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  July 3, 2018 | International, Aerospace

  The German Air Force Wants To Know If Its Eurofighters Can Carry U.S. Nuclear Bombs

  BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK German officials have reportedly asked their American counterparts about whether it would be possible to turn the Eurofighter Typhoon into a nuclear strike aircraft. The answer to this question could have serious ramifications on Germany's effort to replace its aging Panavia Tornado combat jets, which are certified to carry U.S. B61 nuclear bombs during a crisis as part of an inter-NATO agreement, and reinforces previous reports that the European fighter jet is the German Air Force's preferred option. In April 2018, the German Federal Ministry of Defense sent a formal letter to U.S. officials asking about whether it would be feasible to configure Typhoons for the nuclear mission, how expensive it would be, and how long the process might take, according to Reuters. The German Air Force's ability to fly nuclear strikes has become an increasingly important issue even though the country is not a nuclear power itself. During the Cold War, Germany, as well as other NATO allies, agreed to host American nuclear bombs with the understanding that their aircraft could be called upon to employ them if a major conflict with the Soviet Union broke out. After the Cold War, this arrangement has persisted and the Germans continue to keep an unspecified number of B61 bombs at Büchel Air Base near the borders with Belgium and Luxembourg. The problem is that the only German aircraft that can carry these weapons are the Tornados, which are in desperate need of replacement. Availability rates for the Cold War-era swing wing jets have dramatically dropped in recent years. In 2015, state broadcaster Deutsche Welle reported that only 30 of the approximately 85 remaining aircraft were airworthy at any one time. The aircraft also lack cockpits that will work with night vision goggles, which limits the jet's ability to perform missions at night. In March 2018, German magazine Der Spiegel also obtained a report calling into question the security of the Tornado's data links. “This could in the worst case mean that the demand for an encrypted communication system for the Tornado weapons system can't be achieved,” the document stated according to the report. “That means the Tornado weapons system may not take part in NATO missions.” The German Air Force disputed the story, saying that all of the Tornados set aside to support the alliance's requirements had the equipment necessary to perform their missions. Regardless, the service has made no effort to hide the importance of replacing the jets. The Germans will need to certify whatever aircraft replaces the Tornado as a nuclear-capable platform in order to continue performing the mission. In addition to Eurofighter, the Germans are considering an unspecified variant of Boeing's F-15 Eagle or that company's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and Lockheed Martin's stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The process to make sure any of those planes could carry the B61 would likely include ensuring they could safely drop the bombs at all, as well as developing appropriate mission systems and software to enable this capability under various different attack parameters. In addition, engineers would have to find ways to install the necessary systems and linkages so that the pilot can arm the weapon in flight. Each one of the bombs has a so-called “Permissive Action Link,” or PAL, that prevents the warhead from functioning until an individual puts in a specific code. You can read more about these safety features and other components of the bombs in this past feature. The U.S. military has not certified any variants of the Joint Strike Fighter to carry the B61, but Air Force is in the process of doing so with regards to the F-35A. The aircraft types that Boeing is offering are the only ones in the running that have already gone through this process. But the German Air Force's top preference is reportedly the Eurofighter. Germany already has nearly 130 of the jets in service and recently began adding a robust air-to-ground capability to some of them. “A possible purchase of the Eurofighter would ensure the retention of military aircraft expertise in Germany and Europe, and value creation in our own country,” Germany's Deputy Defense Minister Ralf Brauksiepe told the Green Party's Tobias Lindner in a letter earlier in 2018, according to Reuters. “The weapons system has already been introduced to the Bundeswehr [the German Armed Forces] and is being successfully used.” Replacing the Tornados with Eurofighters does make good sense, something we at The War Zone have noted in the past. As I wrote in December 2017: “Eurofighter, a consortium that includes portions of Airbus Defense in Germany and Spain, BAE Systems in the United Kingdom, and Leonardo in Italy, manage the development and production of the fighter jets. A major sale to the Luftwaffe could be worth billions to the group and help keep the production line running and its employees at work, an important domestic consideration for the Germans. On Dec. 11, 2017, Qatar signed a deal for 24 of its own Eurofighters, making it the ninth country to buy the type. This alone could mean significantly lower training and maintenance costs, not to mention saving on large infrastructure needs, compared to acquiring an entirely new type of aircraft, and especially one with high secondary cost demands like the F-35. It also could make it easier for the Luftwaffe to quickly absorb