Lockheed Martin Teams with Vigor for Navy’s LUSV Study

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  September 10, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  GBSD, B-21 Spending Could Top $10B In 2027: Cowen Group

  B-21 production costs, the Cowen analysis finds, will ramp up fast, from $202 million in 2022 to $4 billion in 2027. By THERESA HITCHENSon September 09, 2020 at 6:05 PM WASHINGTON: The Air Force's combined spending on the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) and the B-21 bomber is likely to triple by 2027 to some $10.2 billion annually, as production begins to ramp up under both programs, the Cowen Washington Research Group estimates. The $13.3 billion GBSD contract, announced yesterday by the Air Force, covers engineering, manufacturing and development (EMD) of the new ICBMs through 2029. The Cowen analysis, out today, notes that while the contract announcement does not explain whether LRIP is included, it can be assumed. This is because Air Force budget justification documents detail plans for “five option years” under the contract to include “early production and deployment,” author Roman Schweizer explains. GBSD, which will replace the aging LGM-30G Minuteman III missiles that first became operational in 1970, represents one third of DoD's top priority nuclear modernization effort. The third leg of the modernization program is the Navy's planned buy of 12 new Columbia-class nuke-launching submarines, which the Pentagon's 2021 budget documents estimate to cost $110 billion to buy. The Congressional Budget Office in 2019 estimated the price tag for the total DoD triad modernization effort at $234 billion through 2028. This ginormous price tag does not include spending by the Energy Department to build the nuclear warheads that would be carried by DoD's ICBMs, bombers and subs. Northrop Grumman was the sole bidder for the GBSD program following Boeing's decision last year to drop out over concerns about Northrop's acquisition of one of the two makers of solid rocket motors in the country, Orbital ATK. Cowen estimates that research and development spending for GBSD will jump from $1.5 billion in 2021, peaking at $3.07 billion in 2024, and decreasing to $1.9 billion in 2027. Production, the analysis says, will begin in 2027 with a budget of $2 billion. The Air Force's press release yesterday says that it expects to begin deploying GBSD in late 2020. For the B-21, the analysis estimates that R&D spending will steadily decline from the $2.8 billion in the Air Force's 2021 request to $1.2 billion in 2027. But production costs, the analysis finds, will ramp up: from $202 million in 2022 to $4 billion in 2027. The analysis is largely based on Air Force budget estimates through 2025, and Schweizer's own projections. Of course, this means the numbers are squishy. That's especially true for the B-21, whose program is highly classified. Indeed, the number of B-21 bombers the Air Force intends to buy, originally set at 100, remains unclear. As Breaking D readers know, senior service officials have been hinting loudly that they need more. In addition, unit costs for the stealth bomber's production are also classified. Way back in 2015, when the Air Force awarded Northrop Grumman the B-21 contract, it put a cap on the Average Production Unit Cost per aircraft of $550 million in 2010 dollars. “The APUC from the independent estimate supporting today's award is $511 million per aircraft, again in 2010 dollars,” the release added. No updated assessments have been released. Several high officials have said the program is on budget and on schedule, without providing any details. Finally, the production schedule and the count of how many are to be built each year, is classified, along with the planned annual procurement costs. That said, our colleagues at Bloomberg reported in February that internal Air Force budget documents show procurement starting in 2022 budgeted at $193 million. That jumps to $4.3 billion in 2025. Schweizer said in an email that his estimates are based on those numbers, and that the projections for 2026 and 2027 are his own. Cowen's analysis notes that Congress is by and large supportive of both efforts. While some have fretted that presidential candidate Joe Biden might reconsider building the GBSD, the document says that is not likely. After all, the Obama administration, during which Biden served as Veep, actually started the program. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/09/gbsd-b-21-spending-could-top-10b-in-2027-cowen-group

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  February 26, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Insufficient missile defense funding would leave Americans vulnerable

