Back to news

August 18, 2020 | International, Naval

Top US Navy chief talks connecting tech, recovering from accidents

By:

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy is on the brink of what could be a major shift in how it operates, but first the service's top officer wants a plan to both field technologies that have been lagging for years and develop a path forward to add new unmanned tech to the mainstream fleet.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday took on his latest role in August 2019 and has since been vocal about not just the need to field new tech, but also figuring out how it all fits together.

In an exclusive July 16 interview with Defense News, the CNO talked about developing and executing his plans, as well as what it will take for the Navy to recover from a series of high-profile accidents and scandals.

The interview has been edited for brevity and clarity.

Congress has been asking how the Navy plans to integrate unmanned surface vessels, and whether the service is prematurely committing to them.

We've got a family of unmanned systems we're working on. Undersea, we've got extra-large, large and medium unmanned underwater vehicles; on the surface we have small, medium and large unmanned surface vessels; and in the air we have a number of programs.

What I've asked the N9 [warfare systems directorate] to do is come to me with a campaign plan that ties all those together with objectives at the end. I've got a bunch of horses in the race, but at some point I have to put my money down on the thoroughbred that's going to take me across the finish line so I can make an investment in a platform I have high confidence in and that I can scale.

What I've found is that we didn't necessarily have the rigor that's required across a number of programs that would bring those together in a way that's driven toward objectives with milestones. If you took a look at [all the programs], where are there similarities and where are there differences? Where am I making progress in meeting conditions and meeting milestones that we can leverage in other experiments? At what point do I reach a decision point where I drop a program and double down on a program that I can accelerate?

Observers have questioned whether the Navy has a concrete idea of what it wants these unmanned surface vessels to do. What's the progress on that front?

The concept of operations that the fleet is working on right now will be delivered in the fall, and that talks conceptually about how we intend to employ unmanned in distributed maritime operations. The other piece of this is, what would a day-to-day laydown look like of unmanned forward?

The Navy has got to be forward: For obvious reasons we don't want the fight back here; the Navy exists to operate forward. That's where we need to be in numbers. And with unmanned, if you are not there at the right time, you are irrelevant.

There has to be a number of unmanned [systems] forward. I can't just decide to rally unmanned out of San Diego or in the Pacific northwest at a time when they'll be too late to need.

You've talked about a “Manhattan Project” to get a reliable network to deploy overseas that can bind together all these new platforms. Where are you with that?

That's a critical piece of this, and a really important point of discussion with respect to unmanned, whether that's in the air, on the sea or under the sea, is the Navy Tactical Grid. Coming into the job, the projections for the Navy Tactical Grid was for delivery in about 2035. I knew that was way, way too late.

We're investing in netted weapons, netted platforms, netted headquarters — but we don't have a net.

So, on a handshake with [then-Air Force Chief of Staff] Gen. [David] Goldfein, I said: “Look, I am all in, and my vision is that the Navy Tactical Grid would be the naval plug into JADC2 [Joint All-Domain Command and Control].”

So the Navy Tactical Grid is a very critical piece of the unmanned campaign plan because it becomes the main artery for controlling all those unmanned platforms. Without it, I have a bunch of unmanned that I shouldn't be building because I can't control it very well. I need to put a team of the best subject matter experts that I have on the Navy Tactical Grid to deliver it here within the next few years.

As part of its mark on the National Defense Authorization Act, both the House and the Senate made moves to slow down the development of the large unmanned surface vessel. They cited technical glitches with the Littoral Combat Ship program and the Ford class that have resulted in delays. Do you have concerns about slowing down that development, or is there merit to taking a slower, more iterative approach to fielding technologies?

First of all, I actually agree with Congress on this. It is frustrating when you get marks on “large unmanned surface vessel” because they are concerned with the command and control of the missile systems that we could potentially put on those platforms or other systems.

I go back to the campaign plan: The approach has to be deliberate. We have to make sure that the systems that are on those unmanned systems with respect to the [hull, mechanical and electrical system], that they are designed to requirement, and perform to requirement. And most importantly, are those requirements sound?

I go back to: Do I really need a littoral combat ship to go 40 knots? That's going to drive the entire design of the ship, not just the engineering plant but how it's built. That becomes a critical factor.

So if you take your eye off the ball with respect to requirements, you can find yourself drifting. That has to be deliberate.

