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  May 21, 2020 | International, Land

  Army Braces For Post-COVID Cuts: Gen. Murray

  “I've heard some people talk about [going] back to a BCA [Budget Control Act] level of funding,” Gen. Murray says, referring to the steep cuts also known as sequestration. “And I've heard some people say that it's even going to be worse than BCA.” By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.on May 20, 2020 at 1:11 PM WASHINGTON: Over the last two years, the Army has cut or cancelled more than 240 programs to free billions for its 34 top priorities, from hypersonic missiles to new rifles. Some of those 34 may have to die as the economy and budget reel from the COVID-19 pandemic, . “I start off with what Secretary Esper and Secretary McCarthy have said consistently, across DoD: three to five real growth is what we need,” said Gen. Mike Murray, chief of Army Futures Command. “Given what's going on in this country over the last two or three months.... my personal expectation is we're not going to see three to five percent growth. We'll be lucky to see a flat line.” LRPF: Long-Range Precision Fires. NGCV: Next-Generation Combat Vehicle. FVL: Future Vertical Lift. AMD: Air & Missile Defense. SL: Soldier Lethality. SOURCE: US Army. (Click to expand) While the Army is still working on its long-term spending plan for 2022-2026, the future topline is very much in doubt. “I've heard some people talk about [going] back to a BCA [Budget Control Act] level of funding,” Murray told an online AOC conference yesterday, referring to the steep cuts also known as sequestration. “And I've heard some people say that it's even going to be worse than BCA.” “I do think budgets are going to get tighter,” Murray said. “I do think that decisions are going to get harder.” Across its actual and projected budgets for 2020 through 2025, despite a slight drop in its topline, the Army has moved $40 billion from lower-priority programs to the 34 “signature programs.” Murray's Futures Command runs 31 of the 34, grouped in six portfolios: long-range rocket and cannon artillery is No. 1, followed by new armored vehicles, Future Vertical Lift aircraft, an upgraded battlefield network, air & missile defense, and soldier gear. Meanwhile, three most technologically demanding programs – including hypersonics and high-energy lasers – are handled by the independent Rapid Capabilities & Critical Technology Office. “We're prioritizing what I call the 31 plus 3,” Murray said. “We have fully funded those priorities in the program at the expense of a lot of other things.” The XM1299 Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) howitzer in an earlier test shot last year. But Army leaders have already warned that the Big Six will need more funding as they move from concept to prototype to mass production. Even a flat budget topline will be tight — and COVID makes flat the best-scare scenario. When and if the budget shrinks, Murray warned, “I do think we're going to have to make some tough decisions.” Hypothetically, he said, the choice may come down to something like, “Is it 31 plus three, or is it 24 plus two?” Considering the agonies the Army went through in its multiple rounds of “night court” cuts to find money for the 34 priority programs in the first place, cancelling any of them will be painful – but not impossible. Yes, the Army needs capabilities from each of its six modernization portfolios to work together in what's called Multi-Domain Operations against a future foe like Russia or China. Long-range precision firepower blasts holes in enemy defenses for aircraft, armor and infantry to advance; then they hunt out enemies too well-entrenched or mobile for artillery to destroy. Meanwhile air and missile defense protects the entire force, and the network passes intelligence and targeting data. But each of the Big Six includes multiple programs, and the Army has never expected all 34 to succeed. That's a crucial difference from the service's last major modernization drive, the Future Combat Systems cancelled in 2009, which depended on each of its 20 component technologies working as planned. Army slide showing the elements of the (later canceled) Future Combat System “Is there room for failures? Yes,” Murray told reporters at an Association of the US Army conference last year. “This concept does not count on any specific piece of capability.” That doesn't make cuts painless or easy, however. “Our priorities are our priorities for a reason,” Murray said yesterday. The Army's current weapons, from missiles to tanks to helicopters, largely entered service in the Reagan era. They've been much upgraded since, but there's only so much add-on armor, souped-up horsepower, and advanced electronics a 40-year chassis can take. The Army says it needs new weapons to take it into the next 40 years. “The kids running around on armored vehicles today are riding... fundamentally the same vehicles I rode around in as a company commander, way back when,” Murray said. “My now five-year-old granddaughter [lives] up the road at Fort Hood, Texas... I've got eight grandchildren, and out of all of them, I have absolutely no doubt that she is my infantry company commander wearing an Airborne Ranger tab at some point in the future. So that makes it personal for me.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/army-braces-for-post-covid-cuts-gen-murray

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  August 13, 2019 | International, Security

