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  June 14, 2019 | International, Aerospace

  Saab retire le Gripen des essais pour l'armée

  Pascal Schmuck avec ats Le Gripen E de Saab est exclu de la procédure d'évaluation pour un nouvel avion de combat. La décision a été prise par l'Office fédéral de l'armement (armasuisse) après que le constructeur suédois a indiqué qu'il ne participerait pas aux essais en vol. Un rattrapage ultérieur des tests en vol et au sol irait à l'encontre de l'égalité de traitement de tous les candidats et n'est pas une option, indique jeudi armasuisse dans un communiqué. Saab avait précédemment indiqué que le calendrier de développement de son avion n'était pas adapté au plan suisse visant à tester des appareils pleinement opérationnels dès 2019. Solutions alternatives Saab avait soumis diverses solutions alternatives pour pouvoir participer aux essais en vol de cette année. Armasuisse avait rejeté la proposition du constructeur suédois de mettre à disposition un Gripen C pleinement opérationnel en plus d'un avion d'essai Gripen E pour les tests en vol et au sol. Saab estime que d'autres concurrents ont également démontré leurs capacités sur des plateformes existantes, qui diffèrent des versions définitives à livrer. Dans la procédure d'évaluation en vue de l'acquisition d'un nouvel avion de combat - en remplacement du F/A-18 - l'avion furtif Lockheed Martin F-35, le F/A-18 Super Hornet de Boeing, le Rafale du constructeur français Dassault et l'Eurofighter d'Airbus restent en course. Ils ont subi de nombreux essais en vol à Payerne (VD). Les essais en vol font partie de la procédure d'évaluation concernant l'acquisition d'un nouvel avion de combat à partir de 2025, pour un montant maximal de six milliards de francs. Le choix du type d'appareil reviendra au Conseil fédéral. «Le meilleur choix» Dans son communiqué, Saab se disait convaincu que le Gripen E représente le meilleur choix pour la Suisse. Ce modèle se distingue de ses concurrents en étant le tout dernier système d'avions de combat, selon le constructeur suédois. Sa production a déjà commencé et le premier avion sera livré cette année. L'offre soumise en janvier dernier est toujours valable. Saab est prêt à s'engager à livrer 40 Gripen E-fighter dans les délais et à respecter toutes les spécifications et le budget prévu. L'offre inclut également un programme de support complet, impliquant les fournisseurs locaux, afin d'assurer des coûts d'exploitation les plus bas possible, ainsi que la plus grande autonomie. Déjà un échec en 2014 Lors du dernier processus d'acquisition d'un nouvel avion de combat, Saab avait déjà proposé à la Suisse l'achat du Gripen E, en commun avec les forces aériennes suédoises. A l'époque, le calendrier de développement prévoyait une livraison à la Suisse en 2021. Mais, en mai 2014, la population a rejeté en votation l'achat de 22 avions de combat Gripen pour 3,1 milliards de francs. Saab a alors modifié le calendrier et l'a adapté aux besoins de la Suède et du Brésil. Comparaison au second semestre 2020 Pour chaque candidat, armasuisse, en coopération avec l'Etat-major de l'armée, les Forces aériennes, la Base logistique de l'armée et la Base d'aide au commandement, rassemblera dans des rapports spécialisés les résultats de la phase d'analyse et d'essais. Ces rapports techniques constitueront la base d'une comparaison systématique et complète entre les différents candidats, qui sera effectuée au cours du second semestre 2020. Ils serviront également à déterminer pour chaque modèle d'avion la taille nécessaire de la flotte. Sur cette base, armasuisse préparera un deuxième appel d'offres, conformément au calendrier actuel, et le remettra aux candidats. Une fois les résultats reçus, l'office fédéral comparera les différents postulants sur la base des rapports spécialisés et déterminera l'utilité globale pour chacun d'entre eux. Un rapport d'évaluation sera ensuite établi, dans lequel l'utilité globale sera comparée aux coûts d'acquisition et de fonctionnement pendant trente ans. (nxp) https://www.tdg.ch/suisse/Saab-retire-le-Gripen-des-essais-pour-l-armee/story/19614607

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  May 27, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Will defense budgets remain ‘sticky’ after the COVID-19 pandemic?

