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June 2, 2022 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

L’Europe prête à dépenser davantage pour renforcer sa Défense et son industrie

Les 27 pays de l'Union européenne ont « acté le besoin de dépenser davantage et d'investir davantage » dans le domaine de la Défense, a annoncé le président français, Emmanuel Macron, à l'issue du Conseil européen qui s'est tenu les 30 et 31 mai. « Nous avons acté que notre Europe avait besoin, comme nous le faisons depuis cinq ans avec le Fonds européen de défense, de s'équiper davantage, d'acheter davantage et de construire une base industrielle plus forte. Cet argent que nous allons déployer doit s'accompagner d'une stratégie industrielle car il ne s'agit pas d'aller acheter des équipements qui sont faits ailleurs. Construire notre souveraineté, c'est aussi b'tir des équipements qui sont faits par les Européens pour les Européens », a déclaré le chef de l'Etat français. Le président du Conseil italien, Mario Draghi, a regretté que les Européens importent les deux tiers de leurs armes, insistant sur la nécessité d'une réciprocité dans les achats et appelant à « coordonner ce type d'importations d'une manière ou d'une autre ». Les dirigeants européens ont notamment validé un instrument de soutien doté de 500 M€ pour la période 2023 et 2024, qui sera créé d'ici à l'été pour des achats ciblés d'armements destinés à protéger l'UE. Le rôle de la Banque européenne d'investissement, notamment, doit aussi être renforcé à l'appui de la politique de sécurité et de Défense européenne.

La Tribune et Le Figaro du 1er juin

On the same subject

  • Four technologies Japan and the US should team on to counter China

    April 20, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR

    Four technologies Japan and the US should team on to counter China

    Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — The U.S. and Japan need to expand their collaboration on defense technologies in the future, with a specific focus on four technologies that can help counter the rise of China, according to a new report released Friday by the Atlantic Council. The report also highlights the ongoing discussions about U.S. involvement in Japan's next domestic fighter program as a high-stakes situation that could dictate industrial cooperation between the two nations for years. “The most important component of cooperation on defense capabilities is direct coordination and collaboration on emerging technologies and capabilities,” write authors Tate Nurkin and Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, identifying unmanned systems, hypersonic/hyper-velocity missiles, and the defense applications of AI as three key areas where the U.S. and Japan need to start working together on. “These three areas are at the center of the intensifying U.S.-China military-technological competition. They are key to challenging or upholding military balances and stabilizing imbalances in and across key domain-area competitions — strike versus air and missile defense or undersea — on which regional and, over time, global security is at least partly based,” the authors note. Specifically, the authors identify four project areas that both fit into U.S. strategy and Japan's regional interests, while also matching industrial capabilities: Swarming technology and the loyal wingman: For several years the Pentagon has been investing R&D funding into the development of drones that can be slaved to a fighter jet, providing a “loyal wingman” controlled by the one pilot. Drone swarms are another area of heavy investment. Both concepts fit for Japan, whose Ministry of Defense expressed interest in both concepts going back as far as 2016. Unmanned underwater vehicles and anti-submarine warfare capabilities: China has invested heavily in submarines over the last decade, both manned and unmanned. The U.S. has also begun investing in UUV capabilities, but while Japan's IHI has developed a domestic UUV, the MoD has yet to go all in on the capability. The authors note it is a logical area of collaboration. AI-enabled synthetic training environments: The U.S. and Japan ran a joint synthetic training exercise in 2016, but the authors would