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December 12, 2017 | Local, Aerospace

Replacing and Supplementing Canada's Fighters

Canada's Strong, Secure, Engaged defence policy, announced in June 2017, reaffirmed the government's commitment to invest appropriately in Canada's military.

On December 12, 2017, the Government of Canada launched an open and transparent competition to permanently replace Canada's fighter fleet with 88 advanced jets. This represents an increase in fleet size of more than a third from what was planned prior to the Strong, Secure, Engaged defence policy (65 aircraft).

The Industrial and Technological Benefits Policy will be applied to this procurement. The objective of the policy is to maximize opportunities for Canadian companies, support innovation through research and development, and grow export opportunities from Canada.

All companies are welcome to participate in the process.

Engagement

The government will take the time necessary to ensure that the Canadian aerospace and defence industries and commercial suppliers are consulted and engaged in this process, and that they are well-positioned to participate.

Canada will hold a Future Fighter Industry Day on January 22, 2018 at Library and Archives Canada, 395 Wellington St., in Ottawa.

The objective of this event is to present foreign governments and industry with the information required for them to make an informed decision about participating in the procurement. In addition, the event will provide an opportunity for Canadian industry to network with foreign governments and fighter aircraft manufacturers.

Invitation to participate

Canada will begin by establishing a list of suppliers as a first step in this procurement. The list will be comprised of foreign governments and fighter aircraft manufacturers that have demonstrated their ability to meet Canada's needs, as defined in the Suppliers List invitation.

The invitation to participate on the Suppliers List is available on Buyandsell.gc.ca.

All companies are welcome to participate in the process.

Suppliers List responses are requested by February 9, 2018.

Once the list is formalized, only suppliers on the Suppliers List will be invited to subsequent engagement activities and to submit proposals for this procurement.

Consultation with Canadian Industry Stakeholders

In parallel to the activities related to the Suppliers List, Canadian industry stakeholders will be engaged to gather and share general information related to this procurement. This will ensure the Canadian aerospace and defence industries are well-positioned to participate.

Evaluation of proposals for the permanent capability

Proposals will be rigorously assessed on elements of cost, technical requirements and economic benefits. Our government feels it is important to do business with trusted partners. As such, the evaluation of bids will also include an assessment of bidders' impact on Canada's economic interests.

When bids are assessed, any bidder that is responsible for harm to Canada's economic interests will be at a distinct disadvantage. The new assessment, as well as guidelines for its application as an ongoing procurement tool, will be developed through appropriate consultations.

In addition, the Industrial and Technological Benefits Policy will apply to this procurement, requiring the winning supplier to make investments in Canada equal to the value of the contract.

All Suppliers will be subject to the same evaluation criteria.

Next Steps

  • Engagement with suppliers will continue throughout 2018 and 2019
  • It is anticipated that the formal solicitation documents will be available in spring 2019
  • A contract award is anticipated in 2022, and the first replacement aircraft delivered in 2025

