September 23, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security, Other Defence
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Hyten recently announced a new U.S. Department of Defense joint war-fighting concept will summarize capabilities needed for future all-domain operations and eliminate artificial lines on the battlefield used to deconflict U.S. operations in the past.
Hyten also noted the concept will seamlessly integrate “fires from all domains, including space and cyber,” to overwhelm an enemy.
While these aspirations are laudable, there are indications the concept could fall short of what is needed to inform cross-service trade-offs that must be made in an era of flat or declining defense budgets.
The DoD creates operating concepts to define preferred approaches to perform specific missions or execute a campaign to defeat an enemy. They also provide a foundation for the services to assess new technologies, force alternatives and resource priorities. Said another way, they are the tissue that connects top-level National Defense Strategy guidance to actual plans and programs.
While a joint all-domain war-fighting concept is urgently needed, Hyten has not made it clear the one in development will lead to trade-offs that maximize the DoD's war-fighting potential. For instance, Hyten has said it will call for every service to conduct long-range strikes: “A naval force can defend itself or strike deep. An air force can defend itself or strike deep. The Marines can defend itself or strike deep. ... Everybody.”
This could mean the concept will support a degree of redundancy across the services that has never existed. Setting aside tough trade-offs that eliminate excessively redundant programs will waste defense dollars and reduce capabilities available to U.S. commanders.
More specifically, the concept might endorse the Army's plan to buy 1,000-mile-plus, surface-to-surface missiles that cost millions of dollars each. Doing so would ignore analyses that have determined using large numbers of these weapons would be far more expensive than employing bombers that can strike any target on the planet for a fraction of the cost, then regenerate and fly more sorties. Furthermore, the Army's long-range missile investments could be at the expense of its ability to defend U.S. theater air bases against missile attacks.
Not only has air base missile defense long been an Army mission — it has long neglected and underfunded the mission. Chinese or Russian strikes against under-defended air bases could cripple the United States' primary combat sortie-generation operations.
If the concept does not consider these kinds of trade-offs, it could be due to the approach used to create it. The Joint Staff's doctrine development process is notorious for seeking consensus instead of making cross-service trade-offs necessary to maximize the DoD's war-fighting potential. Assuring bureaucratic service equities versus optimizing combat lethality can lead to operating concepts that fail to create clear priorities or — worse yet — declare everything a priority. If everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority.
Moreover, each service was asked to develop a subordinate concept that will be integrated into the whole. This piece-part approach could result in the services ladening their subordinate concepts with their own equities instead of working together to develop the most effective, decisive options.
In short, a bottom-up, consensus-driven concept for all-domain warfare would not be an effective baseline to compare the DoD's force structure and capability alternatives. Three things could help to avoid this mistake.
First, the secretary of defense should approve a new all-domain war-fighting concept, and the secretary's staff should be deeply involved in its development. Some say the latter is inappropriate, believing the military, not DoD civilians, should create war-fighting concepts. However, it is entirely appropriate for the secretary's staff to be part of the concept's creation if its purpose is to shape the DoD's plans and programs.
Second, DoD leaders should rigorously examine the services' existing roles and missions during the concept's development, and make changes to reduce excessively redundant responsibilities, forces and capabilities. This may need to be driven by congressional language.
Finally, the DoD should jettison the word “joint” as part of the concept's title. This would stress the concept is focused on integrating operations across all domains, not on the services that provide forces to combatant commanders. The point is not for all to participate, but instead for all options to be considered, and those that provide best combat value be prioritized. Otherwise, it becomes a case analogous to all the kids chasing a soccer ball.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy was the beginning of the effort to shift the DoD toward preparing for peer conflict. Given that dollars and time are short, the DoD must now get a concept for all-domain warfare right. Like the National Defense Strategy, the concept must be top-down driven, not a bottom-up, consensus-driven product that fails to make trade-offs across the services and provides a rationale that supports what each service desires to buy. Rather, its ultimate objective should be to seek best-value capabilities and expand theater commander options to defeat peer adversaries.
