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January 13, 2020 | International, Aerospace

FUTUR AVION DE CHASSE EUROPÉEN : LA FRANCE RETROUVE SON LEADERSHIP AÉRONAUTIQUE

13 janvier, par Nicolas Lefebvre

D'ici 2040, le Rafale français, l'Eurofighter allemand et le F-18 Hornet espagnol laisseront la place aux chasseurs de 5e génération du programme européen SCAF. Si les partenaires français de ce consortium tirent leur épingle du jeu, reste à mettre en place une gouvernance à long terme dans ce programme.

Juin 2019, salon aéronautique du Bourget. Le patron de Dassault Aviation, Éric Trappier, ne cache pas sa fierté au moment de poser pour les photographes devant la maquette grandeur nature de la future fierté européenne en matière d'avions de chasse. Le SCAF (Système de Combat Aérien Futur, également baptisé Next Generation Fighter, noms provisoires) est certes sur les rails, mais il n'y a pas une minute à perdre.

Le patron de Dassault est un homme pressé, et veut se donner les moyens de tenir les délais. « Ce n'est pas de l'impatience, c'est indispensable », a-t-il lancé au Bourget, avec le planning en tête : première démo en 2026, produit fini en 2040. Cela semble loin ; en réalité, c'est demain pour l'Europe de la défense. Tenir ce planning passera forcément par une bonne entente avec ses différents partenaires français, allemands et espagnols, les trois pays scellant leur avenir commun le 17 juin dernier.

Genèse d'un projet pan-européen

L'histoire mérite un petit retour en arrière. Initialement, Dassault devait convoler en justes noces avec les Britanniques de BAE Systems, l'un des géants européens de l'industrie de la Défense. En 2010, Paris et Londres – gr'ce au tandem Sarkozy-Cameron – sont sur la même longueur d'ondes, les premiers budgets de développement sont débloqués, le futur avion de chasse mobilise les équipes de part et d'autre de la Manche.

En 2014, Dassault Aviation, BAE Systems, Thales, Rolls-Royce et Safran, auxquels se sont joints les Italiens de Leonardo, travaillent de concert. Jusqu'en 2016. Les dents grincent dans de nombreuses entreprises, Safran (ex-Snecma) a par exemple peur de disparaître, écrasé par Rolls-Royce. La coopération s'arrête, le divorce est consommé ; les Français cherchent d'autres partenaires et se rapprochent des Allemands.

En juillet 2017, le tandem Merkel-Macron lance le programme SCAF, sous l'impulsion commune du Français Dassault Aviation et de l'Allemand Airbus Defence And Space, basé à Munich. La planification stratégique pour les 25 prochaines années se fera donc en haut lieu, suivant la vision de ces deux intégrateurs systémiques, piliers du projet.

Ont par la suite rejoint l'aventure le motoriste allemand MTU Aero Engines et son homologue français Safran, l'électronicien français Thales et leurs homologues allemands Rohde & Schwarz et Hensoldt, ou encore le consortium européen MBDA et le fabricant allemand Diehl pour l'armement. Depuis, les Britanniques ont choisi de s'allier avec les Italiens de Aeronautica Militare et les Suédois de Saab pour développer le chasseur furtif Tempest.

Mission nº1 : d'abord régler le différend avec les Allemands

Retour à l'actualité. Les plus belles histoires connaissent elles aussi des couacs. Tout allait bien jusqu'en juin 2019, les Allemands sortant alors le carnet de chèque pour compléter un premier budget de 65 millions d'euros pour les 24 prochains mois, sachant que la recherche et développement s'élèvera à terme à 200, voire 300 millions d'euros. Mais Paris et Berlin sont tombés sur un os : les deux pays ne suivent pas la même politique diplomatique à l'export.

Au printemps dernier, l'affaire des livraisons d'armes françaises à l'Arabie saoudite, dans le cadre de la guerre au Yémen, passe mal outre-Rhin. Le Bundestag – le Parlement allemand – est en effet très réticent à l'idée d'exporter des armes servant dans cette guerre en particulier. Une position d'autant plus paradoxale que l'Allemagne est beaucoup plus indulgente vis-à-vis des entreprises qui exportent par exemple des armes vers la Turquie, embourbée dans sa guerre contre les Kurdes.

Un avion commun comportant des éléments français et allemands devra néanmoins nécessairement respecter les contraintes les plus fortes. En l'occurrence celles venues de Berlin. En septembre, le patron français de Dassault a demandé aux gouvernements français et allemand de régler cette brouille diplomatique pour ne pas entraver la bonne marche du programme commun.