Frequently Asked Questions

Competitive procurement process

  1. How long will the competition take and when will a contract be awarded?
    • This competition requires extensive planning and stakeholder and industry engagement
    • We need to get this right and we will take the time needed to ensure the Canadian aerospace and defence industries and commercial manufacturers are consulted and engaged in this process
    • A contract award is anticipated in 2022 and the first replacement aircraft delivered in 2025
    • The current estimated schedule to complete this process is consistent with competitions led by allied and partner countries for replacing their fighter fleets
  2. Why are you using a Suppliers List?
    • Fighter aircraft and their component systems are sensitive, heavily controlled goods, and discussing their potential sale requires the existence of defence material cooperation arrangements between Canada and its partners and allies
    • The three criteria included in this invitation are aimed at ensuring Canada works with foreign governments that are operators of fighter aircraft that could meet Canada's needs for sharing defence information, and commercial manufacturers currently producing fighter aircraft
    • This step will identify eligible manufacturers of fighter aircraft in partner and allied nations that demonstrate the potential to meet Canada's needs
    • Their respective governments and/or defence organizations will also need to meet Canada's needs to be on the Suppliers List
  3. Who can participate in the Suppliers List?
    • Foreign governments (or defence organizations made up of participating nations) and fighter aircraft manufacturers and other commercial entities that are able to meet the needs as defined in the Suppliers List invitation, are encouraged to submit a request to be added to the list in order to participate in the competition
    • Canada's Suppliers List will be comprised of teams that will include at a minimum, a government (or defence organization made up of participating nations) and a fighter aircraft manufacturer
    • These teams may also include other companies who are likely to be involved in supporting a future proposal, subject to approval by Canada
    • Once the list is formalized, only suppliers on the Suppliers List will be invited to subsequent engagement activities, and submit proposals
  4. Can a government submit more than one response to the Suppliers List Invitation?
    • Our goal through this open and transparent process is to maximize competition, and therefore governments are encouraged to submit responses for more than one fighter aircraft manufacturer, as defined in the Suppliers List invitation
    • The decision to submit more than one response rests with the foreign government or defence organization
  5. How can Canadian industry participate in the Suppliers List?
    • The Suppliers List will identify key suppliers that will be eligible to submit a proposal, namely a foreign government or defence organization and a fighter manufacturer
    • These suppliers will be required to submit a Value Proposition in their bid outlining their economic commitments to Canada
    • As a result, suppliers will be motivated to form partnerships with Canadian industry and post-secondary institutions over the coming months in order to develop a strong Value Proposition
    • The government will engage with foreign governments, fighter aircraft manufacturers and the Canadian aerospace and defence sectors to ensure they are well-positioned to participate
  6. What are the criteria that suppliers will need to meet, to be accepted on the Suppliers List?
    • Each team must identify a government or nation to act as Canada's main point of contact, and have a current defence material cooperation agreement with Canada
    • The team's fighter aircraft manufacturer, must meet the criteria as defined in the Suppliers List invitation
    • The foreign government or one of the participating nations must be an operator of a fighter aircraft produced by the proposed fighter manufacturer
    • Canada will review response submissions to determine if they have met all the Suppliers List criteria and reserves the right to request clarification, if needed
    • Following review of the responses, suppliers will receive email notification of Canada's decision
  7. Can Canada remove or add a supplier to the Suppliers List?
    • Once a team has been added to the Suppliers List, it may withdraw at any time by written notification to Canada
    • Similarly a foreign government or defence organization can add or remove a company from its team at any time by written notice to Canada, subject to Canada's approval
    • Canada reserves the right to remove, at any time, any team or entity that is listed on the Suppliers List if it presents potential, perceived or real issues that may be injurious to Canada's national security
  8. Does this procurement include industry engagement and discussions related to Industrial and Technological Benefits for Canada?
    • The Government's Industrial and Technological Benefits Policy will apply to this procurement, requiring contractors to make investments in Canada equal to the value of the contract
    • The Government is engaging with fighter aircraft manufacturers and Canadian industry towards the development of a Value Proposition strategic objective that will support the long-term growth of Canada's aerospace and defence sectors
    • This includes promoting growth and innovation of Canadian industry through investments in research and development, providing supplier development opportunities, especially for small and medium-sized businesses and providing export opportunities for Canadian firms
    • The necessary time will be taken to engage with foreign governments, fighter aircraft manufacturers and the Canadian aerospace and defence industries to ensure they are well-positioned to participate
  9. How will Canada evaluate the proposals?
    • Proposals will be rigorously assessed on cost, technical requirements and economic benefits
    • Our government feels it is important to do business with trusted partners. As such, the evaluation of bids will also include an assessment of bidders' impact to Canada's economic interests
    • When bids are assessed, any bidder that is responsible for harm to Canada's economic interests will be at a distinct disadvantage
    • The new assessment, as well as guidelines for its application as an ongoing procurement tool, will be developed through appropriate consultations
  10. Why are you assessing impact on Canada's economic interests?
    • We are continuously looking for ways to enhance our procurement processes and improve outcomes for Canadians
    • Procurements are about forming effective and long-term partnerships and we want to ensure that we are doing business with suppliers whose activities align with Canada's economic interests
    • This approach is consistent with direction in Minister Qualtrough's Mandate Letter, which outlines direction to modernize procurement practices to support our economic policy goals, among other objectives
  11. How will the government ensure that no aircraft supplier has an unfair advantage during the competition?
    • The government is committed to conducting an open and transparent competition to replace Canada's fighter aircraft
    • This process is overseen by an independent fairness monitor to ensure a level playing field for all suppliers
    • Canada will also engage other stakeholders to review, gather and share general information related to the procurement throughout this competition

Supplementing the Existing Fleet

  1. What is Canada doing to ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces has the equipment it needs while the competition is underway?
    • Until permanent replacement aircraft are in place and fully operational, Canada must ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces has the equipment it needs to continue to deliver its missions, and meet its international obligations
    • Canada has received a formal offer for sale of F-18 Hornets from the government of Australia, and intends to pursue it
  2. Will buying these F-18 aircraft require changes to Canada's existing infrastructure?
    • The Department of National Defence is currently reviewing its existing infrastructure to evaluate if any changes are required
  3. How can you be confident these planes will be reliable, safe and effective?
    • Ensuring the safety and security of our women and men in uniform is our top priority
    • The Australian aircraft are similar in age to Canada's CF-18 fleet
    • Australia and Canada have both made significant investments in the development of structural modifications that have allowed the structural life of their respective F-18s to be extended
    • More recently, Canada invested in the development of additional structural modifications that Australia did not
    • Canadian companies have the experience required, and are already performing most of the maintenance work on our existing fleet. Any supplemental aircraft would be maintained through these existing arrangements
    • Just as we do with our current fleet, we will make necessary investments in these aircraft to ensure they meet all requirements of the Royal Canadian Air Force

More information

Fighter Jets

Integrating Australian Jets into the Current Royal Canadian Air Force Fighter Fleet

https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/air/snac-nfps/CF-18-eng.html

