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  February 11, 2021 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - February 09, 2021

  ARMY Covalus LLC,* Dallas, Texas (W912DY-21-D-0006); Holitna Construction LLC,* Anchorage, Alaska (W912DY-21-D-0007); Martek Global Solutions LLC,* Bethesda, Maryland (W912DY-21-D-0008); and Workplace Solutions Inc.,* Jacksonville, Florida (W912DY-21-D-0009), will compete for each order of the $495,000,000 firm-fixed-price contract to support military healthcare construction/renewal projects. Bids were solicited via the internet with 19 received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of Feb. 3, 2026. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntsville, Alabama, is the contracting activity. Vectrus Systems Corp., Colorado Springs, Colorado, was awarded an $18,337,000 modification (P00021) to contract W52P1J-18-C-0025 to provide all personnel, equipment, supplies, transportation, tools, materials, supervision and other items and non-personal services necessary for food services at the Area Support Group-Kuwait dining facility. Work will be performed in Kuwait City, Kuwait, with an estimated completion date of Feb. 10, 2022. Fiscal 2021 operation and maintenance (Army) funds in the amount of $18,337,000 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, is the contracting activity. General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems, Garland, Texas, was awarded a $12,722,355 modification (P00004) to contract W52P1J-18-C-0052 for MK82-1, MK82-6, MK82-8, MK83-4, MK84-6 and BDU-56/B bomb bodies. Work will be performed in Garland, Texas, with an estimated completion date of Sept. 30, 2022. Fiscal 2019 and 2020 aircraft procurement (Army) funds in the amount of $12,722,355 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, is the contracting activity. AIR FORCE Chromalloy Component Services, San Antonio, Texas, has been awarded a $74,632,104 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for the remanufacture of the F108 Module 14 low pressure turbine assembly. This contract provides for the remanufacturing of the F108-200 (CFM56-2A) low pressure turbine assembly (Module 14) to like-new condition. Work will be performed in San Antonio, Texas, and is expected to be completed Feb. 8, 2026. This award is the result of a competitive acquisition and two offers were received. Defense agencies working capital funds will be used, but no funds are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Sustainment Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, is the contracting activity (FA8122-21-D-0002). CORRECTION: The $95,000,000 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract awarded on Feb. 4, 2021, to Scientific Research Corp., Atlanta, Georgia (FA7037-21-D-0001), is for Full Spectrum Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance operational numbered Air Forces Support; not Full Spectrum Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance operational non-appropriated funds Support. NAVY Gichner Systems Group Inc., Dallastown, Pennsylvania, is awarded a $57,319,314 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. This contract procures up to a maximum quantity of 732 mobile facility shelters used for human habitation as well as permanent equipment storage or operation to support the testing, repairing, and operation of various avionics and non-avionics gear for the Navy, Marine Corps and Army. Work will be performed in Dallastown, Pennsylvania, and is expected to be completed in February 2026. No funds will be obligated at the time of award; funds will be obligated on individual orders as they are issued. This contract was competitively procured via an electronic request for proposal and two offers were received. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, New Jersey, is the contracting activity (N68335-21-D-0214). Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, is awarded a $26,825,606 modification (P00010) to previously awarded cost-plus-incentive-fee contract N00019-20-C-0037. This modification exercises an option to provide continued support for training system product development, integration and test for current, fielded and planned hardware baselines in support of the F-35 training systems labs for the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and non-Department of Defense (DOD) participants. Work will be performed in Orlando, Florida (98%); and Fort Worth, Texas (2%), and is expected to be completed in March 2022. Fiscal 2021 research, development, test and evaluation (Navy) funds in the amount of $2,000,000; fiscal 2021 research, development, test and evaluation (Air Force) funds in the amount of $2,000,000; and non-DOD participant funds in the amount of $881,107, will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. General Electric Aviation, Lynn, Massachusetts, is awarded a $21,095,294 firm-fixed-price modification (P00016) to previously awarded contract N00019-18-C-1007. This modification procures 4 T408-GE-400 turboshaft spare engines and various spare engine parts in support of CH-53K Lot 5 low rate initial production aircraft. Work will be performed in Lynn, Massachusetts, and is expected to be completed in December 2024. Fiscal 2021 aircraft procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $20,390,291; and fiscal 2020 aircraft procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $705,003 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY KBR Services LLC, Houston, Texas, has been awarded an estimated $38,110,000 fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for automated fuel handling equipment maintenance. This was a competitive acquisition with three responses received. The estimated dollar amount is for the life of the contract and the maximum dollar amount is $49,500,000. This is a one-year base contract with four one-year option periods. Locations of performance are California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Greenland, Japan and Spain, with a March 12, 2022, base ordering period end date. Using customers are Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, National Guard and Coast Guard. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2021 through 2022 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency, Contracting Services Office, Columbus, Ohio (SP4702-21-D-0001). Abbott Rapid DX North America LLC, Orlando, Florida, has been awarded a maximum $48,750,000 fixed-price with economic-price-adjustment, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for laboratory supplies. This was a competitive acquisition with 32 responses received. This is a five-year contract with no option periods. Location of performance is Florida, with a Feb. 8, 2026, ordering period end date. Using customers are Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and federal civilian agencies. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2021 through 2026 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (SPE2DE-21-D-0017). Metro Medical Equipment and Supply, Saint Ann, Missouri, has been awarded a maximum $42,000,000 fixed-price with economic-price-adjustment, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for hospital equipment and accessories for the Defense Logistics Agency electronic catalog. This was a competitive acquisition with 140 responses received. This is a five-year contract with no option periods. Location of performance is Missouri, with a Feb. 8, 2026, ordering period end date. Using military services are Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2021 through 2026 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (SPE2DH-21-D-0058). Base Utilities Inc.,* Grand Forks and Cavalier, North Dakota, has been awarded a maximum $16,285,037 modification (P00012) to a 50-year utilities privatization contract (SP0600-18-C-8322) with no option periods for additional utility services for two water and two wastewater systems at Grand Forks Air Force Base and Cavalier Air Force Station. This is a fixed-price with economic-price-adjustment contract. Location of performance is North Dakota, with a Jan. 31, 2069, performance completion date. Using military service is Air Force. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2021 through 2069 Air Force operations and maintenance funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Energy, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY Perspecta Enterprise Solutions LLC, Chantilly, Virginia (HC1084-21-D-0002), has been awarded a competitive single-award, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity, firm-fixed-price contract for Global Content Delivery Services II for the Defense Information Systems Agency Operations Center. The contract ceiling is approximately $201,543,314, and the minimum guarantee is $10,000. The place of performance will be at government data centers or future government centers within the continental U.S.; data centers outside the continental U.S.; and other government-approved locations worldwide, in which the government may acquire an operational responsibility. Solicitation HC1084-20-R-0005 was posted on the beta.SAM.gov website as a competitive acquisition and four proposals were received. The period of performance consists of a three-year base period and three one-year option periods, for a total contract life cycle of six years. The Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, is the contracting activity. *Small business https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2498742/source/GovDelivery/

