June 25, 2020 | International, Aerospace
By: Ian Williams
In 2017, I helped author the CSIS report “Missile Defense 2020,” a broad look at the history, status and future of the U.S. homeland missile defense system known as Ground-based Midcourse Defense. The report argued that the establishment of GMD had put the United States in an advantageous position relative to the North Korean missile threat, but this advantage would be short-lived if the United States failed to improve GMD through incremental milestones and regular testing. GMD has had some notable achievements with this strategy. The Pentagon, however, seems to be moving away from this proven approach to GMD, attempting great leaps rather than manageable steps. This riskier approach could make the United States less secure over the near and long term.
Until recently, GMD had been following a well-defined road map, with good results. After a series of flight-test failures from 2010-2013, the Missile Defense Agency began a rigorous effort to root out anomalies within the system's Ground-Based Interceptors, or GBI. MDA carried out a successful intercept in 2014, followed by intercepting an intercontinental ballistic missile-class target for the first time in 2017. In 2019, GMD engaged an ICBM target with a salvo of two GBIs, marking another first for the system. MDA also expanded the fleet to 44 GBIs and is constructing a new Long Range Discrimination Radar in Alaska to provide the system much-needed sensor support.
These achievements were supposed to be followed by an incremental modernization of the GBIs. The plan was to incorporate a new Redesigned Kill Vehicle around the year 2020. The RKV would be similar in concept to those currently deployed but incorporate new technologies and nearly 20 years of lessons learned.
Another part of the plan was to give the GBIs a new booster, one that gave the war fighter the option of using either two or three stages, thereby providing the system more time and space to engage incoming missiles.
MDA also set its sights on a set of longer-term objectives. These goals included a space-based sensor layer for tracking missile threats, and a GBI equipped with multiple kill vehicles that would greatly expand the capacity of the GBI fleet. While the volume kill concept had great appeal, MDA recognized the need for a developmental step between the current kill vehicles and a more advanced, unproven concept. Historically, U.S. missile defense has done best when pursuing steady, achievable goals. The highly successful Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program, for example, has consistently adhered to the mantra: “Build a little, test a little, learn a lot.”
The RKV program, however, ran into delays. Yet, rather than continue trying to fix the program, the Pentagon opted to abandon it and skip directly to a more advanced, multi-kill vehicle approach called the Next Generation Interceptor.
NGI is an ambitious, 10-plus year endeavor that carries significant risk. In the near term, it means that the president's goal to add 20 more GBIs to the fleet will go unmet, as those GBIs were supposed to be capped with RKVs. Any expansion to the GBI fleet before 2030 will require the design and construction of a modernized unitary kill vehicle of some kind.
Absent any effort to expand or modernize the GBI fleet, homeland missile defense will likely fall behind the North Korean missile threat while NGI matures over the next 10 years. The decline will increase U.S. vulnerability to coercion by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at a time when the U.S. military is scrambling to address Chinese and Russian aggression. Furthermore, a major delay of NGI a decade from now (or worse, a failure for NGI to materialize at all) would leave the United States with a fleet of GBIs falling rapidly into obsolescence, squandering decades of resources and effort.
To be clear, the United States should continue developing NGI. Missile threats to the U.S. homeland continue to grow at an alarming pace, in quantity and complexity. But the Pentagon and Congress should support these longer-term efforts while still investing in nearer-term options that keep U.S. homeland defenses current to North Korean missile capabilities, hedge against NGI failure and preserve U.S. investments in the GMD system.
A potential path forward may lie in the Senate's version of the fiscal 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, which contains draft language that would require the deployment of 20 additional GBIs equipped with an interim, unitary kill vehicle by 2026.
Three years ago, we titled our study of GMD “Missile Defense 2020” because we believed that this year would be the start of a new chapter in U.S. homeland missile defense. Obviously, much has changed with the cancellation of RKV. Yet, despite all its challenges, this year may still provide the opportunity to make the kind of decisions that will strengthen our national security in the near and long term.
February 16, 2022 | International, Aerospace
Video released by Proteus Advanced Systems states that Blue Spear's flight profile and mission execution are programmable by its operators but could also be highly automated, depending on mission requirements.
June 1, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
By: Sebastian Sprenger COLOGNE, Germany — A new budget proposal for the European Union shows that the bloc's defense plans are back on the table as the continent pushes to revive its economy following the coronavirus crisis. Two flagship programs to that end — the European Defence Fund and the Military Mobility initiative — are set to receive €8 billion (U.S. $9 billion) and €1.5 billion (U.S. $1.7 billion), respectively, in the seven-year plan beginning in 2021, according to a proposal unveiled this week by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Those figures are lower than the initial proposal of €13 billion and €6.5 billion for the two budget lines. But they represent an uptick compared with recent negotiation positions that envisioned defense-related spending slashed even more. Defense spending remains an unbeloved subject in many European countries, and it is notable that there is no dedicated political narrative around building military prowess in the context of the bloc's recovery plan, dubbed Next Generation EU during a May 27 speech by von der Leyen. Still, the fact that the European Defence Fund — designed to foster intra-continental defense cooperation — remains in the mix is in itself a statement, according to analysts. Defense-spending advocates in Europe believe a robust military can strengthen the EU's hand in trying to assert its role on the world stage with other players like China and Russia. The new proposal of €8 billion for the European Defence Fund may not seem like much, given the high, upfront costs for multinational military equipment projects, said Sophia Besch, a senior research fellow at the Center for European Reform. “But it's a win for the [European] Commission in the current political context,” she added. “COVID-19 has shifted the priorities, and even before the crisis there were signs that defense was losing ground in the traditional budget battles,” Besch said. Given that, the new proposal is “better than nothing,” she argued. At the same time, the de facto reduction would make it harder to prove for the commission that the intended effects can be achieved with the amount envisioned, Besch predicted. Funding through the European Defence Fund and its associated channels ensures that certain projects in many member states can happen at all, said Yvonni-Stefania Efstathiou, an Athens, Greece-based defense analyst specializing in the emerging European defense-cooperation framework PESCO, or Permanent Structured Cooperation. “Allocations to the EDF have the potential of triggering more defense cooperation, as those funds will be used to finance collaborative research and common capability development projects,” she said. What is still missing, however, is an overarching context of where the EU wants to go with its defense ambitions, she argued. “The impact of these funds will be limited unless there is also progress on the common definition of strategic priorities and military requirements.” The cut to the budget line for military mobility means member states stand to pay more of their own money for updating bridges, roads and rail networks to ensure military equipment can quickly move along the continent in the event of a standoff with Russia. The work is seen as a critical interface between the EU and NATO, and alliance officials previously expressed hope for a funding injection that could speed projects along, especially in Eastern Europe. “Unless we have the full costings of how much bridges and roads will cost, it is hard to evaluate whether the funds are sufficient,” Efstathiou said. “What is easy to predict, however, is the dissatisfaction of the Eastern European states.” https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/05/29/the-european-unions-defense-ambitions-are-still-showing-signs-of-life/
May 13, 2024 | International, C4ISR
Two Air Force fighter jets recently squared off in a dogfight in California. One was flown by a pilot — the other wasn’t.