On the same subject

  • Royal Canadian Navy Unveils New Details On CSC Frigates

    November 11, 2020 | Local, Naval

    Royal Canadian Navy Unveils New Details On CSC Frigates

    The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) released the latest details on the configuration of its next generation frigates: the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC). They will be heavily armed, featuring Naval Strike Missiles, Tomahawk and both ESSM and Sea Ceptor! The RCN last week unveiled a PDF document shedding light on the latest configuration retained for its next gen class of frigate: the CSC. Naval News contacted various sources familiar with the program to confirm the selection of a number of systems listed in the document. What stands out in this new document is fact that the CSC will be fitted with a wide range of weapons, both offensive and defense, in a mix never seen before in any surface combatant. Naval Strike Missile (NSM) While NSM launchers were shown in the past on CSC scale models at various tradeshows (Surface Navy and Sea Air Space), the CSC model on display at DSEI 2019 was showing Harpoon launchers aboard the frigate To our knowledge, it is the first time that an official Royal Canadian Navy lists the NSM as the main anti-surface warfare (ASuW) weapon for the CSC. Contacted by Naval News, an industry source said Kongsberg was close to finalizing the deal. NSM has an operational range of 100 nautical miles (185 Km) and a high subsonic speed. It uses Inertial, GPS and terrain-reference navigation and imaging infrared homing (with a target database aboard the missile). The NSM is a fifth generation anti-sip missile, produced by Kongsberg and managed in the U.S. by Raytheon. NSM reached Initial Operational Capability on the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates and Skjold-class corvettes in 2012. It is also fielded by the Polish Navy (coastal defense batteries) and has been selected by the navies of Malaysia and Germany. NSM was also selected in 2018 as the winner of the U.S. Navy Over-The-Horizon Weapon System (OTH WS) competition and by the USMC last year. It will be fitted aboard the Littoral Combat Ship and the Constellation-class frigates. In the case of Canada, is selected, the NSM will likely be sourced from Raytheon via an FMS deal, rather than procured directly from Norway. Tomahawk land attack cruise missile If Tomahawk missiles end up in the CSC weapons package, this would be quite significant. So far, Raytheon's land attack cruise missile has only been exported to the United Kingdom in its submarine launched variant. Canada would become the second export customer for the missile and the only navy, with the US Navy to deploy it from surface vessels. Naval News contacted Raytheon for comment but we have not heard back yet. During the Sea Air Space 2019 tradeshow, representatives from Lockheed Martin Canada confirmed to Naval News the MK41 VLS aboard the frigate were “strike length”. The Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) is a long-range, all-weather, jet-powered, subsonic cruise missile that is primarily used by the United States Navy and Royal Navy in ship- and submarine-based land-attack operations. Its latest variant, the RGM/UGM-109E Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM Block IV) has a range of 900 nautical miles (or 1,000 mi / 1,700 km). ESSM and Sea Ceptor The last thing that really caught our attention in the RCN document is the fact that both the ESSM and Sea Ceptor are listed. On paper, the two missiles are direct competitors and redundant: ESSM is a medium-range, all-weather, semi-active radar-guided missile used in surface-to-air and surface-to-surface roles. According to open sources, the RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow Missile (ESSM) has a range of about 27 nautical miles (50 Km) and a top speed of Mach 4+. Unlike ESSM Block 1, the Block 2's active radar homing seeker will support terminal engagement without the launch ship's target illumination radars. The improved ESSM Block 2 will be fielded by the US Navy from 2020. Canada is one of the 12 nations taking part in the NATO-led ESSM consortium and will be deploying the Block 2 variant aboard the future CSC. The will be launched from the Mk41 VLS. The missiles can be “quad packed” in a single cell. According to MBDA, Sea Ceptor is the next-generation, ship-based, all-weather, air defence weapon system. The Weapon System has the capability to intercept and thereby neutralise the full range of current and future threats including combat aircraft and the new generation of supersonic anti-ship missiles. Capable of multiple channels of fire, the system will also counter saturation attacks. It has a range of 25 Km, a speed of Mach 3 and features an active RF seeker. Also known as Common Anti-Air Modular Missile (Maritime) – CAMM(M), this new missiles has already been fielded aboard the Royal Navy's Type 23 frigates and the Royal New Zealand Navy ANZAC-class frigates. Sea Ceptor will also be fitted aboard the future Type 26 frigates. Contacted by Naval News, an MBDA source shed some light on how the Sea Ceptor was selected in addition to the ESSM. The two missiles were not competing against each other. Raytheon's ESSM was selected to provide “point defense”. Instead, MBDA pitched its missile for the RCN's close in weapons system (CIWS) requirement. The Sea Ceptor beat out systems usually used in that role such as the RAM, SeaRam or Phalanx. The final Sea