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  August 3, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Potential defense budget cuts demand a new calculus

  By: Lt. Gen. David Deptula (ret.) and Douglas A. Birkey With the U.S. election around the corner and the economic impact of COVID-19 mounting, calls for defense spending cuts are on the rise. The practicality of reductions is questionable given the scale and scope of the threat environment, the reality that key elements of the military are decaying, and that defense jobs represent one bright spot in an otherwise bleak economy. If cuts are coming, it is crucial to execute them in a fashion that prioritizes the most effective, efficient and valuable capabilities within the Department of Defense. This requires a new approach to assessing weapon systems' value. Defense programs are traditionally measured in a service-centric fashion based primarily upon two metrics: unit cost, and individual operating and support costs. Think about this in the context of buying a car and expenses associated with gas and maintenance. However, not all vehicles are created equal, with a compact car far different than a large SUV. Relative capabilities are essential when understanding how to best meet mission goals effectively and efficiently. To this point, when it comes to military systems, a much more relevant determination of merit is “cost per effect” — measuring the expense associated with achieving desired mission results. These sorts of comparisons are far from theoretical. On the first night of Desert Storm, it took 41 non-stealth aircraft to hit one target. At the same time, 20 F-117 stealth fighters struck 28 separate targets. Without the protection afforded by stealth, it took a large airborne team to protect the eight bomb-carrying aircraft striking one target. This gets to the crux of the cost-effectiveness challenge. Even though the non-stealth aircraft each cost less from an individual unit aircraft perspective, the F-117s yielded far more mission results at less risk for far less enterprise cost. However, during the last few budget downturns, decision-makers too often cut weapon systems that appeared “expensive” on a spreadsheet but actually delivered far greater effects for less cost. This year saw the Air Force seeking to retire 17 of its B-1 bombers even though a single B-1 can deliver as much or more ordnance than an entire aircraft carrier air wing, depending on the operational realities of range and payload. Production lines for the B-2 and F-22 — respectively the most advanced and capable bomber and fighter ever built — were terminated well before their validated military requirement was filled. Cost-per-effect analysis would have yielded very different determinations. These decisions continue to have very significant consequences. The security environment today is much more dangerous than at any time since the end of the Cold War, and U.S. forces are stretched thin. Smart investments are essential to yield necessary mission results. The U.S. military no longer has the capacity to bludgeon its way to victory through mass as it did in World War II. This is exactly why military leaders are embracing the need to harness information in their future war-fighting construct. Joint All-Domain Command and Control centers around understanding the battlespace in a real-time fashion to seek favorable pathways to achieve mission objectives, minimize the dangers posed by enemy threats and collaboratively team weapon systems to yield enhanced results. This is an incredibly smart approach. However, it is also wholly incongruous, with analysis centered around unit cost and individual operating expenses. If victory is going to be secured through the sum of parts, then we need to stop focusing on unilateral analysis absent broader context. Cost per effect can be applied to any mission area — the measurement points simply need to be tailored to relevant data sets. Accordingly, if we look at high-end air superiority and strike missions, it is important to consider the ability to net results in a precise fashion. This is simple — not only does “one bomb or missile, one target” save money, but it also frees up forces to execute other tasks. It is also important to consider survivability. Large, self-protecting, non-stealth strike packages akin to the Desert Storm example are incredibly expensive. Replacing a plane and pilot is not cheap. Additionally, losses reduce the force employment options available to commanders. Fifth-generation technology attributes are also crucial — the combination of stealth, sensors, processing power, fusion engines, and real-time command-and-control links to penetrate defended adversary regions and understand how best to attain desired effects, while minimizing vulnerability. Finally, range and payload are also very important — a single aircraft able to fly farther and carry more missiles or bombs drives effectiveness and efficiency. Assessing these attributes — all of which are measurable — validate precisely why aircraft like the F-35 and B-21 are so important. Nor should these assessments be restricted within a service. That is not how combat commanders fight. They focus on missions, not service ownership. If cuts to defense are coming, then it is crucial that the DoD maintain the most effective, efficient options, regardless of service. If past DoD budget cuts are any indicator, DoD budget “experts” will once again resort to their traditional monetary spreadsheets focused on unit cost and service-focused budget columns. Leadership from the very highest levels is crucial to ensure the very best options are preserved and prioritized. Joint cost-per-effect analysis is what will ensure a given amount of money will yield the most value at a time when it matters the most. Retired U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula is dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Power Studies. He has more than 3,000 flying hours under his belt, and he planned the Desert Storm air campaign and orchestrated air operations over Iraq and Afghanistan. Douglas A. Birkey is the executive director of the Mitchell Institute, where he researches issues relating to the future of aerospace and national security. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/07/31/potential-defense-budget-cuts-demand-a-new-calculus/

