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June 5, 2020 | International, Aerospace

Croissance rapide du marché Les Avions De Combat avec des entreprises leaders, période de prévision 2020-2028

Une donnée informative intitulée as, Les Avions De Combat market a été publiée par Report Consultant. Il examine de plus près les différents aspects des entreprises, qui alimentent la croissance des entreprises. En outre, il offre des facteurs importants, qui freinent le progrès des industries. Les analystes ont utilisé des techniques de recherche primaires et secondaires pour analyser efficacement les données. Le marché mondial Les Avions De Combat devrait croître dans un proche avenir. Il se concentre sur les scénarios actuels avec les documents historiques pour comprendre l'existant et futuriste portée.

Les Avions De Combat le marché comprend les acteurs clés sont: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, Airbus, Embraer, Dassault Aviation, Avions russes, Sukhoi, Pilatus Aircraft, Alenia Aermachhi, Saab AB, Eurofighter Typhoon

Obtenir Un Exemple De Lien: https://www.reportconsultant.com/request_sample.php?id=10214

En outre, les principaux outils utilisés pour améliorer les résultats des entreprises sont Les Avions De Combat market. Pour les perspectives d'affaires solides et stables, différents paramètres ont été analysés dans les régions mondiales telles que L'Amérique du Nord, l'Amérique latine, L'Asie-Pacifique, L'Europe et L'Inde.

L'augmentation rapide de Les Avions De Combat provoque également le développement des industries. Une compréhension claire du sujet a été examinée en fournissant une analyse approfondie des divers attributs des entreprises.

Demander Le Lien De Remise: https://www.reportconsultant.com/ask_for_discount.php?id=10214

L'objectif principal de ce rapport de recherche est de fournir une analyse complète qui explique clairement comment les tendances récentes pourraient avoir un impact sur l'avenir du marché Les Avions De Combat. L'étude estime les facteurs pour stimuler la performance des entreprises. Différents facteurs internes et externes tels que sont examinés qui contribue à alimenter la croissance du marché Les Avions De Combat. Cette analyse complète offre les facteurs de retenue, ce qui permet de s'attaquer aux obstacles devant les entreprises. Le but de ce rapport informatif est de permettre aux lecteurs de comprendre les moyens de découvrir les opportunités mondiales dans l'espace du marché.

Les Avions De Combat Marché fournit une connaissance détaillée du scénario de marché de la taille de l'industrie, part, croissance, tendances, développement régional, aperçu des principaux fabricants et 2028 prévisions. Le rapport offre une analyse complète et les perspectives de marché à venir sur la base des données passées et présentes recueillies, triées et analysées par année passée et présente.

Pour plus D'informations, Cliquez ici: https://www.reportconsultant.com/checkout?id=10214

Les Avions De Combat rapport D'étude de marché TOC (table des matières):