  The U.S. Missile Defense Agency submitted its report on unfunded priorities to Congress last week, which includes a number of priorities worth more than $1.1 billion. The list demonstrates the tangible consequences of a flat Pentagon budget request and provides a road map for lawmakers to ensure that the U.S. homeland and America's forward-deployed troops have sufficient missile defense protection. The Trump administration requested $705.4 billion for the Department of Defense for fiscal 2021, a level that fails to keep pace with inflation. Accordingly, the DoD is only requesting $9.2 billion for FY21 for the MDA — more than an 11 percent reduction from the FY20 enacted amount of $10.4 billion. The National Defense Authorization Act requires the MDA to submit a list to Congress of items not included in the administration's budget request but that are “necessary to fulfill a requirement associated with an operational or contingency plan of a combatant command or other validated requirement.” The list includes programs that combatant commanders genuinely need and would have included if additional resources were available. The MDA's top unfunded priority for FY21 is $231 million for 10 additional Standard Missile-3 Block IIA missiles. The SM-3 IIA missile is designed to intercept medium- and intermediate-range missiles. This additional purchase would bring the total number to 24 missiles a year, which MDA calls the “maximum sustainable production rate per year without further investment.” In addition to the SM-3 IIA's vital existing capabilities against medium- and intermediate-range missiles, the DoD believes that the missile could potentially be adapted to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles. In response to a mandate in the NDAA, the MDA plans to conduct a flight test this spring, known as FTM-44, to determine whether an SM-3 IIA could intercept an ICBM. If successful, the SM-3 IIA could then provide an additional and complementary layer of protection for the U.S. homeland against a limited ICBM attack from an adversary such as North Korea. Consequently, keeping the SM-3 IIA production line at full speed would enable the U.S. to meet combatant commander requirements for medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile defense. And if the test this spring is successful, optimized ongoing production would also allow the DoD to more quickly field SM-3 IIAs for homeland defense against ICBMs. The MDA's second- and third-highest unfunded priorities relate to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system. These include $319 million to procure an eighth THAAD battery for the United States and $30 million to procure trucks required to support THAAD systems. The THAAD is a rapidly deployable land-based missile defense system designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles during their terminal (or final) phase of flight. Since the program was initiated, the MDA reports, THAAD has completed 15 successful intercepts in 15 attempts. THAAD uses hit-to-kill technology to destroy an incoming warhead. It is effective against short-, medium- and some intermediate-range ballistic missile threats. The DoD can transport the THAAD system by air, land or sea. Iran's January ballistic missile attack on U.S. service members at two bases in Iraq highlighted the lack of sufficient U.S. ballistic missile defense capacity. With no U.S. ballistic missile interceptors in range, U.S. forces could only watch and wait for impact. Had a THAAD system been deployed in the region, the U.S. could have intercepted the Iranian ballistic missiles and better protected U.S. troops. Acquiring an eighth THAAD battery makes not only operational sense, but also financial sense. Saudi Arabia is purchasing a large quantity of THAAD systems. A U.S. and Saudi “synchronized” purchase would enable the U.S. to benefit from the associated economies of scale. The fourth priority on MDA's unfunded list is $39 million to “develop technology and advanced command and control to integrate networked sensors to detect and track advanced cruise missile threats.” As Gen. Terrence O'Shaughnessy, the commander of Northern Command, highlighted in congressional testimony on Feb. 13, the U.S. homeland remains incredibly vulnerable to a cruise missile attack. He testified that “advanced cruise missiles now carried by Russian aircraft and submarines present a growing challenge to our current sensor networks and have the range and accuracy to strike military and civilian targets throughout the United States and Canada.” O'Shaughnessy argued that investments in cruise missile defense capabilities “are necessary to defend our vital facilities and infrastructure, preserve our national ability to project power abroad, and help to safeguard our citizens and vital institutions.” That is exactly what MDA's unfunded priority would do, and the burden of proof should be on those who argue that it should not be funded. A fundamental responsibility of the federal government is to protect the American people. The MDA's report on unfunded priorities to Congress demonstrates that the agency requires additional funding from Congress to fulfill this important responsibility. Bradley Bowman is the senior director for the Center on Military and Political Power with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/02/25/insufficient-missile-defense-funding-would-leave-americans-vulnerable/

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  March 11, 2022 | International, Aerospace

  Pour Airbus, la crise ukrainienne constitue un défi et une opportunité - L'AGEFI

  L’approvisionnement en titane représente le principal risque pour l’avionneur, dont les activités dans la défense connaîtront des retombées positives.