Back to news

April 17, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

Norway’s allies share their views on the country’s new defense plan

By: Stephen J. Flanagan and James Black

As countries around the world grapple with the unfolding coronavirus pandemic, the wider business of government continues. Norway's Ministry of Defence will shortly publish its next Long Term Plan, which will then be debated by parliament.

The plan outlines how the Armed Forces, in tandem with other elements of government and society, can best address the threats to Norway from hostile states, terrorists, and fragile and failing states. The plan also examines how to bolster national resilience to deal with other risks including hybrid warfare, climate change and pandemics.

A new Rand report, commissioned by the MoD to inform its strategy and policy development, offers perspectives from its closest allies on the emerging security challenges and strategic options facing Norway. We found broad alignment of Norwegian and allied assessments across Denmark, France, Germany, the U.K., the U.S. and NATO institutions, but some enduring differences in emphasis and priorities.

Other allies recognize Norway as punching above its weight and playing a critical role in the defense of the North Atlantic and High North. At the same time, our research concludes there is no time for complacency.

Norway's key allies agree that the most significant threat in the High North is not a crisis directed against Norway itself. The more plausible danger is “horizontal escalation” — a crisis elsewhere in Europe rapidly growing into a wider conflict that threatens Norwegian waters, airspace and territory.

Russia continues to demonstrate hostile intent, and its military capabilities threaten the ability of Norway and its allies to operate military forces, secure critical infrastructure and protect civilian populations. The collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019 brings an increased threat from medium-range ballistic missiles, requiring Norwegian and allied defense planners to adjust to new threats to the homeland and region. Improvements in the Russian Northern Fleet, including surface vessels and submarines armed with modern cruise missiles, also pose an increased threat to NATO operations in the Norwegian Sea, to undersea internet cables and to sea lines of communication essential to reinforcing Norway from North America or Europe in the event of any conflict.

There is also strong consensus on the enduring threats posed by terrorism, nonstate actors and challenges such as climate change in the Arctic.

While all allies recognize the need to consider the strategic implications of a rising China, the United States sees China as a more direct and imminent security threat. Allies also welcome Norway's contributions to missions on NATO's eastern and southern flanks.

Allies perceive Norway as having an impressive mix of high-end capabilities for a country of its size and a mature total defense concept — its strategy for engaging all elements of society in national defense. These capabilities and commitments, coupled with a well-respected approach to strategy development, have allowed Norway to have significant influence on strategic thinking within NATO.

Nevertheless, significant security challenges remain, and to address them our report suggests a number of options for Norwegian leaders to consider:

  • Strengthen deterrence in Norway: Expand surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; increase the military posture in northern Norway; enhance the protection of bases and forces against air and missile threats; maximize the F-35 fighter jet's potential to aid joint operations; and prepare for operations in contested cyber, space and electromagnetic environments.
  • Expand capacity to receive allied reinforcements: Build on lessons from the joint Trident Juncture 2018 exercise, which allies viewed as an important milestone but not a full stress test; pursue increasingly challenging training scenarios; ensure sufficient pre-positioned stocks of consumables and equipment; upgrade and expand infrastructure along with concepts for dispersing forces to prevent attack; and deepen cooperation to enhance military mobility and interoperability.
  • Explore concepts to hold potential adversaries at risk: Invite allies with more advanced reconnaissance and deep-attack systems to deploy them to Norway periodically; develop longer-range weapons for Norwegian forces; explore the utility of low-cost, unmanned assets; collaborate with key allies on concepts to deny adversaries access to the sea and to better project forces onto the littoral; and refine parallel strategic communications to control escalation.
  • Enhance national and societal resilience: Test and refine Norway's whole-of-government approach and the mechanisms for civil support to the military; contribute to NATO's strategy for addressing hybrid threats, such as disinformation, economic pressure and cyberattacks; and explore further measures to enhance collective preparedness and will to fight.
  • Solidify Norwegian contributions to NATO and partners: Continue contributions to NATO operations beyond the north; help to address variations in defense expenditure across all NATO nations and rebalance trans-Atlantic burden-sharing; promote deeper NATO cooperation with Sweden and Finland; and use innovation and industry to enable influence within NATO.

