KBR Wins $64M Recompete to Expand DoD Testing and Training Capabilities for U.S. Warfighter

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  July 29, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Airbus Calls For Europe To Strengthen Defense Budgets Post-COVID-19

  Tony Osborne July 10, 2020 While Airbus' commercial business faces strong headwinds from the novel coronavirus pandemic, the company's military capability is still very much in demand. But can Europe's big defense initiatives—many of which involve Airbus-—be sustained with burdened budgets post-COVID-19? London Bureau Chief Tony Osborne put those questions to Airbus Defense and Space CEO Dirk Hoke. AW&ST: What does the defense environment look like post-COVID-19? Will we face more spending cuts, or will spending plans be maintained? And are you confident big defense programs can survive? A health and economic crisis doesn't erase the necessity of being able to defend your territory. NATO missions are continuing, and the extensive use of our A400Ms and [A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transports] MRTTs during the COVID-19 crisis is a perfect example of how much value military assets can bring in humanitarian missions, when nations are in need. In addition, spending in defense procurement, if you do it right, is always an investment in your own economy and therefore now twice as important. The defense business was undertaking some restructuring and cost cutting at the beginning of 2020 after a difficult 2019. Where are those plans; will they have to be reconsidered? We have had to slightly adapt our restructuring due to the COVID-19 impact, but the rationale stays the same. In our defense business, many important contracts had been postponed or came later than expected, which has of course had an impact on operational planning. In our space business, we currently see an extremely flat market for telecommunication satellites. We are [the] market leader and confident that the situation will change again. But for the time being we must take the appropriate measures. How has COVID-19 affected production and output in the various countries, and how have you overcome or are overcoming those hurdles? I would say we were early adapters. Given the experience we had at our commercial sites in China, on which we could build, it took us around a week to clear all production facilities for working under COVID-19 work restrictions. On the defense side, we also delivered aircraft in the lockdown phase and provided our services to the military crews on mission. It was, rather, the space part, where we had to reschedule satellite launches due to the temporary closure of the launch site in Kourou [in French Guiana]. And for the desk jobs, many were working from home during the lockdowns in order to avoid [having] too many meetings at the offices at the same time. They are now coming back to their desks. We could demonstrate that also in crisis times we are a trustful partner for our customers. Airbus proposed a compromise deal for the Eurofighter following Germany's decision on a Tornado replacement. Is Berlin showing interest in your proposals; could we see some of these Eurofighters on contract soon? Let me state that we are very proud of being part of the Eurofighter family. There are some good opportunities ahead. Recently we signed the contract for equipping 115 [German and Spanish] Eurofighters with brand-new Captor-E radars. In the autumn, we are confident [we will] sign a contract for 38 Eurofighters to replace the German Tranche 1 fleet. Additionally, we are in discussions for planning a Tranche 5 [implementation of] the Long-Term Evolution Program. What the final decision on Tornado will be, we will see only after the elections in Germany [at the] end of 2021. In the meantime, there are further opportunities in Spain, Switzerland and Finland. The Eurofighter clearly is the backbone of European air defense. What progress is being made on the Future Combat Air System (FCAS)? Can you talk about some of the technological hurdles, where there needs to be or has been progress to reach the next phase? There is a tremendous drive in the project. All parties, on both the political and industrial sides, are pushing for progress and can be proud of what has been achieved in less than three years after being mentioned the first time in the French-German declaration on July 13, 2017. We need to keep this spirit up to achieve our ambitious timelines. In terms of technologies, we are at the early stage of a long journey. Overall, we are looking into a wide range of technologies in the areas of combat aircraft capabilities, digitalization and data analysis, as well as connectivity and communication. Airbus is the only company in Europe that has extensive know-how in all three areas. Nevertheless, as we are talking about requirements needed in 2040, we are far away from having definite answers yet. The FCAS is very much an incremental journey with an open end—that's what makes the program so