Ceptor configuration aboard the CSC still needs finalized and confirmed but it will likely be 24x missiles launched from Lockheed Martin's Extensible Launching System (ExLS) located amidship. The RCN would become the launch customer for that new launcher alongside the Brazilian Navy (for its new corvette design based on the TKMS MEKO A-100) depending on who signs the contract first. CSC latest configuration Surveillance & Weapon Sensors Solid State 3D Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar – LMC SPY-7 Solid State AESA Target Illuminator – MDA Navigation Radars – X & S Band Electro-Optical and Infrared Systems Electronic Warfare & Countermeasures Suite Radar/Radio ESM Frequency Identification Laser Warning and Countermeasures System Radio Frequency and Electronic Jammers Electronic Decoy System Naval News comments: An industry source informed us that except for the Torpedo decoy systems (to be provided by Ultra) the decoy launchers for CSC and their ammunition is one of the few systems that are still “up in the air”. We were told however that the RCN wants the full range of decoy types available on the market today: Infra red, chaff, corner reflectors, smoke for masking / screening and even offboard active decoys (such as Nulka). The EW suite of the CSC will be known as the RAVEN. Designed by Lockheed Martin Canada, it is based on the RAMSES system currently fitted aboard the Halifax-class frigates. Command & Control Combat Management System – LMC CMS 330 with AEGIS USN Cooperative Engagement Capability – Sensor Netting Integrated Cyber Defence System Integrated Bridge and Navigation System – OSI Internal and External Communication Suite – L3 Harris Aviation Facilities 1 x CH-148 Cyclone Helicopter Space for embarking Remotely Piloted Systems Helo Hauldown and Traverse System – Indal Technologies Inc. Weapons Missile Vertical Launch System 32 Cells – LMC MK 41 Area Air Defence Missiles – Raytheon Standard Missile 2 Point Defence Missiles – Raytheon Evolved Sea Sparrow Naval Fires Support – Raytheon Tomahawk Main Gun System – 127mm Lightweight Torpedoes MK54 & Twin Launch Tubes Close-In Air Defence System – MBDA Sea Ceptor Surface-to-Surface Anti-Ship Missile – Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile 2 x Stabilized Rapid Fire 30mm Naval Gun System – BAE Naval News comments: The main gun is another system on which the RCN has yet to formally make a choice. According to our sources, Italy's Leonardo 127/64 LW is still in competition against BAE System's Mk45 Mod 4. Note that the CSC scale models and illustrations (above) have always shown the American gun. In addition, the UK's Type 26 and Australia's Hunter-class frigates will both use the later naval gun system. A possible FMS of SM-2 Block IIIC missiles for the CSC was approved last week. Reconfigurable Mission & Boat Bays 1 x Rescue Boat – 9 metres 2 x Multi-Role Boats – 9-12 metres Mission Bay Handling System – Rolls Royce Modular Mission Support Capacity – Sea Container, Vehicles, Boats Propulsion & Power Generation Combined Diesel-Electric or Gas Propulsion System (CODLOG) 2 x Electric Motors – GE 1 x Gas Turbine – Rolls Royce MT 30 4 x Diesel Generators – Rolls Royce MTU Integrated Platform Management System – L3 Harris Integrated Underwater Warfare System Towed Low Frequency Active & Passive Sonar – Ultra Electronics Hull-Mounted Sonar – Ultra Electronics Sonar S2150 Towed Torpedo Countermeasures – Ultra Electronics SEA SENTOR S21700 Sonobuoy Processing System – General Dynamics Expendable Acoustic Countermeasures Specifications: Length: 151.4 metres Beam: 20.75 metres Speed: 27 knots Displacement: 7,800 tonnes Navigational Draught: ~8m Range: 7000 nautical miles Class: 15 ships Accommodations: ~204 Naval News comments: The displacement figure (7,800 tonnes) shown on the RCN document is probably the “full load” displacement. For comparison, the official figure for the Royal Navy's Type 26 frigate is 6,900 tons standard displacement while the official figure for the Royal Australian Navy's Hunter-class frigate is 8,800 tons at full load. In addition to the PDF unveiled last week, the Royal Canadian Navy Director of Naval Strategy, Captain Nucci, published an article on CSC in USNI's proceedings: “Canada is pursuing a single class of 15 surface combatants for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), unlike some of its allies who are building multiple classes of more specialized ships. A single variant Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) is better than the project's original vision of two variants based on a common hull (the first a task group command/air-defense version, the other a more general-purpose/antisubmarine warfare version). While all naval force structure is essentially driven by national strategic defense and security interests, a single-class solution is based on three principal factors. First, it fits best for Canada's unique naval requirements shaped by its geography, modest fleet size, and the RCN's operational needs. Second, it optimizes effectiveness now and into the future, while responsibly seeking maximum cost efficiencies. Finally, it is an innovative approach that has only recently become both practical and advantageous because of recent technological developments, such as convergence and digitization.” Captain Christopher Nucci, Royal Canadian Navy, Proceedings, USNI, November 2020 https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/11/royal-canadian-navy-unveils-new-details-on-csc-frigates/