Other countries can learn from how Norway chooses to tackle these emerging challenges, and they can benefit from its lessons learned, particularly with respect to the total defense concept. Pursuit of some of these options, along with the Norwegian government's ongoing efforts to seek allied views, could help enhance deterrence in the north and overall NATO defense.

Stephen J. Flanagan is a senior political scientist at the think tank Rand. James Black is a senior analyst in the defense, security and infrastructure program at Rand Europe.

https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/16/allies-share-views-on-enhancing-defense-of-norway-and-the-high-north/

On the same subject

  • Design Gets Underway on DARPA’s ‘LongShot’ Drone

    February 9, 2021 | International, Aerospace

    Design Gets Underway on DARPA’s ‘LongShot’ Drone

    Feb. 8, 2021 | By Rachel S. Cohen Development of a new breed of unmanned aircraft is now underway, as three major defense companies earned contracts to start designing a future system known as “LongShot.” The LongShot program wants to create an unmanned weapons porter that can be shot from another plane before firing multiple air-to-air missiles itself, according to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which runs the effort. DARPA announced Feb. 8 it has funded General Atomics, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman to start design work in the project's first phase, but did not disclose how much money is part of those contracts. “The objective is to develop a novel [unmanned air vehicle] that can significantly extend engagement ranges, increase mission effectiveness, and reduce the risk to manned aircraft,” DARPA said in a release. “It is envisioned that LongShot will increase the survivability of manned platforms by allowing them to be at standoff ranges far away from enemy threats, while an air-launched LongShot UAV efficiently closes the gap to take more effective missile shots.” The project first appeared in DARPA's fiscal 2021 budget request as a prospective addition to the Air Force and Navy's inventories. The budget called for a plane that uses “multi-mode propulsion” to tackle multiple airborne threats at once, Air Force Magazine previously reported. The program called for $22 million in its first year. “LongShot will explore new engagement concepts for multi-modal, multi-kill systems that can engage more than one target,” DARPA wrote. “LongShot can be deployed either externally from existing fighters or internally from existing bombers.” Last year, the research agency suggested the aircraft could fly slowly toward its target at first to save fuel, then speed up once it gets close. “This approach provides several key benefits,” DARPA said. “First, the weapon system will have a much-increased range over their legacy counterparts for transit to an engagement zone. Second, launching air-to-air missiles closer to the adversary increases energy in terminal flight, reduces reaction time, and increases probability of kill.” The Pentagon hasn't said what weapons LongShot would carry, or how autonomous its software might be. On paper, LongShot appears similar to other efforts like the Air Force's previous Gray Wolf missile program, which looked to create a munition that could carry other weapons inside. That was discontinued in favor of the service's Golden Horde swarming bomb project. Later in the LongShot program, DARPA said, the companies will fly a full-scale prototype that is “capable of controlled flight before, during, and after” it is fired. The agency did not immediately answer how long the initial design phase will last. The fiscal 2021 budget also called for a new program entitled “Gunslinger,” a new air-launched missile armed with a gun that would be designed for Air Force and Navy missions. But that appears to have a murkier future than the LongShot. “The Gunslinger program has yet to formally launch and, at this time, we have no information on when that may happen,” DARPA spokesman Jared Adams said in December. https://www.airforcemag.com/design-gets-underway-on-darpas-longshot-drone/