November 1, 2021 | International, Aerospace
En janvier 2019, le standard F-4 du Rafale fut officiellement lancé, via l'attribution d'un contrat de développement à Dassault Aviation, pour un montant de deux milliards d'euros. Depuis, une première campagne de "revue d'aptitude à l'utilisation" [RAU], visant à
October 27, 2020 | International, Naval
David Pugliese, Two reports by the parliamentary budget officer looking into the costs of major Canadian naval equipment projects have been delayed. The Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates had unanimously passed a motion in June to request the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer undertake a costing analysis of the Royal Canadian Navy's new joint support ships as well as the leasing of the Asterix supply ship from a private firm. The PBO study was to also look at the cost of building the joint support ships in Canada at Seaspan shipyard in Vancouver. The committee asked that the PBO report be provided by Oct. 15. Another motion from the committee, passed later in June, asked the PBO to examine the $60 billion price tag of Canada's proposed new fleet of warships – the Canadian Surface Combatant or CSC. Parliamentary Budget Officer Yves Giroux was tasked to investigate the cost of the CSC as well as examine the cost of two other types of warships: the FREMM and the Type 31. That study was supposed to be presented to the committee by Oct. 22. But those original motions from the committee expired when Parliament was prorogued. So new motions have to be provided to the PBO. The Commons committee passed a new motion on Oct. 19 on the Asterix and Joint Support Ship analysis. That analysis is to be delivered by Nov. 30, PBO spokeswoman Sloane Mask told this newspaper. A date for the analysis to be made public has not yet been determined. “Currently, we are also in the process of confirming the revised timelines for the CSC report,” she added.There is particular interest in the defence community about what the PBO determines is the current price-tag of the Canadian Surface Combatant project. Last year the Liberal government signed an initial deal on CSC that is expected to lead to the eventual construction of 15 warships in the largest single government purchase in Canadian history. Lockheed Martin offered Canada the Type 26 warship designed by BAE in the United Kingdom. Irving is the prime contractor and the vessels will be built at its east coast shipyard. Construction of the first ship isn't expected to begin until the early 2020s. But the Canadian Surface Combatant program has already faced rising costs. In 2008, the then-Conservative government estimated the project would cost roughly $26 billion. But in 2015, Vice-Admiral Mark Norman, then commander of the navy, voiced concern that taxpayers may not have been given all the information about the program, publicly predicting the cost for the warships alone would approach $30 billion. The overall project is currently estimated to cost around $60 billion. “Approximately one-half of the CSC build cost is comprised of labour in the (Irving) Halifax yard and materials,” according to federal government documents obtained by this newspaper through the Access to Information law. But some members of parliament and industry representatives have privately questioned whether the CSC price-tag is too high. There have been suggestions that Canada could dump the Type 26 design and go for a cheaper alternative since the CSC project is still in early stages and costs to withdraw could be covered by savings from a less expensive ship. Canada had already been pitched on alternatives. In December 2017, the French and Italian governments proposed a plan in which Canada could build the FREMM frigate at Irving. Those governments offered to guarantee the cost of the 15 ships at a fixed $30 billion, but that was rejected by the Canadian government. The other type of warship the PBO will look at is the Type 31, which is to be built for the Royal Navy in the United Kingdom. Those ships are to cost less than $500 million each. In 2017, then Parliamentary Budget Officer Jean-Denis Fréchette estimated the CSC program would cost $61.82 billion. The entry of the BAE Type 26 warship in the Canadian competition was controversial from the start and sparked complaints that the procurement process was skewed to favour that vessel. Previously the Liberal government had said only mature existing designs or designs of ships already in service with other navies would be accepted on the grounds they could be built faster and would be less risky. Unproven designs can face challenges if problems are found once the vessel is in the water and operating. But the criteria was changed and the government and Irving accepted the BAE design, though at the time it existed only on the drawing board. Construction began on the first Type 26 frigate in the summer of 2017 for Britain's Royal Navy. https://www.thetelegram.com/news/canada/defence-watch-new-dates-set-for-budget-watchdogs-reports-on-major-naval-projects-512897
March 12, 2024 | International, Aerospace, Land
Northrop Grumman Corporation and Diehl Defence GmbH & Co. KG signed a Memorandum of Understanding formalizing their commitment to work together to support innovative layered air and missile defense capabilities for...