September 30, 2020 | International, Aerospace
WASHINGTON — The Defense Department and Lockheed Martin reached a handshake agreement that will require the defense giant to invest about $70.6 million to fix an ongoing problem with F-35 spare parts, one that resulted in increased government labor costs, the department announced Sept. 29.
For the past few months, Lockheed and the Defense Contracts Management Agency have been locked in a dispute over more than 15,000 F-35 spare parts sent to the U.S. military with incorrect or incomplete “electronic equipment logs” or EELs, which allow the parts to be absorbed into the F-35′s logistics system and installed on the jet.
Lockheed and the Defense Contracts Management Agency expect a final agreement to be formalized sometime within the next two weeks or so, said DCMA spokesman Matthew Montgomery, who confirmed the $70.588 million deal to Defense News.
The use of EELs — which allow the government to track the usage and lifespan of major F-35 parts — is unique to the joint strike fighter program and is meant to help inform smarter, more cost-effective maintenance and buying practices.
But when parts are delivered with inaccurate EEL information, it can take hours for military maintainers and Lockheed support personnel to track down the correct data that will allow a part to be uploaded into the system and installed in the aircraft.
Instead of paying back the government directly for the added costs associated with the EELs, Lockheed will “compensate the government with Lockheed Martin investments” that will ultimately ensure spare parts are delivered with accurate electronic logs, said Lockheed spokesman Brett Ashworth.
“We appreciate the partnership with the Defense Contract Management Agency and the F-35 Joint Program Office, and we remain focused on ensuring the warfighter has the support they need to employ the F-35′s game changing capabilities,” he said.
The final sum of the agreement is less than half of the $183 million sum that DCMA initially projected that the government had spent to correct wrong or incorrect EELs since 2015. It was not immediately clear why DCMA had agreed to a compensation deal worth so much less than the department's estimated costs.
During a July hearing, lawmakers from the House Oversight and Reform Committee chastised Lockheed for its failure to deliver parts ready to fly.
“That's $183 million that the American taxpayers were forced to pay because Lockheed Martin failed to meet the requirements of its contract,” said Rep. Carolyn Maloney, the committee's chairwoman.
But Greg Ulmer, Lockheed's vice president for the F-35 program, said then that the company should not take all of the blame for the spare parts problems.
“It's not all associated with Lockheed Martin performance. There are many aspects associated with [parts that are] not ready for issue,” he said.
June 11, 2021 | International, Naval
PASCAGOULA, Miss. — Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Ingalls Shipbuilding division has been awarded a contract with a potential total value of $724 million for planning yard services in support of in-service amphibious ships, the company announced June 8. “Ingalls has a...
February 2, 2021 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
By: Sean Kennedy The Biden administration has the opportunity to institute reforms in several crucial areas at the Department of Defense. First and foremost, it should eliminate the overseas contingency operations account. The continued justification for the OCO has reached the stage of parody. Originally intended for emergency spending in response to the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the account has transitioned into a slush fund designed to inflate spending at the DoD far above the baseline budget and for purposes unrelated to foreign wars. In fiscal 2015, approximately 50 percent of OCO funding was for nonemergency items. An August 2019 Congressional Budget Office report noted that approximately 85 percent of funding for the OCO in FY20 and FY21 “is designated for base-budget and ‘enduring' activities,” funding maintenance in support of foreign operations that will continue regardless of force size. OCO spending has long outpaced the military's presence in combat zones. In FY08, the U.S. deployed an average of 187,000 troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. OCO spending topped $187 billion that year, equating to $1 million per service member. The DoD currently has approximately 5,000 troops stationed in these countries, meaning the $70.7 billion in OCO spending in FY20 equates to $14.1 million in funding per service member — more than 14 times the amount in FY08. With President Joe Biden unlikely to substantially increase the military's footprint in Afghanistan and Iraq, outsized OCO spending will continue in FY21 and beyond, barring reform. The DoD has received approximately $2 trillion from the OCO since 2001. Were it considered to be a federal agency, the FY20 OCO funding would make it the fourth largest, dwarfing spending at all other agencies except the departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs. The incoming administration must also expand efforts to make DoD finances more transparent and accountable. The bookkeeping is so abysmal that areas within the DoD have been on the Government Accountability Office's list of programs at high risk for waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement since 1995. The financial black hole is nowhere more evident than in the DoD's inability to pass a clean audit, unlike every other federal agency. On Nov. 16, 2020, the Pentagon announced that for the third straight year it failed its financial review. Progress has been incremental, with seven of 24 DoD agencies thus far producing clean audits. However, the DoD estimates that