challenging, but also so exciting. You made representations to Madrid regarding the involvement with Indra on the FCAS. Is there any sign of that changing? Is there a point when you begin working together and sideline the differences? Spain is a very welcome partner in the FCAS program and is one of our Airbus home nations. I really believe that the FCAS project is large enough for the whole European defense industry. To make it a success, it is important that everybody contributes where he has the largest experience. In terms of system integration, it is undoubtedly Airbus—especially in Spain, where we have a large industrial footprint, are producing the Eurofighter, A400M, tankers and the light and medium transport aircraft. I think it is understandable that we expressed our incomprehension to the Spanish government. Are you any closer to securing a contract for the Eurodrone development? Are you concerned that France could still be swayed down the U.S. route? In June we handed over our best and final offer and are expecting a decision by the nations after the summer break. Germany, France, Spain and Italy worked with us on the capabilities from the onset, so the complete design is according to their wishes. Therefore, in terms of performance, capability and European sovereignty there is no serious competitor on the market. What is clear is, the later the order comes, the more the delivery dates are slipping. I don't think that's in anybody's interest. Are you making any proposals for Germany's Pegasus signals--intelligence (sigint) platform since Berlin withdrew from using Triton? Will you offer the Integrated Standby Instrument Systems (ISIS) system on a manned platform? That's now in the hands of the German government. Over the years of the project we developed many skills and capabilities in Germany that are required in any sigint platform. That applies especially for the ground control station, which we also deliver for NATO's [Alliance Ground Surveillance] project. Therefore, we stand ready [for] implementing our know-how once the decision has been taken. Nonetheless, I am still convinced that Triton would have been the most capable platform for the envisaged missions. On MRTT, where do you see the next market for that platform? How many more orders could come from the European Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet/Unit (MMF/MMU)? Is the agreement with Lockheed on MRTT making progress on marketing for U.S. needs? What is your hope for that? Only weeks ago, we delivered the first MRTT to the joint NATO fleet. I don't want to speculate about numbers, but pooling resources as is already the case with military transport capacities is a blueprint for the future. The U.S. surely is the largest accessible market for military tankers. We have the best aircraft in this class. And besides our own Airbus footprint, we have Lockheed Martin as an equal partner in the country. We stand ready. In the end the question will be whether the U.S. is ready for this, too. Regarding A400M tactical capabilities and exports, any progress on both? The A400M has meanwhile proven to be a real workhorse in the services, and flight testing again has made good progress in recent months. Simultaneous paratrooper jumps out of the side doors are now certified, and the helicopter air-to-air refueling is advancing well. The aircraft is simply best-in-class. Other nations recognize this very well, but it is currently a difficult environment to predict when the next exports are coming in. Given that space has been declared a warfighting domain by several nations, are you seeing an uptake in defense interest in space, or is that something still warming? When we see how dependent mankind is on assets in space, it is high time to act and find ways to protect them. Some countries are making progress already. Others are still undecided on their strategy. As Europe's largest space company, we can make suggestions. But what is valid for the world applies also in space: You can't defend space or your assets there as a single country. What we need is a common approach. And it is needed sooner rather than later. https://aviationweek.com/ad-week/airbus-calls-europe-strengthen-defense-budgets-post-covid-19

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  August 14, 2019 | International, Aerospace

  Four rocket companies are competing for Air Force funding, and it is war