the new aircraft into its inventory. Existing Typhoon variants are already compatible with the targeting and reconnaissance pods the Luftwaffe uses on the Tornado, as well as many of its weapons. Saab has already tested the Taurus KEPD 350 cruise missile on one of the fourth generation fighter jets, as well, giving it a relatively long-range standoff attack capability." There is a growing concern, however, that the Eurofighter won't be survivable enough to perform the nuclear mission in the future. One source told Reuters that the United States would consider this factor in its response about whether it would certify the jets to carry the B61s. The implication is that the fifth generation F-35 could be the only realistic option. But German authorities reportedly forced the German Air Force's previous head, Lieutenant General Karl Müllner, into retirement over his support for the F-35 option, though it's not clear whether that was over his preference for the jet itself or his public comments on the matter. It is important to note that the United States has been working to make sure the forthcoming improved B61-12 bombs will be compatible with existing NATO platforms, including Tornado, since 2015. Eurofighter, as well as Boeing, also both insist that their aircraft would be able to carry out nuclear strikes in any high-threat environment in cooperation with electronic warfare aircraft and other supporting assets. NATO members regularly train to do just this as part of what is known as Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics, or SNOWCAT. At the same time, Germany and the rest of the alliance are increasingly worried about Russia's steadily more aggressive foreign policy. This has included veiled and outright threats against member states and non-NATO partners in Europe. Earlier in June 2018, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova implied that increased U.S. military presence in Norway was an implicit threat toward her country. The Kremlin has also deployed advanced air defenses and other weapons systems, including the S-400 surface-to-air missile system and Iskander nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles, along NATO's eastern flanks and within its Kaliningrad enclave on the Baltic Sea. The latter position means that Russian weapons already have the range to engage aircraft flying over Germany proper. Lieutenant General Müllner and other supporters of buying the F-35 had argued that this reality made a stealthy fifth-generation aircraft a necessity. Germany has joined with France to develop a new low-observable combat jetfor both countries. The Joint Strike Fighter program and other stealth fighter development efforts elsewhere make it clear that this process will be long and potentially exorbitantly expensive. There's no guarantee that it will produce a working design any time soon, if at all. For all of its very real issues, the F-35 is in production now. If the German Air Force does decide to replace the Tornados with more Typhoons, it could take up to a decade to certify the latter type for the nuclear mission, according to Reuters. It's not clear when that process might begin, but Germany wants to have all of the older Tornado jets out of service by 2030. This means there is a distinct potential for a gap in capability to occur between when the replacement aircraft arrive and when they're deemed nuclear capable. Domestic and international politics are almost certain to have an impact on the final decision, too. Germany itself is in the midst of a political crisis that traces back the last federal elections in September 2017. A poor showing for Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) part, as well as its allies in the Christian Social Union (CSU), led to six months of deliberations on the future of their bloc. This was the longest the country had been without a government since the end of World War II. Any further upheaval could impact attempts to increase the country's defense spending overall and to address systematic readiness issuesplaguing the German Armed Forces as a whole. Perhaps more importantly, German relations with the United States have plummeted amid a largely personal feud between Merkel and President Donald Trump. Richard Grenell, the new U.S. Ambassador to Germany and a Trump appointee, has suggested he could engage with opposition parties looking to unseat the CDU-CSU alliance. In May 2018, Merkel reiterated comments she had made in 2017 that it was increasingly clear Germany could not rely on the United States for protection. “It's no longer the case that the United States will simply just protect us,” Merkel said in the 2018 speech, which also lauded French President Emmanuel Macron who was on hand to receive an award. “Rather, Europe needs to take its fate into its own hands. That's the task for the future.” This could make the idea of buying any type of American aircraft increasingly politically untenable. It could also potentially raise new questions about whether Germany should be hosting American nuclear weapons in the first place, which is a controversial issue that left-leaning political parties in the country typically oppose on principle. In the meantime, the Tornados are only getting older and are steadily less capable of performing any missions, nuclear or otherwise. As such, Germany and the United States will have to come to some agreement on certifying any future planes soon if the German Air Force intends to continue having a nuclear role at all. http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/21679/the-german-air-force-wants-to-know-if-its-eurofighters-can-carry-u-s-nuclear-bombs

