Peraton to provide SATCOM for US Central Command

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  August 5, 2020 | International, Naval

  Stackley: Combined L3Harris Technology Will Compete to Build New Navy Distributed Battle Networks

  By: Megan Eckstein August 4, 2020 3:25 PM A year after L3 and Harris merged into a single $18-billion defense company, the corporation is finding its formerly siloed components can come together to meet some of the Navy's and joint force's most complex needs. Sean Stackley, president of the Integrated Mission Systems segment for L3Harris Technologies, told USNI News in an interview that L3 and Harris each had important pieces of the puzzle to help the Navy achieve its distributed maritime operations concept. But Stackley, who previously served as the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition from 2008 to 2017 and as the acting secretary of the Navy from January to August 2017, said the key to DMO is not just fielding new platforms and tools but rather managing how information flows throughout the network, he said. Under the Navy's DMO vision, rather than deploying concentrated strike groups to a few places around the globe, the Navy would have many dispersed ships and planes that could share data to create a combined picture of the battlespace. He described the future fight as a combination of aircraft, ships, submarines and ground vehicles – manned and unmanned – all with sensors and communications devices, feeding data into a battle management system. The challenge will be the ordnance-to-target ratio and picking out the right targets to control the fight. Before the fight starts, the U.S. needs to ensure it has control of the EM spectrum so that network of platforms can communicate, sense and target. “It's really about linking sensors, providing assured communications, having the ability to disrupt the enemy's communications in their operating picture. It's everything from electronic support to electronic attack. ... That is a tremendous challenge because you have to work across the services, work across the platforms, you have to work across industry, you have to work across systems. So there's not one contract that's going to go out for DMO; it's going to be incremental. It's going to be an incremental approach to building this capability over time, over systems. And frankly the Air Force and the Navy are taking different approaches. I think there are some best practices across the services that they'll benefit by as each of these get more mature,” he explained, saying those were his personal views and not the company's. “I'm frankly studying the way the Air Force is approaching ABMS [Advanced Battle Management System], and I see a lot of strengths to their approach. There's a lot of parallel activities to the way they're contracting ABMS that should allow, if we do it right, should allow the incremental steps that need to be taken to be done in parallel as opposed to one at a time in a series. And I'm frankly also spending time with the Navy trying to link up the Navy's approach to DMO with the Air Force's approach to ABMS, to at least study – the services should be studying each other's approaches – and best practices should emerge, because otherwise we won't get there, it will take too long.” For example, he said, the Navy is preparing to contract for a ship-based signals intelligence program called Spectral. It also has an upcoming competition for a Spear program for electro-optical/infrared targeting. Under DMO, Stackley said, those two could be approached in parallel to ensure the whole network has access to the data they produce, instead of pursuing them separately and waiting for someone down the line to integrate the systems into a larger network. “Traditional (acquisition) says you do the standalone upgrades; inside of DMO, you're constantly looking at the total framework architecture, how do these capabilities integrate” on the front end “so that on the back end you are, in fact, building a distributed maritime operational capability,” he said. Stackley said the company is positioned to adapt to the changing requirements of DMO. “We are on the ocean floor, and we operate from the depths of the sea to the depths of space. We are in every domain. We operate across the entire kill chain, from sensing, communications, tracking, targeting, right down to putting ordnance on target. We operate across the kill chain and across the entire electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. In the acoustic realm, we operate below 10 hertz, and then you move into the [radio frequency] and in the RF end of the EM spectrum we're operating above 50 gigahertz. So we dominate – I would say spectrum superiority is one of our strengths. And we do this to provide capabilities, solutions, for national security, ours and our allies.” The company's advantage is based on “two