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September 17, 2018 | International, C4ISR

Silicon Valley should work with the military on AI. Here’s why.

By Editorial Board

GOOGLE DECIDED after an employee backlash this summer that it no longer wanted to help the U.S. military craft artificial intelligence to help analyze drone footage. Now, the military is inviting companies and researchers across the country to become more involved in machine learning. The firms should accept the invitation.

The Defense Department's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency will invest up to $2 billion over the next five years in artificial intelligence, a significant increase for the bureau whose goal is promoting innovative research. The influx suggests the United States is preparing to start sprinting in an arms race against China. It gives companies and researchers who want to see a safer world an opportunity not only to contribute to national security but also to ensure a more ethical future for AI.

The DARPA contracts will focus on helping machines operate in complex real-world scenarios. They will also tackle one of the central conundrums in AI: something insiders like to call “explainability.” Right now, what motivates the results that algorithms return and the decisions they make is something of a black box. That's worrying enough when it comes to policing posts on a social media site, but it is far scarier when lives are at stake. Military commanders are more likely to trust artificial intelligence if they know what it is “thinking,” and the better any of us understands technology, the more responsibly we can use it.

There is a strong defense imperative to make AI the best it can be, whether to deter other countries from using their own machine-learning capabilities to target the United States, or to ensure the United States can effectively counter them when they do. Smarter technologies, such as improved target recognition, can save civilian lives, and allowing machines to perform some tasks instead of humans can protect service members.

But patriotism is not the only reason companies should want to participate. They know better than most in government the potential these technologies have to help and to harm, and they can leverage that knowledge to maximize the former and minimize the latter. Because DARPA contracts are public, the work researchers do will be transparent in a way that Project Maven, the program that caused so much controversy at Google, was not. Employees aware of what their companies are working on can exert influence over how those innovations are used, and the public can chime in as well.

DARPA contractors will probably develop products with nonlethal applications, like improved self-driving cars for convoys and autopilot programs for aircraft. But the killer robots that have many people worried are not outside the realm of technological possibility. The future of AI will require outlining principles that explain how what is possible may differ from what is right. If the best minds refuse to contribute, worse ones will.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/silicon-valley-should-work-with-the-military-on-ai-heres-why/2018/09/12/1085caee-b534-11e8-a7b5-adaaa5b2a57f_story.html

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  • Two Men & A Bot: Can AI Help Command A Tank?

    July 27, 2020 | International, Land

    Two Men & A Bot: Can AI Help Command A Tank?

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  • A consensus-driven joint concept for all-domain warfare will fall short

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Assuring bureaucratic service equities versus optimizing combat lethality can lead to operating concepts that fail to create clear priorities or — worse yet — declare everything a priority. If everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority. Moreover, each service was asked to develop a subordinate concept that will be integrated into the whole. This piece-part approach could result in the services ladening their subordinate concepts with their own equities instead of working together to develop the most effective, decisive options. In short, a bottom-up, consensus-driven concept for all-domain warfare would not be an effective baseline to compare the DoD's force structure and capability alternatives. Three things could help to avoid this mistake. First, the secretary of defense should approve a new all-domain war-fighting concept, and the secretary's staff should be deeply involved in its development. Some say the latter is inappropriate, believing the military, not DoD civilians, should create war-fighting concepts. However, it is entirely appropriate for the secretary's staff to be part of the concept's creation if its purpose is to shape the DoD's plans and programs. Second, DoD leaders should rigorously examine the services' existing roles and missions during the concept's development, and make changes to reduce excessively redundant responsibilities, forces and capabilities. This may need to be driven by congressional language. Finally, the DoD should jettison the word “joint” as part of the concept's title. This would stress the concept is focused on integrating operations across all domains, not on the services that provide forces to combatant commanders. The point is not for all to participate, but instead for all options to be considered, and those that provide best combat value be prioritized. Otherwise, it becomes a case analogous to all the kids chasing a soccer ball. 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