With respect to the systems we are putting on unmanned vessels, I'd say we absolutely learned from LCS and Ford; those have to be proven systems that are prototyped and land-based tested before we start doubling down and going into production.

The littoral combat ships are quickly coming off the lines. Is the Navy prepared for them?

There are things in the near term that I have to deliver, that I'm putting heat on now, and one of them is LCS. One part is sustainability and reliability. We know enough about that platform and the problems that we have that plague us with regard to reliability and sustainability, and I need them resolved. That requires a campaign plan to get after it and have it reviewed by me frequently enough so that I can be sighted on it. Those platforms have been around since 2008 — we need to get on with it.

We've done five deployments since I've been on the job, we're going to ramp that up two and a half times over the next couple of years, but we have got to get after it. LCS for me is something, on my watch, I've got to get right.

I also have to deliver both the mine and anti-submarine warfare modules. These ships are probably going to [start going] away in the mid-2030s if the [future frigate] FFG(X) build goes as planned. But I need to wring as much as I can out of those ships as quickly as I can.

Have you seen any significant successes with the ship?

I do think we have it about right with manning. We were honest with ourselves that the original design wasn't going to do it. I really like the blue-and-gold construct because I get way more [operational availability] than I would with just the single crew.

So I can get these ships out there in numbers doing the low-end stuff in, let's say, 4th Fleet where I wouldn't need a DDG [destroyer]. The Navy deployed the LCS Detroit to South America — the 4th Fleet area of operations — last year on a counternarcotics mission, and it returned earlier this month. Those are the kinds of missions for which the LCS is perfectly suited. I can deploy these things with a [law enforcement detachment] and a signals intelligence capability, and I can do that on LCS with carry-on gear. It's the right kind of platform for that.

Also in 5th Fleet, those maritime security missions that we were heavily sighted on in the late 1990s and early 2000s: They still exist, I'd just prefer to do them with an LCS instead of a DDG if I can.

What other programs have caught your attention?

In unmanned, whether it's the MQ-4C Triton [long-range surveillance drone] or the MQ-25 Stingray [carrier-based tanker drone], I've got to put heat on those. We have to get them out there in numbers, operating with a high level of confidence, so we can leverage what we learn across the rest of the unmanned build.

In the wake of the Fat Leonard bribery scandal, the fatal accidents in 2017 and now the most recent fire onboard the amphibious assault ship Bonhomme Richard, there are questions about systemic issues in the Navy. What are your thoughts about that?

The Pentagon and Washington, D.C., drives you to focus on things. One of things [the late Air Force Col.] John Boyd talked about was that the priorities, even in a highly technical world, need to be on people, ideas and machines in that order. The issues we've faced in the Navy over the past few years all come back to people. They all come back to culture.

If I draw it to Fat Leonard or to the 2017 Comprehensive Review or the review we did with the SEALs, most of that is cultural. Ninety-five percent of it is people-focused. It really comes down to leadership. That is not lost on me. It is easy in this building not to pay attention to it, but it is on my mind, and at the fleet commander level those are the things we talk most about: people, training, attitude.

It's premature to judge the outcome of the investigation into Bonhomme Richard, but what questions do you have as you look at the scale of that disaster?

This is a very, very serious incident that I think will force the Navy to stand back and reevaluate itself. We've got to follow the facts. We've got to be honest with ourselves and we've got to get after it. My intention, once the investigations are done, is to make this available for the public to debate, including what we need to do to get after any systemic problems that we might have.

But one of things I did on the Sunday [after the fire broke out] was I read the report of the Miami fire back in 2012. That was the last mass conflagration in a shipyard environment that we had. There were a number of recommendations coming out of that incident.

One of the questions I have is: Did we fully and adequately implement those recommendations? Because that fire was probably the most recent similar mass conflagration we've had. We learned from that. When we completed the investigation, did we just leave it in the rearview mirror, or did we — no kidding — take it seriously?

