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July 24, 2023 | Local, Aerospace

Canadian, French military planes ‘came into contact’ at Guam air base - National | Globalnews.ca

The Department of National Defence told Global News the incident occurred Friday on the ramp at Anderson Air Force Base "in which the two aircraft came into contact."

https://globalnews.ca/news/9853572/canada-french-military-planes-contact-guam/

On the same subject

  • A new Defence Procurement Agency – Would it solve anything?

    November 5, 2019 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    A new Defence Procurement Agency – Would it solve anything?

    By Brian Mersereau Defence Watch Guest Writer During the recent federal election, the issue of considering a new Defence Procurement Agency or DPA surfaced again. The Liberals made such an organization part of their defence platform this time around as part of their plan to improve military procurement. While positive outcomes could result from a new organizational structure, simply installing one will not in and of itself create an efficient procurement model. It most certainly will not address in any substantive manner why taxpayers pay far too much to acquire the defence capabilities Canada needs to protect our sovereign interests in a world that has become increasingly unstable in recent years. It appears that, in many cases, Canada pays more per unit of capability to satisfy its defence needs than most of its allies. Unfortunately, though quite logically, this phenomenon has effectively shrunk the size of our armed forces as the number of platforms we can afford to acquire continues to dwindle due to high costs. While this approach can create short-term jobs, they are ultimately unsustainable since there is no international market for our higher-priced solutions. This is not the direction in which Canada should be headed. Before Canada decides to move ahead with a new procurement agency, it should assemble a “smart persons” panel or forum to thoroughly review the existing system and establish the mandate and objectives of whatever type of organization results from said review. Such a review group must be composed of people from the public and private sector with significant experience, not skewed with staff whose procurement experience primarily consists of exposure to the Canadian “way”. During this review, the panel must examine various issues which are currently perceived to be an impediment to the efficiency of Canada's procurement system. Based on my own years of experience on both the buy and sell sides of the procurement equation, the following areas merit some serious thought: Organizational Structure The fewer individuals, departments and oversight committees with their fingers in the “procurement pie”, the quicker and more coherently things will get done. Even at today's interest rates, time really is money for all involved in the process. Adding more time to a schedule for another management review quite often has a negative impact. While I understand governance and oversight committees have their place, their overinvolvement can produce negative outcomes if mandates are not absolutely clear and if individuals on these committees have limited experience with respect to the issue at hand. Risk Canada's ongoing method for defence procurement is that it will not assume any risk on their side of a contract. If Canada insists the private sector must accept all risk, the private sector will so oblige – but at a significant price and to the detriment of schedules and timelines. As contract prices necessarily increase, so do governments costs to manage the contract. In reality, the most efficient procurement solution for Canada would see some elements of risk managed by the buyer, rather than entirely borne by the seller. More consideration needs to go into balanced risk-sharing formulas. Process Canada has an extremely hands-on procurement process for major systems during the competitive phase, as well as during the implementation of the contract. Even in this digital age, Canada hamstrings its own progress with the sheer degree of detail and bureaucracy it requires; unbelievably, freight trucks are still required to deliver proposals. It seems as though, on occasion, the buyer thinks it knows more about designing and engineering the defence systems Canada needs than the actual designers and engineers for whom it is a primary occupation. Requirements of little or no consequence are painstakingly spelled out in the greatest of detail. Such an approach has a tremendous impact on the amount of time consumed by both the buyer and seller, again driving up costs and extending schedules. Less “hand holding” by the customer must be seriously considered. Sole Source In the procurement world, “sole source” is often viewed as a dirty phrase. Frequently, Canada attempts to run competitions in scenarios where the chances of achieving any meaningful savings or benefits related to competition are low at best. This takes years and drives costs higher at no measurable gain for the buyer. The parameters of when and under what circumstances Canada should move directly to a sole source should be thoroughly reviewed. Significant resources are being wasted managing nearly meaningless processes. Skills Canada's internal skill set for managing large, complex defence procurements does not appear to be adequate. As a result, it turns more and more often to the expertise of external third parties in order to keep up with large private sector firms at the negotiation table from a knowledge and experience standpoint. While there will always be a need for some third-party expertise, project managing many external suppliers in the negotiation phase – each of whom have their own agendas – only further complicates the already convoluted procurement process. Canada would be much better off with an enhanced internal core staff. If Canada takes the time to review the appropriateness of some form of DPA model, it must cast the net wider and review other critical aspects of the procurement process – or else any organizational changes will inevitably succumb to the systematic inertia of the overall process. A failure to do so means Canada will continue struggling mightily to stand-up the level of defence and security necessary to secure its citizens in an increasingly turbulent world. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/a-new-defence-procurement-agency-would-it-solve-anything