  By ERIC BERGER Monday marked the deadline for four US rocket companies to submit bids for Air Force contracts, encompassing all national security launches from 2022 to 2026. This is a hugely consequential and much-contested bid process that has implications for the American aerospace industry for the next decade and beyond. The Air Force is seeking two providers for about two dozen launches. The prime contractor will receive 60% of the launches while the secondary contractor claims the remaining 40%. As the US military pays a premium for launch contracts to its nine reference orbits, this guaranteed revenue is extremely valuable to US companies aspiring to run a profitable launch business. The lead-up to Monday's deadline has included heavy political lobbying from the four companies: United Launch Alliance, SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Northrop Grumman. As a result of this, Congress is considering some changes to the Air Force's procurement policy, including an on-ramp for a third provider during the 2022 to 2026 period. But so far, the Air Force is resisting this. Here's a look at the four bidders and what is at stake for each of them. United Launch Alliance United Launch Alliance—a joint venture between Boeing and Lockheed Martin that enjoyed a monopoly on national security launches before the emergence of SpaceX—may be bidding for its life. To wean itself off its costly Delta boosters (as well as the Russian rocket engines that go with its workhorse Atlas V rocket), ULA has been developing the Vulcan rocket to cut costs while maintaining performance. The company says the Vulcan will be ready for its first flight in 2021. "Vulcan Centaur will provide higher performance and greater affordability while continuing to deliver our unmatched reliability and orbital accuracy precision from our treasured cryogenic Centaur upper stage," ULA's chief, Tory Bruno, said in a news release Monday. "ULA is the best partner for national security space launch, and we are the only provider to demonstrate experience flying to all orbits including the most challenging heavy-class missions, providing the bedrock foundation for the lowest risk portfolio of two launch service providers for the US Air Force." With increasing competition from SpaceX, Europe's Arianespace, Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Russian launch vehicles, ULA has been unable to capture much of the commercial market for satellite launches in the last decade. Therefore, it has largely been reliant on government business, mostly from the military. But ULA also relies on NASA through its science missions and lifting cargo and crew missions to the International Space Station. If the company does not emerge victorious from this competition, it faces an uncertain future unless Vulcan can become commercially viable. Moreover, ULA will lose out on hundreds of millions of dollars in government money to finalize Vulcan if it does not receive an award. Historically, Boeing and Lockheed have been stingy parents, and whether or not they would pay to complete Vulcan is unclear. One intriguing twist with ULA's bid is that its Vulcan rocket will use the BE-4 rocket engine, which is being developed and manufactured by Blue Origin—one of the four competitors in the Air Force bidding process. Blue Origin has said the Air Force competition was designed to unfairly benefit ULA. SpaceX The Hawthorne, California-based rocket company is the only bidder proposing to use rockets that are already flying—the Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy boosters. This family of rockets has had a string of 49 successful launches since a static fire accident in September 2016, and according to SpaceX, it can meet all of the Air Force's desired orbits and payload specifications. "SpaceX means to serve as the Air Force's long-term provider for space launch, offering existing, certified, and proven launch systems capable of carrying out the full spectrum of national security space-launch missions and requirements," said the company's president and chief operating officer, Gwynne Shotwell. Since the Air Force agreed to admit SpaceX to the national security launch competition in 2015, the company has won several contracts for key missions and begun flying them for the military. These include the National Reconnaissance Office Launch 76, Orbital Test Vehicle 5, Global Positioning System III-2, and STP-2 flights. SpaceX also likely will offer the government the lowest price on service to orbit. However, in its criteria for awarding missions, the Air Force listed price among the last of its considerations. Due to its lower price point, especially with is reusable Falcon 9 rocket, SpaceX has considerable commercial business to offset the loss of Air Force contracts. But it would hurt financially, all the same. Blue Origin Jeff Bezos' rocket company has bid its very large New Glenn rocket for the Air Force missions. However, when this rocket will begin flying is not entirely clear, as there are questions about whether it will be ready by the beginning of the 2022 contracting period. What is clear is that Blue Origin does not believe the US Air Force has created a fair bidding process. Already, the company has filed a "pre-award" protest with the US Government Accountability Office. "The Air Force is pursuing a flawed acquisition strategy for the National Security Space Launch program," Blue Origin said, according to SpaceNews. The Air Force decision to award contracts to just two companies creates a "duopoly," Blue Origin says, and it limits commercial development of strategic US assets such as rocket