  • NORAD MODERNIZATION: REPORT ONE: AWARENESS & SENSORS

    September 18, 2020 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    NORAD MODERNIZATION: REPORT ONE: AWARENESS & SENSORS

    INTRODUCTION The CDA Institute, in partnership with NDIA and NORAD/USNORTHCOM hosted a three-part virtual roundtable focused on NORAD modernization. The goal was to allow experts from industry, academia, and government to break down silos and engage in direct conversations about North American continental defence challenges and what form NORAD modernization might to address them. The forum was created to imagine the art of the possible. More specifically, the goal of these three events were to identify security gaps and brainstorm actionable solutions to the issues identified during the discussions. 12 August 2020: Domain Awareness/Sensors 26 August 2020: Defeat Capabilities 9 September 2020: JADC2/JADO This report is focused on the first of these three events and will be followed up by two upcoming exposés of the conversations that took place during the subsequent panels. The Domain Awareness / Sensors event was 2 hours in length and took place on 12 August 2020. NORAD Deputy Commander L. Gen Pelletier provided introductory remarks. This was followed by a white paper overview from Dr. Thomas Walker of Lockheed Martin. Director of the Centre for Defence & Security Studies and University of Manitoba's, Dr. Andrea Charron served as a guest speaker, providing an overview and context for the discussion that would follow. Director, Operations for NORAD HQ, Brig Gen Pete. M Fesler also helped set the scene with a short presentation. Following this, LGen (Ret'd) Guy Thibaut, Chair of the CDA Institute moderated a panel discussion on awareness and sensors with several industry representatives. The panel consisted of: Sunil Chavda, Director, New Satellite Systems Development, Telesat Canada Ravi Ravichandran, Vice President, CTO BAE Systems Mike Walsh, Chief Engineer, Radar and Sensor Systems, Lockheed Martin Jerome Dunn, Chief Architect, NG Counter Hypersonics Campaign Launch & Missile Defense Systems, Northrop Grunmman Mark Rasnake, Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) Enterprise Capture Lead, Boeing The following report will outline the major points of consensus and contention reached by participants during the webinar, a backgrounder on the case for NORAD modernization, sections on obstacles to modernization, all domain awareness requirements, design considerations for Canadian industry, and data plans. This report was created by the CDA Institute and is intended to read as an overview of the key points made by our invited experts. The report was produced by rapporteurs from the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN), a Department of National Defence MINDS Collaborative Network. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY NORAD's defences are challenged by advanced new weapons like hypersonic glide vehicles. These new weapons have proliferated across all military domains, designed to threaten North America and place its political autonomy and financial stability at risk. North American homeland defence needs to modernize to meet these new threats. A major component of this new thinking is the development of All Domain Awareness capabilities provided by a multi-layered sensor system (an ecosystem) that can detect, identify, and track these and other new threats at great distances and provide the right information to the right assets at the right time. High financial costs and tight timelines are major obstacles to NORAD implementing an All Domain Awareness capability. These factors necessitate an approach to All Domain Awareness that emphasizes the technological readiness levels of industry. What ‘off the shelf' technology is available that can be modified and brought to bear quickly? Experts from across the defence industry elaborated on the design of the multi-layered sensor system that will enable a future All Domain Awareness capability. Sensors should be multi-mission, able to detect, identify, and track more than one threat from “birth to death”. These sensors should be modular, scalable, and software-defined with an open architecture for quick adaptability and upgradability. Throughout the discussions, the need to integrate these multi-layered sensors into a holistic system was emphasized. The goal is to create All Domain Awareness that seamlessly converges with renewed Command and Control (C2) and defeat capabilities to enable NORAD's deter, detect, and defeat mission. Many decisions have yet to be made that will drive the design of the multi-layered sensor system. Where should these sensors be placed that provides the best coverage? Furthermore, the data this system provides will be valuable and could be partly shared with allies and industry. How can industry ensure the integrity of this data? Lastly, where and how does human decision-making come into a largely autonomous system. POINTS OF CONSENSUS All Domain Awareness is paramount to enabling NORAD's deter, detect, defeat mission. A renewed multi-layered system will be a combination of new, old, and repurposed equipment. Solutions will favour “off the shelf” technology that can be modified and upgraded. Most of the sensor technology to meet NORAD requirements exists today or will shortly. The system must have seamlessly layered sensors to detect, identify, and track full spectrum of threats across All Domains, from ballistic missiles to advanced hypersonic glide vehicles to cheap aerial drones. Data must be shared widely to be effective but policy must be developed to ensure that information can be shared to the right people at the right time. Multi-layered sensors should be able to detect and identify a threat at its ‘birth' and track until its ‘death.' The Arctic poses unique challenges for remote ground-based sensors and space-based sensors in polar orbits. The NWS is nearing its end of serviceable life but a replacement is not possible yet. Instead, the life of the NWS will need to be extended in parallel with new systems and capabilities. POINTS OF CONTENTION How much of the world, beyond North America and its approaches, will All Domain Awareness have to cover to be effective? The disposition of the renewed all domain awareness sensor network, with debate over how much of it should be space or terrestrially based. Where does the human decision-making process to ‘not shoot' or chose other options (such as to exploit, probe, surveille) come into a largely autonomous ‘kill chain'? Extent of compatibility/upgradability of older Cold War Domain Awareness architecture to work with new systems. Integrity of sensor data. Could it be tampered with? THE CASE FOR NORAD MODERNIZATION In opening the webinar, NORAD Deputy Commander LGen Alain Pelletier presented the broad challenge facing NORAD. Following 9/11 the command focused on violent extremist organizations, putting its energies into looking inward across North American airspace to prevent such a terror attack from happening again. This reorientation of NORAD has since been exploited by adversaries, with China and Russia having developed new capabilities specifically to bypass NORAD's largely Cold War-era defences. As the world shifts towards a state of great power competition, this threat becomes more acute. By being able to defeat NORAD, these states can essentially hold North America hostage, preventing it from intervening in conflict overseas. Brig Gen Pete M. Fesler, Deputy Director of Operations at NORAD's Headquarters, explained that America's long mobilization times have been noted as a vulnerability. By exploiting seams, adversaries can target military