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  November 3, 2020 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR, Security

  Securing the final frontier: Digital twins, satellites and cybersecurity

  Kevin Coggins The United States and our allies are increasingly dependent on unfettered access to space. However, it has become abundantly clear that our space systems have significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities that our adversaries are eager to exploit. Earlier this year, William Akoto wrote about the growing constellations of satellites operated by private industry, led by SpaceX, Blue Origin and others: “If hackers were to take control of these satellites, the consequences could be dire. On the mundane end of scale, hackers could simply shut satellites down, denying access to their services. Hackers could also jam or spoof the signals from satellites, creating havoc for critical infrastructure. This includes electric grids, water networks and transportation systems.” Space Policy Directive 5, recently issued by the White House, notes that “cybersecurity principles and practices that apply to terrestrial systems also apply to space systems” and that we must integrate these principles and practices into every phase of the space system life cycle. SPD-5 is charting the right course toward assuring our cybersecurity in the space domain. This article highlights the unique vulnerabilities of space systems and how innovative solutions like “digital twins” can help us protect systems in orbit today and design more secure ones for the future. Cyberattacks on space systems — comprised of satellites, ground control stations, and user terminals (e.g., GPS receivers) — are appealing to nation-states, criminal groups, hackers and other bad actors. It's a tremendous opportunity to breach data and disrupt operations in a low-risk way with a low cost of execution. The different components that make up space systems each come with their own set of cyber vulnerabilities, the ground segment in particular. Some space systems were built with speed to market rather than cybersecurity in mind. In contrast, for traditional defense-focused space systems, a slower design and development process has introduced vulnerabilities as well. Space systems operating today may have taken a full 20 years to go from paper to launch and lack the capabilities to recognize or respond to today's cyberthreats. Space systems are increasingly interconnected — a malicious attack can easily spread from a single point of vulnerability in a ground station to the satellites. Cybersecurity in space systems has struggled to keep pace with the rapid evolution of threat actors and exploits. Given these challenges, how can organizations with space systems stay ahead of cyberthreats and protect their missions and users? The older approach of paper-based assessments has significant limitations, like the inability to duplicate reactions to all possible scenarios. At the other end of the spectrum, full-scale replicas are expensive and time-consuming to build. In the middle is the “digital twin” concept — a virtual mirror model that synchronizes a physical object with a cyber representation. With this approach, organizations can test a satellite in different scenarios to identify vulnerabilities and develop protection strategies, even before the satellite is built. One specific project that demonstrated digital twins' strengths and capabilities: testing Air Force GPS space systems for vulnerabilities after the passage of Section 1647 of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. Starting with a model-based system engineering review of thousands of pages of design documents, we built a digital replica of critical GPS Block IIR satellite components launched between 1987 and 2004 that ran on a single laptop with lightweight applications. Our digital twin created the foundation for a flexible cyber test bed — a suite of scalable software applications to demonstrate and validate cyber vulnerabilities and protection strategies as the system is designed or modified. The test bed can connect with assets beyond the network to generate data, provide war-gaming support and explore attack scenarios. We need this flexibility and functionality for future space system protection. The next generation of satellites will encounter more extreme service conditions and increased, simultaneous cyberattack vectors over longer periods of time. To respond to these challenges, these space systems will need increasingly complex designs, and with such complexity comes potentially greater vulnerability to cyberattacks and threats. Digital twins and model-based system engineering approaches can strengthen security throughout the acquisition and sustainment phases. Use them to: Develop system requirements and analyze design trades. Create test scenarios for requirements clarification and reference systems. Simulate threats, anomalies and impacts without risk to critical infrastructure. Assess the impact of new threats or operational scenarios on an on-orbit system design. What can space system acquisition professionals, developers and operators learn here? Digital twins offer an innovative approach that can streamline and strengthen the testing and design process of our space assets. They can also provide insights on as-built systems and enable the buydown of risks across the space system life cycle, enabling affordability across the entire system life cycle. Now is the time to leverage their capabilities, to ensure that the space infrastructure so vital to our security and American way of life has the protection it requires. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/11/02/securing-the-final-frontier-digital-twins-satellites-and-cybersecurity/