1. à propos du marché Les Avions De Combat

2. Paysage De La Concurrence Sur Le Marché Mondial

3. La Part De Marché Mondial

4. Analyse De La Chaîne D'Approvisionnement

5. Les Profils D'Entreprise

6. Mondialisation et commerce Les Avions De Combat marché

7. Distributeurs et clients

8. Importation, exportation, consommation et valeur de consommation par grands pays

http://pechealliance.com/les-avions-de-combat/

On the same subject

  • HOW HACKED WATER HEATERS COULD TRIGGER MASS BLACKOUTS

    August 14, 2018 | International, C4ISR

    HOW HACKED WATER HEATERS COULD TRIGGER MASS BLACKOUTS

    WHEN THE CYBERSECURITY industry warns about the nightmare of hackers causing blackouts, the scenario they describe typically entails an elite team of hackers breaking into the inner sanctum of a power utility to start flipping switches. But one group of researchers has imagined how an entire power grid could be taken down by hacking a less centralized and protected class of targets: home air conditioners and water heaters. Lots of them. At the Usenix Security conference this week, a group of Princeton University security researchers will present a study that considers a little-examined question in power grid cybersecurity: What if hackers attacked not the supply side of the power grid, but the demand side? In a series of simulations, the researchers imagined what might happen if hackers controlled a botnet composed of thousands of silently hacked consumer internet of things devices, particularly power-hungry ones like air conditioners, water heaters, and space heaters. Then they ran a series of software simulations to see how many of those devices an attacker would need to simultaneously hijack to disrupt the stability of the power grid. Their answers point to a disturbing, if not quite yet practical scenario: In a power network large enough to serve an area of 38 million people—a population roughly equal to Canada or California—the researchers estimate that just a one percent bump in demand might be enough to take down the majority of the grid. That demand increase could be created by a botnet as small as a few tens of thousands of hacked electric water heaters or a couple hundred thousand air conditioners. "Power grids are stable as long as supply is equal to demand," says Saleh Soltan, a researcher in Princeton's Department of Electrical Engineering, who led the study. "If you have a very large botnet of IoT devices, you can really manipulate the demand, changing it abruptly, any time you want." The result of that botnet-induced imbalance, Soltan says, could be cascading blackouts. When demand in one part of the grid rapidly increases, it can overload the current on certain power lines, damaging them or more likely triggering devices called protective relays, which turn off the power when they sense dangerous conditions. Switching off those lines puts more load on the remaining ones, potentially leading to a chain reaction. "Fewer lines need to carry the same flows and they get overloaded, so then the next one will be disconnected and the next one," says Soltan. "In the worst case, most or all of them are disconnected, and you have a blackout in most of your grid." Power utility engineers, of course, expertly forecast fluctuations in electric demand on a daily basis. They plan for everything from heat waves that predictably cause spikes in air conditioner usage to the moment at the end of British soap opera episodes when hundreds of thousands of viewers all switch on their tea kettles. But the Princeton researchers' study suggests that hackers could make those demand spikes not only unpredictable, but maliciously timed. The researchers don't actually point to any vulnerabilities in specific household devices, or suggest how exactly they might be hacked. Instead, they start from the premise that a large number of those devices could somehow be compromised and silently controlled by a hacker. That's arguably a realistic assumption, given the myriad vulnerabilities other security researchers and hackers have found in the internet of things. One talk at the Kaspersky Analyst Summit in 2016 described security flaws in air conditioners that could be used to pull off the sort of grid disturbance that the Princeton researchers describe. And real-world malicious hackers have compromised everything from refrigerators to fish tanks. Given that assumption, the researchers ran simulations in power grid software MATPOWER and Power World to determine what sort of botnet would could disrupt what size grid. They ran most of their simulations on models of the Polish power grid from 2004 and 2008, a rare country-sized electrical system whose architecture is described in publicly available records. They found they could cause a cascading blackout of 86 percent of the power lines in the 2008 Poland grid model with just a one percent increase in demand. That would require the equivalent of 210,000 hacked air conditioners, or 42,000 electric water heaters. The notion of an internet of things botnet large enough to pull off one of those attacks isn't entirely farfetched. The Princeton researchers point to the Mirai botnet of 600,000 hacked IoT devices, including security cameras and home routers. That zombie horde hit DNS provider Dyn with an unprecedented denial of service attack in late 2016, taking down a broad collection of websites. Building a botnet of the same size out of more power-hungry IoT devices is probably impossible today, says Ben Miller, a former cybersecurity engineer at electric utility Constellation Energy and now the director of the threat operations center at industrial security firm Dragos. There simply aren't enough high-power smart devices in homes, he says, especially since the entire botnet would have to be within the geographic area of the target electrical grid, not distributed across the world like the Mirai botnet. But as internet-connected air conditioners, heaters, and the smart thermostats that control them increasingly show up in homes for convenience and efficiency, a demand-based attack like the one the Princeton researchers describes could become more practical than one that targets grid operators. "It's as simple as running a botnet. When a botnet is successful, it can scale by itself. That makes the attack easier," Miller says. "It's really hard to attack all the generation sites on a grid all at once. But with a botnet you could attack all these end user devices at once and have some sort of impact." The Princeton researchers modeled more devious techniques their imaginary IoT botnet might use to mess with power grids, too. They found it was possible to increase demand in one area while decreasing it in another, so that the total load on a system's generators remains constant while the attack overloads certain lines. That could make it even harder for utility operators to figure out the source of the disruption. If a botnet did succeed in taking down a grid, the researchers' models showed it would be even easier to keepit down as operators attempted to bring it back online, triggering smaller scale versions of their attack in the sections or "islands" of the grid that recover first. And smaller scale attacks could force utility operators to pay for expensive backup power supplies, even if they fall short of causing actual blackouts. And the researchers point out that since the source of the demand spikes would be largely hidden from utilities, attackers could simply try them again and again, experimenting until they had the desired effect. The owners of the actual air conditioners and water heaters might notice that their equipment was suddenly behaving strangely. But that still wouldn't immediately be apparent to the target energy utility. "Where do the consumers report it?" asks Princeton's Soltan. "They don't report it to Con Edison, they report it to the manufacturer of the smart device. But the real impact is on the power system that doesn't have any of this data." That disconnect represents the root of the security vulnerability that utility operators need to fix, Soltan argues. Just as utilities carefully model heat waves and British tea times and keep a stock of energy in reserve to cover those demands, they now need to account for the number of potentially hackable high-powered devices on their grids, too. As high-power smart-home gadgets multiply, the consequences of IoT insecurity could someday be more than just a haywire thermostat, but entire portions of a country going dark. https://www.wired.com/story/water-heaters-power-grid-hack-blackout/