companies a couple of years ago that had a large number of stand-alone capabilities seeing a match in terms of our separate capabilities, and also seeing the power that comes through integration of these capabilities, understanding where the customer is going in terms of the future fight where that EM spectrum, that spectrum superiority, is so critical. Whether you're talking about the Navy's strategy, the Navy's vision for distributed maritime operations, or the Air Force's advanced battle management system, it is the same capability the services are looking for, which is to have the advanced sensors at the forward edge, have the information that they collect communicated back through secure data links to platforms, have that information integrated into a common picture so that we can control the spectrum, we can ensure our communications, we can disrupt [adversaries'] communications, and we can pull the information from our sensors and get it to where it's most needed so that when the time comes we can put ordnance on target rapidly and reliably,” Stackley said. The two companies had different tools in their portfolios prior to the merger that contribute to this new ability to network together tools for fighting in the EM spectrum. For example, “Harris focuses on tactical communications, electronic warfare, space payloads and supports FAA air traffic control modernization. L3's portfolio is a bit more diverse and includes electronic components, aircraft modernization, flight simulation, UAS/UUVs, airport security and C4ISR components and subsystems,” Defense News quoted Byron Callan, an analyst for Capital Alpha Partners, as writing in a note to investors ahead of the merger. In the interview, Stackley used undersea warfare as an example of where L3 and Harris have been to provide the Navy options to support DMO. On the seabed, the company leveraged each of the halves' legacy systems to create an underwater acoustic system that won a prime contract with the Navy – something neither L3 nor Harris could have done before the merger. “Within the first year, we're offering integrated solutions to the customer that prior to the merger we would never have seen and would never have found together,” Stackley said. The combined portfolio also includes experience with unmanned underwater vessels. L3Harris is competing for the Medium UUV program that will replace separate medium UUV systems for the explosive ordnance disposal and the submarine communities. Stackley said the company had an already-existing, highly modular design that allowed it to work with Navy labs to integrate and operate advanced payloads at sea while the Navy was developing its specifications for the MUUV program. The company's UUV experience, Stackley said, coupled with underwater acoustic systems and above-water communications capabilities that reside within L3Harris, means it can offer a package that allows the Navy to receive real-time or near-real-time updates from this UUV. The company also recently won a contract with the Navy to design and build at least one Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MUSV), with options for more vehicles. Stackley said L3Harris had extensive experience with USVs, including through the Overlord large USV demonstrator program run by the Pentagon's Strategic Capabilities Office. For its MUSV offering, the company is partnering with Gibbs and Cox, which also participated in the Overlord program. Through its in-water testing, L3Harris has learned about autonomy software, vehicle reliability, and command and control. Stackley said the company, outside of the MUSV program, wants to take its USV a step further and demonstrate to the Navy another option for combining several legacy L3 and Harris technologies. The company builds the signals intelligence system on the Air Force's RC-135 surveillance aircraft. That system had been stovepiped in the company's aircraft systems division before, but Stackley said L3Harris plans to use that as the basis for the upcoming Spectral competition, which will be a ship-based SIGINT tool. L3Harris will adapt that system for integration on a medium USV, he said, thereby demonstrating “a sensing capability, where you start with a reliable unmanned surface vessel that has endurance on station, more so than an aircraft; you give it a sensor package that [meets Navy and Joint Force needs]; and then you add to that the data links that L3Harris provides and the secure communications that we provide, so that now you've got a node on the network that's passing critical information to the operating force from an unmanned vessel.” He made clear that the SIGINT package on the USV is not part of the Navy's current MUSV program but that L3Harris would pitch the capability to the service. https://news.usni.org/2020/08/04/stackley-combined-l3harris-technology-will-compete-to-build-new-navy-distributed-battle-networks

