Patria and Lockheed Martin have signed the first agreement within Finland´s F-35 direct industrial participation programme

On the same subject

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  September 16, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Other Defence

  Opinion: How To Break Exponential Pentagon Cost Growth

  James Chew The recently published viewpoint “Can the Pentagon Spend More Smartly?” (AW&ST Aug. 31-Sept. 13, p. 58) highlights the consequences of increased dependence on technology to maintain an edge. In fact, the core issue of the exponential growth in cost associated with the linear growth in technology capability is highlighted in Norman Augustine's 1982 book Augustine's Laws. Specifically, two of “Augustine's laws” focus on what needs to be avoided within the Defense Department acquisition community. One of the laws states: “In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy three and a half days each per week, except for leap year when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.” Additionally, the book highlights the Defense Department's growing dependence on electronic systems with this law: “After the year 2015, there will be no airplane crashes. There will be no takeoffs either, because electronics will occupy 100% of every airplane's weight.” Even if these laws seem outlandish, the book's underlying lessons still ring true today. For decades, the Pentagon was the driving force behind the development of microelectronics until, interestingly, the commercial sector ultimately ended up in the driver's seat. To share a little history, the Army-funded Micromodule project was the precursor of the integrated circuit and the Very-Large Scale Integration project created today's electronic design automation companies and resulted in the development of multichip wafer fabrication technology. The fact is, today's microelectronics technology would not exist, or would almost certainly be less sophisticated, if not for a few brave and visionary Defense Department project officers. The electronics industry is likely the most visible and significant example of a commercial market that not only transitioned from but significantly advanced technology developed by the U.S. military. Without the government investment, the device on which I am writing this article, and the one on which you are reading it, would perhaps not exist. There are lessons to be learned from both the public and private sectors, and best practices from each can certainly be applied cross-functionally to optimize outcomes. For example, the commercial electronics industry has enabled electronic systems companies to develop high-quality, sustainable and modernizable products on a “can't-miss-Christmas” schedule. Much of the industry's success is due in large part to an adherence to “first-pass success” and the computational software tools and processes that enable it. These tools and processes have been developed by companies that invest significant portions of their annual sales—some up to 40%—into research and development (that is “IR&D” to you in the Pentagon) and are a result of the intense competition within the unforgiving consumer electronics market. These tools and processes, which have institutionalized the product development practice of “emulate before you fabricate,” make up the foundation of on-schedule, on-cost product development. The best-case scenario is that the current Defense Department and defense industry electronic development process matches up with the commercial electronics development process, where they both seek to achieve “first-pass success.” Even if all things were equal, which they aren't, the commercial timeline would still be around 30% that of the defense timeline. Eliminating the need for prototype hardware and the associated tests and reworks is a major reduction in design time and cost. So, after so many years of funding research into electronic design and development, why have the Defense Department and defense industry turned away from the commercial processes that stemmed from that investment? Why aren't these processes being adopted? Congress appreciates that transitioning to commercial electronics best practices is the basis for the much-desired firm, fixed-price acquisition. The fiscal 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, reinforced by the fiscal 2021 Defense Appropriations Act, has an entire section on transitioning to commercial electronics best practices. Program offices and some individuals within the defense industrial base are seeking to better understand the commercial industry-proven way to design electronics that reduce design schedules by at least 70%, producing “first-pass success” electronic system designs that are immediately sustainable and agilely modernizable. The answer is out there—adopt commercial best practices to save time and money. With nontraditional companies entering the picture (what's the name of that space company?), the public sector should have plenty of motivation to implement tools and processes that are prevalent and successful in today's private sector. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/budget-policy-operations/opinion-how-break-exponential-pentagon-cost-growth

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  December 19, 2018 | International, Aerospace

