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  September 20, 2018 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR

  The new critical capabilities for unmanned systems

  By: Ryan Hazlett With unmanned systems becoming ever more ubiquitous on the battlefield, the question of where unmanned systems and accompanying technologies, such as autonomy, are headed is in the limelight. First, to better understand the future direction of the unmanned field, it is instructive to note some important trends. The number of uses for unmanned systems on the battlefield has increased significantly in the post-9/11 conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the U.S. Army's Shadow® Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) program having logged nearly 1 million flight hours in those areas of operation. The proliferation and commoditization of UAS capabilities is a global phenomenon, as demonstrated by both the widespread possession of UAS hardware as well as the ability to indigenously produce at least rudimentary unmanned systems. Growth of the nascent commercial unmanned systems market has added to this trend, as has the government's emphasis on a greater use of commercial off-the-shelf solutions. But while commoditization has occurred at the platform level — particularly among smaller airborne vehicles — overcoming the challenges of adversaries employing anti-access area-denial (A2AD) military strategies requires far more capable solutions than simply having hordes of cheap drones. In this environment, how will U.S. and allied forces retain their advantage? Critical capabilities and technologies are necessary. These include the ability to dynamically swarm, conduct automatic target recognition, possess on-board autonomy and artificial intelligence, as well as have interoperable communications capabilities. First, future platforms — manned or unmanned — will increasingly need better collaboration between the sensors and payloads they carry and with allied forces. This growing level of collaboration and autonomy is already happening. Driven by advances in onboard computing power, as well as smaller and less power-intensive sensors and advanced algorithms, tomorrow's unmanned systems will be able to better communicate among themselves and make their own decisions on basic functions, such as navigation, to enable dynamic swarming or to identify areas of interest during intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Next, systems that can seamlessly operate and communicate with other military platforms across domains will be the most successful. Gone are the days when largely mission-specific platforms dominated the force composition. With platforms needing to be highly capable to meet A2AD threats, a mission-specific approach will simply be unaffordable. Instead, increasingly we see platforms that can act as highly capable but also flexible “trucks” that can easily swap payloads designed for specific missions, while the overall platform serves many needs. Multi-domain abilities for conducting command and control (C2) and other tasks will also be vital as technologies move from remote-control type operations to more of a “man monitoring the loop” concept. Technological progress in providing secure communications and a level of onboard artificial intelligence are necessary enablers, as will be data fusion technologies. Initial versions of these multi-domain C2 solutions for unmanned systems are already here. For example, the U.S. Army has years of experience operating the Universal Ground Control Station and One System Remote Video Terminal that allow soldiers in tactical units to access overhead sensor video from unmanned aircraft. Next-generation, multi-domain control and collaboration technologies to take the concept to a new level are mature, allowing a single user to simultaneously operate multiple vehicles and sensors, including the ability to control numerous types of aircraft and other multi-domain unmanned systems from different manufacturers. In addition, these systems are ready to incorporate the best available software applications as “plug-ins” to an open architecture. Industry is also investing in additional technology to ensure that tomorrow's unmanned systems continue to meet U.S. and allied needs. Among them are advanced power generation, systems with improved maneuverability, and vehicles designed to deploy with lighter support and operational footprints. Done smartly, the application of technologies such as autonomy can be better integrated into unmanned systems to enable improved navigation, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as other tasks, while leaving a man in the loop for the use of weapons. Moreover, defense users can rightly leverage the commercial sector's work on areas such as self-driving cars and unmanned taxis that are at the forefront of artificial intelligence for navigation. But while the military can leverage such commercial developments, there are, and will remain, cyber hardening, survivability and other specific requirements that are unique to the defense marketplace and require experienced industrial partners with deep knowledge of national security needs. The ongoing move away from only long-term programs of record to the embrace of the “buy, try, and decide” model, as well as greater uses of funded prototyping, is helping to fast-track many of these promising new technologies. Companies can now match their internal research and development funding to move that innovation along and ensure the United States and its allies remain at the forefront of unmanned technologies. Ryan Hazlett is senior vice president at Textron Systems. https://www.c4isrnet.com/thought-leadership/2018/09/19/the-new-critical-capabilities-for-unmanned-systems