  • Le stratagème du ministre Harjit Sajjan pour dégoter des respirateurs

    April 23, 2020 | Local, Security, Other Defence

    Le stratagème du ministre Harjit Sajjan pour dégoter des respirateurs

    (Ottawa) Le ministre de la Défense Harjit Sajjan a pu déjouer les velléités protectionnistes de l'administration Trump et obtenir 200 respirateurs destinés au Canada qui étaient retenus à Boston gr'ce aux liens qu'il a pu établir avec le Pentagone au cours des cinq dernières années. Publié le 21 avril 2020 à 4h00 Selon des informations obtenues par La Presse, les respirateurs en question sur lesquels les autorités canadiennes voulaient mettre la main ne devaient plus quitter le territoire américain à la suite de la décision du président des États-Unis Donald Trump d'invoquer le Defence Production Act (DPA), une loi qui remonte à la guerre de Corée et qui permet à l'administration d'imposer des conditions aux manufacturiers américains, par exemple le type de produits qu'ils fabriquent en priorité, et d'en limiter les exportations. Le président Trump a récemment invoqué cette loi pour empêcher la société américaine 3M d'exporter des masques N95 vers le Canada et des pays d'Amérique latine. Cette décision, qui a soulevé l'ire des autorités canadiennes, et en particulier du premier ministre de l'Ontario Doug Ford, a toutefois été partiellement infirmée une semaine plus tard, et l'entreprise a pu reprendre ses exportations vers le Canada. En coulisses, le ministre Sajjan et ses conseillers ont pu contourner les obstacles érigés par le président américain afin d'obtenir les 200 respirateurs flambants neufs en demandant aux Forces armées canadiennes de procéder à leur achat. « Le ministre et son équipe ont persuadé le Pentagone de les envoyer au Canada. On leur a dit qu'il fallait que la commande soit faite par les Forces armées canadiennes et le Pentagone, en raison des alliances militaires existantes, avait l'autorisation de procéder à l'envoi des respirateurs », a expliqué une source gouvernementale. La Presse a accordé l'anonymat à cette source parce qu'elle n'avait pas l'autorisation de discuter publiquement de ce dossier. « C'est tout de même remarquable ce qui a été fait dans ce dossier. [...] C'est d'autant plus vrai que les relations canado-américaines représentent tout un défi en raison de la crise et que les choses risquent d'empirer encore au sud de la frontière », a ajouté cette source digne de foi. D'un commun accord, le Canada et les États-Unis ont annoncé en fin de semaine que la frontière entre les deux pays allait demeurer fermée pour les voyages non essentiels pour une autre période de 30 jours, soit jusqu'au 21 mai. Ces 200 respirateurs font partie des quelque 400 appareils obtenus par le gouvernement fédéral qui ont été distribués aux provinces au cours des dernières semaines, selon nos informations. Il a été impossible d'obtenir le nombre de respirateurs qui a été remis à chacune des provinces par Ottawa. Au bureau du ministre Sajjan, un proche collaborateur n'a pas voulu commenter l'intervention en coulisses du ministre, préférant braquer les projecteurs sur l'ensemble du gouvernement fédéral durant la crise de la pandémie de COVID-19. « Le ministre a d'excellentes relations avec son homologue de la Défense aux États-Unis. Il s'agit d'un travail d'Équipe Canada », a notamment affirmé ce proche collaborateur, qui a requis l'anonymat. Récemment, le premier ministre Justin Trudeau a annoncé que le gouvernement fédéral avait conclu des ententes avec des entreprises canadiennes comme Thornhill Medical et CAE, entre autres, afin d'acheter 30 000 respirateurs fabriqués au Canada. À la reprise des travaux de la Chambre des communes, lundi, M. Trudeau a indiqué que l'on s'attend à ce qu'une première commande de respirateurs soit livrée en mai. M. Trudeau a d'ailleurs dû expliquer aux Communes pourquoi une agence fédérale avait jeté aux ordures quelque 2 millions de masques N95 et 440 000 gants qui se trouvaient dans un entrepôt de la Réserve nationale stratégique d'urgence (RNSU), qui a pignon sur rue à Regina, au printemps dernier, comme l'a révélé la semaine dernière une enquête de la CBC. La RNSU, qui relève du gouvernement fédéral, permet aux provinces et aux territoires d'obtenir des équipements médicaux qui s'y trouvent en cas de crise sanitaire comme une pandémie. Le premier ministre a indiqué que ces équipements étaient périmés depuis au moins cinq ans, mais il a affirmé que l'on doit revoir les protocoles d'utilisation afin de remettre ces équipements aux provinces pour les utiliser avant qu'ils atteignent la date limite d'utilisation de cinq ans. Cela devrait permettre à l'agence de renouveler son stock en quantité suffisante pour affronter les crises comme celle que l'on vit en ce moment. https://www.lapresse.ca/covid-19/202004/20/01-5270187-le-stratageme-du-ministre-harjit-sajjan-pour-degoter-des-respirateurs.php