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  August 21, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Money and missions: NATO should learn from Europe’s pandemic response

  By: Charles V. Peña The first COVID-19 clusters appeared in Italy in late February, and by early March the Italian authorities issued a decree to install strict public health measures, including social distancing first in the affected regions and then nationwide. Soon afterward, Spain, France and many other European countries instituted similar public health measures. Without debating the efficacy of those measures, the important takeaway is that when faced with what was viewed as a clear and present danger, European countries acted in their own self-interest without having to depend on the U.S. to counter the threat posed by COVID-19. They need to take that same approach for their own security and responsibilities under NATO. It is not a question of resources or capabilities — it is largely a matter of political will. The low hanging fruit for our European NATO allies is to meet their pledge of spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense. Currently nine countries meet that threshold: the United States (3.42 percent), Bulgaria (3.25 percent), Greece (2.28 percent), the United Kingdom (2.14 percent), Estonia (2.14 percent), Romania (2.04 percent), Lithuania (2.03 percent), Latvia (2.01 percent) and Poland (2 percent). Noticeably absent are Germany (1.38 percent), France (1.84 percent) and Italy (1.22 percent) — the fourth, seventh and eighth largest economies in the world. These are wealthy countries that can afford to make the necessary investment. Indeed, the combined GDP of NATO Europe is nearly on par with the U.S. — about $17.5 trillion versus about $20 trillion. Yet, the U.S. spends more than double on defense than our European NATO allies. Other than political will, there is no real reason that European NATO countries cannot spend 2 percent of their GDP for their own defense. Yet, even though Germany previously pledged to meet its 2 percent obligation, Berlin is proposing a new metric based on a country's defense needs — perhaps because U.S. President Donald Trump has stated that he wants European allies to spend 4 percent of their GDP on defense (a metric even the U.S. does not meet). Beyond spending, there is the question of what threat NATO should counter. Originally created in 1949, NATO was intended to counter the Soviet military threat and communist expansion. At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies had some 4 million troops and 60,000 main battle tanks deployed against Western Europe — and threatened invasion via the North German Plain, Hof Corridor and Fulda Gap. But today's Russian Federation is not the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, NATO's European countries have the resources to counter a Russian military threat (although it's worth noting that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently said: “We don't see any imminent threat against any NATO ally.”) NATO Europe's combined GDP is 10 times larger than Russia's — more than $17 trillion versus $1.7 trillion. And current defense spending is also in Europe's favor by more than 4-to-1 ($287 billion versus $65 billion). Again, there is no practical reason why NATO Europe cannot make the necessary investments to provide for its security. It is more a question of political will. Moreover, if NATO is concerned about Russia as a potential threat, it should think twice about continuing to expand the alliance eastward onto Russia's doorstep. Rather than providing increased security, it may do more to provoke the Russian bear. Part of the problem is that NATO has largely strayed from its original purpose of collective defense against the Soviet Union (and now Russia). According to the NATO website, the organization is “an active and leading contributor to peace and security on the international stage” that “promotes democratic values and is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes” with “approximately 20,000 military personnel ... engaged in NATO operations and missions around the world.” If Russia is deemed a threat to Europe and NATO, then the European members of NATO need to take primary responsibility for defending themselves against that threat — and they should view that threat widely to include Russian cyberthreats as well as misinformation and disinformation campaigns meant to undermine elections. That doesn't mean a U.S. withdrawal from NATO. But it is long past the post-World War II era when European countries were struggling to regain their footing and needed America to be the bulwark of its defense. Europe as a whole is today an economic powerhouse — second only to the United States. NATO Europe can and should do more to provide for its own security rather than depending on the U.S. to act as the front line of its defense. All that needs to happen is for those countries to be as serious as they were with COVID-19 and take the same approach to national security as they did when the pandemic began. Charles V. Peña is a senior fellow with Defense Priorities. He has experience supporting the U.S. departments of Defense and Homeland Security. He previously served as the director of defense for policy studies at the Cato Institute, and he is author of “Winning the Un—War: A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism.” https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/08/20/money-and-missions-nato-should-learn-from-europes-pandemic-response/

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  October 30, 2020 | International, C4ISR