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  June 14, 2018 | International, Aerospace

  La Belgique a survolé l'offre de Dassault pour le remplacement des F-16

  Olivier Gosset L'offre française de partenariat stratégique n'a jamais été étudiée dans le détail. La version complète n'a d'ailleurs pas été déposée auprès des autorités du pays. La proposition de partenariat stratégique mise sur la table par Paris pour le remplacement des F-16 n'a jusqu'ici pas été examinée en détail par la Belgique, dont les autorités ne sont même pas en possession de l'offre complète, a-t-on appris d'une source proche du dossier. La France a décidé de ne pas participer à l'appel d'offres (Request for Government Proposal ou RfGP) lancé en mars 2017 par la Belgique pour l'achat de 34 chasseurs-bombardiers de nouvelle génération. S'engageant dans une autre voie, Paris a fait parvenir le 6 septembre 2017 au cabinet du ministre belge de la Défense, Steven Vandeput, une lettre proposant un "partenariat approfondi et structurant" fondé sur l'avion de combat Rafale. Une coopération allant bien au-delà de la seule fourniture d'avions de combat, selon les responsables français. La proposition française est restée cantonnée au niveau du cabinet de la Défense. Quelques éléments de cette offre ont filtré, principalement en ce qui concerne les retombées industrielles potentielles si la Belgique achète le Rafale. Des retours économiques que la France chiffre à 20 milliards d'euros sur 20 ans. Ensuite, plus rien! Du moins jusqu'au 15 mai dernier, lorsqu'une délégation de membres du cabinet de la ministre française des Armées, Florence Parly, s'est rendue à Bruxelles – pour la première fois en huit mois – dans le but d'expliciter auprès de leurs homologues belges l'offre française. Mais la proposition n'a pas été réellement scrutée à la loupe ni examinée sous tous les angles, puisque le document complet, qui fait plus de 3.000 pages, n'a jamais été formellement déposé en Belgique. À l'exception de la Défense, aucun cabinet belge n'a été autorisé à recevoir des représentants de l'Hexagone, et encore moins à réceptionner le volumineux dossier. Que ce soit au niveau du Premier ministre ou des Affaires étrangères. Aucun contact, même informel, ne semble avoir eu lieu non plus avec le SPF Économie ou le cabinet qui le chapeaute. Bref, la proposition française – ou du moins son résumé – est restée cantonnée au niveau du cabinet de la Défense qui, de son côté il est vrai, était tenu de travailler dans le seul cadre de l'appel d'offres en l'absence de décision politique du gouvernement remettant cette procédure en cause. Rien de nouveau? Dans ces conditions, il n'est pas étonnant que ce même cabinet ait toujours jugé non pertinente l'offre française. Ou qu'il ait indiqué n'avoir "rien entendu de nouveau" lors de la visite des émissaires français il y a quelques semaines. Que les experts militaires de l'équipe Accap, chargée d'évaluer les deux offres finales considérées comme juridiquement valables, n'aient pas pris en compte la proposition française, rien de plus normal. Pour rappel, les deux candidats qui ont remis des offres en bonne et due forme sont les Etats-Unis avec le F-35 Lightning II de Lockheed Martin et l'Eurofighter Typhoon du consortium européen éponyme. Le rapport de ces experts se trouve désormais sur le bureau de leur ministre, qui doit le transmettre au kern. Par contre, que le contenu du partenariat français n'ait jamais été examiné de près à un autre niveau en l'absence de tout engagement, voilà qui a de quoi surprendre. D'abord parce qu'il contient visiblement des éléments intéressants, comme une éventuelle participation au programme de Système de combat aérien du futur (Scaf) franco-allemand, ou encore, selon nos informations, une période très courte (sur moins de trois ans) pour la livraison des 34 appareils, quel que soit le moment où le contrat serait signé. Par ailleurs, le gouvernement belge serait bien avisé de garder plusieurs fers au feu. Parce que le résultat de l'appel d'offres risque de se heurter à des obstacles géopolitiques imprévus. Il ne va pas être très aisé en effet de justifier l'éventuelle acquisition d'appareils américains alors que l'administration Trump a déclaré une guerre commerciale au Vieux continent et que Paris et Berlin tentent de relancer l'Europe de la défense. https://www.lecho.be/entreprises/defense-aeronautique/la-belgique-a-survole-l-offre-de-dassault-pour-le-remplacement-des-f-16/10021780.html

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  September 22, 2020 | International, Naval

  Is the US Navy winning the war on maintenance delays?