  Start of Air Force’s light attack plane competition pushed back until next year

  By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — If the Air Force moves forward on a proposed initiative to buy light attack planes, it won't happen by the end of 2018. The service intended to put out a final request for proposals this month for a potential light attack aircraft program, but the date has now slipped into 2019, an Air Force official confirmed Tuesday. “The Air Force does not anticipate release of the final Light Attack Request for Proposal by the end of the calendar year as we complete additional analysis,” said Air Force spokeswoman Capt. Hope Cronin in an emailed response to Defense News. The service released a draft solicitation on Aug. 3, following two experimentation campaigns that brought the Sierra Nevada Corp.-Embraer A-29 Super Tucano, Textron's Scorpion jet and AT-6 attack plane, and L3's AT-802L Longsword to Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico for several rounds of test flights. The second set of flight experiments between the A-29 and AT-6 were curtailed this summer after an A-29 crashed, killing its pilot. However, the Air Force maintained that it could garner the data it needed on aircraft maintenance and network operations while testing the planes on the ground. Air Force acquisition officials have shied away from declaring whether a program of record will begin in the fiscal year 2020 budget, but the August presolicitation seems to limit the contenders to the A-29 and AT-6, stating that SNC and Textron “are the only firms that appear to possess the capability necessary to meet the requirement within the Air Force's time frame without causing an unacceptable delay in meeting the needs of the warfighter.” The goal of the light attack experiments is to prove whether the Air Force can quickly bring industry to the table to experiment with off the shelf equipment and rapidly make a decision about whether to buy it. In that light, the delay in releasing the final request for proposals is at least a slight setback, as it's unclear whether the wait for a final RFP could also push back the Air Force's proposed due date for awarding a contract — before the start of the 2020 fiscal year on Oct. 1. But it remains unclear whether the Air Force will have the money to buy it. Officials have maintained that a light attack capability is “additive," meaning that they would not be willing to sacrifice procurement dollars designated for aircraft in existing or planned programs of record so that it could buy the AT-6 or A-29. However, the Pentagon's topline budget is still uncertain. Defense Department budget officials had geared up for a $733 billion budget in FY20, only to have President Donald Trump call for a cut to $700 billion. Now, it appears that number is growing after intervention from Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and congressional hawks, and could be as high as $750 billion. Whether the light attack aircraft program fits into any of those topline budgets is currently unknown. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/12/18/start-of-air-forces-light-attack-plane-competition-pushed-back-until-next-year

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  August 5, 2019 | International, C4ISR

  Carderock Uses High-Fidelity Signature Simulation to Train Surface Combat Systems

  By Benjamin McNight III, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Public Affairs WEST BETHESDA, Md. (NNS) -- In the world of simulations, getting a system to act as close to authentic as the real-world situations it represents is always the main goal. Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Carderock Division develops high-fidelity acoustic simulation and training systems, giving naval personnel the ability to practice combat scenarios virtually. The Combined Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Trainer, better known as CIAT, made its official debut in December 2018 at Naval Base San Diego. In June, Naval Station Norfolk became the site for another CIAT installation. Motions to create this trainer began in 2014, according to Rich Loeffler, Carderock's senior scientific technical manager, director for signatures, tactical decision aids and training systems (Code 705). “CIAT is what we refer to as a Combat Systems Team Trainer,” Loeffler said. “Meaning that your goal is to bring in the whole portion of the crew that would be operating the combat system and train them in a shore site how they can best utilize the system when they are at sea.” Carderock shares CIAT responsibilities with NSWC Dahlgren Division. Dahlgren is responsible for the overall system integration and manages the IAMD aspect of the trainer, while Carderock leads the development of the acoustic and ASW capabilities. Carderock also has capabilities that contribute to the IAMD training. Using the periscope simulation that creates a real-time visual simulation of what one could see through the periscope of a submarine, Loeffler said they were able to utilize that technology for the surface ship trainer in the CIAT. “In this case, they have deck cameras if they want to be able to see when a missile launches from the forward or aft launchers. We basically provide the visuals for that,” he said. By modeling the threats and the ocean environment and then stimulating the actual tactical combat system software, the CIAT system is highly flexible in the ability to train real-world scenarios. With the many possibilities of training situations that can be created within the CIAT comes the need to use multiple sources of knowledge to create effective training situations that will benefit the fleet. “We'll work with people like the Office of Naval Intelligence to get threat intelligence data, we'll work with folks like the Naval Oceanographic Office to get the latest environmental models and databases, and then we'll work with the tactical programs themselves to get the tactical software,” Loeffler said. “Our role here at Carderock has been to leverage signature simulation capabilities we have developed over the years across submarine, surface and surveillance ASW trainers and provide the system design, development, integration and testing support to implement the CIAT requirement to support the fleet's training needs,” he said. Before the CIAT existed, the Surface ASW Synthetic Trainer (SAST) was developed by Carderock as an on-board embedded training system within the AN/SQQ-89 A(V)15 Sonar system. Loeffler said beginning in 2008, they went through a series of large analyses to compare and contrast what the simulation produced with what operators saw at sea. The data from that testing helped further develop the SAST and subsequently create the CIAT. Now, they are able to represent all components of the operations they run from the physics modeling perspective, such as what sounds are generated and how they propagate through the water, interactions with interfering objects and sea-state effects on these variables. “Since we're acoustically stimulating the actual tactical software of the sonar system, the users are operating the systems just as they would at sea,” he said. Loeffler believes that there is not anything off limits for what the CIAT can do, but adapting with new threats will require the right development within the trainer to represent the real-world situation. Although the system is relatively new, discussions on the next steps in the development of the trainer are already taking place with the help of Center for Surface Combat Systems (CSCS) defining and prioritizing fleet training requirements “CSCS is basically the primary stakeholder that owns the surface-ship training schoolhouses, and they've done their requirements review to see what additional capabilities they'd like to see in the next version of CIAT,” Loeffler said. “So, we're going through that process, assessing those requirements and looking for what would go into the next version to further improve training and also address training of the new combat system capabilities as they are being introduced into the fleet.” https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=110471