  • Augmented reality: Seeing the benefits is believing

    July 20, 2020 | International, C4ISR

    Augmented reality: Seeing the benefits is believing

    Lt. Col. Brett Lindberg and Jan Kallberg There is always something taken away when there are added functionalities. Does the concept of wearing augmented reality that digitally provides situational awareness create an upside that outweighs what it takes away for rifleman skills? The supercharged hearing, six senses for those equipped, broader view of sight, picking up smells, changes in lights and shadows, slightest change in the near environment: With all these close-action skills, will augmented reality create more distraction than enhancement? Is it too early to push digital situational awareness all the way down to the soldier in maneuver units? Is the upside present? Naturally, all new defense technology takes time to find its place in the fight. The helicopter was invented in the 1930s, and it found a limited military role in the Korean War, not meeting the military expectation of higher impact. But 15 years later, it played a pivotal role in the war in Vietnam. New technology is not only technology — the human component to properly implement it is likely slower than the technological advancements. It is always easier to question than explain, and we understand that many thoughts and thousands of work hours have gone into designing the early augmented reality systems. However, still we find our questions worth discussing because once fielded, utilized and put into action in a conflict, it is too late to raise any concerns. This is the time to discuss. How reliable are the sensors? Can the sensors be easily spoofed? Is it too early to push it all the way down to the individual soldier? A technologically advanced adversary will likely devote research already in peacetime to develop one-time use, tossable, simple, low-cost devices that can — in close combat — create spurious sensor data and derail augmented reality. If the integrity of the sensor data is in question, it will likely force commanders to refrain from using augmented reality. A similar, relevant issue is the extent of the augmented reality technology's electromagnetic signature. Will the interconnectivity of the squad's augmented reality compromise the unit and deliver information to the enemy? What we do not want to face is a situation where adversaries can pinpoint the location or proximity to U.S. forces by simple detection measures. So, worst-case scenario, inexpensive devices can nullify a significant U.S. investment in technology, training and tactics. Added to the loss of usable augmented reality equipment, the soldiers could be “HUD-crippled.” Navy aviators use the term “HUD-cripple” to visualize a complete dependency of heads-up displays in the cockpit. The “HUD-cripple” is the loss of traditional Navy aviator skills such as landing on an aircraft carrier without the heads-up display. Will soldiers have retained the skills to fight effectively without augmented reality if it goes down? Technical advancements bring us new options and abilities, and they increase mission success. But as with all uncharted territory, they also bring surprises and unanticipated outfalls. During the war in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, military aviation instruments took a significant leap forward, going from World War II-styled gauges in fixed-winged Douglas A-1 Skyraider planes to an earlier version of today's instrumentation in McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle fighter jets rolled out as the war in Vietnam came to an end. Parallel with the military advancements, these avionic upgrades were transposed into civilian cockpits with increased complexity and variations, as jetliners are multi-engine airframes, where the number of information points and alarms became numerous in the jetliner cockpit. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, civilian aviation faced several accidents that were hard to explain with standard aviation physics and crash evidence. Instead, the conversations recorded in the black boxes revealed these fatal air crashes. Several of the deadly crashes could have had another outcome if the pilots had not become overwhelmed by all the blinking lights, alarms, buzzers and avionics grabbing their attention, so the pilots lost situational awareness and focus. The warnings, avionics and buzzers had the correct information, but the presentation was a tsunami of red blinkers and alarming sounds, lacking any hints on how to prioritize what needs to be done to recover from a dangerous in-flight emergency. In our view, the key to effective augmented reality is to structure and segment what matters and when. Units — and it varies from soldier to soldier — have different experience levels, so information has a variation in value down to the soldier level. In research design, you seek to explain as much as you can with as little as you can without losing rigor. The same challenge goes for augmented reality, where rigor could be said to be the integrity of the information. Transferred to the ground-fighting world, are we, as an engineering-driven nation, so technology-happy that instead of creating tools for increased survivability and mission success, we initially increase the risks for the war fighter and only correct these after we suffered a surprise in combat? We understand that implementing augmented reality is a long process that is just now at the stage of proving the concept; with setbacks and successes, where are we on the learning curve? In our view, synthetic learning environments have already matured and provide an ample opportunity to use the augmented reality technology with a high return on investment. The opportunities reside in knowledge transfer, sharing experiences, preparing for an ever-changing operational environment, and by doing so, increasing soldiers' survivability and ensuring mission success. The question is: Are we ready to rely on augmented reality in combat? Lt. Col. Brett Lindberg is a research scientist at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and a simulation operations officer. Jan Kallberg is a research scientist at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, and an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, the U.S. Military Academy or the U.S. Defense Department. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/07/17/augmented-reality-seeing-the-benefits-is-believing/

  • Safran in talks with MBDA over Roxel's stake, La Tribune reports

    September 11, 2024 | International, Aerospace

    Safran in talks with MBDA over Roxel's stake, La Tribune reports

All news