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January 9, 2020 | International, Aerospace

US Air Force demonstrates increasing F-35 capabilities

A little more than four years after receiving their first combat-coded F-35A Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, Hill Air Force Base's fighter wings have achieved full warfighting capability – shedding light on the future of the RAAF's future air combat capability.

The term describes a set of focus areas within the 388th and 419th Fighter Wings: fully trained pilots and maintainers, a full complement of 78 aircraft and the mission and support equipment needed to fly.

While the designation of full warfighting capability is an important milestone, the wing has been combat capable since the Air Force declared initial operational capability in August 2016.

Since then, the wings have participated in several large combat exercises, deployed twice to Europe and once to the Pacific and supported two Middle East combat deployments, including one short-notice tasking.

Colonel Steven Behmer, 388th Fighter Wing commander, explained, "Every training opportunity, exercise and deployment we've completed over the past four years has been a key stepping stone in reaching full warfighting capability.

"This is just the beginning of sustained F-35A combat operations and we will remain focused on staying ready to deploy whenever, wherever we're needed."

The first F-35As arrived at Hill AFB in September 2015 and the final aircraft arrived in December 2019. In the intervening years, airmen at Hill AFB have been training and developing tactics as the aircraft systems and capabilities have matured.

Reaching the right balance of qualified manning can be a challenge when activating a brand-new weapon system.

The first squadron to stand up, the 34th Fighter Squadron, started with a core of pilots who had some level of F-35A training and experience in other platforms.

As the wing began to grow, that experience level was diluted, and each squadron has been through a period where a majority of pilots could be considered "inexperienced wingmen".

When the first jets arrived at Hill AFB, about 50 per cent of the maintainers were fully-trained, seasoned F-35 maintainers from Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and Luke Air Force Base, Arizona. That number decreased due to PCS, retirements and separations.

Since then, there has been an influx of new manning with less experience, and every other maintainer has been “homegrown”.

"We really relied on our more experienced personnel, and as we received more aircraft, spread them throughout the group to train and equip the next F-35A aircraft maintenance units the right way. When you have the right mix of leadership, with the right focus, they can empower their people and everyone develops maintenance capability quickly," explained Colonel Michael Miles, 388th Maintenance Group Commander.

When the first aircraft arrived in 2015, the goal was to fully equip each squadron with 24 primary assigned aircraft and six backups by the end of 2019. That was realised in December with the delivery of the 78th jet.

Over that four-year period, the wings received roughly two jets every month and immediately began putting them to use. In the spring of 2016, the 34th FS deployed six jets to RAF Lakenheath, UK.

In some cases, the delivery process became so streamlined that the aircraft were able to fly combat training missions within 24 hours of arriving at Hill AFB. This was more than just convenient. It meant that it was possible to deliver a jet from the factory straight into combat if necessary.

Fifth-generation technology on the F-35A requires more specialised equipment than legacy aircraft. Every system on the F-35A has an associated piece of equipment to keep aircraft loaded, fueled and flying.

There are more than a dozen critical pieces of heavy equipment, from the standard – power generators and weapons loaders, to the unique – 5.8 ton air conditioners to cool the jet's advanced avionics.

There's also other equipment – like the high-tech, personalised helmets that integrate with the jet's mission systems – and computer and network systems to support flying and maintenance.

COL Miles explained the importance of the milestone: "At IOC (initial operational capability), we had the equipment to support one squadron that could do some semblance of combat operations. Now, as each squadron has progressed, and we're on track to have all the required assets, we demonstrated that we can rely on the program for the technical support and weapons system parts we need while we deployed all our squadrons last summer."

In 2019, the wings proved that they could balance the equipment requirements to support all three squadrons away from home station – the 4th FS was deployed to the Middle East, the 421st FS was in Europe and the 34th FS spent two months at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho.

In a seven-day span, the wings had aircraft, equipment and personnel operating out of nine different countries.

