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July 6, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

La nécessaire relance de la défense en France

Dans une tribune publiée dans le journal Les Echos, Cédric Perrin, sénateur (LR) du Territoire de Belfort, et l'économiste Bruno Alomar appellent à une relance économique de la filière défense. Les crises récentes et à proximité de l'Europe ont montré l'importance du rôle des armées et la nécessité d'un « Etat-puissance ». Une autre raison est économique. Les entreprises de défense sont « transverses » industriellement et sont réparties sur tout le territoire. Les armées représentent « également de formidables bancs d'essai pour de nombreuses entreprises de petite et moyenne taille qui trouvent dans le client militaire un outil de retour d'expérience, leurs matériels étant testés et éprouvés au-delà de toutes conditions ». La Base industrielle et technologique de défense (BITD) « n'assure pas seulement les besoins opérationnels de nos armées. Elle est très puissamment imbriquée avec les filières aéronautique et spatiale, au travers de la dualité des technologies, ainsi que de celle des compétences de pointe qu'elle mobilise ».

Les Echos du 29 juin 2020

On the same subject

  • The US needs to rethink its overseas supply chain

    May 25, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    The US needs to rethink its overseas supply chain

    By: Thomas Ayres As Americans respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, we have become acutely aware of the outsized impact of our dependence on China in the supply chain. Pharmaceutical companies learned key chemicals and minerals are exclusively made or mined in China. For instance, reports show China produces 97 percent of the antibiotics, 95 percent of ibuprofen and 91 percent of hydrocortisone consumed in the U.S. market. Hospitals also learned that while China produces 50 percent of the world's face masks, they are of dubious reliability. There is cause for concern with the quantity or quality of ventilators. In sum, we learned as citizens what we in the Department of Defense have known for some time: Our national security supply chain must be free from dependence on China. The DoD's concern for its supply chain is not new. Congress spurred activity over a decade ago by questioning the DoD's supply chain risk management, or SCRM, policies. The National Defense Strategy‘s recognition of a new era of strategic, great power competition further sharpened the DoD's focus, propelling recent efforts to enhance regulations and procedures in addressing supply chain threats. We are transitioning from analog to digital, with the goal of planes, ships, tanks and satellites all seamlessly sharing data — a lethal version of the ride-sharing app on your smartphone. Yet, even as the DoD builds this future, the threat of supply chain disruption and concerns about component quality within the electronic backbone are real. Counterfeit or planted microelectronic parts can be vectors for cybersecurity intrusions. Recently, for instance, the DoD voiced concerns that Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei's 5G solution provided back doors, purposefully or negligently, for data corruption, data extraction, system failure or worse. Similarly, SCRM policies have increasingly addressed the concern of intellectual property theft enabled by subcomponents designed to allow information to flow back to larger architectures. The COVID-19 pandemic is giving new meaning to that threat, and the risk of disruption to both raw and manufactured materials from abroad has become apparent. Our SCRM focus must broaden in response to COVID-19 to better address national production capacity and sustainability. Being able to assure access to the minerals, chemicals, subcomponents and components required to build weapon systems is essential. China supplies 80 percent of the rare earth minerals imported to the U.S., many of which are essential to electronic parts. Since 1933, the Buy American Act has required federal agencies, including the DoD, to purchase items manufactured in the U.S. Additionally, these items must be made from supplies mined or made in the U.S. The act is implemented by regulations requiring analysis of the components — where they are mined or made, and where they are assembled. Companies that falsify “Made in America” designations can be debarred from the federal marketplace. In July 2019, months before the pandemic emerged, President Donald Trump issued an executive order seeking to increase the minimum domestic manufacture thresholds above the current 50 percent floors. The pandemic now shows even more needs to be done. We must increase to President Trump's mandated percentages, and we must also analyze where each of the subcomponents are manufactured. This doesn't mean we need to back away from allied contributions or alliance-based weapon systems like the F-35 fighter jet, which benefits from the industrial cooperation of nine partner nations. But in light of COVID-19, it does mean that when we make risk-based and measured decisions to produce an alliance system, we program in several months' worth of component backlogs to allow continued production during future quarantines. The majority of our weapon systems are made in the U.S. by American companies with greater than 50 percent of component production and assembly done domestically. Yet, what is less clear are the composition of the subcomponents in the components themselves. Not recognizing the risks of the subcomponents equally jeopardizes the new reality of disruptions to our supply chain and risks of data extraction, degradation and spying, about which we have increasingly been concerned. Recently, I sought to buy a grapefruit spoon on the internet and found it exceedingly difficult to learn where the offered spoons were made. The harder it was to find, the more I suspected it was made in China. Perhaps Congress should pass a law making it easier to learn the source of manufacturing. Ensuring my access to an American-made grapefruit spoon is not nearly as vital as assuring our access to critical weapon systems, rare earth materials, and pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. A vital step is knowing the source countries of components and subcomponents. We must have deeper knowledge of the full supply chains of subcomponents, and how and where they are produced. Trust can only come once we know all that is required to understand our supply chains and we seek even greater focus in our new normal. Our security depends on it. Thomas Ayres is general counsel for the U.S. Air Force. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/22/the-us-needs-to-rethink-its-overseas-supply-chain/