  In a COVID-19 world, system integration is the best approach

  Lt. Gen. David Mann (ret.) and Maj. Gen. Francis Mahon (ret.) As COVID-19 is adding “social distancing” and “PPE” to our everyday lexicon and making handshakes a thing of the past, Project Convergence's experimentation with artificial intelligence and integration is moving the U.S. Army closer to the realization that “any sensor, any shooter — or any sensor, best shooter” applies to more than solely the air and missile defense community. Project Convergence is validating the path to success in future combat operations by integrating capabilities of many systems and not solely hanging our hopes on a new, best artillery or aviation or maneuver system. Concurrently, it is validating the need for the Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense system, or AIAMD. “See first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively” was the mantra of Army transformation in the early 2000s, and here we are, 20 years into the 21st century, with AIAMD modernization efforts on the cusp of achieving the first two elements of that axiom — which enables the last two. AIAMD's development has not been easy, but it is essential, as our adversaries have not taken a tactical pause. North Korea is now a nuclear state with intercontinental ballistic missiles and, as recently noted on Oct. 10, other missile initiatives underway. China is creating barrier islands, improving its air and missile forces, and building a carrier fleet. Russia has optimized Syria and Crimea as proving grounds for its capabilities and forces while regularly probing NATO and North American airspace. Iran has fired ballistic missiles against undefended U.S. bases, demonstrated technical and tactical prowess by executing an integrated and complex armed unmanned aerial system and cruise missile attack against Saudi Arabia, and provided nonstate actors an expanded poor man's air force. Cyber, too, is becoming “mainstream” among our adversaries, and two of our near peers are developing hypersonic weapons, as witnessed in Russia's recent Zircon cruise missile test. As the U.S. Army, and the military at large, look to the future, all acknowledge integrating systems achieves a synergistic effect from our limited number of sensors, weapon systems and munitions. Integration closes gaps and seams, and enables the timely application of fires while reducing the cost-per-intercept dilemma. Closed architectures are a thing of the past, as are stovepiped systems. We must leverage each other's data and information and apply the best available weapon to counter threat activities or inflict maximum damage upon an adversary. If the Army's Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor can provide an accurate launch point for a ballistic missile, shouldn't the Army's Precision Strike Munition or other long-range fires capability leverage this data in real time for an offensive strike? If an F-35 fighter jet detects aerial threats it cannot counter, shouldn't it pass this data via a joint architecture so the joint family of systems can defeat those threats? Project Convergence is endeavoring to expand integration and advance operating concepts to leverage all possible capabilities. It is a logical extension of a key AIAMD modernization effort — the Army's IAMD Battle Command System, or IBCS — which demonstrated impressive capabilities during a recent limited-user test. Patriot batteries executed near-simultaneous engagements against ballistic missiles and low-altitude cruise missiles, while using only Sentinel targeting data provided to IBCS. Multiple capabilities operating as an integrated system — leveraging one element's information and another's lethality to defeat a complex and integrated attack — represents true integration. The Missile Defense Agency's integration efforts with the Patriot and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems, and its recent successful flight test, also demonstrate the power of an integrated approach. Specifically, this capability enables earlier engagements, expanded battlespace, an increase in defended area, flexible firing doctrines, interceptor optimization and the tightening of operational seams. We cannot afford to slow these efforts or take our eye off the objectives and capabilities these programs will deliver. IBCS is approaching a key milestone decision, which will enable low-rate production to begin, execute additional development and operational tests, and field an initial operational capability in 2022. Further integrating IBCS with other Army systems must be a future priority: It is the standard bearer for air and missile defense integrated operations and a key enabler for dealing with complex and integrated attacks. This investment requires sustained support from the Department of Defense and Congress as well as priority funding as we wrestle with flat budgets and COVID-19's fiscal challenges and potential bills. The Army is expected to add IBCS to Project Convergence — a good plan, but this action cannot become a distraction or diversion of resources that slows its development and fielding. IBCS, as well as the integration of Patriot and THAAD, are critical to success in today's tactically and technically challenging operations, which are stressing the force. Our integration efforts must expand to all joint air and missile defense systems and to our allies and partners, who remain essential to our success. AIAMD will also be a major contributor to the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control concept and the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System — two key programs focused on integration at the theater level. COVID-19 has changed our lives in many ways and will levy a bill on our defense budgets. We cannot allow integration programs or initiatives to become COVID-19 casualties because seeing first and understanding first are the most critical elements in managing a crisis and keeping it from becoming a catastrophe. Retired Lt. Gen. David Mann led U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. He has also commanded Army air and missile defense forces in Iraq, Southwest Asia and the United States. Retired Maj. Gen. Francis Mahon served as the director for strategy, policy and plans at North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command. He also commanded Army air and missile defense forces in Southwest Asia, South Korea and the United States. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/c2-comms/2020/10/29/in-a-covid-19-world-system-integration-is-the-best-approach/