"Through hard work, providing programmatic feedback, and developing new processes and procedures, we shaped and pushed the program. Each airmen can look back with pride and see their contributions over the last four years standing up this wing, and enabling F-35A combat capability for our country," COL Miles added.

https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/strike-air-combat/5388-us-air-force-demonstrates-increasing-f-35-capabilities

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  • Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties

    June 9, 2020 | International, Aerospace

    Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties

    By: Sarah Bidgood Russia recently published a new document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Its release marks the first time that Russia's official policy on deterrence has been made publicly available. As others have observed, this document is an example of declaratory policy aimed primarily at a foreign audience — and should be read with this orientation in mind. Still, it contains information that helps readers better understand how Russia thinks about nuclear weapons, and this certainly makes it worth a close examination. Some of the more useful insights this document offers pertain to Russia's threat assessments and what it sees as likely pathways to nuclear use. A number of these threats line up with American declaratory policy as reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These overlaps are noteworthy, since the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been able to work together to mitigate mutual threats even when their bilateral relationship is in crisis. As such, they can point toward ways to get arms control back on track at a time when it is in deep trouble. One such area of overlap appears in section 19C, which covers the conditions that could allow for nuclear use. This list includes an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions." The similarities between this language and that which appears in the 2018 NPR are considerable. That document identifies “attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian populations and infrastructure and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” as a significant non-nuclear strategic attacks that could warrant the use of nuclear weapons. These parallels suggest that an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear command, control and communications systems could be of interest to both Washington and Moscow. A treaty along these lines would help to shore up crisis stability while rebuilding trust and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. It could also become a multilateral approach involving the five nuclear weapon states, which have been meeting regularly to discuss risk reduction and other topics. This would represent one of the few concrete outcomes of these discussions, which have been met with cautious enthusiasm but have so far failed to bear much fruit. Another example of mutual U.S.-Russia threats appears in section 12E of the Russian document. Here, the “uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture” are described as risks that nuclear deterrence is meant to neutralize. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons seems to remain a focus of U.S. nuclear policy, too, and the 2018 NPR commits to strengthening institutions that support “verifiable, durable progress on non-proliferation.” This ongoing shared interest is an argument for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, especially as it relates to strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. There is a long history of engagement between the two largest nuclear weapon states on nonproliferation, even at times of major discord in their relationship. Successful outcomes of this cooperation include the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty itself, which the United States and the Soviet Union concluded 50 years ago to stop additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite decades of joint work toward this shared goal, the rift between Washington and Moscow has now brought most bilateral efforts in this area to a halt. As some in Iran, Turkey and Germany contemplate the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it's time for the U.S. and Russia to shore up the credibility of the regime they built. Other sections of Russia's document offer additional glimpses into Moscow's perceived threats, although not all find ready analogs in U.S. declaratory policy. Many relate instead to the possibility that an adversary will carry out a conventional attack on Russia. Sections 12 and 14, for instance, reference the risks posed by adversary deployments of medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons. They also mention the deployment of missile defense systems in space; military buildups by would-be adversaries of general-purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in territories neighboring Russia; and the placement of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapons states, among others. There is little here that would surprise most Russia-watchers, but if the U.S. is serious about pursuing “next generation” arms control, it is useful to have a list of potential topics for discussion that go beyond ballistic missile defense. This list might also prove helpful in negotiating asymmetric treaties or in identifying confidence-building measures that cross domains. Overall, this short document does provide greater clarity with respect to Russia's deterrence strategy, but it is ambiguous on many points as well. Olga Oliker, the International Crisis Group's program director for Europe and Central Asia, noted, for instance, it does not settle the debate over whether Russia has an “escalate-to-deescalate” policy, and it is (unsurprisingly) vague about the precise circumstances under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons. Still, despite leaving some questions unanswered, the document offers a valuable window into Russia's strengths and vulnerabilities as they appear from Moscow. While likely not the intended signal this document was meant to send, it nevertheless points to possible opportunities for engagement when other good alternatives are hard to see. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/08/russias-new-nuclear-policy-could-be-a-path-to-arms-control-treaties/

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