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  May 19, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Citing TransDigm, DoD seeks new acquisition powers, and trade groups oppose

  By: Joe Gould WASHINGTON ― Four defense industry trade associations “strongly oppose" a handful of Pentagon-backed procurement reform proposals that they say would harm the defense industrial base, and they're asking Congress to reject them. Two of the proposals aim at controversial pricing practices used by TransDigm by requiring contractors to submit cost information for commercial items and by requiring contracting officers to conduct a commercial item determination for every procurement. Others would set a preference for performance-based contract payments and authorize the Defense Department to release or disclose detailed manufacturing or process data. The May 6 protest letter came from the Acquisition Reform Working Group — made up of the National Defense Industrial Association, American Council of Engineering Companies, the Computing Technology Industry Association and the Information Technology Industry Council — to the the House and Senate armed services committees. It comes as the panels were readying their drafts of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act. The Pentagon has worked to monitor its network of suppliers from the economic shocks associated with the coronavirus pandemic and to protect suppliers by using emergency funding from Congress to speed payments and improve cash flow along the supply chain. The trade groups noted they represent “thousands of small, mid-sized, and large companies in addition to hundreds of thousands of employees that provide goods, services, and personnel to the Department of Defense,” and said the four proposals a “could have significant consequences for the defense industrial base.” Congress focused ire at TransDigm last year after the Defense Department's Inspector General found for $26.2 million in parts the military bought from TransDigm, it earned $16.1 million in excess profit. Transdigm was the only manufacturer of the majority of the parts, which let it set the market prices even for competitively awarded parts. Though DoD has argued its contractors need new latitude to make commercial item determinations and obtain cost or pricing information to prevent the excessive pricing TransDigm was accused of, the trade groups argue the TransDigm's actions weren't facilitated by an inappropriate reliance on improper commercial item determinations, or insufficient access to pricing data. “As illustrated by the TransDigm Group, Inc's pricing practices, generally once a conversion to a commercial product or commercial service is made, it is common for prices to increase and subsequent contracting officers find it difficult to obtain data necessary to determine price reasonableness and negotiate fair and reasonable prices on behalf of the taxpayer,” the department said in its proposal. Another proposal would require a contractor to submit uncertified cost information for commercial item proposals or contracts less than $2 million. The idea behind the reform is DoD wants to be able to get more insight into the costs of sole-source items and put itself in a more favorable position to negotiate with sole-source companies. Congressional hearings on TransDigm's excessive pricing showed Defense leaders need the authority to obtain the data “to the extent necessary to determine price reasonableness is paramount in ensuring that such excessive pricing practices are curtailed.” But the trade groups argue that levying the new regulations would “add a significant barrier to commercial item acquisition, reduce information sharing, further burden the system, and impede—rather than enable—the delivery of capabilities to the warfighter at the ‘speed of relevance'—all with little to no added protection for the government or the taxpayer." The trade associations also opposed DoD's legislation to set a preference for performance-based contract payments. The groups said a DoD proposal to “recouple” total performance-based payments to total cost incurred would reverse Congress's previous work to emphasize performance over cost and contradict a spate of defense acquisitions rules. DoD's argument is that it shouldn't be reimbursing a contractor more than its actual costs, or it “would result in negative levels of contractor investment,” and create a disincentive for contractors to deliver. Another disputed proposal would let DoD release detailed manufacturing or process data, or DPMD, pertaining to privately funded commercial or noncommercial items outside of the government to third parties seeking to compete against the original equipment manufacturer. It's the latest episode in a running game of tug-of-war between industry and DoD over intellectual property. While Congress has in recent years prodded DoD to set intellectual property strategies early in acquisition programs and negotiate for IP rights on a case-by-case basis, the trade groups argue the proposal would give DoD “an automatic default authority” and “eliminate the possibility of a negotiated solution.” https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/05/15/citing-transdigm-dod-seeks-new-acquisition-powers-and-trade-groups-oppose/

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  April 14, 2022 | International, Aerospace

  Arcfield Canada Awarded $50M CF-18 Avionics Optimized Weapon System Support Contract Extension