June 20, 2019 | International, Naval
By: Ben Werner
WASHINGTON, D.C. — The Navy's next large surface combatant will probably look more like the futuristic Zumwalt class of guided-missile destroyers than fleet's current workhorse class of Arleigh Burke destroyers, the program executive officer said.
Navy and industry designers are talking about increased payloads, increased computing and increased design flexibility when considering the possible capabilities of the fleet's next large surface combatant, Rear Adm. William Galinis, the Navy's program executive officer for ships, said during the American Society of Naval Engineering's annual Technology, Systems & Ship symposium on Tuesday. Designers also have to consider that the Navy now plans to operate in an increasingly contested environment, which means taking into account how adversaries will see the new ship class on radars.
“The signature aspect of it, what does that do to the shaping of deckhouse hull form. I will tell you, not to predispose anything, but I think in the end, you know, it's probably going to look a lot more like a DDG-1000 than a DDG-51 if I had to say so,” Galinis said. “But there's still a lot of work to kind of go do in that area.”
Galinis was speaking during the opening keynote address at the 2019 TSS conference. Rear Adm. Lorin Selby, the Navy's chief engineer and deputy commander for ship design at Naval Sea Systems Command, joined Galinis during the keynote.
The Navy had planned to buy the first of its new class of large surface combatant in 2023, but Galinis said the Navy has since pushed back the start date. USNI News first reported the Navy now is looking at awarding a contract in Fiscal Year 2025. The current Arleigh Burke-class multi-year contract expires in 2022.
By pushing back the production timeline, Galinis said the Navy can refine its requirements now and incorporate feedback from industry and current programs to help improve the ship design and control costs.
As an example, Galinis said the Navy continues learning from the DDG-1000 program. The Navy is applying a lot of acquisition and production lessons learned from the Zumwalt class experience to the Columbia-class submarine program, Galinis said.
“When you start thinking about large surface combatant, that's going to be a key element of that acquisition strategy,” Galinis said.
At the same time, the current emphasis on developing new ships is increasing the demand for ship design expertise, Selby said. He wants to establish a constant design workflow so the Navy doesn't lose talent during the years between ship major designs.
“There's a lot of design work across the enterprise,” Selby said. “We really have to work hard to build that talent base back up.”
When introducing Galinis and Selby, retired Navy Capt. Richard White, the TSS 2019 committee chair, said Secretary of the Navy Richard V. Spencer had requested that conference attendees not ask questions about aircraft carriers.
During his keynote address highlighting recent advances naval ship design, Galinis merely said, “the one new design over the last couple of years is obviously the Ford-class carrier, but we're not going to talk a lot about that over the next couple of days.”
During the second day of TSS 2019, White provided clarification to his previous comments regarding the discussion of aircraft carriers. When planning this year's conference, the decision was made to focus on surface ships. There was no direction from the Navy regarding asking about aircraft carriers.
“I did not receive any direction from the Secretary of the Navy,” White said.
https://news.usni.org/2019/06/19/navy-next-large-surface-combatant-will-look-a-lot-like-zumwalt
November 5, 2023 | International, Aerospace
Soldiers in the war-ravaged region dug in near the front line described how Russian artillery intensified significantly in recent weeks, but said it remains below peaks seen a year ago as both sides struggle to advance.
December 20, 2018 | International, C4ISR
Executive Summary The fifth generation of mobile network technologies, known as “5G,” promises greater speed, security, and capacity. 5G will underpin the internet economy and provide the backbone for the next generation of digital technologies. So, it is unsurprising that there is intense competition among companies and countries for 5G leadership. 5G will determine the direction the internet will take and where nations will face new risks and vulnerabilities. Who makes 5G technologies will affect security and innovation in an increasingly competitive technological environment. Decisions made today about 5G will affect national security and economic performance for decades to come. This is a competition among companies and groups of companies but also a competition between market-based and state-directed decisionmaking. The United States has relied on the former, China on the latter, and Europe falls somewhere in between. American technology remains essential for 5G mobile telecommunications. American companies have been strong performers in developing 5G technologies, but the United States and its allies face a fundamental challenge from China. The focus of competition is over 5G's intellectual property, standards, and patents. Huawei, for example, has research programs to develop alternatives to American suppliers, and U.S. trade restrictions have accelerated China's efforts to develop its own 5G industry. While American companies lead in making essential 5G technologies, there are no longer any U.S. manufacturers of core telecommunications network equipment. Four companies dominate the market for the core network technologies needed for 5G networks. None of these companies are American. 1The choices are between European security partners (Ericsson and Nokia) and China (Huawei and ZTE). Telecom is a strategic industry and having two companies with close ties to a hostile power creates risk for the United States and its allies. A secure supply chain for 5G closes off dangerous areas of risk for national security in terms of espionage and the potential disruption to critical infrastructures. China's aggressive global campaign of cyber espionage makes it certain that it will exploit the opportunities it gains as a 5G supplier. One way to envision this is to imagine that the person who built your house decides to burgle it. They know the layout, the power system, the access points, may have kept a key, and perhaps even built in a way to gain surreptitious entry. Major telecom “backbone” equipment connects to the manufacturer over a dedicated channel, reporting back on equipment status and receiving updates and software patches as needed, usually without the operator's knowledge. Equipment could be sold and installed in perfectly secure condition, and a month later, the manufacture could send a software update to create vulnerabilities or disrupt service. The operator and its customers would have no knowledge of this change. The United States can manage 5G risk using two sets of policies. The first is to ensure that American companies can continue to innovate and produce advanced technologies and face fair competition overseas. American and “like-minded” companies routinely outspend their Chinese competitors in 5G R&D and hold 10 times as many 5G patents. Chinese companies still depend on the western companies for the most advanced 5G components. The second is to work with like-minded nations to develop a common approach to 5G security. The United States cannot meet the 5G challenge on its own. When the United States successfully challenged Chinese industrial policy in the past, it has been done in concert with allies. Another task will be to find ways to encourage undecided countries to spend on 5G security. Huawei's telecom networks cost between 20 to 30 percent less than competing products. Huawei also offers foreign customers generous terms for leasing or loans. It can do this because of its access to government funds. Beijing supports Huawei for both strategic and commercial reasons. Many countries will be tempted by the steep discount. Not buying Huawei means paying a “premium” for security to which economic ministries are likely to object. The United States will need to encourage others to pay this security premium while at the same time preparing for a world where the United States unavoidably connects to Huawei-supplied networks and determine how to securely connect and communicate over telecom networks in countries using Chinese network equipment. The United States does not need to copy China's government-centric model for 5G, but it does need to invest in research and adopt a comprehensive approach to combatting non-tariff barriers to trade. 5G leadership requires a broader technology competition policy in the United States that builds the engineering and tech workforce and supports both private and public R&D. The United States also needs to ensure that U.S. companies do not face obstacles from antitrust or patent infringement investigations undertaken by other countries to obtain competitive advantage. In the twentieth century, steel, coal, automobiles, aircraft, ships, and the ability to produce things in mass quantity were the sources of national power. The foundations of security and power are different today. The ability to create and use new technologies is the source of economic strength and military security. Technology, and the capacity to create new technologies, are the basis of information age power. 5G as the cornerstone of a new digital environment is the focal point for the new competition, where the United States is well-positioned to lead but neither success nor security are guaranteed without action. This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-5g-will-shape-innovation-and-security
February 3, 2022 | International, Aerospace, Land
TRANSCOM hopes a rocket cargo program could one day fly a C-17's worth of cargo to any spot in the world in an hour.