like to see development expanded in the future. “Given both countries' need to accelerate training, their shared competency in machine learning and virtual and augmented reality, and a highly fractured simulation and training market, there is potential for a collaborative program to develop a synthetic simulation and training capability, to stress the specific operational contingencies to which US and Japanese forces will have to respond,” they write. Counter-unmanned systems: The entire world seems to be investing in weapons to counter unmanned systems, but the authors see a solid spot for the two nations to find workable technologies together. Japan's acquisition group is currently testing a “high-power microwave generation system” for this mission. That all sounds good on paper, the authors acknowledge, but there are very real challenges to increasing technology development between the two countries. Japan's modernization priorities are best viewed through a defensive lens, designed to protect the island nation. That's a contrast to America's posture in the region, which tends more towards force projection. In addition, Japan lags in military space and cyber operations compared to the U.S., making cross-domain collaboration challenging in several areas. Those negotiations have also been impacted by “different perceptions of the nature of joint technology research,” the authors write. “U.S. defense officials have ‘emphasized operational concepts and capability requirements as the basis for collaboration,' while Japanese officials have ‘continued to focus on technology development and industrial base interests.'” Other challenges include Japan's 1 percent-of-GDP cap on defense spending, as well as the state of Japan's defense industry, which until 2014 was focused entirely on serving the Japanese government's needs. Hence, the industry, while technically very competent, is also relatively small, with limited export experiences – and Tokyo has an interest in protecting that industry with favorable contracts. Meanwhile, U.S. firms have concerns about “potentially losing revenue, transfer of sensitive technologies, and the potential replacement of US companies with Japanese ones in critical supply chains,” the authors write. Some of those issues have come to the forefront in the ongoing discussions about what role American firms can play in Japan's ongoing fighter development program. Japan recently rejected an offer by Lockheed Martin of a hybrid F-22/F-35 design, stating that “developing derivatives of existing fighters cannot be a candidate from the perspective of a Japan-led development.” Getting the F-3 deal right will have long term implications for how the two nations develop capabilities together, the authors warn, quoting defense analyst Gregg Rubinstein in saying “Successfully defining a path to U.S.-Japanese collaboration on this program could make the F-3 an alliance-building centerpiece of cooperative defense acquisition” while failure to do so could “undermine prospects for future collaboration in defense capabilities development.” Putting aside the internal issues, any collaboration between the U.S. and Japan has to be considered through the lens it will be see in Beijing and, to a lesser extent, Seoul. “Even marginal differences in perception produce limits to the parameters of U.S.-Japan joint development of, and coordination on, military capabilities. Especially provocative programs like joint hypersonic-missile development will be viewed as escalatory, and will likely generate a response from China,Russia, and/or North Korea that could complicate other trade or geopolitical interests that go beyond Northeast Asia,” the authors warn, noting that China could attempt to exert more pressure on the ASEAN nations as a counterweight. Additionally, South Korea would likely “see substantial U.S.-Japan collaboration not through an adversarial lens, but certainly through the lens of strained relations stemming from both historical and contextual issues, further complicating U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea trilateral cooperation.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/04/16/four-technologies-japan-and-the-us-should-team-on-to-counter-china/