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/08/17/top-us-navy-chief-talks-connecting-tech-recovering-from-accidents/

On the same subject

  • General Dynamics Receives $43.2M Contract for Columbia/Dreadnought-Class SSBN Fire Control Systems

    January 29, 2021 | International, Naval

    General Dynamics Receives $43.2M Contract for Columbia/Dreadnought-Class SSBN Fire Control Systems

    Posted on January 28, 2021 by Seapower Staff PITTSFIELD, Mass. – The U.S. Navy recently awarded a contract modification to General Dynamics Mission Systems that includes a broad scope of work for the Columbia and Dreadnought ballistic-missile submarine class to support development, production, and installation requirements. This $43.2 million award is comprised of development, production, installation, and deployed-systems support exclusively for the Columbia/Dreadnaught (CLB/UKD) class of U.S. and U.K. submarine strategic weapons systems and subsystems and coincides with one of the largest manufacturing floor expansions at the Pittsfield, Massachusetts facility. General Dynamics Mission Systems' Maritime and Strategic Systems line of business will deliver fire control systems for the U.S. Navy's first Columbia class submarine (US01) and the first U.S. Columbia class training facility (Kings Bay Trident Training Facility, KB-TTF) as well as installation support and pre-deployment planning for both U.S. and U.K. sites. This contract also includes CLB/UKD design completion scope and continuation of design activities for the first planned refresh of the CLB/UKD fire control system, as well as design support for CLB/UKD planning at the KB-TTF and procurement of the infrastructure material to support the new Trident Training Facility labs. The majority of the work in support of this contract will take place in Pittsfield. “In November, we celebrated with our Navy partner, 65 years of outstanding support to our nation's strategic deterrent mission,” said Laura Hooks, vice president of General Dynamics Mission Systems' Strategic Systems business. “We are entering the next era of development and production for the Navy's fire control system on the newest fleet of submarines that will extend this deterrent capability for another 65 years.” https://seapowermagazine.org/general-dynamics-receives-43-2m-contract-for-columbia-dreadnought-class-ssbn-fire-control-systems

  • Muhstik Botnet Exploiting Apache RocketMQ Flaw to Expand DDoS Attacks

    June 6, 2024 | International, Security

    Muhstik Botnet Exploiting Apache RocketMQ Flaw to Expand DDoS Attacks

    Muhstik DDoS botnet is exploiting a critical vulnerability (CVE-2023-33246) in Apache RocketMQ to infect servers.

  • ‘The math doesn’t make sense’: Why venture capital firms are wary of defense-focused investments

    January 31, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    ‘The math doesn’t make sense’: Why venture capital firms are wary of defense-focused investments

