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May 22, 2019 | International, Aerospace

Extension de durée de vie pour les Super Hornet de l'US Navy

Par Emmanuel Huberdeau

Boeing a entamé le chantier d'extension de la durée de vie des Super Hornet de l'US Navy. A partir de 2021, les appareils seront aussi portés au standard Block III.

Sept chasseurs F/A-18E/F Super Hornet de l'US Navy sont actuellement alignés dans le nouveau hall de l'usine de Boeing à Saint Louis consacré au chantier d'extension de durée de vie de ces appareils. Il s'agit des premiers avions à bénéficier de cette rénovation. L'ensemble de la flotte de Super Hornet de l'US Navy va voir sa durée de vie portée de 6 000 à 10 000 heures de vol. L'US Navy prévoit de réaliser en moyenne 200 heures de vol par appareil par an.

Le prolongement de la durée de vie du Super Hornet se fait en 18 mois pour les premiers appareils puis durera 12 mois à mesure que le processus sera mieux maitrisé. Boeing va inauguré une seconde chaine de modification du Super Hornet à San Antonio. Au total 40 avions pourront être modifiés chaque années. Au total près de 550 Super Hornet subiront ce chantier.

A partir de 2021 Boeing commencera à livrer les 76 Super Hornet Block III neufs commandés par l'US Navy. Les Super Hornet Block II seront aussi tous modernisés au standard Block III. La modernisation se déroulera en parallèle du chantier d'extension de durée de vie.

Les Super Hornet Block III seront équipés de réservoirs conformes, d'un système de communication par satellite, de la liaison de données TTNT, d'un écran tactile unique dans le cockpit (ACS) et du capteur optronique IRST.

http://www.air-cosmos.com/extension-de-duree-de-vie-pour-les-super-hornet-de-l-us-navy-123543

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