  • Two upcoming documents will reveal how the US Navy should fight in a great power competition

    September 16, 2021 | International, Naval

    Two upcoming documents will reveal how the US Navy should fight in a great power competition

    An ongoing Global Posture Review and a 2022 update to the National Defense Strategy will provide the U.S. Navy more clarity on what its roles and expectations will be in an increasingly competitive maritime space.

  • Libya is turning into a battle lab for air warfare

    August 7, 2020 | International, Aerospace

    Libya is turning into a battle lab for air warfare

    By: Tom Kington ROME — During Libya's proxy war this year, the skies over the North African country have filled with Turkish and Chinese drones, Russian MiG 29s and Sukhoi 24s and Emirati Mirage 2000s — reportedly — with Turkish F-16s and Egyptian Rafales waiting in the wings. Russian air defense systems have taken down drones while fighters, civilians and air bases have been bombed by jets as C-130s and Turkish A400M aircraft keep up deliveries of new weaponry and fighters into the country. In short, Libya has been transformed this year into something of an air warfare laboratory, begging the question, what exactly is going on, who is winning and what has this conflict taught generals about modern air combat? “On one level, Libya yet again simply underscores the value of air power – you do not want to get in a fight without it,” said Douglas Barrie, Senior Fellow for Military Aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. The conflict in lawless Libya began to escalate in April 2019 as local strongman General Khalifa Haftar launched his campaign to take the capital Tripoli. Backed by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Russia and France, he felt confident going up against the UN-recognized government in Tripoli backed by Turkey, Italy and Qatar. In April last year, Chinese Wing Loon II drones operated by the UAE bombed civilian targets in the city, reflecting the recent, and rapid, procurement of Chinese drones around the Middle East. “The Chinese have been adept at selling drones in the Middle East, including to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Iraq. With the US previously constrained in selling systems, the Chinese saw a gap in the market,” said Barrie. Turkey has proved the exception. Around May 2019, it introduced its own TB2 drone into the fray, attacking Haftar's forces, knocking out Russian Pantsir air defense systems supporting him and helping end his ambitions to take Tripoli. “Turkey has majored in UAV design and manufacture and likely used Libya in part as a test and adjust battle lab, and its systems are now ‘combat proven'. Its industry, like Roketsan, has also developed small, precision-guided munitions for UAVs,” Barrie said. A second analyst said Turkey's use of its TB2 in Libya had been a game changer. “Turkey decided it was okay to lose them from time to time, that they were semi-disposable, and that novel approach caught their enemy off guard,” said Jalel Harchaoui at the Clingendael Institute in Holland. The reason? Cost. “They used to cost the Turks $1-1.5 million apiece to build, but thanks to economies of scale as production volumes rose, the cost has dropped to below $500,000, excluding the control station,” said Harchaoui. He added that software and other technical changes had boosted the TB2′s efficiency and reconnaissance capabilities, which allowed them to find the right altitude to avoid the Russian Pantsir systems. “The performance of the Wing Loon II's in the hands of the UAE has meanwhile been largely static. They didn't evolve, so they have been much less impressive,” he said. Barrie said Libya was another example of the normalization of drone use in modern warfare. “UAVs are a capability now pursued by state and non-state actors alike. Obviously states can afford more capable, larger systems, while non-state actors may have to make do with home-built systems akin to being made with Radio Shack-like components, or acquiring systems from state sponsors.” He added, “In Libya UAVs have suited this kind of ugly, attritional warfare against small, lightly armed units.” The use of manned fighters in Libya has meanwhile been characterized by major powers sending them in on the quiet, with no announcement. Last July, a missile strike on a migrant center near Tripoli which killed 53 was likely the work of the UAE, the BBC has reported, quoting a confidential UN investigation. Analyst Harchaoui alleged that UAE Mirage 2000-9 aircraft flying out of an Egyptian base had been supporting Haftar periodically since June 2019. “Misrata airbase, which has hosted Turkish TB2 drones, was bombed multiple times last year by Emirati drones and jets until the Turks brought in Korkut and MIM-23 Hawk air defense systems. The raids over Misrata stopped in 2020 – probably because the UAE did not want to see a captured pilot show up tortured on Facebook,” he said. On July 4, fighter jets attacked Al-Watiya air base, just after Turkey had brought in its MIM-23 Hawk air defense missiles there. “Sonic booms heard over Sebha, in southwest Libya, suggest the aircraft took off from Egypt then flew to Libya via the Sahara to avoid being spotted by Turkish frigates off the Libyan coast,” said Harchaoui. “Could it have been Egyptian Rafales? They are good but don't have enough experience for an ultra-precise mission like this. French pilots flying Egyptian Rafales is unlikely in case one was captured, leaving the UAE Mirages as most likely,” he said. “Of all the Gulf states, the UAE is the most capable of this kind of mission – they have the combat experience and could do this,” added Barrie. Meanwhile, the U.S. military command in Africa reported in late May that satellite imagery showed Russian aircraft arriving in Libya to support Haftar. USAFRICOM said, “At least 14 MiG-29s and several Su-24s were flown from Russia to Syria, where their Russian markings were painted over to camouflage their Russian origin.” The aircraft are reportedly being used to support the Wagner Group, a Russian-sponsored mercenary operation on the ground in Libya which Moscow denies links to. The American command warned the aircraft might be flown by “inexperienced” mercenaries who “will not adhere to international law.” According to Harchaoui, eye witnesses in Libya reported a number of misses notched up during bombing raids by the aircraft. “That suggests they were not Russian air force pilots,” he said. This summer the conflict has slowed, as Haftar's forces retreat from Tripoli and take up position to fight for the coastal city of Sirte, which is key to controlling Libya's oil trade. With Al-Watiya airbase now repaired and back in business after the July air raid, Turkey may be considering basing its F-16s there, finally giving it a beach head for fighters in Libya. Bringing in American-built aircraft could however rely on the say-so of the U.S. “Is the U.S. so concerned about Russia's intervention in Libya it would support the deployment of Turkish F-16s to stop it?” said Harchaoui. “Or will it come down on the side of Egypt, which is a US ally? The ball is in its court.” https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-air-power/2020/08/06/libya-is-turning-into-a-battle-lab-for-air-warfare/

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