bases, airports, and seaports from far away, greatly disrupting the long and complex mobilizations required to project military power abroad. Future overseas conflict involving the great powers will thus see North America struck to delay its forces from intervening abroad, buying time for an adversarial victory. LGen Pelletier stated that NORAD's adversaries are agile, rapidly evolving their capabilities to exploit vulnerabilities in the command's aging defences or circumventing these defences entirely. Jerome Dunn of Northrop Grumman elaborated on how these new threats can avoid NORAD's current sensors and that they can come in quantity. While NORAD's current defences are designed to deal with a few ballistic missiles from a rogue state, such as North Korea, these defences can be easily overwhelmed by large numbers of aerospace threats from a power like Russia. NORAD must address advanced new aerospace weapons such as hypersonic glide vehicles. A requirement to defend against sophisticated cyber-attacks was repeatedly emphasised throughout the seminar. Lockheed Martin's Mike Walsh also pointed out that NORAD needs a response for swarms of cheap unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that can attack vulnerable Arctic infrastructure that supports NORAD's current Domain Awareness capability. A diversity of threats to NORAD have proliferated across the spectrum of military domains, from cyberspace to aerospace. Ultimately, NORAD's defences have been overtaken by advancing technology. LGen Pelletier made clear that with aging systems and just two percent of NORAD's original force strength to draw upon from Cold War peak, the command can no longer deter great power adversaries as it had during the Cold War. This potentially places Canada into the ‘hostage situation' outlined above, putting its political autonomy and economic growth and stability at unacceptable risk. With its ability to meet its mission statement to deter, detect, and defeat threats against the United States and Canada degrading, NORAD cannot continue its current course. NORAD must be modernized. Obstacles to the Modernization of NORAD and the defence of North America Dr. Andrea Charron, Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS) and co-lead of the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Networks cautioned not to expect that endless financial resources will be available. The COVID-19 pandemic, she highlighted, has placed great strain on federal budgets, creating new fiscal realities and old agreements about cost splitting connected to the NWS are likely to change. CDAI Chair LGen (ret'd) Guy Thibault also emphasized this point. COVID-19 will put future pressure on Ottawa's coffers as the pandemic unfolds, making NORAD modernization spending uncertain. Dr. Charron also raised the importance of meaningful consultations with indigenous peoples about the old and potential new sensors that are located in indigenous territories. Aside from the growing fiscal challenges are the looming time constraints facing NORAD modernization. Dr. Charron stated the obvious, “ the North Warning System, are on borrowed operational time.” Brig Gen Fesler elaborated that there were multiple systems coming to the end of their useful lives. These sensors are rapidly becoming obsolete and cannot wait for a twenty-year procurement plan. Both Charron and Fesler emphasized to the audience that these two factors were driving the overall approach to NORAD modernization : prolonging the service life of useful existing architecture and mixing it with new sensors through the process of incremental improvement to achieve, over time and with a new emphasis on homeland defense All Domain Awareness. Telesat's Sunil Chavda observed that the subsequent engineering challenge was not in the new technologies NORAD modernization requires, but in bringing this eclectic approach together as a holistic system. LGen Pelletier made clear that while NORAD would have to push its all domain sensors far out into the world, covering the Arctic is the most challenging of the command's environments to surveille. Walsh elaborated on these challenges, pointing out the wide range of threats from multiple adversaries passing through the Arctic. The sensors that are needed to address these threats will be placed into “a resource constrained space,” characterized by vast distances with little infrastructure to support them. These remote sensors will have to be able to reliably cope with the Arctic's harsh climate and severe weather. Walsh stated that while space-based sensors will be helpful to surveille the arctic there are constraints imposed by what orbit the satellite is in. Fidelity can be sacrificed for distance as well. All Domain Awareness Requirements Dr. Thomas Walker of Lockheed Martin stated that the primary concern of NORAD modernization is the technology readiness levels of industry, the command wanting solutions now. What ‘off the shelf' technology is available that can be modified and brought to bear quickly? What current NORAD systems can be retrofitted? Walker conveyed that NORAD was open to making all sorts of solutions work so long as they emphasised little to no development timelines and speed of implementation. All Domain Awareness is a core capability requirement of NORAD. Dr. Walker emphasized that the multi- layered sensor system NORAD needs to develop to enable this capability must be able to detect, identify, and track all types of missiles ranging from ballistic to cruise missiles and new hypersonic glide vehicles. He also stressed that this new sensor system must detect threats at great distance to increase warning and reaction times as much as possible, both of which are central to decreasing the risk these weapons pose to Canada. Brig Gen Fesler elaborated that the proposed multi-layered sensor system must ensure that detection sensors are separate from defeat sensors. The layering of the sensors has to be seamless, closing current gaps in coverage that make NORAD so vulnerable to developing threats such as hypersonic glide vehicles. Closing these gaps requires a combination of multi-spectral sensor capabilities (a combination of radar, infra-red, radio frequency, acoustics, etc.). Lastly, he emphasised Dr. Walker's point that All Domain Awareness must occur at longer ranges to detect and engage threats as early as possible. Preferably the extent of Domain Awareness would allow for a threat to be identified and track from its ‘birth.' Design Considerations for Canadian Industry Lockheed Martin's Mike Walsh, working on next generation sensors, presented three considerations for NORAD modernization. The first was the concept of multi-mission sensors that could detect and track more than one threat. These sensors could adapt what they do and where they do it to handle a high volume of threat. Second, sensors should be software defined and open architecture for quick adaptability and upgradability. This would facilitate C2 networking without requiring a hardware update, increasing the lifespan of the renewed system and keeping down future costs. Lastly, industry should provide sensors that are modular and scalable. This means adapting sensors developed for other parts of the world for use with NORAD, making the renewed system quick to install, cheap, and easily upgradable. Chavda, who works on satellite systems development, emphasized the need to integrate the proposed multi-layered sensors into a holistic system. This requires a paradigm shift. How is the processed data displayed for action? He pointed out that there is limited development and no superclusters working on this. This means bringing in the commercial sector to tackle how information