engines and boosters. Bezos has been investing about $1 billion a year of his own money into Blue Origin, which has largely been used to support development of the BE-4 engine and New Glenn rocket. He is likely to continue development of the New Glenn rocket without Air Force funding, but company officials say it is not fair to hold their wealthy founder against their bid. Northrop Grumman Northrop has been developing the Omega rocket for this competition since at least 2016. The Omega vehicle differs from the other entrants in the competition as its first and second stages, as well as side-mounted boosters, are powered by solid-rocket motors rather than liquid-fueled engines. The bet by Northrop is that the US military, through its national security launch contract, would want to support one of the nation's most critical suppliers of solid-rocket motors for intercontinental ballistic missiles. Northrop officials have not said whether they would continue development of the Omega rocket if Northrop were to lose out on the Air Force contract. Northrop's bid suffered a setback in May when an "anomaly" occurred during test firing of its solid-propellant Castor 600 rocket motor, the Omega rocket's first stage. From a video provided by the company, a major part of the rocket's large nozzle appeared to break apart, blasting debris around the area. Afterward, a Northrop vice president, Kent Rominger, called the test a success. "It appears everything worked very, very well on this test," he said. "And at the very end when the engine was tailing off, we observed the aft exit cone, maybe a portion of it, doing something a little strange that we need to go further look into." Nevertheless, the test cannot have instilled absolute confidence in the Air Force. https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/08/four-rocket-companies-are-competing-for-air-force-funding-and-it-is-war/

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  February 18, 2019 | International, Security

  Mettre en place un Conseil de sécurité européen ? Une idée à travailler

  (B2) Berlin insiste régulièrement sur un point souvent oublié dans la rhétorique sur l'armée européenne : la mise en place d'un « Conseil de sécurité de l'UE ». Un point qui mérite un peu d'attention Avec mes amis de ‘La faute à l'Europe‘ (J. Quatremer, Y. A. Noguès, K. Landaburu, H. Beaudoin), qui reçoivent ce week-end Michèle Alliot Marie, alias MAM, l'ancienne ministre de la Défense (sous Jacques Chirac) et ministre des Affaires étrangères (sous Nicolas Sarkozy), nous parlons ‘défense', ‘Europe puissance' et notamment de ce Conseil de sécurité européen (video). @bruxelles2 pèse le pour et le contre d'un Conseil de sécurité européen à l'image de @ONU_fr pic.twitter.com/JfbkGh4Kot Une proposition franco-allemande Cette proposition ne nait pas de nulle part. Elle figurait en dernier lieu dans la déclaration de Meseberg adoptée par les deux dirigeants Emmanuel Macron et Angela Merkel en juin 2018. L'objectif est d'avoir un « débat européen dans de nouveaux formats » et « d'accroitre la rapidité et l'efficacité de la prise de décision de l'Union européenne [en matière] de politique étrangère » (lire : Défense, Sécurité, Migrations, Développement, l'accord franco-allemand de Meseberg). Une explication merkelienne Au Parlement européen, en novembre 2018, la chancelière Angela Merkel souligne l'importance d'« une enceinte au sein de laquelle des décisions importantes pourront êtres prises », avec une « présidence tournante » (lire : « Une armée (européenne) montrerait au monde qu'entre (nous) il n'y aurait plus de guerre » (Angela Merkel). Le format serait limité précise-t-on du côté allemand : « un petit cercle d'États se relayant et représentant l'ensemble de l'UE [pour] travailler plus promptement et intensément au règlement des crises en cours. » (1) Une certaine réserve française Du côté français, on ne peut pas dire que le projet suscite une grande mobilisation. A l'Élysée, la prudence est de règle : « C'est une idée [de] la Chancelière. Ce pourrait être une proposition commune, mais cela mérite encore [d'être travaillé] » l'che en ‘off' un Élyséen, à quelques journalistes (dont B2) en novembre 2018. Et d'ajouter : « Nous n'avons pas de détails proposés par le gouvernement allemand : est-ce un forum pour discuter ou pour décider des questions de politique étrangère ? Ce n'est pas encore une position qui est mûrie. » (3) Une idée mal perçue dans les milieux européens Dans les couloirs européens, cette idée est à peine commentée. « Je suis un peu sceptique sur la création d'une nouvelle structure. Est-elle vraiment nécessaire. N'a-t-on pas déjà pas assez de structures » s'interroge un bon connaisseur des questions sécuritaires interrogé par B2, résumant assez bien le sentiment à Bruxelles, perplexe et qui a, à peine, réfléchi sur l'idée. Un vide béant de réflexion stratégique Cette proposition répond pourtant à un réel besoin. L'Union européenne souffre aujourd'hui d'un vide béant d'absence de direction politique