Mission nº2 : ensuite assurer le leadership systémique du projet

Côté français, le programme SCAF réunit aujourd'hui les compétences et savoir-faire de fleurons de l'industrie de la Défense : l'avionneur Dassault Aviation, le motoriste Safran, ainsi que Thales pour la partie électronique. Trois grandes entreprises du secteur régalien de la Défense. Thales – dirigé par Patrice Caine – et Safran – dirigé par Philippe Petitcolin –ont en commun d'avoir l'Etat français à leur capital, respectivement à hauteur de 25,7% et de 11%. L'Etat français est également présent indirectement chez Dassault via la participation d'Airbus (9% environ, sachant que l'l'Etat détient 11% d'Airbus). A noter que Dassault Aviation, aux mains de la famille Dassault – détient également 24,3% de Thales.

Chez Dassault, la priorité est désormais de garder la main sur le projet, et de rendre pérenne la coopération franco-allemande. Une position de nº1 qui fait d'ailleurs des envieux, notamment du côté de Thales.

Entre les patrons de Dassault et de Thales, il y a d'ailleurs un petit air de Je t'aime, moi non plus, les deux entreprises se connaissant par cœur puisqu'elles collaborent sur de nombreux projets et en premier lieu sur le fleuron militaire de Dassault, le Rafale.

En réalité, Patrice Caine a très mal pris de ne pas être intégré au projet SCAF, dès le début. De plus, si Dassault considère que le fuselage reste la pierre angulaire d'un avion furtif, Thales pense que l'électronique et l'intelligence artificielle ont déjà pris le pas sur plateformes. En clair, Thales ne veut plus de l'étiquette de simple « équipementier » et se rêve désormais en maître d'œuvre des grands programmes d'armements. Sachant que du terrestre au naval, en passant par l'aérien, Thales est présent absolument partout, l'argument n'est pas complètement dénué de sens. De plus, les systèmes d'armes actuels sont effectivement centrés sur la communication entre systèmes de capteurs et systèmes d'armes, cœur de métier de Thales version défense. Pour autant, Thales manque cruellement de l'expérience nécessaire à la conduite des grands programmes.

Il est possible que l'adoubement de Caine par Emmanuel Macron, après le rejet de la candidature d'Henri Proglio en 2015, ait donné des ailes au patron de Thales dont l'ambition dévorante dérange, en interne comme en externe.

Le groupe n'hésite pas en effet à croiser le fer avec ses condisciples industriels de défense et Patrice Caine est coutumier des joutes franco-françaises : pour marquer son territoire il n'hésite pas, par exemple, à présenter Thales face à des partenaires français comme cela a pu être le cas face au constructeur maritime Naval Group début 2019 lors d'un important appel d'offre belgo-néerlandais qu'il a finalement perdu. L'histoire ne manque pas de sel quand on sait que la société détient 35% de Naval Group. Thales ne manque pas pourtant de sujets internes de préoccupation voire d'inquiétude, parmi lesquels l'intégration de Gemalto, spécialiste de la cybersécurité récemment racheté pour 5,6 milliards d'euros.

Pour revenir sur le futur avion de chasse européen, Éric Trappier garde la main. Et à travers lui, l'aéronautique français dans son ensemble. La France n'est pas la seule bénéficiaire de ce programme ; se joue aussi à long terme la souveraineté industrielle de l'Europe sur les questions de défense.

https://www.taurillon.org/futur-avion-de-chasse-europeen-la-france-retrouve-son-leadership

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  • Army Wrestles With SIGINT vs. EW

