Space Development Agency awards L3Harris $919 Million contract to build satellites for missile tracking program

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  April 29, 2019 | International, Aerospace

  CAE Wants to Help the Pentagon Train Pilots Through Data Analysis

  By Brian Garrett-Glaser Canadian simulator and training provider CAE is in talks with the U.S. Navy to add its new high-tech data analysis tool suite, CAE Rise, to existing and future programs, including aircrew training services for the T-44C Pegasus, according to the company. Launched for the civil aviation market in 2017, CAE Rise allows instructors to objectively assess pilot competencies using live data during training sessions, accessible via iPad interface. CAE pitches the system as a means of using big data analysis to reduce subjectivity in pilot assessment, allow instructors to focus more on teaching and help create more efficient training programs. The CAE Rise system can "detect everything for a maneuver, and it's able to tell the instructor what parameter went out of whack, where [the pilot] did not do according to standards,” said Terry Constantakis, CAE's director of civil aviation training solutions. “So in terms of key benefits for CAE Rise, we often use the term ‘better than the naked eye' in terms of detecting errors and helping the instructor provide assessments,” he added. “It also allows the instructor to focus more on soft skills. For example, when we look at things like grading, we noticed that when instructors have RISE they spend more time providing comments on soft skills like teamwork, communication and workload management — things that are not necessarily performance-based or technical skills.” CAE Rise has been adopted by a number of airlines in Asia, including a five-year agreement with AirAsia to train its long-haul pilots to fly for affiliate airline AirAsia X on the Airbus A330. More recently, in late 2018, CAE released its RISE data suite for the defense market, with key features like development on Microsoft Azure Government for cloud computing to meet government cybersecurity and compliance requirements. The company is offering CAE Rise to the Pentagon as an enhancement to its current contract for T-44C aircrew training devices, which the company began delivering in 2014. “As far as what branches of the U.S. military have expressed an interest, I will say we have had ongoing discussions with the U.S. Navy,” said a company spokesperson. “We have briefed and demonstrated to the Navy how CAE Rise could be used to enhance and improve naval aviator training.” “There are no other CAE Rise customers on the defense side that we can disclose currently,” the spokesperson added. CAE hopes the platform will, in addition to improving the quality of aviation training services, help address the global civil and military pilot shortage that is expected to worsen in coming decades. The company's analysis on pilot demand published in 2016 estimated a need for 180,000 new captains globally within the next 10 years. Drivers of that shortage differ regionally but include aging populations of pilots reaching retirement, expected growth in air travel and falling supply from universities, business aviation and military training compared to previous decades. https://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/04/25/cae-wants-help-pentagon-train-pilots-data-analysis/

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  June 3, 2024 | International, Security

  Researcher Uncovers Flaws in Cox Modems, Potentially Impacting Millions

  Researchers discovered authorization bypass vulnerabilities in Cox modems that could have allowed hackers to access and control millions of devices.

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  July 7, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Future Missile War Needs New Kind Of Command: CSIS

  Integrating missile defense – shooting down incoming missiles – with missile offense – destroying the launchers before they fire again – requires major changes in how the military fights. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.on July 07, 2020 at 4:00 AM WASHINGTON: Don't try to shoot down each arrow as it comes; shoot the archer. That's a time-honored military principle that US forces would struggle to implement in an actual war with China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran, warns a new report from thinktank CSIS. New technology, like the Army's IBCS command network – now entering a major field test — can be part of the solution, but it's only part, writes Brian Green, a veteran of 30 years in the Pentagon, Capitol Hill, and the aerospace industry. Equally important and problematic are the command-and-control arrangements that determine who makes the decision to fire what, at what, and when. Today, the military has completely different units, command systems, doctrines, and legal/regulatory authorities for missile defense – which tries to shoot down threats the enemy has already launched – and for long range offensive strikes – which could keep the enemy from launching in the first place, or at least from getting off a second salvo, by destroying launchers, command posts, and targeting systems. While generals and doctrine-writers have talked about “offense-defense integration” for almost two decades, Green says, the concept remains shallow and incomplete. “A thorough implementation of ODI would touch almost every aspect of the US military, including policy, doctrine, organization, training, materiel, and personnel,” Green writes. “It would require a fundamental rethinking of terms such as ‘offense' and ‘defense' and of how the joint force fights.” Indeed, it easily blurs into the even larger problem of coordinating all the services across all five domains of warfare – land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace – in what's known as Joint All-Domain Operations. The bifurcation between offense and defense runs from the loftiest strategic level down to tactical: At the highest level, US Strategic Command commands both the nation's nuclear deterrent and homeland missile defense. But these functions are split between three different subcommands within STRATCOM, one for Air Force ICBMs and bombers (offense), one for Navy ballistic missile submarines (also offense), and one for Integrated Missile Defense. In forward theaters, the Army provides ground-based missile defense, but those units – Patriot batteries, THAAD, Sentinel radars – belong to separate brigades from the Army's own long-range missile artillery, and they're even less connected to offensive airstrikes from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The Navy's AEGIS system arguably does the best job of integrating offense and defense in near-real-time, Green says, but even there, “different capabilities onboard a given ship can come under different commanders,” one with the authority to unleash Standard Missile interceptors against incoming threats and the other with the authority to fire Tomahawk missiles at the enemy launchers. This division of labor might have worked when warfare was slower. But China and Russia have invested massively in their arsenals of long-range, precision-guided missiles, along with the sensors and command networks to direct them to their targets. So, on a lesser scale, have North Korea and Iran. The former deputy secretary of defense, Bob Work, warned of future conflicts in which “salvo exchanges” of hundreds of missiles – hopefully not nuclear ones – might rocket across the war zone within hours. It's been obvious for over a decade that current missile defense systems simply can't cope with the sheer number of incoming threats involved, which led the chiefs of the Army and Navy to sign a famous “eight-star memo” in late 2014 that called, among other things, for stopping enemy missiles “left of launch.” But that approach would require real-time coordination between the offensive weapons, responsible for destroying enemy launchers, command posts, and targeting systems, and the defensive ones, responsible for shooting down whatever missiles made it into the air. While Navy Aegis and Army IBCS show some promise, Green writes, neither is yet capable of moving the data required among all the users who would need it: Indeed, IBCS is still years away from connecting all the Army's defensive systems, while Aegis only recently gained an offensive anti-ship option, a modified SM-6, alongside its defensive missiles. As two Army generals cautioned in a recent interview with Breaking Defense, missile defense and offense have distinctly different technical requirements that limit the potential of using a single system to run both. There are different legal restrictions as well: Even self-defense systems operate under strict limits, lest they accidentally shoot down friendly aircraft or civilian airliners, and offensive strikes can easily escalate a conflict. Green's 35-page paper doesn't solve these problems. But it's useful examination of how complex they can become. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/07/future-missile-war-needs-new-kind-of-command-csis/