  New Model Standardizes Measurement Of Cybersecurity In Critical DoD Assets

  ARLINGTON, Va., Aug. 13, 2019 /PRNewswire/ -- Cyber experts from Lockheed Martin [NYSE: LMT] developed and piloted a first-of-its-kind model that standardizes how to measure the cyber resiliency maturity of a weapon, mission, and/or training system anywhere in its lifecycle – the Cyber Resiliency Level™ model (CRL®). The U.S. government defines "cyber resiliency" as the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to changing conditions in order to maintain the functions necessary for mission effective capability. Until now, the aerospace and defense industry lacked a simple, common method to discuss cyber resiliency of a military system. "Today's software-based military systems and a global supply chain make securing military systems a complex problem to solve," said Jim Keffer, director of Cyber, Lockheed Martin Government Affairs. "With the CRL, we can now leverage existing risk management frameworks to effectively measure and communicate resiliency across six categories we know are important to our customers. The release of this model builds on Lockheed Martin's enduring commitment to mission assurance and will ultimately help the warfighter operate in cyber-contested environments." To use the model, engineers work with U.S. and allied military program stakeholders to conduct a series of risk and engineering assessments. The process provides increased visibility into the current state of risk and produces a customized, risk-mitigation roadmap that shows how to increase a system's CRL to a more desirable level. "In an era of scarce resources, the CRL model can help stakeholders make informed decisions and prioritize cyber spending on the most impactful solutions," said Keffer. To date, Lockheed Martin has used model-based assessments on several of its own systems across multiple domains and plans to conduct at least 10 CRL assessments by the end of 2019. To learn more about CRL and how to apply it to your systems, visit: http://lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/cyber/crl.html About Lockheed Martin Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, Lockheed Martin is a global security and aerospace company that employs approximately 105,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. SOURCE Lockheed Martin https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2019-08-13-New-Model-Standardizes-Measurement-of-Cybersecurity-in-Critical-DoD-Assets

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  October 23, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Battle Force 2045 could work — if defense leaders show some discipline

  By: Timothy A. Walton and Bryan Clark U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper is sprinting. With less than four months left in the administration's term, he unveiled a new vision for the Navy that would grow the fleet to more than 500 manned and unmanned vessels from today's 296 ships. Although some dismiss Esper's Battle Force 2045 concept as a political ploy shortly before an election, it could lead to a more effective and affordable future fleet — as long as Navy and Department of Defense leaders can avoid loading it down with expensive options. The Navy clearly needs to change its force design and operational approach. Even though naval forces are increasingly important to deter and defeat Chinese aggression, the Navy's previous plan to build a force of 355 ships lacked resilience and firepower, fell short on logistics, and was projected to cost 50 percent more than the current fleet. The Navy tried to adjust that plan with an integrated naval force structure assessment, but Esper rejected it, as it failed to implement new concepts for distributed multidomain operations and would be too expensive to realistically field. Instead, over the course of nine months, he and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist led a study taking a fresh look at the Navy's force structure. The Hudson Institute contributed to the project by developing one of three fleet designs that informed the new plan. Hudson's proposed fleet is affordable to acquire and operate. Even though it consists of 581 vessels, more than 200 are unmanned or have small crews. The Hudson study's conservative estimates suggest it can be acquired for the ship construction funding in the Navy's President's Budget for fiscal 2021, adjusted for inflation, and would only cost moderately more than the current one to operate. The Hudson proposal becomes more affordable than the Navy's plan by gradually rebalancing the fleet to incorporate more smaller, less-expensive ships and fewer large multimission combatants. The proposed fleet would also constrain the size and cost of some large new ships, such as the future large surface combatant and next-generation attack submarine. Employing new operational concepts, the proposed fleet would outperform the current Navy in important metrics for future operations. First, the proposed fleet's groups of manned and unmanned vessels would generate more numerous and diverse effects chains compared to today's Navy, improving the force's adaptability and imposing greater complexity on enemy decision-making. Second, the fleet would deliver more offensive munitions from vessels and aircraft over a protracted period, and defend itself more effectively using distribution, shorter-range interceptors and electric weapons. Lastly, it enhances the fleet's amphibious, logistics and strategic sealift capacity. Overall, this results in a Navy that can help the joint force prevail across a range of potential scenarios, including the most challenging ones such as an attempted Chinese attack on Taiwan. The Hudson fleet is also achievable. Its shipbuilding plan relies on mature technologies or allows sufficient time to complete needed engineering and operational concept development before moving ships into serial production. The plan sustains the industrial base through stable ship-construction rates that avoid gaps in production and smoothly transition between ship classes. Even with this measured approach, however, the fleet can rapidly evolve, reaching more than 355 manned and unmanned vessels by 2030, and 581 by 2045. Although Battle Force 2045 focuses on ships, the Navy needs to spend more on improving repair yard infrastructure, growing munitions stocks, and providing command-and-control capabilities to the force. As the Hudson study shows, ship construction savings could help fund these and other enablers, but only if the Navy and the DoD have the discipline to avoid expensive new investments, such as building a third attack submarine every year, installing boost-glide hypersonic missiles on old destroyers or pursuing a significantly larger combatant to follow the Arleigh Burke class. Even if the procurement cost of these programs was funded through budget shifts within the DoD, each will incur a sustainment bill that is not factored into Navy plans and could accelerate the descent toward a hollow force. The Navy is now developing a new shipbuilding plan as part of its FY22 budget submission. Congress should carefully assess that plan and, in collaboration with the DoD, refine the budget. Esper may depart, but the results of this study can serve as a starting point for an operationally effective and fiscally sustainable fleet for the next administration. Timothy A. Walton is a fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Defense Concepts and Technology, where Bryan Clark is a senior fellow. Along with Seth Cropsey, they recently completed a study of future naval force structure. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/10/22/battle-force-2045-could-work-if-defense-leaders-show-some-discipline/