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  December 7, 2022 | International, Aerospace

  Robins Air Force Base cleared to replace JSTARS fleet

  The battle management squadron will start arriving at Robins in 2023 and become fully operational by October 2024.

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  October 23, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Battle Force 2045 could work — if defense leaders show some discipline

  By: Timothy A. Walton and Bryan Clark U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper is sprinting. With less than four months left in the administration's term, he unveiled a new vision for the Navy that would grow the fleet to more than 500 manned and unmanned vessels from today's 296 ships. Although some dismiss Esper's Battle Force 2045 concept as a political ploy shortly before an election, it could lead to a more effective and affordable future fleet — as long as Navy and Department of Defense leaders can avoid loading it down with expensive options. The Navy clearly needs to change its force design and operational approach. Even though naval forces are increasingly important to deter and defeat Chinese aggression, the Navy's previous plan to build a force of 355 ships lacked resilience and firepower, fell short on logistics, and was projected to cost 50 percent more than the current fleet. The Navy tried to adjust that plan with an integrated naval force structure assessment, but Esper rejected it, as it failed to implement new concepts for distributed multidomain operations and would be too expensive to realistically field. Instead, over the course of nine months, he and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist led a study taking a fresh look at the Navy's force structure. The Hudson Institute contributed to the project by developing one of three fleet designs that informed the new plan. Hudson's proposed fleet is affordable to acquire and operate. Even though it consists of 581 vessels, more than 200 are unmanned or have small crews. The Hudson study's conservative estimates suggest it can be acquired for the ship construction funding in the Navy's President's Budget for fiscal 2021, adjusted for inflation, and would only cost moderately more than the current one to operate. The Hudson proposal becomes more affordable than the Navy's plan by gradually rebalancing the fleet to incorporate more smaller, less-expensive ships and fewer large multimission combatants. The proposed fleet would also constrain the size and cost of some large new ships, such as the future large surface combatant and next-generation attack submarine. Employing new operational concepts, the proposed fleet would outperform the current Navy in important metrics for future operations. First, the proposed fleet's groups of manned and unmanned vessels would generate more numerous and diverse effects chains compared to today's Navy, improving the force's adaptability and imposing greater complexity on enemy decision-making. Second, the fleet would deliver more offensive munitions from vessels and aircraft over a protracted period, and defend itself more effectively using distribution, shorter-range interceptors and electric weapons. Lastly, it enhances the fleet's amphibious, logistics and strategic sealift capacity. Overall, this results in a Navy that can help the joint force prevail across a range of potential scenarios, including the most challenging ones such as an attempted Chinese attack on Taiwan. The Hudson fleet is also achievable. Its shipbuilding plan relies on mature technologies or allows sufficient time to complete needed engineering and operational concept development before moving ships into serial production. The plan sustains the industrial base through stable ship-construction rates that avoid gaps in production and smoothly transition between ship classes. Even with this measured approach, however, the fleet can rapidly evolve, reaching more than 355 manned and unmanned vessels by 2030, and 581 by 2045. Although Battle Force 2045 focuses on ships, the Navy needs to spend more on improving repair yard infrastructure, growing munitions stocks, and providing command-and-control capabilities to the force. As the Hudson study shows, ship construction savings could help fund these and other enablers, but only if the Navy and the DoD have the discipline to avoid expensive new investments, such as building a third attack submarine every year, installing boost-glide hypersonic missiles on old destroyers or pursuing a significantly larger combatant to follow the Arleigh Burke class. Even if the procurement cost of these programs was funded through budget shifts within the DoD, each will incur a sustainment bill that is not factored into Navy plans and could accelerate the descent toward a hollow force. The Navy is now developing a new shipbuilding plan as part of its FY22 budget submission. Congress should carefully assess that plan and, in collaboration with the DoD, refine the budget. Esper may depart, but the results of this study can serve as a starting point for an operationally effective and fiscally sustainable fleet for the next administration. Timothy A. Walton is a fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Defense Concepts and Technology, where Bryan Clark is a senior fellow. Along with Seth Cropsey, they recently completed a study of future naval force structure. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/10/22/battle-force-2045-could-work-if-defense-leaders-show-some-discipline/

