January 13, 2021 | International, Aerospace
By Arnaud Sobrero
The Japanese archipelago lies in a volatile region rife with historical tensions and territorial disputes. China's defense spending has increased at a double-digit rate annually for much of the past three decades. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has drastically modernized its air capabilities with development of the J-20 fighter and the upcoming FC-31, and has demonstrated consistently assertive behavior, including airspace violations and military buildups in the South China Sea.
North Korea, a nuclear power since 2006, has also shown belligerence by firing ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan, while Russia has violated Japanese airspace on several occasions prompting Japan to scramble its F-15J fleet.
Those geopolitical challenges are clearly stated in Japan's Mid Term Defense Plan and National Defense Plan Guidelines, which define Japan's long-term procurement strategy. To effectively address those security challenges, these documents claim, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) needs to modernize its existing fleet and significantly upgrade its capabilities.
Japan's 200-plus-strong F-15J fleet, built under license by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, has been the backbone of Japan's air superiority for close to 40 years. Nonetheless, they face some obsolescence issues that have led the Japanese defense ministry to purchase a $4.5 billion upgrade package to modernize 98 of them into a “Japan Super Interceptor” configuration equipped with better radar, avionics, and weaponry.
The F-2 program, co-developed with Lockheed Martin, has been facing operational challenges and has a staggering unit cost of $170 million. Even though the last F-2 was delivered in 2011, the program faces significant obsolescence issues and will remain in service for a shorter duration than the F-15J.
Given the dynamic geopolitical environment Japan finds itself in, the Japanese defense ministry is determined to fill the capability gap created by the old F-15J and the future retirement of the F-2. It has decided to purchase its first batch of 42 F-35As, destined to replace the aging F-4, followed by a second batch comprised of 63 F-35A and 42 F-35B fighters, worth $23 billion.
The F-35 is a formidable addition to Japan's military apparatus: it offers stealth, excellent sensor and networking capabilities,and an ability to fuse real-time information for rapid decision-making rather than high speed and pure dogfighting capabilities.
From a traditional standpoint, the F-35 scarcely represents the air superiority platform the JASDF wants to counter China's growing fleet of J-11 fighters, or even the more advanced platforms recently deployed by Beijing, such as the Su-35 or J-20. Japan has tried to acquire the F-22 from Lockheed Martin but ultimately failed to do so, given that the aircraft was not designed for export due to its sensitive technologies. The JASDF is still looking to acquire a stealthy, twin-engine, long-range air superiority fighter with a robust payload and advanced networking capabilities, which will provide Japan with a qualitative military edge over growing Chinese air capabilities.
ADVERTISEMENT
Beyond the requirement of modernizing JASDF's capabilities, maintaining a competitive defense industrial base has been a primary strategic goal for Japan. After the Second World War, Japan spent decades rebuilding its aerospace sector, building U.S. military aircraft under license, including the F-86, F-4, F-15, CH-47, and P-3. Building sophisticated aircraft under license has been Japan's de facto strategy to acquire new technologies and upgrade its industrial base skills.
Japan has historically relied on U.S. companies to import military hardware through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) framework. These imports have increased considerably in the last decade, its proportion of the country's total defense budget rising from 0.9 percent in 2010 to 8.9 percent in 2019 with big-ticket items like the F-35, the MV-22, and the E-2D being procured through the government-to-government route. Outside of servicing those types of equipment, tier 1 and tier 2 domestic companies have not benefited from those FMS programs. Japanese companies face restrictions on sharing some critical software intellectual property and technical data from equipment that has originated in the U.S. original. Even Japan's industrial participation in the manufacture of the F-35 has been a far cry from what the local industry had envisioned initially, when Japanese companies were seeking a larger role in the aircraft's production. Recently, in a blow to U.S. military exports, the Japanese defense ministry has decided to scrap two major programs – the Global Hawk and the Aegis Ashore – due to some price and technical issues.
These developments may suggest that Japan is potentially reconsidering its engagement with the U.S. on military hardware and could utilize government funds instead for domestic development to enhance the competitiveness of its defense industrial base and, more importantly, gain full control of defense capabilities, as well as on future upgrades. According to the ministry of defense's Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency, Japan is looking to leverage the technologies the industry has captured through license production, as well as the development of the experimental ATD-X stealth aircraft, for the development of an indigenous fighter, known as F-X. This would represent a shift in Japan's long-term procurement strategy and could indicate that Japan is now looking to partner for the design and manufacturing of sixth-generation fighter aircraft technologies.
After former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's return to power in 2012, he stopped years of decline in defense spending by boosting investments modestly. After eight years of slow but steady increase, the Japanese defense budget stands at a record of about $51.6 billion with the FY21 budget request. In addition, the Japanese defense ministry decided to “convert” its Izumo helicopter destroyer into a small aircraft carrier capable of accommodating 12 F-35B jet fighters, which will strengthen Japan's offensive capabilities. Following the lift of the ban on defense exports, Japan had seen last year its first successful military export, with the sale of air radar systems to the Philippines.
Japan would likewise welcome an opportunity to export the F-X, its future sixth-generation fighter, with the assistance of an international partner – if not to promote military ties with friendly nations, then in order to reduce the tremendous development cost. Of all the challenges the F-X program will face, its affordability will be the most pressing.