  • Canada's arms deal with Saudi Arabia is shrinking

    September 10, 2018 | Local, Land

    Canada's arms deal with Saudi Arabia is shrinking

    The LAV sale is being scaled back. Critics want it killed completely. Murray Brewster · CBC News A Canadian defence contractor will be selling fewer armoured vehicles to Saudi Arabia than originally planned, according to new documents obtained by CBC News. That could be a mixed blessing in light of the ongoing diplomatic dispute between the two countries, say human rights groups and a defence analyst. The scaled-back order — implemented before the Riyadh government erupted in fury over Canada's public criticism of Saudi Arabia's arrest of activists and froze new trade with Canada this summer — could make it politically less defensible for the Liberal government, which has argued it's in the country's business and economic interests to uphold the deal. The documents show General Dynamic Land Systems Canada, the London, Ont.-based manufacturer, was — as of spring last year — going to deliver only 742 of the modern LAV-6s, a reduction from the original 2014 deal. The initial order from the desert kingdom was for 928 vehicles, including 119 of the heavy assault variety equipped with 105 millimetre cannons. Details of the agreement have long been kept under a cloak of secrecy. General Dynamic Land Systems, the Canadian Commercial Corporation (the Crown corporation which brokered the deal) and the Saudi government have all refused to acknowledge the specifics, other than the roughly $15 billion price tag. Last spring, CBC News obtained copies of internal documents and a slide deck presentation from 2014 outlining the original agreement. The latest internal company documents obtained by CBC News are dated March 29, 2017, and indicate the agreement had been amended a few months prior, perhaps in the latter half of 2016. The documents also indicate delivery of the vehicles is already underway and has been for months. CBC News asked for a response from both Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland's office and General Dynamics Land Systems Canada. Both declined comment over the weekend.. A cash-strapped kingdom A defence analyst said the amended order likely has more to do with the current state of Saudi Arabia's finances than its frustration over Canada's human rights criticism. "Saudi Arabia — in part because of low oil prices and in part because of corruption and mismanagement of its own economy — has a large budget deficit," said Thomas Juneau, a University of Ottawa assistant professor and former National Defence analyst. "Spending $15 billion over a number of years for armoured vehicles that it doesn't need that much, at least in a pressing sense, is an easier target for budget cuts, for sure." The kingdom has projected a budget deficit of $52 billion US this year and the country's finance minister said last spring it is on track to cut spending by seven per cent. When it was signed, the armoured vehicle deal was a way for Canada to cement relations with an important strategic partner in the region, said Juneau. Should Ottawa cancel the sale? He said he wonders if it's still worthwhile, in light of the furious diplomatic row that began over the Canadian government's tweeted expressions of concern for jailed activists — and quickly escalated with the expulsion of Canada's ambassador, the freezing of trade, the cancellation of grain shipments and the withdrawal of Saudi medical students from Canadian programs. "Now, with the dust not really having settled after the dispute from August, is that partnership, in abstract terms, still necessary? I think it is. But is it still possible?" said Juneau. Human rights groups say they believe there is even more reason for Ottawa to walk away from the deal now, given the events of this summer and the declining economic benefit. "We're compromising our position on human rights for even less than we thought," said Cesar Jaramillo, the executive director of Project Ploughshares, which has opposed the agreement from the outset. "Even if it's not a huge decrease, it is still a decrease. It should, at least in political and economic terms, make it easier for the Trudeau government to reconsider this deal, especially in terms of the latest diplomatic spat." Full article: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-s-arms-deal-with-saudi-arabia-is-shrinking-1.4815571

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