  By: Eric Lofgren Congress' unprecedented fiscal response to COVID-19 has many in the defense community wondering whether belt tightening will hit the Pentagon. On May 19, the Congressional Progressive Caucus wrote a letter arguing for substantial defense budget cuts to support additional spending on the pandemic. Nonprofit progressive supporters have been asking to cut a much larger $350 billion each year from the Pentagon in their “Moral Budget” proposal. What the progressives perhaps do not fully appreciate is the “stickiness” of defense budgets. In economics, stickiness refers to rigidity in the movement of wages and prices despite broader economic shifts pushing for new equilibrium. The phenomenon is apparent in defense budgets as well. Most expectations are that the fiscal 2021 budget will remain over $700 billion. Consider an analogy: the 2008 financial crisis. Lehman Brothers collapsed just a couple weeks before fiscal year 2009 started, leaving that $666 billion defense budget largely beyond recall. The following years' budgets were $691 billion, $687 billion, $646 billion and then finally in FY13 a more precipitous 10 percent fall to $578 billion. It took four years for the Pentagon to really feel the squeeze of the financial downturn. The uninitiated may believe COVID-19 happened with enough of lead time to affect the FY21 budget. Congress received the president's budget in February 2020 and has until the start of October to make targeted cuts without encountering another continuing resolution. The defense budget, however, represents the culmination of a multiyear process balancing thousands of stakeholder interests. It reflects a vast amount of information processed at every level of the military enterprise. The Pentagon's work on the FY21 budget request started nearly two years ahead of time and includes a register of funding estimates out to FY25. Moreover, defense programs are devised and approved based on life-cycle cost and schedule estimates. Cuts to a thorough plan may flip the analysis of alternatives on its head, recommending pivots to new systems or architectures and upsetting contract performance. Not only are current budgets shaped by many years of planning, but they get detailed to an almost microscopic level. For example, the Army's FY21 research, development, test and evaluation request totaled $12.8 billion, less than 2 percent of the overall Pentagon request. Yet the appropriation identifies 267 program elements decomposing into a staggering 2,883 budget program activity codes averaging less than $10 million each. Congressional staff is too small to understand the implications of many cost, schedule and technical trade-offs. To gather information on impacts, the Pentagon is thrown into a frenzy of fire drills. More draconian measures, like the FY13 sequestration, leading to indiscriminate, across-the-board cuts can sidestep hard questions but comes at a significant cost to efficiency. Targeted cuts at a strategic level, such as to the nuclear recapitalization programs and other big-ticket items, can expect stiff resistance. First, there is real concern about great power competition and the damage that may be wrought by acting on short-term impulses. Second, targeted programs and their contractors will immediately report the estimated number of job losses by district. Before measures can get passed, a coalition of congressional members negatively impacted may oppose the cuts. Resistance is intensified considering the proximity to Election Day. Budget stickiness is built into the political process. The FY22 budget is perhaps the first Pentagon budget that can start inching downward. More than likely, severe cuts aren't in the offing until FY23 or FY24 at the very earliest. That gives time for policymakers to reflect on the scale of the rebalancing between defense and other priorities. In some important ways, congressional control of the Pentagon through many thousands of budget line items restricts its own flexibility. For example, continuing resolutions lock in program funding to the previous year's level until political disagreements can be resolved. The military cannot stick to its own plans, much less start new things. If budget lines were detailed at a higher level, such as by major organization or capability area, then the Pentagon could make more trade-offs while Congress debates. Similarly, if the Pentagon had more budget flexibility, then Congress could more easily cut top lines and allow Pentagon leaders to figure out how to maximize with the constraint during the year of execution. Congress could gain the option to defer the hard questions that can make cuts politically difficult. The Space Force recently released a proposal for consolidating budget line items into higher-level capability areas. It reflects the idea that portfolio-centric management is an efficient method of handling rapid changes in technologies, requirements or financial guidance resulting from economic shocks. Until such reforms are pursued, expect defense budgets to remain sticky. Eric Lofgren is a research fellow at the Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University. He manages a blog and podcast on weapon systems acquisition. He previously served as a senior analyst at Technomics Inc., supporting the U.S. Defense Department's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/26/will-defense-budgets-remain-sticky-after-the-covid-19-pandemic/

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  December 2, 2019 | International, C4ISR

  NATO Navies need more Airborne ISR

  In the face of unpredictable conflict environment, one of the key considerations of armed forces around the world is to improve their ability to rapidly identify and analyze potential threats, in order to transmit coordinates and information to whomever the appropriate response will come from. In this latest report we describe how in the modern threat environment, the average Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft must be able to find and detect new, evolving threats including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), stealth aircraft, cruise missiles (both supersonic and hypersonic) and electronic warfare systems. As technology improves on combat air systems, Airborne ISR platforms are also needed to evolve to be able to detect and help defend or combat these systems. Airborne ISR continues to be an incredibly important capability for militaries. Effective ISR enables kinetic assets the resources they need to be successful on the battlefield. Perhaps more than this, ISR is an exceptionally capable deterrent in its own right and modern-day dissemination technology and techniques allows forces to deal with threats before they can cause harm. Currently the navies of NATO member nations do not have the required number of airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide the information naval fleet commanders need in today's oceanic battlefields. The Navies of NATO member states have three major sources of ISR: satellite photos, ISR drones and search operations performed by specialized, manned electronic warfare aircraft and AWACS aircraft. Most of these airborne assets, however, are land-based. This means ships far out at sea or aircraft stationed far away from friendly airfields will have less access to information from MQ-4C Triton drones or P-8 Poseidon aircraft. Meanwhile, China's threat to the US Navy's sea control abilities within the Indo-Pacific region is increasing. The PLA's Rocket Force (PLARF) has developed the ability for mass missile attacks on US ships that it can launch from standoff distance. The Russian Navy too, has developed similar capabilities to deter NATO ships from coming close to Russian coastal waters. Effective airborne ISR will allow the United States and NATO to gain insights along with tactics, techniques and procedures about the air defense systems of their adversaries. It would also provide a non-kinetic way to defeat those air defense systems and passing location data to shooters. As on this date both Russia and China can outpace NATO in a conflict's opening phases. It is hardly surprising then, that as per the latest study – “Global Airborne ISR Platforms & Payloads - Market and Technology Forecast to 2027” carried out by Amsterdam based Market Forecast, the global market for Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance systems is projected to grow at a CAGR of 4.06% between 2019 and 2027. Airborne ISR represents the eyes and ears of modern defense forces, and major U.S. projects such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) have attracted attention from leading aerospace and defense companies all over the world. Now, the rest of the world is following suit. This market study also focusses on 20 of the most sought- after aerospace companies in the ISR industry. The report is valuable for anyone who wants to understand the dynamics of airborne ISR industry and the implementation and adoption of airborne ISR services. http://www.asdnews.com/news/defense/2019/11/28/nato-navies-need-more-airborne-isr