    August 1, 2018 | International, Land, C4ISR

    Army Wrestles With SIGINT vs. EW

    This internal budget battle in the Army could cede the actual battlefield to high-powered Russian and Chinese jammers, electronic warfare advocates fear, with the same lethal consequences for US troops that Ukrainian forces have suffered since 2014. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. CAPITOL HILL: Can the Army unite its rival tribes to retake the high-tech high groundof modern warfare, the electromagnetic spectrum? Those are the stakes in the service's ongoing internal struggles over doctrine, organization, and an obscure but critical program known as TLIS, the Terrestrial Layer Intelligence System. Army leaders see TLIS as a powerful synergy between Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), which eavesdrops on and locates enemy transmissions, and Electronic Warfare (EW), which jams those same transmissions and can be used for cyber warfare. But TLIS, as the “intelligence” in its name implies, began as a pure SIGINT system, before it absorbed the former Multi-Function Electronic Warfare (MFEW) program, and there's always the possible it might regress. At least some electronic warriors hear worrying rumors that the more powerful SIGINT branch wants to save money on TLIS by cutting back on its jamming capabilities, leaving it as a passive sensor rather than an active weapon. This internal budget battle in the Army could cede the actual battlefield to high-powered Russian and Chinese jammers, electronic warfare advocates fear, with the same lethal consequences for US troops that Ukrainian forces have suffered since 2014. “The intel people will finally be able to get rid of EW, again, by taking it over, again, and crushing it,” said Col. Jeffrey Church, who until his retirement last year was the most senior Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) in the Army: There are no EW generals, in stark contrast to SIGINT and cyber. Church was also the last EWO to run the electronic warfare directorate on the Army's Pentagon staff: His immediate successor was an engineer — an expert on bridges and minefields, not electrons. Both the staff directorate and the EWO specialty have since been folded into Army cyber. “Next,” Church predicted in a bitter post on LinkedIn, “they will cancel the intel portions of MFEW they insisted be written into the EW requirements (i.e. when MFEW was folded into TLIS) and thereby kill the MFEW program.” “I don't think your article will affect anything for Army EW,” a weary Church told me. “The only thing that will is when a bunch of our soldiers get killed. Then the Army will act shocked by it and be compelled to bring EW into the force with real gear, real operators, real training and real EW leadership.” Synergy or Tension? From drones to foot troops, radio to radar, networks to GPS, everything in a 21st century military has to send and receive signals through the electromagnetic spectrum — which means everything can be detected, targeted, and disrupted. Russia and China have invested massively in electronic warfare since the end of the Cold War while the US disbanded most EW. Today, while the Navy and Air Forcehave high-cost jamming aircraft — the EA-18G Growler and EC-130H Compass Call respectively — they're too rare, expensive, and over-powered to support small units on the ground. But the US Army's own arsenal consists almost entirely of short-range jammers that fit in backpacks or on Humvees, most of them designed to disable radio detonators for roadside bombs. Meanwhile Russia and China have fleets of heavy trucks packed with high-power EW gear that can scramble US signals hundreds of miles away. The Army's original solution to this problem was called Multi-Function Electronic Warfare (MFEW), a common family of sensors and jammers meant to go on trucks, drones and manned aircraft — eventually. But the service decided to fold MFEW into the land-based TLIS and an as-yet-unnamed airborne counterpart instead. “We are specifically looking at putting SIGINT, EW and cyber on the same platform, both on the ground and in the air,” Maj. Gen. Robert Walters told a July 18 forumorganized by the Association of Old Crows, an EW professional group. As commander of the Army's intelligence center at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., Walters is the Army's lead “proponent” for TLIS requirements, with the cyber center at Fort Gordon, Ga. in a significant supporting role. There's a natural synergy here, Walters said. SIGINT finds the enemy signals and analyzes them, then cyber and electronic warfare can target the weak links in the enemy network. While he didn't say so out loud, that's how it's done by the current masters of the art, the Russians, whose SIGINT and EW officers often sit side by side in the same vehicle so they can quickly coordinate devastating electromagnetic maneuvers, as in Ukraine. But there's also a tension between the two sides. Intelligence naturally wants to keep listening to the enemy signals to find out more, whereas cyber/EW warriors want to shut them down or use them to feed cyber weapons into. Now, you can try to shut down only the enemy's most secure networks so they have to use the ones SIGINT can easily crack. That's what the Russians did against the Ukrainians, forcing them off their military radios onto personal cellphones — but it's not easy to pull off. Second, when EW turns on its jammers, their powerful signal doesn't just disrupt enemy transmissions: It also provides a big target for enemy missiles and artillery radars to home in on. At best, that means the combined SIGINT/EW unit has to relocate frequently, disrupting listening operations. At worst, it means the combined unit blows up in one shot. (You can reduce the risk to your troops by putting the jammers on drones or ground robots operated from a distance by remote control, but that creates a new problem: The enemy can detect, decode and jam your communications with the robots). So how well will the Army balance these tensions? Right now, said one well-connected electronic warfare expert, the intelligence branch is in the driver's seat, and “once again intel has defaulted back to SIGINT, which disappoints me.....It's not looking too good.” This attitude may be overly pessimistic. But there's little cause for optimism in Army's unhappy history of internecine intramural rivalries and cancelled procurement programs. Is Big Six Missing One? The current Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, is trying to make a break with the service's dysfunctional past. He has named six modernization priorities, each with its own Cross Functional Team (CFT), led by