au plus haut niveau, d'anticipation stratégique et de réactivité en cas de crise majeure. Parler d'autonomie stratégique ou de réflexion sans avoir une instance capable de décider est un leurre. Des leaders européens absents collectivement Certes, en théorie, le Conseil européen doit se pencher une fois par an au minimum sur les grandes questions de sécurité. Mais cette disposition du Traité de Lisbonne est restée plutôt lettre morte. Force est de constater que ces dernières années, sur toutes les crises majeures — Libye, Syrie, Irak, Ukraine, crise migratoire, coup d'état en Turquie, etc. — les Chefs d'État et de gouvernement européens, collectivement, ont été ‘à la ramasse'. Un manque d'anticipation certain Pour en attester, il suffit de reprendre la liste des crises récentes. Les 28 ont-ils à la veille de signer l'accord d'association avec l'Ukraine clairement évalué les conséquences de cet acte sur les relations avec la Russie, donné leur accord en bonne et due forme ? Ont-ils planifié un dispositif de gestion de crise soit diplomatique, soit militaire en cas d'intervention russe (largement prévisible) ? Lors de la déroute du printemps arabe en Syrie, ont-ils anticipé la crise des réfugiés et des migrants à venir ? Après l'intervention franco-britannique en Libye, qui laisse un pays déchiré et un État failli, ont-ils envisagé et débattu de la solution à apporter à la crise, en commençant par résoudre leurs différends ? Lors du coup d'Etat en Turquie, y-t-a-il eu une réunion de crise par rapport à un pays le plus proche ? Non, non ! Des questions posées trop vite abordées Au mieux, les ‘Leaders' ont discuté une ou deux heures pour s'accorder sur les traitements collatéraux de la crise (rupture des liens diplomatiques, aide humanitaire, sanctions...). La plus longue discussion au cours de ces dernières années a été consacrée à définir l'intensité des sanctions mises en place sur la Russie. Mais rarement pour tenter de résoudre leurs différends, trouver des solutions ou b'tir des feuilles de route. Au pire, ils ont préféré ne pas trop se pencher sur la question. Une réforme facile à mettre en place Si l'on met de côté certains aspects proposés par A. Merkel, avoir un Conseil de sécurité de l'Union européenne est possible dans le cadre existant. Pas de modification de traité Ce projet ne nécessite pas de modification des traités constitutifs. Il suffit juste de changer les usages. On peut décider (par exemple) de consacrer une demi-journée lors de chaque Conseil européen aux grandes questions internationales ou (autre exemple) dédier une de ses quatre réunions annuelles aux questions internationales. Il serait même possible de tenir une ou deux fois par an un Conseil européen informel dans un pays tournant (permettant à un chef de gouvernement de coprésider la réunion). Juste changer les usages Rien n'empêche d'ailleurs quelques pays plus proches en matière d'approche sécuritaire — France, Allemagne, Belgique, Espagne, Italie — de tenir régulièrement des conciliabules préparatoires à l'image des réunions G6 des ministres de l'Intérieur (un petit cercle conjoint). Rien n'empêche aussi de joindre à ces réunions des Chefs, une réunion parallèle des ministres de la Défense ou des Affaires étrangères, voire des ambassadeurs, pour mettre en musique immédiatement les mesures décidées par les Chefs. Toutes ces dispositions, tout à fait possibles dans les traités existants, permettraient de se rapprocher du modèle prôné par A. Merkel. Un dispositif diplomatique et technique prêt à répondre Au-dessous du niveau politique, le dispositif européen en cas de crise est plutôt complet et prêt à travailler. On a ainsi des ambassadeurs des 28 (le Comité politique et de sécurité), qui siègent en permanence à Bruxelles, avec au minimum deux réunions par semaine (sans compter les petits déjeuners, goûters et autres dîners informels) permettant d'échanger et affiner des positions communes. En cas d'urgence, une réunion du COPS peut être improvisée. Ces diplomates, discrets mais parfaits connaisseurs de leurs sujets, sont tenus d'être là, 24h/24 sur le pont. J'en ai été témoin à plusieurs reprises. Des réunions ont eu lieu le dimanche, au mois d'août, à 6 heures du matin ou à 22 heures le soir. Un dispositif de veille et d'analyse On a aussi un dispositif de veille du renseignement (l'IntCen) (dirigé aujourd'hui par un Allemand ancien des services de renseignement) qui produit régulièrement des notes d'analyses. Ces notes — environ 1400 par an — sont plutôt bien appréciées de leurs destinataires, selon mes informations. On peut ajouter à cela des dispositifs de réaction de crise — cellule de protection civile à la Commission européenne, état-major militaire de l'UE (EUMS), commandement des missions civiles (CPCC) etc. — qui existent et ne demandent qu'à produire des résultats. Tous ces dispositifs peuvent au besoin être renforcés et rendus plus performants. (Nicolas Gros-Verheyde) https://www.bruxelles2.eu/2019/02/16/mettre-en-place-un-conseil-de-securite-europeen-une-idee-du-futur/