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  October 1, 2019 | International, C4ISR, Security

  France’s new cyber defense ‘conductor’ talks retaliation, protecting industry

  By: Christina Mackenzie PARIS — Maj. Gen. Didier Tisseyre is France's new cyber defense force commander — the “conductor” of an orchestra made up of military officials and the domestic defense industry, as he puts it. Cyber Defence Command was created in 2017 and was expanded in January when Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly announced France will develop and deploy offensive cyber weapons. Tisseyre took on the lead role Sept. 1 from his predecessor and most recently served as the deputy to that former commander. He spoke to Defense News earlier this month in a meeting room at the Armed Forces Ministry. What is your role as the head of Cyber Defence Command? I am a conductor, and my orchestra is made up of the Army, Navy and Air Force chiefs of staff, ANSSI [France's National Agency for the Security of Information Systems], and defense industry leaders. We must protect our systems, be robust, be resilient because if France's vital interests are attacked, then the armed forces must be able to react. Our weapons systems, our command systems are all computer-controlled. This makes them powerful and effective but also vulnerable, so we must be able to protect them. And today this protection must be as global and end-to-end as possible. This means that everyone in the Ministry of the Armed Forces must work together, and there must be a conductor to coordinate the protection and the defense of our interconnected networks. That is my job I have a staff and a number of specialized units who contribute to this defense and coordinate it. But within each armed force — the Navy, the Army, the Air Force — there are cyberwarriors who liaise with us to defend their systems. We work very closely with ANSSI, exchanging information so that we can anticipate future attacks. We also work closely with our fellow NATO members, our bilateral partners and other international organizations. The idea is to be able to anticipate and not just to react. What does France consider a top cyberthreat? Cyberspace is a very positive place for bringing people together and is wonderful for the economy, for arts and so on. But precisely because it brings thousands of people into contact with each other, it is also used to get money fraudulently, to influence, to destabilize, to spread ideologies. And even if we must maintain freedom of expression, there are certain things in France which cannot be said publicly — [incitement to ethnic and racial hatred, for example]. Our principle is that everything that happens in real life is transposable into cyberspace, so for France and many other countries, the law is just as applicable in cyberspace as it is in real life. But because there is a general impression that no rules apply in cyberspace, then individuals and groups use it for criminal activities, spying, destabilizing electoral processes. And the question arises as to whether these individual or groups are being backed by states. As a member of the armed forces, my duty is to be paranoid and assume that the cyber enemy may have a strong, state-backed criminal intent to prepare conflicts, and so that is what we must be prepared for. How do you anticipate the ways imaginative hackers will act? By hiring imaginative youngsters ourselves. Our cyberwarriors have to be extremely motivated to protect the ministry's systems and France, obviously. They must have very specialist IT technical or social media know-how, or be brilliant intelligence gatherers. A lot of what is said on social networks allows us to learn about our enemy, to anticipate possible attacks, or even enables us to hinder their propaganda, particularly on our theaters of operation in Africa or the Levant, for example, where part of our mission is to stop jihadist groups from recruiting. Our cyberwarriors have to have a particular frame of mind because we are not asking them to configure the network or equipment, we are really in a combat situation in cyberspace. We work on operations to defend or to undertake offensive actions to protect our systems, our freedom to act, to guarantee the sovereignty of our systems. Is France confronting specific threats that are different from those faced by other countries? Fundamentally, no, because we are all cyberattacked by people trying to block our computers, and attackers are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their ways of hacking. How does France respond? We must be prepared to react. But France considers that attributing an attack — notably where advanced persistent threats, [or APT], are concerned — is a very political, highly sensitive thing to do. APT can be the work of individuals seeking ways to make money, or being paid by others and potentially linked to intelligence services of other nations. If an organization such as NATO is attacked, then France is, by principle, against collective attribution. Each member of the organization must agree that the attacking individual or group is taking its orders from a state because attribution of blame, as I said, is highly political: You're designating a state as being responsible for attacking another one, and that has a very strong impact. You have to be able to prove it, and the state that has been blamed might not appreciate having the finger pointed at it. In the physical world when an aircraft crosses into another nation's airspace or a vehicle crosses a border, there is concrete proof: radar, photographs and so on. The difficulty in cyberspace is that it's very easy to pass oneself off as somebody else and to hide one's tracks; [just] because an APT is perpetrated by attackers physically present in one country, that [doesn't mean] they were taking