  David B. Larter WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy, beset by maintenance delays, is making progress on getting its ships out of the shipyards on time, fleet officials say. Over the past three years, the Navy is on track to more than double the percentage of ships getting out of maintenance on time, key to the service's efforts to make deployments more sustainable for its ships and sailors, Capt. Dave Wroe, U.S. Fleet Forces Command's deputy fleet readiness officer told Defense News in an email. “On-time ship maintenance availability completion rates in private shipyards improved from 24% in FY18 to 37% in FY19,” Wroe said. “Current performance trends in FY20 are projected to be 65%.” The improvement is a sign that the Navy may be turning the corner on a fight to restore readiness from its nadir in the early part of the last decade, when the Navy was running ragged filling unsustainable requirements for forces around the globe. Getting ships through their maintenance cycles on time is the linchpin of what the Navy calls its “optimized fleet response plan,” which is the system through which the Navy generates deployable ships that are maintained, manned and trained. Late last year and again in January, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday told audiences that repeated delays in the shipyards was undermining the Navy's Optimized Fleet Response Plan, and turning that around was vital. “We are getting 35 to 40 percent of our ships out of maintenance on time: that's unacceptable,” Gilday said at the USNI Defense Forum in December. “I can't sustain the fleet I have with that kind of track record.” A recent Government Accountability Office report found that between 2015 and 2019, only 25 percent of the Navy's maintenance periods for ships and submarines. Improvements Getting out of that hole has been difficult for a number of reasons: High operational demand for Navy forces makes planning maintenance difficult, and inevitably when the ships go into maintenance after years of hard use, workers discover more work that needs to be done, creating delays. And those delays make executing OFRP difficult, Wroe said. “OFRP provides the construct to best assess and optimize readiness production — down to a unit level — taking into account all the various competing factors to produced Navy readiness,” Wroe said. “Bottom line: OFRP helps mitigate fundamental points of friction, such as shipyard capacity and manning gaps at sea — but in itself doesn't solve key degraders like depot level maintenance delays and extensions.” But some key factors in the delays have been identified and the Navy is working to mitigate them, Fleet Forces Commander Adm. Chris Grady said this week at this week's Fleet Maintenance and Modernization Symposium. One area that has a tendency to drive delays is when workers discover things that need to be fixed, the fix may not cost much but the adjustment must go through an approval process that slows everything down. Those kinds of changes add up to about 70 percent of the so-called “growth work.” Part of it is anticipating and building in ways to deal with growth work into every maintenance period, and the other part is making it easier to address small changes to the scope of the work, Grady said. “When we began this initiative, cycle time for the small value changes averaged about 30 days,” he said “We're now at six and aim to bring it down further to only two days.” Other things that have helped the problem has been bundling maintenance periods for ships, meaning that contractors bid on multiple ships to fix, and can plan hiring further out, Grady said. Additionally, improving base access for contractors has helped, as well. “Last year, we averaged 110 days delayed per ship in private avails,” Grady said, using the short-hand term for “maintenance availability.” “Things much better this year — even with COVID-19,” he continued. “We go from about one-third avails finishing on-time to two-thirds. That is great. But, again, each delay has real impact on our readiness, and we need to keep working together to do better.” What happened? Because the U.S. Navy is set up to meet standing presence requirements and missions around the world, it must cycle its ships through a system of tiered readiness. That means ships go on deployment fully manned, trained and equipped. Then the ships come home, and after a period of sustained readiness where the ship can be redeployed, it goes into a reduced readiness status while undergoing maintenance. Following maintenance, the ship and crew goes into a training cycle for another deployment as an individual unit, then as a group, then returns to deployment. The whole cycle takes 36 months: Rinse and repeat. OFRP was designed in the 2013-2014 time-frame when the Navy was deploying well beyond its means, with carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups going out for nine-to-10 months at a time. The excess use wore hard on the ships and sailors who manned them and put more wear on the hulls than they were designed