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  April 2, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Opinion: Six Ways COVID-19 Could Change Defense Sector

  Byron Callan The coronavirus pandemic is going to be as consequential for defense and security as were the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the U.S. For the defense sector, there are multiple implications to ponder and possibly to begin to position for as these play out in 2021 and beyond. Large contractors should fare relatively well in 2020, compared to other sectors. They will not see the demand destruction that is ripping through commercial aerospace and therefore are unlikely to experience financial duress. That alone may enable them to act strategically and aggressively in 2020 and beyond, although there are risks to weigh as well. Here are six changes to ponder: First, a crisis the size of the COVID-19 pandemic is bound to spawn new government investment and organization to address future outbreaks. The Sept. 11, 2001, attacks led to the formation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and creation of the position of director of national intelligence. It's fair to assume there will be changes in the wake of the current pandemic. Some contractors already have federal services segments that address U.S. health care. Core skills they can bring are dealing with bureaucracies, technology and regulations. There should be new opportunities in 2021 and beyond from whatever changes are made to improve the national resilience and response to future pandemics. Second, small and medium-size businesses are being stressed. The CARES Act in the U.S. may help somewhat, and changes in Defense Department progress payment rates could be another short-term relief. Large contractors might choose to vertically integrate to improve their fortitude against future shocks. Or there could be further consolidation, particularly of distressed suppliers. A reintegration of defense and commercial aerospace is a third change that might emerge. The Raytheon-United Technologies merger may be a harbinger of this shift. The ramifications of the coronavirus crisis on the air transport and commercial aerospace sectors could lead to structural changes and a need for capital, particularly in commercial aerospace. If valuations remain depressed in 2020-21 in commercial aerospace, there could be more opportunity for defense contractors to reintegrate. A fourth change could be to expectations for contractors. The model for U.S. defense since 1945 has largely been that the Pentagon pays for the bulk of research and development, and contractors can reclaim most of their own research and development as an allowable cost for which they are reimbursed. Operating margins have generally risen, compared to levels evidenced in the 1980s and before, and large contractors have in the last 15-20 years allocated most free cash flow to shareholders. It is conceivable that this model will change in the 2020s. Operating margins may appear to be ho-hum compared to other sectors, but returns on invested capital are attractive. If there is a greater squeeze on the Pentagon budget and demand for security remains steady or increases, this could compel the Pentagon to change expectations for contractor behavior. Could they be expected to take on more contract risk? Will they need to step up their own independent research and development funding or find more creative ways to access and apply technology to national security needs? On the flip side, could there be more emphasis on dual-use technology investment, as occurred in the 1990s, where research and development for defense should have commercial/civil benefits as well? A fifth potential change is in security threats and national defense strategies. Some governments and regimes might come through this crisis with their positions enhanced, having overseen relatively mild disruptions and having been able to achieve quick economic bounce-backs. Others, however, will have failed this test, and they could see new political challengers (in democracies) or be overthrown or consumed by internal unrest from competing forces or mass movements that are emboldened by recent failures. The Middle East remains a likely place for these sorts of changes; Venezuela is another. The civil war in Syria and the fighting in Libya are current examples of how state collapse and regime challenge can drag in outside interests. The U.S. National Defense Strategy that reoriented the Pentagon and contractors toward “great power” competition could be pulled in different directions depending on where fragilities emerge. Some allies may be significantly weakened, and that could bear on U.S. defense planning and export sales. It is not just the coronavirus that matters in this regard; the crash in oil prices is also a factor to weigh. Finally, the coronavirus has turbocharged federal deficits and is sending federal debt to record levels. It may take weeks or months to assess just how much is going to be added, but there will be a fourth and possibly a fifth stimulus package in the U.S. Ultralow interest rates and the urgency of limiting social and economic damage and keeping the health care system functioning make this tolerable. But higher debt raises the risk in the 2020s that if rates increase, interest outlays could weigh on defense. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/opinion-six-ways-covid-19-could-change-defense-sector

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  May 25, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Securing technological superiority requires a joint US-Israel effort