a general who can pull in people from across the bureaucracy and put them in one room until they thrash out how to get things done. Those CTFs, in turn, will play a leading role in the new Army Futures Command being stood up in Austin. But electronic warfare has no clear home in this new structure. Of the six priorities — 1) long-range artillery, 2) armored vehicles, 3) aircraft, 4) networks, 5) air & missile defense, and 6) soldier equipment, in that order — the closest fit is with Priority No. 4, the network. That covers all the computerized communication and data systems the Army uses to transmit orders and intelligence: Lose all those and you're back to carrier pigeons. So, understandably, the emphasis of the network Cross Functional Team is on defending the US network from jamming and hacking, not on attacking enemy networks with our own jammers and hackers. A spin-off CFT on Precision Navigation & Timing has a similar defensive focus: How can US forces keep track of where everything is and when it has to happen if the enemy disrupts GPS? For that matter, the entire cyber center at Fort Gordon, despite having responsibility for electronic warfare, evolved when the old Signal Corps school took on a growing role in not just setting up communications networks but defending them. It's only recently taken on an offensive role, and primarily in cyberspace rather than electronic warfare. So all these leading Army organizations have the same focus on defense. Their job is to keep the network working under attack. But defense is not enough on its own. A tank doesn't just need armor: It needs a gun. Maybe a network doesn't just need cybersecurity and resilience against jamming: It needs to be able to attack the other side's network. A rmy Secretary Mark Esper has made clear the Big Six priorities are unlikely to change, so don't expect him to add electronic warfare as Big No. 7 any time soon. But there is still some wiggle room to spin off subsidiary priorities with their own Cross Functional Teams. In fact, from the beginning, there've been eight Cross Functional Teams, not six: The network priority is also supported by that Precision Navigation & Timing CFT, while the soldier equipment CFT spun off a training simulations CFT. Now, that eight-fold structure hasn't changed since the initial announcement in 2016. But there's no fundamental reason why the Army couldn't add a ninth CFT for electronic warfare, supporting the network priority area alongside the PNT team. What this would take — besides a memo from Esper and Milley — would be a fundamental change in how the Army thinks about “the network,” as an offensive weapon instead of a mere technical function. his is a philosophical shift. There's a longstanding tendency in Western militaries to focus on reducing what Clausewitz called the friction and fog of war, the innumerable minor mishaps, miscommunications, and misunderstandings that constantly impede military operations. The ambition to “lift the fog of war” reached its peak of hubris in the “transformation” movement before the invasion of Iraq, where the fog rolled in again unstoppably. Eastern tradition, by contrast, has long seen fog and friction as not only obstacles but weapons: You want to reduce them for your own side, of course, but also to increase them for the enemy. Hence Sun Tzu's maxim that “all warfare is based on deception,” a concept the Russians have embraced with their doctrine of maskirovka and which seems well-suited to the information age. So, instead of treating the network simply as an electromagnetic means to reduce our fog and friction, why not extend the concept to include electromagnetic means to increase the enemy's fog and friction? Instead of an asset to be defended, what if it's a weapon to attack? s the Network a Weapon? There are signs the Army is starting to think this way. At the Capitol Hill forum, Lt. Gen. Stephen Fogarty — current head of Army Cyber Command and former chief of the Cyber Center at Fort Gordon — even talked about the network as a “weapon” and (intentionally or not) echoed Sun Tzu. “We've truly started to operationalize the Army networks,” Fogarty said. “That's the foundational weapons platform for a modern military.” Without the network, he said, you can't do persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); long-range precision fires (LRPF) with missiles and artillery; logistics; medical evacuation; or command and control (C2, what the Army now calls “mission command”). Now, Fogarty's list is about how the network enables other parts of the Army, rather than the network taking the offensive itself. Still, calling the network a “weapons system” is a long way from the old-school Army view of it as a mere utility, a technical convenience the geeks set up in the back room so the real mencan go up front and fight. Why is the network so fundamental, in Fogarty's view? Because, he said, “our ability to operate and defend that network is what gives our commanders the ability to do two things: to see the adversary and see ourselves.” Once again, Fogarty is not talking about using the network to attack, only to “operate and defend.” Nevertheless, he's sounding an awful lot like Sun Tzu: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.” Or as Fogarty put it, with less elegance but more specificity: “In the multi-domain battlespace, not of the future but of today, against peer and near-peer adversaries, whoever has the ability to sense, understand, decide, and act faster than their opponent (will) enjoy decisive advantage.” (He's referring to an updated version of the classic OODA loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, & Act). That requires bringing formerly disparate specialties together in new ways, said Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, the deputy chief of Army staff for intelligence (G-2). “Our primary challenge is one of integration,” he told the AOC forum. “Future forces must integrate SIGINT, electronic warfare, and cyber capabilities to provide situational awareness” — i.e. know yourself, know your enemy — “and enable commanders to deliver kinetic and non-kinetic fires” — i.e. both physical attacks, like missiles, bombs, and shells, and intangible ones, like hacking and jamming. This transition can be intellectually and culturally wrenching, Berrier admitted. “While the tribes have come together, there are still members of the tribes that are a little obstinate,” he said to laughter. For those who don't see the inherent benefits, however, Berrier added, “another reason we're doing it is that the Chief of Staff of the Army told us to do it.” https://breakingdefense.com/2018/07/army-wrestles-with-sigint-vs-ew/

