NATO concludes contracts for another $1.2 billion in artillery ammunition

On the same subject

• 

  August 4, 2023 | International, Naval

  US nuclear submarine visits Western Australia as allies increase defence preparedness

  A U.S. Navy nuclear submarine arrived in Western Australia on Friday as allies Canberra and Washington deepen defence ties and prepare to transfer nuclear submarine capability to Australia.

• 

  February 2, 2021 | International, Aerospace

  Opinion: The Innovation That Will Ensure U.S. Security In Space

  Charles Beames During the Cold War, it was not the U.S.' superior weapons or soldiers that ultimately led to the Soviet Union's capitulation. Historians record that the relative economic might of the U.S. ultimately brought the Cold War to a peaceful and conclusive end. Three decades later, the U.S. again finds itself at the dawn of what many have dubbed the “Second Space Race,” for which the U.S. ought to remain mindful of this lesson, lest it be used against us. The West is once again threatened by a hegemonic national security rival. This time, America's archnemesis is characterized by planning for a long contest that will feature fast-forward economics, global diplomacy, military muscle and information manipulation: China, it appears, is preparing to use its economic power to win. While maintaining its deep belief in Marx's communist vision, the Chinese one-party government has fashioned a national economy that learned from the Soviet Union's mistakes. Through friendly engagement with Western economies, China strengthens its own economy and weakens the West's, nudging the world toward the worldview of the Chinese Communist Party. What then, are the best avenues for the U.S. to win this new near-peer space competition? They are the same ones that delivered victory in the last century: free markets, real economic growth and the productivity that often follows. This time, however, we must keep in mind that our rival is a keen student that has learned from our earlier successes—and Soviet failures. The American response must not repeat the Cold War strategy of outspending our rival in government programs. Instead, the U.S. long game must put the commercial industry first: deliberately buy goods and services from our commercial domestic market, only providing government solutions when the commercial market cannot meet requirements. Unlike other military services, there are no real “weapons” in space. Much of what the government is developing for civil and national security space needs also exists as products or services in the commercial market. By encouraging the commercial industry to grow and not competing against it, the U.S. will secure a long-term strategy leading to unrivaled space leadership. The U.S. economy has generated growth and prosperity unmatched in human history, with billions of dollars being invested every year into profitable commercial space companies. To outpace China militarily and economically, the new administration must double down on space privatization projects like NASA's Commercial Crew and Commercial Resupply Programs started under the Obama administration. The Trump administration correctly reprioritized the importance of space for national security, but it directed too much government spending to legacy space projects and fell short in encouraging the next generation of commercial space companies. An American “commercial first” policy for space technologies can solve government needs at the federal and state levels, which account for about half of commercial space company revenue. By prioritizing the highly competitive commercial sector, the government will bolster U.S. competitiveness without illegally subsidizing it. More important, it would reinforce the American values of free markets and open competition. As the new administration settles in, national security political insiders are already hedging their bets on who and what will be the winners and losers of the new political cycle. This is especially true for the space sector, not only because it was an area of significant emphasis during the last administration but also because there continues to be significant private investment and anticipated growth in the area. The unrelenting march of the knowledge economy and remarkable utility of the commercial space industry is limited only to our imaginations. The new U.S. Space Force and other civil space agencies will be better positioned if they leverage the burgeoning industry and do not overshadow it with government alternatives. If, however, the government decides to compete against the private sector with its top-down directed design methods and protocols, our commercial industry will be lost to China, much like the drone market was just a decade ago. Economic dominance in the space industry, not space weapons, will ultimately decide which side defines the 21st-century space domain and the national security implications that come with it. America must strategically rethink policies that will take advantage of, rather than compete against, its blossoming commercial space industry. Getting space policy right—commercial industry first and using government solutions only when necessary—will lead to explosive growth. Getting policy wrong? Well, just ask the Soviets. Charles Beams is executive chairman and chief strategy officer of Colorado-based York Space Systems and chairman of the SmallSat Alliance. https://aviationweek.com/aerospace/commercial-space/opinion-innovation-will-ensure-us-security-space