  By: Bradley Bowman   The United States is now engaged in an intense military technology competition with the Chinese Communist Party. The ability of U.S. troops to deter and defeat great power authoritarian adversaries hangs in the balance. To win this competition, Washington must beef up its military cooperative research and development efforts with tech-savvy democratic allies. At the top of that list should be Israel. Two members of the Senate Armed Services Committee understand this well. Sens. Gary Peters, D-Mich., and Tom Cotton, R-Ark., introduced S 3775, the “United States-Israel Military Capability Act of 2020,” on Wednesday. This bipartisan legislation would require the establishment of a U.S.-Israel operations-technology working group. As the senators wrote in a February letter to Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, the working group would help ensure U.S. “warfighters never encounter a more technologically advanced foe.” Many Americans may be surprised to learn that they can no longer take U.S. military technological superiority for granted. In his new book, “The Kill Chain,” former Senate Armed Services Committee staff director Chris Brose notes that, over the last decade, the United States loses war games against China “almost every single time.” To halt this trend, the Pentagon must shift its ongoing modernization efforts into high gear. Early cooperative R&D with the “Startup Nation” can help in this regard. Israel is one of America's closest and most technologically advanced allies. The country boasts an “innovative and agile defense technology sector” that is a “global leader in many of the technologies important to Department of Defense modernization efforts,” as the legislation notes. Some may deem the working group unnecessary, citing the deep and broad cooperation that already exists between the United States and Israel. But, as the legislation explains, “dangerous United States military capability gaps continue to emerge that a more systematic and institutionalized United States-Israel early cooperative research and development program could have prevented.” Consider the fact, for example, that the Pentagon only last year acquired for U.S. tanks active protection systems from Israel that had been operational there since 2011. Consequently, U.S. soldiers operated for years in tanks and armored vehicles around the world lacking the cutting-edge protection Washington could have provided against missiles and rockets. That put U.S. soldiers in unnecessary risk. Such examples put the burden of proof on those who may be tempted to reflexively defend the status quo as good enough. Given the breakneck speed of our military technology race with the Chinese Communist Party, it's clear the continued emergence of decade-long delays in adopting crucial technology is no longer something we can afford. One of the reasons for these delays and failures to team up with Israeli partners at the beginning of the process is that U.S. and Israeli defense suppliers sometimes find it difficult to secure Washington's approval for combined efforts to research and produce world-class weapons. Some requests to initiate combined U.S.-Israel R&D programs linger interminably in bureaucratic no-man's land, failing to elicit a timely decision. Confronted by deadly and immediate threats, Israel often has little choice but to push ahead alone with unilateral R&D programs. When that happens, the Pentagon misses out on Israel's sense of urgency that could have led to the more expeditious fielding of weapons to U.S. troops. And Israel misses out on American innovation prowess as well as on the Pentagon's economy of scale, which would lower unit costs and help both countries stretch their finite defense budgets further. Secretary Esper appears to grasp the opportunity. “If there are ways to improve that, we should pursue it,” he testified on March 4, 2020, in response to a question on the U.S.-Israel working group proposal. “The more we can cooperate together as allies and partners to come up with common solutions, the better,” Esper said. According to the legislation, the working group would serve as a standing forum for the United States and Israel to “systematically share intelligence-informed military capability requirements,” with a goal of identifying capabilities that both militaries need. It would also provide a dedicated mechanism for U.S. and Israeli defense suppliers to “expeditiously gain government approval to conduct joint science, technology, research, development, test, evaluation, and production efforts.” The legislation's congressional reporting requirement would hold the working group accountable for providing quick answers to U.S. and Israeli defense supplier requests. That's a benefit of the working group that will only become more important when the economic consequences of the coronavirus put additional, downward pressure on both defense budgets. Once opportunities for early cooperative U.S.-Israel R&D are identified and approved, the working group would then facilitate the development of “combined United States-Israel plans to research, develop, procure, and field weapons systems and military capabilities as quickly and economically as possible.” In the military technology race with the Chinese Communist Party, the stakes are high and the outcome is far from certain. A U.S.-Israel operations technology working group represents an essential step to ensure the United States and its democratic allies are better equipped than their adversaries. Bradley Bowman is the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/22/securing-technological-superiority-requires-a-joint-us-israel-effort/