  • Marines want a better way do force-on-force tactical shooting training

    June 11, 2018 | International, Land

    Marines want a better way do force-on-force tactical shooting training

    After decades of using laser-type devices for shooting simulations and force-on-force tactical warfighting, the Marine Corps is asking for a new way to do fake shooting. A recent request for information is asking the commercial industry to bring ideas to the Corps that would help it make simulated shooting more realistic for up to a battalion-size force and improve current systems. Some versions of those systems have been in operation since Nintendo's Duck Hunt video game was considered high-tech shooting and laser tag advertisements dominated Saturday morning cartoons. This won't hit every Marine Corps installation but many will have it. Based on the RFI, the systems would be employed “to provide turnkey instrumented exercises with After Action Review (AAR) at 29 Palms, Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, MCB Hawaii, MCB Okinawa or MCB Quantico within 3 weeks of notice, as well as support additional exercises upon request at Camp Fuji, Japan, Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Center, MCB Yuma, and specified reserve locations.” And the Marines are not doing this alone. They will be leveraging the Army's Live Training Engagement Component software. That's a tactical training framework so that simulations can be on the same standards and work jointly with other services and potentially foreign partners. One of the key cross functional teams that the Army formed last year included simulated training environment work. The goal is to incorporate better simulations for training at all levels, beginning in the design and procurement of future weapons and other equipment systems. The Corps wants a system that would be able to simulate all weapons and vehicles typically seen in a battalion, which would include at least: M4/M16; M9 or sidearm, the M27 Infantry Automatic Weapon; hand grenades; rocket propelled grenades; Light Anti-Tank Weapon; 60mm mortars; 81mm mortars; Claymore antipersonnel mine; Mk-19 grenade launcher; Russian machine gun; AK-47 variants; M41 TOW; Javelin missile and the Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle. It would distinguish between a hit, wound or miss and record information for after-action reviews. Marine Corps Times first reported news of this initiative last year following an interview with then-program manager for Training Systems at Marine Corps Systems Command, Col. Walt Yates. At the time, Yates described some of the shortfalls of using lasers when gauging accuracy and real-world effects. “A laser is at the speed of light, and the bullet is not,” he said. Yates previously said that though the current shooting systems are a generational change from old MILES, or multiple integrated laser engagement system, lasers have fundamental flaws for realistic battle scenarios. For example, laser-based systems shoot line-of-sight, making arcing weapons such as mortars and grenade launchers more difficult to simulate. Lasers can also be deflected by light concealment such as tree leaves and thin walls. And the number of troops and shooting ranges will change with new systems. The first generation ITESS accommodated 120 Marines and opposition forces, the second generation expanded to 1,500 with a communication radius of 5 to 8 km. The third seeks to track up to 2,500 Marines, making it capable of battalion on battalion exercises envisioned by the commandant, Yates said in the November interview. A new simulator must act more like a real bullet, requiring Marines to lead their moving targets, fire rifles on semi, burst and fully automatic modes and ensure the bullet travels in the realistic path, which is not perfectly line of sight, he said. https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2018/06/04/marines-want-a-better-way-do-force-on-force-tactical-shooting-training/

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