it will not be able to pass an audit before 2027, or 37 years after it was required to do so by law. The DoD must also determine the replacement mechanism for the chief management officer position, which was the No. 3 civilian slot until it was eliminated in the FY21 National Defense Authorization Act. Despite identifying $22.3 billion in savings between FY18 and FY21, legislators bowed to Pentagon pressure, distributing the duties and responsibilities of the role to various existing positions with far less authority. The acquisition side is also a mess, including several infamous procurement disasters that epitomize the Pentagon's systemic problems. The foremost example is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The program has been under continuous development since the contract was awarded in 2001, and has encountered innumerable delays and cost overruns. Total acquisition costs now exceed $428 billion, nearly double the initial estimate of $233 billion. The total costs for the F-35 are estimated to reach $1.727 trillion over the lifetime of the program. On Jan. 14, 2021, then-acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller labeled the Joint Strike Fighter a “piece of sh*t.” Enough said. Many of the problems with the F-35 program can be traced to the decision to develop and procure the Joint Strike Fighter simultaneously. Whenever problems have been identified, contractors needed to go back and make changes to aircraft that were already assembled, adding to overall costs. Of course none of this has stopped the Pentagon from asking for Joint Strike Fighter funding, and members of Congress from supplying it, oftentimes exceeding the request from the DoD. This trend continued in FY20, when legislators added $2.1 billion in earmarks to fund the acquisition of 22 Joint Strike Fighters beyond the amount requested by the Pentagon, bringing the total amount of earmarks for the program to $8.9 billion since FY01. Lastly, the Biden administration would do well to introduce some stability into Pentagon leadership. Every defense secretary brings to the job different priorities for the government's largest bureaucracy. President Donald Trump burned through two confirmed and four acting secretaries, the most for any administration. President Biden should endeavor to reverse this churn. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/02/01/these-five-items-should-top-bidens-defense-priorities/
June 10, 2020 | International, Aerospace
By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force will delay a full-rate production milestone for the KC-46 aerial refueling tanker to the end of fiscal 2024 to correspond with a fix for one of the aircraft's key systems, the service announced late Monday. The Pentagon's independent weapons tester — Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Robert Behler — intends to conclude operational testing of the KC-46 only after prime contractor Boeing fixes the tanker's critical deficiencies and has finalized its production configuration. “Accordingly, the Air Force will defer the KC-46 full rate production decision until after the completion of [initial operational test and evaluation], and the receipt of the statutorily-required Beyond Low Rate Initial Production report from [Behler],” the Air Force said in a statement. The KC-46 program has several remaining category 1 deficiencies, the term used by the Pentagon to describe the most serious form of technical problems. Two of the deficiencies involve the aircraft's remote vision system, which is a series of cameras and sensors used by the boom operator to see outside the KC-46 and refuel other aircraft. The Air Force has contended that the RVS does not properly function in all weather and lighting conditions; the service has refused to deploy the KC-46 until the problem is fixed. Boeing in April agreed to completely redesign the system on its own dime, which will take until at least 2023. One other issue involves the KC-46 boom, which was developed to meet NATO-specific requirements but cannot refuel the A-10 aircraft. The Air Force is paying to redesign the boom actuator, as the service signed off on the original design and did not realize until afterward that it did not meet the specifications needed to refuel the A-10. In March, the Air Force announced an additional category 1 deficiency after maintainers found fuel leaking between the tanker's primary and secondary fuel protection barriers. It is unclear whether this is still a problem, as Boeing had already developed a fix and began retrofitting aircraft when the issue was revealed. “Given its confidence in deficiency resolution timelines for both the aerial refueling boom and Remote Vision System, the Air Force is rescheduling the KC-46's Full Rate Production Decision milestone to late Fiscal Year 2024,” the service stated. The Air Force notes that delaying the full-rate production decision will not affect the program's cost — which is locked into place courtesy of a firm, fixed-price deal with Boeing that holds the contractor financially responsible for cost overruns;nor will it cause the service to alter its current delivery schedule. Boeing is already producing KC-46s at “full rate,” which for the program is 15 tankers per year. It delivered the first KC-46 to McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, in January 2019. Since then, Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma, and Pease Air National Guard Base, New Hampshire, have also taken on new KC-46s. Boeing is set to produce 179 KC-46s over the program of record. The company has racked up cost overruns of about $4.6 billion in excess of the $4.9 billion contract it was awarded in 2011. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/06/09/the-air-force-delays-a-full-rate-production-decision-for-the-kc-46/