• 

  July 6, 2018 | International, Aerospace

  Study finds these gaps in Army’s small unit counter-drone capabilities

  Army units at and below the battalion level are unprepared to defeat aerial drones and current plans can't keep up with rapidly evolving technology, according to a recent study. Back in 2016, the Army Research Office asked an outside organization, The National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, to evaluate their counter drone capabilities for battalion and below operations. The report they published earlier this year notes some significant gaps and threats to soldiers with this technology. “Contrary to the past, when U.S. warfighters may have found (improvised explosive devices), now the IEDs will find our warfighters,” according to the report. While the Army and Marine Corps, which also included representatives in the study, are throwing resources at the small drone problem, they are not keeping pace with the threat. “Army time frames are significantly out of sync with the rapidly advancing performance capabilities of individual (small Unmanned Aerial Systems) and teams of sUASs,” according to the report. The report noted that most of the service's counter drone asset work was focused on heavy vehicle platforms or on fixed sites, which leaves smaller units most likely to first encounter the threat more exposed. “Significant quantities of man-portable” counter-drone systems have been fielded, Army spokesman Maj. Chris Ophardt told Army Times in an email. The Army will continue to pursue those capabilities based on emerging threats. Based on his response, which did not include details of capabilities, the Army is pursuing other ways to defeat drones. A large portion of the study was classified, due to operational security concerns. “Future Army C-UAS systems will encompass a variety of potential platforms to include fixed, mobile, and Soldier-portable capabilities,” Ophardt wrote. But beyond the types of systems employed, what they're targeting or attacking also came under fire in the report. The Army and other branches have invested significantly in counter-drone technology, “often focusing on detecting radio frequency transmissions and GPS signals of individual sUASs. However, today's consumer and customized sUASs can increasingly operate without radio frequency (command and control) links.” Drones now available can use automated target recognition, tracking, obstacle avoidance and other software-enabled activities instead of traditional RF and GPS. Ophardt did not divulge specifics of how the Army is addressing this, but responded that the service's counter drone capabilities, “include multiple methods in order to detect, identify and defeat enemy UAS.” A new school began last month at Fort Benning, Georgia to give basic trainees familiarity with small drones. The drone school gives infantry and scouts the ability to fill out a seven-line report when they encounter a drone then relay that info to their headquarters. The students use both fixed-wing and helicopter small drones. They also learn defensive tactics such as how to use dispersal and hiding tactics to minimize casualties from drone-coordinated fires, according to an Army release. Those introductory tactics can help even brand-new soldiers start thinking about how to deal with drone threats. But, at the same time, the low-level tactics currently used for counter drone work have tried to use “kinetic effects,” basically shooting down the drone by interfering with its signals or overheating its circuits. The report noted that method isn't practical on a wide scale for large numbers of troops, especially dismounted units. That path only adds more gear from the equipment to the batteries, to an already overloaded soldier, not to mention the “cognitive load” of training and using another piece of equipment, according to the report. Ophardt responded that the Army's counter-drone strategy included “multiple methods” to detect, identify and defeat” enemy drones. The major provided a similar response when asked about Army efforts at counter-drone tactics, capabilities against swarming drones and collaboratively acting drone groups, which the report remarks will be more prevalent and sophisticated as soon as 2025. Report authors urge Army leaders to adjust their timelines for matching tech development, which are woefully inadequate for the exponential changes in software, hardware and drone capabilities. Current Army time frames consider near-term planning to run from now until 2025; mid-term planning in the 2026 to 2035 window and far-term at the 2036 to 2050. Those efforts mirror vehicle acquisition strategy timelines, not the drone arena. The report pushes for a near-term planning of one to two years, mid-term at the three- to five-year level and far term in drone tech at the six- to eight-year range. The advances are happening so quickly, authors point out, that it is “impossible to predict performance capabilities beyond eight years.” https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/07/05/study-finds-these-gaps-in-armys-small-unit-counter-drone-capabilities