  • Insufficient missile defense funding would leave Americans vulnerable

    February 26, 2020 | International, Aerospace

    Insufficient missile defense funding would leave Americans vulnerable

    The U.S. Missile Defense Agency submitted its report on unfunded priorities to Congress last week, which includes a number of priorities worth more than $1.1 billion. The list demonstrates the tangible consequences of a flat Pentagon budget request and provides a road map for lawmakers to ensure that the U.S. homeland and America's forward-deployed troops have sufficient missile defense protection. The Trump administration requested $705.4 billion for the Department of Defense for fiscal 2021, a level that fails to keep pace with inflation. Accordingly, the DoD is only requesting $9.2 billion for FY21 for the MDA — more than an 11 percent reduction from the FY20 enacted amount of $10.4 billion. The National Defense Authorization Act requires the MDA to submit a list to Congress of items not included in the administration's budget request but that are “necessary to fulfill a requirement associated with an operational or contingency plan of a combatant command or other validated requirement.” The list includes programs that combatant commanders genuinely need and would have included if additional resources were available. The MDA's top unfunded priority for FY21 is $231 million for 10 additional Standard Missile-3 Block IIA missiles. The SM-3 IIA missile is designed to intercept medium- and intermediate-range missiles. This additional purchase would bring the total number to 24 missiles a year, which MDA calls the “maximum sustainable production rate per year without further investment.” In addition to the SM-3 IIA's vital existing capabilities against medium- and intermediate-range missiles, the DoD believes that the missile could potentially be adapted to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles. In response to a mandate in the NDAA, the MDA plans to conduct a flight test this spring, known as FTM-44, to determine whether an SM-3 IIA could intercept an ICBM. If successful, the SM-3 IIA could then provide an additional and complementary layer of protection for the U.S. homeland against a limited ICBM attack from an adversary such as North Korea. Consequently, keeping the SM-3 IIA production line at full speed would enable the U.S. to meet combatant commander requirements for medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile defense. And if the test this spring is successful, optimized ongoing production would also allow the DoD to more quickly field SM-3 IIAs for homeland defense against ICBMs. The MDA's second- and third-highest unfunded priorities relate to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system. These include $319 million to procure an eighth THAAD battery for the United States and $30 million to procure trucks required to support THAAD systems. The THAAD is a rapidly deployable land-based missile defense system designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles during their terminal (or final) phase of flight. Since the program was initiated, the MDA reports, THAAD has completed 15 successful intercepts in 15 attempts. THAAD uses hit-to-kill technology to destroy an incoming warhead. It is effective against short-, medium- and some intermediate-range ballistic missile threats. The DoD can transport the THAAD system by air, land or sea. Iran's January ballistic missile attack on U.S. service members at two bases in Iraq highlighted the lack of sufficient U.S. ballistic missile defense capacity. With no U.S. ballistic missile interceptors in range, U.S. forces could only watch and wait for impact. Had a THAAD system been deployed in the region, the U.S. could have intercepted the Iranian ballistic missiles and better protected U.S. troops. Acquiring an eighth THAAD battery makes not only operational sense, but also financial sense. Saudi Arabia is purchasing a large quantity of THAAD systems. A U.S. and Saudi “synchronized” purchase would enable the U.S. to benefit from the associated economies of scale. The fourth priority on MDA's unfunded list is $39 million to “develop technology and advanced command and control to integrate networked sensors to detect and track advanced cruise missile threats.” As Gen. Terrence O'Shaughnessy, the commander of Northern Command, highlighted in congressional testimony on Feb. 13, the U.S. homeland remains incredibly vulnerable to a cruise missile attack. He testified that “advanced cruise missiles now carried by Russian aircraft and submarines present a growing challenge to our current sensor networks and have the range and accuracy to strike military and civilian targets throughout the United States and Canada.” O'Shaughnessy argued that investments in cruise missile defense capabilities “are necessary to defend our vital facilities and infrastructure, preserve our national ability to project power abroad, and help to safeguard our citizens and vital institutions.” That is exactly what MDA's unfunded priority would do, and the burden of proof should be on those who argue that it should not be funded. A fundamental responsibility of the federal government is to protect the American people. The MDA's report on unfunded priorities to Congress demonstrates that the agency requires additional funding from Congress to fulfill this important responsibility. Bradley Bowman is the senior director for the Center on Military and Political Power with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/02/25/insufficient-missile-defense-funding-would-leave-americans-vulnerable/

  • Newsletter September 2021

    September 21, 2021 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    Newsletter September 2021

    In this month’s edition, we go behind the scenes of the launch of the European Maritime Transport Environmental Report – the first report of its kind! We’re at ...

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