Here's what stood out at the 2021 Dubai Airshow

On the same subject

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  November 8, 2022 | International, C4ISR

  Pentagon to unveil zero-trust cyber strategy

  Zero trust is often likened to '€œnever trust, always verify.'€ Or, as Pentagon CIO John Sherman put it: '€œYou truly trust no one or no thing.'€

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  May 25, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  The US needs to rethink its overseas supply chain

  By: Thomas Ayres As Americans respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, we have become acutely aware of the outsized impact of our dependence on China in the supply chain. Pharmaceutical companies learned key chemicals and minerals are exclusively made or mined in China. For instance, reports show China produces 97 percent of the antibiotics, 95 percent of ibuprofen and 91 percent of hydrocortisone consumed in the U.S. market. Hospitals also learned that while China produces 50 percent of the world's face masks, they are of dubious reliability. There is cause for concern with the quantity or quality of ventilators. In sum, we learned as citizens what we in the Department of Defense have known for some time: Our national security supply chain must be free from dependence on China. The DoD's concern for its supply chain is not new. Congress spurred activity over a decade ago by questioning the DoD's supply chain risk management, or SCRM, policies. The National Defense Strategy‘s recognition of a new era of strategic, great power competition further sharpened the DoD's focus, propelling recent efforts to enhance regulations and procedures in addressing supply chain threats. We are transitioning from analog to digital, with the goal of planes, ships, tanks and satellites all seamlessly sharing data — a lethal version of the ride-sharing app on your smartphone. Yet, even as the DoD builds this future, the threat of supply chain disruption and concerns about component quality within the electronic backbone are real. Counterfeit or planted microelectronic parts can be vectors for cybersecurity intrusions. Recently, for instance, the DoD voiced concerns that Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei's 5G solution provided back doors, purposefully or negligently, for data corruption, data extraction, system failure or worse. Similarly, SCRM policies have increasingly addressed the concern of intellectual property theft enabled by subcomponents designed to allow information to flow back to larger architectures. The COVID-19 pandemic is giving new meaning to that threat, and the risk of disruption to both raw and manufactured materials from abroad has become apparent. Our SCRM focus must broaden in response to COVID-19 to better address national production capacity and sustainability. Being able to assure access to the minerals, chemicals, subcomponents and components required to build weapon systems is essential. China supplies 80 percent of the rare earth minerals imported to the U.S., many of which are essential to electronic parts. Since 1933, the Buy American Act has required federal agencies, including the DoD, to purchase items manufactured in the U.S. Additionally, these items must be made from supplies mined or made in the U.S. The act is implemented by regulations requiring analysis of the components — where they are mined or made, and where they are assembled. Companies that falsify “Made in America” designations can be debarred from the federal marketplace. In July 2019, months before the pandemic emerged, President Donald Trump issued an executive order seeking to increase the minimum domestic manufacture thresholds above the current 50 percent floors. The pandemic now shows even more needs to be done. We must increase to President Trump's mandated percentages, and we must also analyze where each of the subcomponents are manufactured. This doesn't mean we need to back away from allied contributions or alliance-based weapon systems like the F-35 fighter jet, which benefits from the industrial cooperation of nine partner nations. But in light of COVID-19, it does mean that when we make risk-based and measured decisions to produce an alliance system, we program in several months' worth of component backlogs to allow continued production during future quarantines. The majority of our weapon systems are made in the U.S. by American companies with greater than 50 percent of component production and assembly done domestically. Yet, what is less clear are the composition of the subcomponents in the components themselves. Not recognizing the risks of the subcomponents equally jeopardizes the new reality of disruptions to our supply chain and risks of data extraction, degradation and spying, about which we have increasingly been concerned. Recently, I sought to buy a grapefruit spoon on the internet and found it exceedingly difficult to learn where the offered spoons were made. The harder it was to find, the more I suspected it was made in China. Perhaps Congress should pass a law making it easier to learn the source of manufacturing. Ensuring my access to an American-made grapefruit spoon is not nearly as vital as assuring our access to critical weapon systems, rare earth materials, and pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. A vital step is knowing the source countries of components and subcomponents. We must have deeper knowledge of the full supply chains of subcomponents, and how and where they are produced. Trust can only come once we know all that is required to understand our supply chains and we seek even greater focus in our new normal. Our security depends on it. Thomas Ayres is general counsel for the U.S. Air Force. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/22/the-us-needs-to-rethink-its-overseas-supply-chain/