their orders from that country. Here's an example to illustrate my point: They could use a server in Germany to send the data to the U.K., which then rebounds in France and finally attacks the United States. So Washington would try and work back to see where the attack came from and would eventually discover that it came from Germany, but that doesn't mean the order to attack came from Germany. In cyberspace, leads very quickly get entangled. So we really have to be extremely careful about a hack-back before thorough due diligence has been undertaken. What France wants is that each member state validates the blame before the finger is pointed. We are against the idea that just because one member blames a state for attacking it, that NATO takes it as a given and invokes Article 5 of the NATO treaty, [which calls for collective action if a member state is attacked]. What would happen if France is attacked? It depends. If France thinks that the attack came from a state and wants a collective reaction from NATO, then there'd be a whole lot of discussions about the risk of escalation, Article 5, the right to self-defend and so on. These notions involve significant commitments for countries, and so we want things to be clearly defined where cyberspace is concerned: What is an attack? Who was targeted? What are the consequences of the attack? Did it touch the physical integrity of nationals of the country? Were the operating systems of a hospital or a power station impacted? We want to take into account the economic or human impact of the attack and the nature of the attacker: Was it an individual having fun? Was it a group, and what were its motivations? Was it a jihadist group with terrorist intent, or was it outright a state pre-positioning itself for future conflicts or trying to wield influence? France wants things to be clear. We want to establish how international laws apply to cyberspace, and as I mentioned earlier, we insist on due diligence. Could you explain what you mean by “due diligence”? If, for example, France sees that it has been attacked via a server in Germany, then “due diligence” means that instead of us simply hacking Germany back, we would ask the authorities in Berlin to act to stop that server being used. So even if, within NATO, a member state is attacked, then France holds that that state is not authorized to hack back without due diligence being undertaken first. It's a bit complex, but we've listed the types of attack, the principle of digital sovereignty, the references to the Tallinn Manual — [the independent academic research product authored by an international group of about 20 experts to guide how international law applies to cyber conflicts and cyberwarfare]. And we've positioned ourselves with regards to this, and in certain particular cases have said, “Be careful, our interpretation of X is slightly different for these reasons,” and we explain why. We also explain that we consider an attack on information systems in France is an attack on our national sovereignty. That gives us the right to riposte, not necessarily in a cyber way but it could be a diplomatic response or an economic one ― it depends on the nature of the attack and the impact it has and on the attacker himself, what his motivations were and in what framework the attack took place. How does the ministry work with industry? The ministry knows how to defend itself, and we have the right, within a very strict framework, to undertake offensive cyberattacks in foreign operations. The attacker knows that a direct attack on us is thus likely to fail. So he will ruse. He'll attack the weak link: the defense industry, notably the subcontractors that may only make a small component of a weapon or an IT system. He'll put a virus or malware in that subcontractor's system, and it will progressively make its way into the major contractor's system and then into the weapon system. And as all these are interconnected, then this is how we would be attacked. So we need to have confidence in the entire supply chain, and we are on the verge of signing a convention with industry aimed at raising general awareness of this risk at every level of industry. France has allocated €1.6 billion (U.S. $1.8 billion) to cyber defense in its 2019-2025 military program law. What are the main spending priorities? To ensure that the system is protected and defendable. Until recently, we concentrated on the functionality of the system: what it was designed to do and who for (the Air Force, the Navy, the Army, etc.). And making the systems secure was an additional layer to the basic functions, so if funds ran out, then sometimes the layer would be only half done or had holes in it. Today we are aware that there is such vulnerability in computer systems that security has to be built in by design. It's part and parcel of the functionality of the system. We're also spending money on the detection of attacks. Our network has sensors in it to detect whether anyone is using the network who shouldn't be. We're working on the characterization of attacks, which means we're collecting data on malware — a bit like a laboratory that might keep a sort of library of viruses and bacteria — to be able to quickly establish what type of attack is being undertaken and therefore what the best “medicine” is for it. And of course we'll be hiring another 1,000 cyberwarriors between now and 2025. https://www.fifthdomain.com/international/2019/09/30/frances-new-cyber-defense-conductor-talks-retaliation-protecting-industry/

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  June 19, 2024 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR

  Small drones will soon lose combat advantage, French Army chief says

  He cited the example of the Bayraktar drone, “the king of the war” at the start of the conflict in Ukraine, that is no longer being used.