The F-X program represents a clear continuation of Abe's robust defense doctrine and will further cement its legacy into Japan's long-term military modernization. By bolstering the country's domestic defense industrial base and by enabling technological transfer, the F-X program will help Japan catch up with China and Russia in the stealth fighter market.
Based in Asia for more than 10 years, Arnaud Sobrero is an independent writer focused on defense technology and East Asian affairs.
https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/does-japan-need-to-develop-a-new-fighter-aircraft/
July 14, 2024 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR
As the prime contractor, GA-EMS is responsible for the spacecraft bus and EO/IR payload design development, build, AIT and has assembled a highly experienced, best-in-class team to deliver the EWS satellites.
August 17, 2020 | International, Naval
Mark Pomerleau The Navy's primary cyber outfit released its strategic plan for the next five years, a document that calls for using the service's networks as a warfighting platform. The document, released by 10th Fleet/Fleet Cyber Command in late July, covers the range of responsibility of the command, which is the only fleet with a global footprint in all the military domains, to include cyberspace operations, signals intelligence and recently, the Navy's component to U.S. Space Command. Much has changed since the last strategic plan was published in 2015, namely, the rampant activity of adversaries on a daily basis below the threshold of armed conflict to strategically harm the United States. “The long term competition we face today is between democracies and authoritarian regimes, freedom of navigation, and access to shared world markets. Our long-term strategic competitors are executing strategic cyber activities to alter the international order. This will not let up,” the document read. It added that adversaries learned the military's game but now the military must learn the adversary's game and play it on their terms. “Historically, to undermine a state's power required territorially-focused, overt armed attacks or physical invasion. While that is and will always remain a possibility, technology has provided our adversaries with the ability to achieve their objectives without traditional military force,” the document read. “Currently, our adversaries are engaging us in cyberspace and the costs are cumulative – each intrusion, hack or leak may not be strategically consequential on its own, but the compounding effects are tantamount to what would have been considered an act of war.” The Navy, and military by extension, must be prepared to contest this activity. “I am certain the opening rounds of a 21st century great power conflict, particularly one impacting the maritime domain, will be launched in the electromagnetic, space, or cyber domains. If the Navy is to fight and win, Navy networks must be able to survive those hits and ‘fight hurt,'” Vice Adm. Timothy White, who rarely speaks publicly, said in the forward to the strategy. “Our people must be trained and exercised to fight through those hits. This contest spans the continuum of competition and conflict. We must win this contest during the day-to-day competition of ‘peacetime operations,' where our networks are already in close contact, under constant probing and attack. If we do not, we will be at a severe disadvantage during crisis and lethal combat.” The plan, which continues to nest within the Navy's overarching vision of Distributed Maritime Operations, features a three pronged vision; acting first in full spectrum information warfare, fighting and winning in a fully contested battlespace and promoting modernization and innovation. Moreover, the plan tweaks the five goals outlined in the previous strategic plan 2015-2020. They include: Operating the network as a warfighting platform: Following several high profile network breaches, the Navy must tighten the screws on its IT. Fleet Cyber is responsible for operating, maintaining and defending the network and as part of that, service leaders recognize they must “fight hurt” when networks are strained. They are also working ton establish greater cyber situational awareness across the service and reduce the intrusion attack surface. Conducting fleet cryptologic warfare: Fleet Cyber published its cryptologic cyber warfare vision in 2019. As part of the new strategy, command officials said they will seek to expand and enhance capabilities in distributed signals intelligence as part of its contribution to Distributed Maritime Operations. Delivering warfighting capabilities and effects: Fleet Cyber wants to expand how it delivers effects on the battlefield to include accelerating and synchronizing information warfare capabilities across Maritime Operations Centers, advancing integration of cyber effects into Navy and Marine Corps concepts and creating tactical cyber teams along with a maritime fires cell to provide expertise across the fleet for delivering cyber effects. Accelerate Navy's cyber forces: Fleet Cyber needs to develop a plan to meet increased demand, both for its joint force requirements through U.S. Cyber Command and Navy specific requirements. Leaders are also looking to mature organizational structures and command and control relationships between various cyber entities that control forces across the globe such as Joint Forces Headquarters–DoDIN, Joint Force Headquarters–Cyber and Cyber Operations–Integrated Planning Elements. Moreover, with the additional importance of the space domain, Fleet Cyber will look to exploit the increasing convergence between space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Establish and Mature Navy Space Command: The document states that Fleet Cyber's goal is to “maintain maritime superiority from the sea floor to space with a core emphasis on lethality, readiness and capacity,” and so officials must re-focus to provide the best space integration possible as the service component to Space Command. The strategy also articulates Fleet Cyber's role in enabling Distributed Maritime Operations, which is underpinned by assured command and control, battlespace awareness and integrated fires. All of those require robust networks, information and completion of the kill chain. https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2020/08/13/the-new-strategy-from-navys-cyber-command/
July 12, 2023 | International, Aerospace, Naval
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi heads to France on Thursday to deepen ties with New Delhi's oldest strategic partner in the West, with a slew of high-profile defence deals expected and a new joint plan to ensure stability in the Indo-Pacific.