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  November 5, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Here’s how the Pentagon will test industry’s counter-drone tech for an enduring capability

  By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — Beginning early next year, the Pentagon will host the first opportunity for industry to demonstrate counter-drone technology aimed at small systems, the next step in a plan to test out new capabilities twice a year at common test ranges, according to Army officials in charge of the effort. Pentagon leaders approved in late September a set of requirements to help counter small drones, laying a path for how industry can develop technology to plug into a single command-and-control system. The Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, or JCO, kicked off the pursuit with an industry open house Oct. 30. The defense secretary delegated the Army in November 2019 to lead the effort to consolidate the wide range of counter-small unmanned aerial system, or C-sUAS, capabilities into a select group of interim systems. Those systems have now been chosen, with the JCO turning its sights toward establishing an enduring collection of capabilities — while acknowledging that there's no silver bullet and that a layered approach is needed, using both kinetic and non-kinetic means, to defeat small drones. The JCO has identified three sites for common test ranges to conduct evaluation and testing of promising counter-drone technology, according to Col. Greg Soule, resources director for the Army's Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office. The RCCTO is supporting the JCO by helping identify material solutions for C-sUAS, and it is leveraging its work on directed-energy and high-power microwave technologies to roll into a solution. A decision memo on locations is awaiting approval by Army Vice Chief Gen. Joseph Martin. Soule said those locations will be shared “when the time is right.” The JCO also set up a working group to look into testing C-sUAS capabilities in an urban environment, according to Soule. To ensure the JCO is comparing apples to apples when it comes to counter-drone technology, it also stood up a working group with representatives across all the armed services to establish joint test protocols. That protocol is out for signature and should be in hand by Nov. 6. Additionally, Ellen Lord, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, has asked the JCO to look at the feasibility of establishing a single source for training targets “to help reduce costs, reduce lead times and streamline the waiver process,” Soule said. “All services already have sources for where they go now. So potentially we could find a way to find some synergies and efficiencies.” Industry interest Industry is eager to get technology in front of both the JCO and RCCTO. Many defense companies participating in the Association of the U.S. Army's annual virtual conference last month highlighted counter-drone capability. General Dynamics Mission Systems featured its recent partnership with Dedrone, a leader in drone detection and defeat technologies using machine-learning software, sensors and electronic attack methods. Lockheed Martin showcased its MoRFIUS C-sUAS capability that it is working on with the RCCTO. MoRFIUS uses high-power microwave technology in an aerial platform. That capability can be used to extend the range beyond current counter-drone defeat systems to defeat drone swarms. MoRFIUS is a recoverable and reusable technology. Leonardo DRS also highlighted its mobile counter-drone capability using Moog's Reconfigurable Integrated-weapons Platform turret with multiple kinetic effectors, different electro-magnetic and infrared sensors, an onboard radar, and electronic warfare technologies. Raytheon, which has a foothold in the C-sUAS market with its Coyote Block II kinetic effector and its Ku-Band Radio Frequency System, emphasized its track record and upgrades to the system. The industry open house had roughly 500 industry representatives tune in. The JCO will select industry applicants to show off their capabilities at the first demo, which is to take place in the second quarter of fiscal 2021. At the demonstration, the JCO will provide instrumentation and threat surrogates as well command-and-control elements. Industry participants will need to bring technology to defeat drones, said Adam Martin, who briefed industry on test ranges and protocols at the open house. There will be technology insertion points in the enduring architecture after each demonstration that address gaps, he added. https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2020/11/04/heres-how-the-pentagon-will-test-industrys-counter-drone-tech-for-an-enduring-capability/