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  July 9, 2020 | International, Naval

  US Navy shakes up the carrier Ford program after latest setback

  By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON –The officer overseeing the deployment of the carrier Gerald R. Ford was fired Wednesday, the latest jolt to the trouble program that has been operating under a microscope as technical problems with nearly two dozen new technologies bundled into the lead ship have piled up. Capt. Ron Rutan was removed by Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition James Geurts last Wednesday in connection with his “performance over time” in the role as program manager for the ship. “Based on the recommendation of PEO Aircraft Carriers [Rear Adm. James Downey] due to performance over time, ASN RDA Geurts reassigned CVN 78 (PMS 378) Program Manager Capt. Ron Rutan to Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) staff, and selected Capt. Brian Metcalf, previously LPD 17 program manager and Executive Assistant to COMNAVSEA, as his relief, effective 1 July,” according to a statement from Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman Rory O'Connor The Navy said the change was made to get “fresh eyes” on the effort to get the new aircraft carrier through its post-delivery test and trial period, which will go on through the rest of this year before the ship heads into full-ship shock trials, where live explosives are set off next the ship to see how it handles battle damage. “While there is no perfect time for leadership transitions, it is prudent to bring in renewed energy now to lead the CVN 78 team through the challenges ahead,” the statement reads. “Capt. Metcalf's proven program management acumen and extensive waterfront experience will be a tremendous asset to the CVN 78 team in the months ahead.” News of Rutan's removal was first reported by USNI News. The Ford has had a witches' brew of technical problems and accompanying delays and setbacks since construction of the ship began in 2005. Much of the trouble is the result of trying to pack too much new stuff in a single new hull, and Rutan's firing shows the problems are still vexatious, said Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and analyst with the Telemus Group. “Obviously the problems on the Ford are still beyond the managers' ability to control them,” Hendrix said . “And while this may be a blow to Capt. Rutan's career, it sounds like they just needed to move on to someone who will take a different approach and brought a different perspective. It may be more about getting to the next guy as it is removing the current guy. “Look, I don't think it's possible to overstate the complexity of the Ford program.” The ship, conceived in an era when the Defense Department was looking to make giant steps forward in military technology while it had no direct peer competitors, packed at least 23 new technologies into the lead ship. Those included a complete redesign of the systems used to arm, launch and recover the ship's aircraft. All those systems have, in their turn, caused delays in getting the Navy's most expensive-ever warship to the fleet, which was originally to have deployed in 2018, but now will likely not deploy until 2023. The Ford cost the Navy roughly $13.3 billion, according to the latest Congressional Research Service report. Trials and tribulations The latest hiccup came in the form of a fault in the power supply system to the electromagnetic aircraft launch system, which is replacing the old steam catapult system on the Nimitz-class carriers. The fault curtailed flight operations on the ship for several days while the crew and contractors tried to identify the issue. Prior to the latest EMALS issue, the Advanced Weapons Elevators – which are designed to reduce the time it takes to get bombs armed and to the flight deck for mounting on aircraft – became the center of a firestorm and contributed to former Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer's firing last year. In January 2019, Spencer announced he'd told the President that if the weapons elevators aren't functioning by mid-summer, then he should fire him. But within months Spencer had to admit that the weapons elevators would not be finished until the end of 2021 or maybe 2022, which he blamed on Huntington Ingalls Industries for not communicating adequately. Making the Ford deployment ready was a focus of former acting Navy Secretary Thomas Modly, who likened the ship to an albatross around the Navy's neck. “The Ford is something the president cares a lot about, it's something he talks a lot about, and I think his concerns are justified,” Modly said. “It's very, very expensive, and it needs to work. “And there is a trail of tears that explains why we are where we are, but right now we need to fix that ship and make sure it works. There is nothing worse than having a ship like that, our most expensive asset, being out there as a metaphor for why the Navy can't do anything right.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/07/07/the-us-navy-shakes-up-the-carrier-ford-program-after-latest-setback/