to sustain. That meant that when ships went in for maintenance they were more broken than they were supposed to be, and funding to fix them was hampered by spending cuts. For nuclear ships — submarines and aircraft carriers — the funding cuts were a double whammy of work stoppages and furloughs that contributed to a wave of retirements in the yards, meaning the public yards were understaffed and had to hire and train new workers. Work took longer, throwing a wrench into an already complicated system of generating readiness. All that added up to significant delays in getting ships through their maintenance cycles and contributed to astonishing delays in attack submarine maintenance especially. What OFRP was meant to do was create a system whereby the Navy could meet combatant commander demands but not break the system. That meant that the Navy would generate as much readiness as it possibly could but that the demand would have to be limited to what the Navy could reasonably maintain, man, train and equip. But getting to that system has been immensely difficult because of the deep hole the Navy dug meeting requirements that well outstripped funding and supply. For example, there was a two year period when the service was forced to supply two carrier strike groups to the Arabian Gulf at all times, a requirement only canceled when automatic across-the-board spending cuts in 2013 made it impossible for the Navy to fund the two-carrier requirement. Adding to the difficulty: some of OFRP's founding requirements were nigh impossible to pull off. One was that the all the ships in group would go into and come out of their maintenance availabilities on time and together. Another was that a group would go into the first phase of their training, the so-called basic phase right after coming out of maintenance, fully manned. Both have been immensely difficult to pull off. But Fleet Forces, headed then by OFRP architect Adm. Phil Davidson, was given ample warning that those assumptions would be difficult to achieve. Then-NAVSEA head Vice Adm. William Hilarides told USNI News in January 2015 that getting ships to come out of the yards simultaneously would be hard. “The challenge to me is, let's say you want four destroyers in a battle group, all to come out at the same time in one port? That's a real challenge,” Hilarides told USNI News. The current head of NAVSEA, who at the time was in charge of the Regional Maintenance Center enterprise, backed up his boss to USNI News, saying it would be particularly challenging in places with less infrastructure. “Your big rub there is, the challenge of OFRP is ... all those ships [in a carrier strike group], they go through maintenance together, they go through training together and they deploy together,” said then-Rear Adm. William Galinis. "So, what our challenge is, is to be able to take all that work from all those ships and try to schedule it for roughly about the same time, and to get all that work done on time. So that's our challenge. “Now, in a port like Norfolk or San Diego, we have big shipyards, a lot of people, a lot of ships. You can kind of absorb that type of workload. When you go to Mayport, they've got like 10 ships down there [and typically cannot work on more than one or two destroyers at a time.],” he told USNI. Galinis said that Fleet Forces would have to be responsive to the shipyards because at least that way they could plan for delays. “They know if they give us all this work at one time, it's going to go long anyway,” he told USNI. “So they'd rather be able to plan that and at least know when they're getting the ship back, as opposed to, ‘nope, we're not going to talk to you, you've got to go do it,' and then the ships go long because we don't have enough people to do the work.” Fleet Forces Command has been reviewing its assumptions this year and is preparing to release a revised OFRP instruction, but the core is likely to remain the same. In any case, Wroe said in the email, it was always going to take a long time to dig out of the hole the Navy found itself in when OFRP was implemented fully in 2015. “It was clear at the inception of OFRP, and remains clear today, that it will take the entire 2015-2025 period to recover readiness and establish stable readiness production,” Wroe said. “That makes sense when readiness production is planned over 9-years and large blocks of time have already been scheduled for depot maintenance periods.” Ultimately, if the process of OFRP is funded correctly and ships can get out of maintenance on time, it's a sound way of moving forward, Fleet Forces Commander Grady told the audience this week. “My bottom line here is that, as a process, OFRP works,” he said. “If we are looking where to improve upon it, each of these studies came to the same conclusion: the biggest inhibitor to fleet readiness is maintenance and modernization performance in the shipyards. We simply must get better, and I know you share my concern.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/09/19/is-the-us-navy-winning-the-war-on-maintenance/