is managed, providing new opportunities for industry products and services. Ravi Ravichandran of BAE Systems, with an extensive background in technology development, asked industry to consider how technology enables a mission. The language surrounding Domain Awareness has become mission-focused, having shifted away from being about platforms and sensors. Domain Awareness cannot be considered in isolation, it has to be connected to C2 and defeat mechanisms. Data to decision-makers and their thinking needs to happen ‘at the speed of relevance,' which means understanding computing and data structures. Faster computing is required, the processing behind complex systems having struggled in the past. He agreed that sensors should be reconfigurable in real time, supported by an open architecture. He concluded that the ability to anticipate battle management demands should drive Domain Awareness. Dunn, working on countering hypersonic threats for Northrop Grumman, stressed that the architecture of the sensor system must be able to account for all threats, from ‘birth to death.' Engage on Remote to engage a threat as early as possible is of paramount importance for a successful defeat outcome since this allows a Shoot Asses Shoot shot doctrine. Dunn emphasized that new ways of engaging these threats are needed, including Artificial Intelligence (AI) weapons. Engaging threats remotely could represent another paradigm shift in thinking. He posited that ‘kill chains' could be forged on the fly rather than pre-planned, leading to the combination of “any sensor, best shooter.” Lastly, he wanted industry to consider building in systems redundancy; All Domain Awareness cannot just rely upon space assets. Punch Moulton argues that terrestrial sensors cannot provide All Domain Awareness alone; the sensor system must be based mostly in space. This will provide NORAD with the global level awareness needed to detect threats originating outside of North America ‘from birth.' Second, he suggests participants should consider that NORAD states are also a part of NATO. Tying the two organizations together should help NORAD address deficits in awareness across the North Atlantic whilst giving the command a chance to secure NATO funding for its modernization. Lastly, he stressed the necessity of integrating a holistic multi-layered sensor system with the C2 and defeat mechanisms; the best shooter is the weapon that gets the right information at the right time. The goal should be ‘best sensor, best shooter.' DATA PLANS A major theme of the webinar was the sharing of sensor data with allies and industries. Moulton largely considers the sharing of data to be a policy question – one that should be tackled from the beginning – using the example of NORAD sharing US-Canada ‘Two Eyes' data with the other twenty-eight members of NATO. He also raised this issue in relation to dual-use technology that can be shared with American and Canadian civilian departments and industries. As the technology goes forward, he cautions that the policy needs to be in place that collectively says what can and cannot be shared in an open architecture system. Dr. Charron argues that sensors should be capable of dual use by military/civilian government agencies. This generates additional value beyond defence, contributing data for use across government and possibly the commercial sector. LGen Thibeau commented that such an approach improves the economic case for NORAD modernization as this type of defence investment could be seen as developing northern infrastructure. Similarly, LGen Pelletier commented sharing this data across departments and agencies means “everyone is a contributor” to NORAD modernization. Dr. Charron recommended creating a lexicon to facilitate the sharing of data due to the number and diversity of potential beneficiaries. She also suggests there may be lessons that can be taken from NORAD assuming its maritime warning mission. Similarly, LGen Thibault offered the example of Canada's procurement of SPY-7 radars, and the role of Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) working with partners and the commercial sector in providing sensor data as a potential model. Walsh raised the significant challenges NORAD modernization poses to project teams having to work across governments and industry. He highlighted the need for more collaboration between government and industry on operational analysis (on sensors, C2, and defeat capabilities) which could improve this working relationship. It was noted, however, that more industries are declining to work with the military – a challenge that needs to be resolved. Dr. Charron recommend that the Canadian government send a ‘finishing advocate' to NORAD. Such an advocate would increase the success rate of projects by matching the ‘hoovering' practice of attracting ideas and technology to NORAD's particular problems, seeing them through to fruition. She recommended this advocate approach as part of an overarching Canadian science and technology strategy. Another major theme of the webinar was that the sensor did not matter so much as the actionable data it provided. What does matter is where the sensor is placed to provide the best coverage. Chavda stated that getting the technology into the right place was a challenge. Dunn stressed this point with respect to space-based sensors, emphasizing that they have to be put in the right orbit to be effective. He projects that some operational ability will be flying in two to three years. The expert panel agreed that most of the technology to make the types of sensors envisioned exists today. For technology that must be developed, both Dunn and Chavda argued that rapid prototyping must be able to fail early and more often for best results, especially for space-based sensors. Physical demonstrations are important. Ravichandran pointed out that digital prototyping is getting better, driving down development costs. Digital prototyping is beginning to allow for digital demonstrations – not just of components, but of systems as well. Such an approach will allow for system designs to be tested before being physically built and put into place. A common element running throughout the discussion was that NORAD should have its All Domain Awareness, C2, and defeat capabilities fully converge and be as autonomous as possible. Dunn explained that a full convergence system would see sensors push data to C2, with the sensors changing with the defeat needs for intercept, thus completing a seamless ‘kill chain.' Dr. Charron asked what would happen if NORAD did not want to shoot at a particular threat that it detects (which could leave room for a diplomatic solution). I.e. the sensors cannot only feed information that leads only to the defeat of a target. The sensors must provide information that allows for flexible responses including the exploitation, tracking or gathering of intelligence of a target, not just its defeat. The human decision-making process within this tightly knit kill chain was largely omitted from discussion but the participants concurred that it was an important subject for consideration and future discussion. Lastly, LGen Pelletier raised the issue of data integrity during his closing remarks. Could he trust that the data he was being provided by sensors was safe, secure, and reliable? Could All Domain Awareness capability be tampered with? This question is salient given the sophistication of adversaries, the core importance of information sharing, and the long supply chains of contractors and sub-contractors needed to build and maintain NORAD's All Domain Awareness capability. https://cdainstitute.ca/norad-modernization-report-one-awareness-sensors/