  • BAE receives $50M order to build 20 more CV90s for Norwegian Army

    February 19, 2021 | International, Land

    BAE receives $50M order to build 20 more CV90s for Norwegian Army

    BAE Systems announced Thursday that it has received a $50 million order from the Norwegian Army for 20 additional CV90 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, bring its total fleet to 164 vehicles.

  • COVID-19: Farnborough Cancellation Another Blow For Defense Biz

    March 24, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    COVID-19: Farnborough Cancellation Another Blow For Defense Biz

    "Looking ahead, defense acquisition is in uncharted territory," says Air Force acquisition head Will Roper of the effects of the COVID-19 virus. By THERESA HITCHENS WASHINGTON: While the cancelation of the biennial Farnborough Air Show due to the COVID-19 pandemic may not have an immediate impact on the bottom lines of aerospace firms in the defense sector, the decision to close one of the world's top two airshows is yet another harbinger of pending upheaval in the overall market, analysts say. In particular, it deprives US firms of publicity abroad and highly valuable face-time with customers and potential customers from foreign governments. “Things like Farnborough are important to US aerospace companies because they help to facilitate sales and marketing,” said Todd Harrison, director of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). “It's traditionally been a place where you show off your latest technology and latest systems, but it's also where you finalize deals that have been in the works for a while. And so, some of that can still happen, but some of it may not happen.” Richard Aboulafia, a veteran aircraft industry analyst at Teal Group, echoed: “It's just a reflection of a sad reality: economic time has simply come to a halt for our industry and for others. That means fewer big opportunities to meet clients, advertise products and capabilities, share information, and look for opportunities. Big air shows are essential for these, but here we are.” The Farnborough Air Show — which takes place south of London — registered representatives from 96 countries in 2018, and some logged $192 billion in orders and contract commitments. The cancelation of the 2020 show, slated for July 20-24, was announced today. “I don't see the cancellation of Farnborough as a big blow to defense contractors. It is generally a way of raising their profile, but has no immediate impact on their business prospects,” said Phil Finnegan, Teal Group's director of corporate analysis. That said, Finnegan and a number other analysts agreed, the aerospace market is in for a rough ride — and not just on the commercial side as airlines see their profits for 2020 nosediving, making it increasingly unlikely that they will invest in new planes. “Looking ahead, defense acquisition is in uncharted territory. Near- and far-term impacts of Coronavirus evolve daily,” Air Force acquisition head Will Roper said this afternoon. “As we complete our first week of response, our teams navigated potential work stoppages, changing local and state directives, halted supply chains, and gearing up to support any national Defense Production Act requirements.” The Defense Production Act, which allows the government to order companies to boost production or produce new things, was invoked last week by President Donald Trump. Finnegan said “the biggest threat to defense contractors will come to those with significant commercial aerospace operations. The cash flow drain from those operations potentially could hurt them. “It also reiterates the importance of maintaining a balance in operations,” he added. “Obviously, in recent years commercial aerospace has offered greater growth and potentially high profit margins. This crisis reiterates the importance of a diversified approach to defense and aerospace to take advantage of the stability of the defense market in a crisis.” Indeed, several other long-time industry analysts said that DoD may face price hikes as firms try to shift the costs of commercial overhead to the defense contracts — especially for spare parts. Further, Harrison noted, governments around the world are going to be cash-strapped and likely loathe to make new commitments to large buys of new fighter jets or drones. According to the latest report from the Aerospace Industries Association, US aerospace and defense exports in 2018 amounted to $151 billion: civil aerospace accounted for the majority with $131.5 billion; defense products the remaining $19.5 billion. “So, Farnborough may not be the reason that sales go down, It's more of a symptom of the fact that there just aren't going to be as many opportunities for a while,” he said. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/03/covid-19-farnborough-cancelation-another-blow-for-defense-biz

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