the Air Force lead command for ISR, is attacking the crew-to-aircraft model to test a sensor-agnostic approach using multiple data sources to address intelligence requirements. Cross-functional teams of Airmen are now assigned broader operational problems to solve, rather than a specific sensor to exploit. This will change joint and service collection management processes. ACC is tackling this future. We are supporting Air Force commanders in Europe and the Pacific with a pilot project that allows Airmen to explore these sensor-agnostic approaches. An additional element to our future success is partnering with our joint and allied partners, as well as national agencies, to bring resources, tools, and insights to bear. As we field the open architecture Distributed Common Ground System, we are shifting the focus from airmen operating specific sensors to airmen leveraging aggregate data for broader analysis. Headquarters Air Force and ACC are installing technologies to ensure readiness for the future ISR enterprise. Cloud technology paired with artificial intelligence and machine learning promises to speed human-machine teaming in generating intelligence across warfighting domains at the speed and scale necessary to inform and guide commanders. Underpinning this effort is a new data strategy and agile capability development for rapid prototyping and fielding. The Defense Department and the Air Force must continue to prioritize this retooling. Our adversaries see the opportunities; this is a race to the future. Situational awareness in the next war will require the development and fielding of AI/ML to replace the limited and manpower-intensive processes across the Air Force ISR enterprise. Employing AI/ML against repetitive data exploitation tasks will allow the service to refocus many of its ISR Airmen on AI/ML-assisted data analysis and problem solving. ISR and multi domain command and control ... enabling decide and act A headquarters-led initiative, with eyes toward a joint capability, is the creation of a collaborative sensing grid that operates seamlessly across the threat spectrum. Designs call for a data-centric network of multi domain platforms, sensors, and airmen that work together to provide persistent ISR. Equipped with manned and unmanned platform sensors capable of computing via AI/ML, these capabilities will link commanders to real-time information, plus tip and cue data from sensors-to-sensors, joint commanders, and weapons. This collaborative sensing grid is a foundational element for multi domain command and control . The vision of MDC2 is to outpace, outthink and outmaneuver adversaries. Creatively and rapidly applying new technology to operational problems is a long-held characteristic of airmen. Our DCGS airmen are no different. Non-material solutions deserve as much attention as hardware. This pilot project is our vanguard initiative to prepare for rapidly changing future systems environments. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2019/10/08/how-airmen-can-work-together-for-persistent-isr/