  • Maxar's Radiant Solutions Selected by DARPA to Develop Next-Generation Optical System for Agile Earth Observation Satellites

    November 8, 2018 | Local, Aerospace

    Maxar's Radiant Solutions Selected by DARPA to Develop Next-Generation Optical System for Agile Earth Observation Satellites

    In partnership with Maxar's SSL, team demonstrates collaborative approach to growing U.S. Government space programs pipeline HERNDON, VA, Nov. 8, 2018 /CNW/ - Radiant Solutions, a Maxar Technologies company (NYSE: MAXR) (TSX: MAXR), has been awarded a $2 million contract by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to lead a team in designing, building, and demonstrating a next-generation optical telescope system for agile small satellite constellations. Radiant Solutions is partnered on this program with SSL, Maxar's spacecraft manufacturing business, demonstrating the power of combining unique capabilities from across Maxar to meet U.S. Defense and Intelligence agency demand for small form-factor satellites and grow Maxar's US Government space program pipeline. Radiant Solutions will provide world-class geospatial mission engineering expertise, augmented by SSL's decades of experience in providing powerful and resilient spacecraft systems. Both Radiant Solutions and SSL are focused on helping national security customers see, understand and anticipate activity across our changing planet in support of global mapping and intelligence missions. The companies' combined advanced capabilities are driving revenue growth for Maxar's Space Systems Segment by contributing to a variety of defense and intelligence missions which aim to accelerate innovation in support of global GEOINT missions, next-generation spacecraft design, missile defense, and end-to-end system engineering and integration support. The satellite telescope system's lightweight design and large field-of-view is expected to enable more capable small satellites that can be manufactured more rapidly and economically. The system can easily scale to many dozens of spacecraft for persistent, resilient coverage. To reduce mass, the system's design incorporates a robust, high-performance silicon carbide material designed for the most demanding applications in space. "Radiant Solutions is proud to play a major role in the development of disruptive, next-generation technologies that will transform satellite imaging missions and enhance global mapping and intelligence at scale," said Tony Frazier, President of Radiant Solutions. "With our team's extensive experience in highly specialized geospatial systems, we're uniquely positioned to accelerate the evolution of the DoD's most critical imaging infrastructure." "SSL brings unmatched integrated spacecraft system capabilities to deliver effective and affordable end-to-end solutions that build a better world and support our nation's leadership in space," said Richard White, president of SSL Government Systems. "We're delighted to be working closely with our colleagues at Maxar Technologies to solve problems from space." https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/maxars-radiant-solutions-selected-by-darpa-to-develop-next-generation-optical-system-for-agile-earth-observation-satellites-700016421.html

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