    By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — In American's technology marketplace, venture capital funds are crucial for pumping capital into small companies in need of cash infusions to keep operating. Part of the venture capital model is acknowledging that many of those businesses will fail, but if a few are successful, venture capitalists can make huge returns on their investments. At a time when the Pentagon is working hard to entice small technology companies to work on defense projects, venture capital, or VC, funding could further mature technology and give entrepreneurs a chance to keep projects going. And yet, investors seem wary of putting forth cash to support companies with a defense focus. Why? In the wake of the very public fight inside Google over working with the Pentagon — which ended with the company pulling the plug on its Project Maven participation — there was a consensus from the defense establishment that there may be a culture gap that is simply too large to overcome. But according to a trio of venture capitalists who spoke to Defense News in December, the reasons are simpler. Katherine Boyle, with VC firm General Catalyst, said the culture issue is overblown for the VC community. The reluctance to work on defense programs comes down to a mix of “math and history," she said. "The math is the reason why investors are hesitant to put a third of their fund into these types of technologies because history shows us that they haven't worked out well,” Boyle explained. She said the math can be broken down into three factors: mergers, margins and interest rates. On the first, she pointed to the fact that the defense sector has seen thousands of firms exit the market, sometimes because of acquisitions by primes. But, she argued, where mergers and acquisitions tend to occur in other parts of the world to acquire new technology or capability, in the defense realm it's all about contracting value. That makes it “very difficult for new technologies to enter the market and ultimately be acquired at the valuations that venture investors would need to see in order to have a return for their fund.” In terms of margins, Boyle pointed out that defense firms are very focused on hardware, which requires a lot of investment upfront. That makes it “very difficult to invest in for venture capital firms because software has 80 percent margins, and it's much easier to build a company that can scale very quickly if it's software-based versus needing a lot of capital,” she said. The third factor, interest rates, ties into the last two. For decades interest rates have allowed VC firms to expand dramatically — something that requires a constant flow of return from investments in order to turn around funds and quickly invest in another opportunity. In the world of defense, investors with $3 billion to $5 billion under management by the VC community will find it difficult to get the kind of returns investors are accustomed to from other markets. All three of those factors come together in a mix that means there are very few chances for VC firms to invest in defense-related companies that match up with what a VC traditionally wants to see, said John Tenet, a partner with investment firm 8VC and vice chairman of the defense company Epirus. “VC investors invest based on speed and scale and probability of a 10 to 20 times return. And so I think that's where you've seen a little bit of apprehension, at least in [Silicon] Valley,” Tenet said. “The exits haven't been that fast, and you sort of have these five big players on one side [that] sort of monopolize the market.” From a pure numbers standpoint, a good benchmark for performance is to look at the S&P 500, according to Trae Stephens, co-founder and chairman of Anduril Industries and partner at Founders Fund. Over a 10-year period, an investor in the S&P can expect to get roughly 3 times their investment back. VC firms want to be able to beat that for an investment to be worth it. To highlight the challenge of attracting VC funding to defense firms with potentially limited return, Stephens pointed to the case of Blackbird Technologies. A venture-backed player in specialized communications tech aimed at the defense market, Blackbird was bought in 2014 by Raytheon for about $420 million. That looks good on paper, but the reality is the churn isn't strong enough for a big, Silicon Valley-based venture capital group. “A lot of times in the government, people say: ‘Oh, Blackbird is this, like, great example of a success story that was like a boost for venture.' It's actually not. It's not a venture scale of return for most funds,” he said. “There are some funds where the economics of [an exit that size] is really good, but for large, Silicon Valley tier-one funds, it doesn't move the needle. And so you have to have these multibillion-dollar opportunities in order for it to really make economic sense.” Another issue raised by Stephens will be familiar to defense primes as well: concerns over sharing intellectual property with the Defense Department. The department is essentially saying “you are the right product for us, now turn over your source code,” Stephens said. “It's crazy. We're literally doing to our companies in America what we're criticizing the Chinese for doing to their companies and to our companies when we enter that market. And so there has to be a better commercial practice for enabling companies to retain their IP and do business with the government without having to fight a legal battle every time they go through a contract.” ‘Knock down the doors' Despite those concerns, all three venture capitalists that spoke to Defense News are involved in investments in defense-focused firms. So why are they spending their money in the sector? Mission is part of it — the belief that, as Americans, a stronger Defense Department benefits their firms. But that only goes so far if dollars don't follow. Once again, it comes down to math. Investing in a company focused on defense technologies, which may have to wait years to secure a contract with the Pentagon, isn't a great strategy for a VC firm looking for quick returns. But if a company is able to get government funding early on, the business suddenly becomes more worthy of investment, said Boyle. “If the government is allocating capital in the right way, it will get VC dollars immediately. Like, it will follow so quickly,” Boyle said. “I see so many people come in to our office and they have an OTA [other transaction authority contract], and they're excited. It's a small, $1 million contract, and that is great for a seed company. But if that same company came in 18 months later and said, ‘Oh, by the way, the OTA has turned into a $10 million contract,' that would meet every milestone that I usually see to series A.” (An OTA is a type of contract that enables rapid prototyping; series A financing is the investment that follows growth from initial seed capital used to launch operations.) “$10 million to the US government is nothing, but to [a] startup — $10 million is the best startup I've seen all year, if they're an 18-month-old startup and they're getting that kind of capital early on,” she said. Added Stephens: “It means they're doing something right.” That creates a chicken and egg scenario: Venture capitalists only want to invest in companies that already have a Pentagon contract, but small firms often can't keep the doors open long enough without external funding while waiting for the department's contracting processes to progress. While groups such as the Defense Innovation Unit — the Pentagon's technology hub — are helping speed along that process, it remains a problem with no easy solution, at a time when the Pentagon needs the nondefense technology community in ways it hasn't for decades. Boyle believes there is a “growing group” of investors who see the strong success of a handful of companies like goTenna, Anduril or Shield AI that have managed to break through and become successful defense-focused investment vehicles. That means the next few years are going to be critical for everyone involved. “None of us would be here if we weren't optimistic,” she said. “I actually think this is an incredible time to be investing in deep tech, particularly deep-tech companies that are selling to the Department of Defense because if it doesn't happen now, it never will.” https://www.defensenews.com/smr/cultural-clash/2020/01/30/the-math-doesnt-make-sense-why-venture-capital-firms-are-wary-of-defense-focused-investments/

All news