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  September 18, 2018 | International, Aerospace

  Air Force calls for 74 more squadrons to prepare for possibility of war against major power

  By: Stephen Losey How will the Air Force get to 386 squadrons? Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson on Monday called for growing the Air Force from its current size of 312 operational squadrons to 386 by 2030, as it prepares for a possible conflict against a major nation such as China or Russia. This 24 percent increase in squadrons is the centerpiece of the service's “Air Force We Need”proposal, which has been in the works for six months. This proposal seeks to lay out what it would take for the Air Force to fight a peer adversary and win, as well as defend the homeland, provide a credible nuclear deterrent, counter a medium-sized rogue nation that might try to take advantage of the Air Force's focus on the major adversary, and fight violent extremists such as the Taliban and the Islamic State. This follows the National Defense Strategy that the Pentagon unveiled earlier this year, which is structured around the need to shift away from the violent extremist fight and instead focus on deterring or fighting nations with significant, well-developed militaries. In her keynote address at the Air Force Association's Air, Space, Cyber Conference, Wilson referenced the massive Russian military exercises launched last week, involving more than 300,000 of their troops, and China's unveiling of its first aircraft carrier and its ongoing militarization of islands in the South China Sea to extend its long-range bombers' reach. “We must see the world as it is,” Wilson said. “That was why the National Defense Strategy explicitly recognizes that we have returned to an era of great power competition.” But Wilson reiterated the service's view that the Air Force is not big enough to carry out all the missions currently being asked of it. The Air Force has to meet the threats facing the nation with its most basic unit: the squadron, Wilson said. “Our operational squadrons are the combat power of the Air Force," Wilson said. "They are the clenched fist of American resolve.” Full article: https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/09/17/air-force-calls-for-74-more-squadrons-to-prepare-for-possibility-of-war-against-major-power

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  April 3, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Editorial: A Code Of Conduct For Aviation’s Recovery

  Desperate times call for bold measures, and the $2.2 trillion coronavirus economic rescue package passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President Donald Trump certainly passes that test. Tucked into the gargantuan measure was $58 billion for airlines and cargo carriers, including $29 billion in grants to keep workers paid for the next six months, even if they are staffing empty flights. Boeing did not get the $60 billion directly that it had sought for aerospace manufacturers, but the aircraft giant and its suppliers still qualify for hefty rescue loans or guarantees. The secretary general of the United Nations has called COVID-19 the worst crisis the world has seen since World War II, and governments have a duty to ensure that this unprecedented pandemic does not wipe out vital industries. But the torrent of rescue money could have negative side effects, and it is imperative that governments step back when the crisis subsides. The market distortions of state aid already are apparent in the airline industry, where a lack of coordination among governments—even those within the EU—has tilted the playing field. And what if Boeing receives government backstops that Airbus has said it does not need? It is increasingly likely that when the pandemic subsides, the aviation industry will be facing a long uphill march to recovery, rather than the quick bounce-back that had been hoped for. As such, we urge the industry's stakeholders to start looking ahead and taking steps that will position them to recover as quickly as possible. Consider this Code of Conduct: Take care of your employees. You will need them to excel and work as a team when you recover. Do whatever possible to keep them healthy and well-informed. In the near term, furloughs, wage freezes and hiring freezes may be unavoidable to control costs. But prioritizing shareholders or senior executives over workers would create labor issues that could slow any recovery. Take care of your customers. You will only recover if they recover, so be flexible in responding to their issues during the crisis. Relationships cemented during hard times will pay off, while fractured relationships could cause long-term damage. Take care of your suppliers. Aviation manufacturers have spent decades pushing risk down to suppliers while trying to limit their rewards to reduce costs. If your suppliers do not survive or take too long to recover, all those risks will rebound onto you. Take care of your industrial base. The Pentagon wields an enormous amount of buying power at the taxpayers' expense. That should be deployed to keep its supply base healthy in the near term, even if it is at the expense of delaying long-term capabilities. Take care of your business. You need to come back more agile and flexible than ever to adjust to the immediate challenges of a recovery and to tackle future challenges unrelated to the coronavirus, such as climate change. And what about taking care of shareholders? Consider that in one recent year Boeing returned nearly six times as much money to shareholders through stock buybacks and dividends as it invested in R&D. Or consider that U.S. airlines sent 96% of their free cash flow to shareholders over the last five years. Now that hard times have hit, taxpayers are being asked to step in and foot the bill to save the industry. Shareholders need healthy airlines and healthy manufacturers. They can wait their turn. https://aviationweek.com/aerospace/editorial-code-conduct-aviations-recovery